Earnings management of initial public offering firms: evidence from regulation changes in China

Discretionary current accruals of Chinese initial public offering (IPO) firms decreased after the abolition of fixed‐price offering systems that directly linked offering price to reported earnings. Results suggest IPO firms that decrease managerial ownership manage earnings upward during the fixed‐price offering period, but this relationship disappeared after the introduction of a book‐building system. We also find that bank debt is negatively related to discretionary current accruals during the fixed‐price offering period, but no relation exists for the book‐building period. Leverage has a significant positive relationship with earnings management. However, this finding is potentially attributable to nonoffering price objectives or endogeneity biases.     

Why are IPOs underpriced? Evidence from Japan's hybrid auction-method offerings

We document discretionary underpricing and partial adjustment of IPO prices in the public offer tranche of Japan's hybrid auction regime, in which investor information differences are not important, there are no roadshows, preferential allocations are negligible, institutional investing is low, and the public offer tranche cannot fail. The magnitude and variation of underpricing in our sample, which spans relatively hot and cold markets, are similar to those reported for US IPOs. The evidence is most consistent with underpricing arising from an implicit contract to allocate risk related to initial mispricing where, in exchange for guaranteeing a minimum price, the underwriter participates indirectly in upside performance. The results raise important questions about interpretations of IPO underpricing in the US.     

Seasoned Offerings,Imitation Costs,and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings

This paper presents a signalling model in which high-quality firms underprice at the initial public offering (IPO) in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned offering. The main assumptions are that low-quality firms must invest in imitation expenses to appear to be high-quality firms, and that with some probability this imitation is discovered between offerings. Underpricing by high-quality firms at the IPO can then add sufficient signalling costs to these imitation expenses to induce low-quality firms to reveal their quality voluntarily. The model is consistent with several documented empirical regularities and offers new testable implications. In addition, the paper provides empirical evidence that many firms raise substantial amounts of additional equity capital in the years after their IPO.     

Do banks price their informational monopoly?

Theory suggests that banks’ private information lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since new information about a firm is revealed at the time of its bond IPO, it follows that banks will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards after firms undertake their bond IPO. We test this hypothesis and find that firms are able to borrow at lower interest rates after their bond IPO. Importantly, firms that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit from larger interest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating. These findings provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly. We also find that it is costly for firms to enter the public bond market.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

Does aggressiveness help? Evidence from IPO corruption and pricing in China

Using a unique database of Chinese firms bribing initial public offering (IPO) regulators, we examine the impact of bribing on IPO pricing. Our findings suggest that bribing firms are younger, smaller, more volatile in their operating activities, and more generous in compensating underwriters and management. Most important, bribing firms price their IPO shares more aggressively than non-bribing firms and exhibit a higher price-to-earnings ratio, lower first-day return, and poorer post-IPO stock performance. Additional analyses suggest that both bribing and non-bribing firms exhibit negative announcement returns after the arrest of corrupt officials. However, the effect is stronger for bribing firms. Overall, bribing firms are systematically more aggressive than their non-bribing counterparts. They concede less to IPO investors and reward underwriters and management for helping them access the capital market.     

Does earnings management lead to favorable IPO price formation or further underpricing? Evidence from Japan

This study addresses an important but unanswered question regarding the relationship between earnings management and underpricing. Earnings management has long been one of the central issues in initial public offerings (IPOs), however little evidence exists on whether earnings management leads to favorable price formation or further underpricing. Using several proxies for earnings management, this study finds evidence that firms with aggressive earnings management during the pre-IPO period tend to be more underpriced than firms without it, in contrast to the dominant hypothesis that IPO firms can sell their stocks at inflated prices by manipulating earnings upwardly. This finding is consistent with the asymmetric information theory of underpricing and suggests that aggressive earnings management increases valuation uncertainty of IPO firms and leads to steeper price discounts.     

Valuation of Internet Stocks—An IPO Perspective

We empirically investigate valuations of Internet firms at various stages of the initial public offering (IPO) from two perspectives. First, we examine the association between the valuation of Internet IPOs and a set of financial and nonfinancial variables, which prior anecdotal or empirical evidence suggests may serve as value drivers. Second, we document differences in IPO valuations between Internet and non-Internet firms as well as across different stages in the IPO process—i.e., initial prospectus price, final offer price, and first trading day price—within each set of firms. Our primary two conclusions are as follows. First, there are noticeable differences between valuations of Internet and non-Internet firms, especially at the prospectus and final IPO stage. Specifically, the valuation of non-Internet firms generally follows the conventional wisdom regarding valuation: positive earnings and cash flows are priced, while negative earnings and negative cash flows are not. The valuation of Internet firms, however, departs from conventional wisdom, with earnings not being priced, and negative cash flows being priced perhaps because they are viewed as investments. This difference between the two classes of firms may be expected, given the age and unique nature of the Internet industry. Second, there are significant differences between the initial valuation of firms at the prospectus and IPO stage and their valuation by the stock market at the end of the first trading day. For non-Internet firms, the difference is largely ascribed to the relative offering size. For Internet firms, however, the differences are with respect to positive cash flows, sales growth, R&D, and high-risk warnings, in addition to the relative offering size.     

Share repurchases of initial public offerings: motives,valuation effects,and the impact of market regulation

This study investigates the motives and valuation effects of share repurchase announcements of German firms during the 1998–2008 period, addressing the question why initial public offering (IPO) firms repurchase shares soon after going public. While our focus is on IPO firms, we also examine the impact of firm size by differentiating between IPO and established DAX/MDAX firms and by analyzing the source of surplus cash holdings, that is, either from equity issuances or from operating cash flows. We further explore the impact of the regulatory environment. Our empirical analysis reveals significant differences between the IPO and DAX/MDAX subsamples regarding their repurchase motives, stock price performance, and explanatory factors. Standard corporate payout theories are essential in explaining the different valuation effects. Our empirical analysis suggests agency costs of free cash flow as the main reason for the observed valuation effects of both IPO and DAX/MDAX firms, yet for different reasons. While DAX/MDAX firms continuously generate high operating cash flows before and after repurchasing shares, IPO firms exhibit low operating cash flows during the entire period but large surplus cash holdings due to the mandatory equity issuance at their public offering. Overall, the repurchase decisions of IPO firms are best explained by the agency costs of cash holdings and the unique rules and regulations of the German stock exchange.     

IPO限价发行与新股二级市场价格泡沫——论股票市场“弹簧效应”

本文通过对比2009年7月1日至2014年6月30日IPO市场化定价发行阶段与2014年7月1日至2018年6月30日IPO限价发行阶段共1950个IPO样本,发现IPO限价发行对于新股在二级市场股价表现具有“弹簧效应”:即抑制股票一级市场发行价格会造成新股在二级市场价格短期内超涨,限价发行新股的二级市场定价显著高于市场化定价发行新股的二级市场定价。限价发行引起的过高二级市场定价最终导致股票长期回报率低下。另外,创业板公司“弹簧效应”显著强于主板公司。这些实证结果都可以被本文提出的一级市场价格压抑造成二级市场非理性投资者上涨预期一致、盲目追涨的理论模型所解释。本文的研究指出抑制股票一级市场定价虽然形式上可以解决新股发行价过高问题,但是却造成二级市场更大的价格扭曲。这一发现为进一步完善我国IPO发行定价机制提供了依据。     

The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with Information Production

This paper presents an information-theoretic model of IPO pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the IPO and the secondary market, have private information about their firm's prospects, and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm. High-value firms, knowing they are going to pool with low-value firms, induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing, which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information. The information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity, giving a higher expected stock price for high-value firms.     

Signaling and Takeover Deterrence with Stock Repurchases: Dutch Auctions versus Fixed Price Tender Offers

This article presents a model of repurchase tender offers in which firms choose between the Dutch auction method and the fixed price method. Dutch auction repurchases are more effective takeover deterrents, while fixed price repurchases are more effective signals of undervaluation. The model yields empirical implications regarding price effects of repurchases, likelihood of takeover, managerial compensation, and cross-sectional differences in the elasticity of the supply curve for shares.     

Are share price levels informative? Evidence from the ownership, pricing, turnover and performance of IPO firms

We ask whether a firm's choice of IPO price is informative in the sense that it relates systematically to the firm's other choices and characteristics. We find that both institutional ownership and underwriter reputation increases monotonically with the chosen IPO price level. We also find that the relationship between IPO price and underpricing is U-shaped. In contrast, post-IPO turnover displays an inverted U-shaped relation to IPO price. Moreover, firms choosing a higher (lower) stock price level experience lower (higher) mortality rates. Our results are robust to controls for market liquidity and firm size, and for partial adjustment of IPO prices based on pre-market information.     

THE ROLES OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE FAILURE OF NEWLY PUBLIC STOCKS

In this article, we study two negative events that can happen to newly public stocks: (1) the price drops at least 50% from the closing price on the first trading date within one year after the initial public offering (IPO) (initial failure) and (2) the firm is delisted for negative reasons within three years after the IPO (final failure). We find that high investor sentiment at the time of IPO can lead to both initial failure and final failure of IPO firms, whereas monitoring by external professionals plays a more important role in averting final failure than initial failure. Exploring the roles of different types of institutional investors, we find that transient (i.e., short‐term trading) institutions sell before initial failure. In contrast, dedicated (i.e., monitoring) institutions focus on long‐term performance and may stay with stocks suffering temporary initial failure, but their selling typically signals the imminent final failure of newly public firms.     

Perceptions and Price: Evidence from CEO Presentations at IPO Roadshows

This paper examines the relation between cognitive perceptions of management and firm valuation. We develop a composite measure of investor perception using 30‐second content‐filtered video clips of initial public offering (IPO) roadshow presentations. We show that this measure, designed to capture viewers’ overall perceptions of a CEO, is positively associated with pricing at all stages of the IPO (proposed price, offer price, and end of first day of trading). The result is robust to controls for traditional determinants of firm value. We also show that firms with highly perceived management are more likely to be matched to high‐quality underwriters. In further exploratory analyses, we find the impact is greater for firms with more uncertain language in their written S‐1. Taken together, our results provide evidence that investors’ instinctive perceptions of management are incorporated into their assessments of firm value.     

The oversight role of regulators: evidence from SEC comment letters in the IPO process

This study investigates how regulatory oversight affects the price formation of initial public offerings (IPOs). We provide evidence on the oversight role of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) by examining the effects of comment letters issued by the SEC in the process through which companies are initially listed. We find that IPO issuers reduce their offer price if they receive comment letters. The reduction in price from the IPO filing date to the final issue date is greater when the IPO firm has more correspondence with the SEC. The pricing impact of SEC comment letters is more pronounced for IPO issuers with greater hyping incentives. Moreover, we find that IPO firms that receive more comment letters have similar levels of underpricing and outperform over the long run after the issue date, compared with IPOs with fewer comment letters.     

Global equity offerings and access to domestic loan market: U.S. evidence

This study examines whether and to what extend global equity offerings at the IPO stage may affect issuing firms' ability to borrow in the domestic debt market. Tracking bank loans taken by U.S. IPO firms in the domestic syndicated loan market, we observe that global equity offering firms experience more favorable loan price than that offered to their domestic counterparts. This finding holds for a set of robustness tests of endogeneity issues. We also find that, compared with their domestic counterparts, global equity offering firms are less likely to have financial distress, engage more in international diversification, and are more likely to wait a longer time to apply for syndicated loans.     

Fixed price and book building methods in an exogenous environment: Evidence from Indonesia stock market

Book building has become a popular method of selling new shares. Although previous models suggest that book building is an efficient method for price discovery in initial public offering (IPO) issuance, empirical evidence provides mixed results. Previous empirical findings on IPO methods have been obtained from markets that allow issuers to choose the IPO method, and this setting is not free from endogeneity issues. We investigate the effect of IPO method (fixed price vs book building) in Indonesia, which is an emerging market that offers an exogenous setting for IPO methods. More specifically, Indonesia used the fixed price method for IPOs before October 2000 and used the book building method thereafter following the introduction of new IPO regulations. Using estimation methods that consider clustering phenomena, we find that book building yields larger underpricing and greater volatility than the fixed price method. Moreover, a positive relationship is observed between underpricing and aftermarket volatility for the book building method and book building IPOs underperform fixed price IPOs. No relationship was observed between underpricing and long-term performance for book building IPOs. Compared with previous models, our findings suggest that book building does not represent a quality IPO method and suffers from agency conflict; thus, this method needs improvement.     

合资承销商影响新股破发率的实证研究

新股破发是目前中国股市目前面临的一个重要现象。本文基于2004年至2010年上市的A股IPO,研究合资承销商对新股破发率的影响。研究发现,合资承销商所承销的新股破发率显著低于本土承销商。合资承销商的低破发率主要归功于更加有效且符合市场预期的一级市场发行定价能力,其表现为合资承销商发行的股票的短期市场价格相对发行价的偏离程度显著低于本土承销商发行的股票。另外,我们还发现合资承销商采取了一定的托市行为,该行为也减小了短期内新股跌破发行价的概率。本文的发现从新股发行的角度提供了开放金融市场对我国资本市场影响的新现象。     

Insider Trading after Repurchase Tender Offer Announcements: Timing versus Informed Trading

Abnormally high net insider selling is commonly observed after repurchase tender offer (RTO) announcements although, on average, firms experience positive abnormal returns in the years after the repurchases. We explore two potential explanations: liquidity trade timing and informed trading. Consistent with the notion that fixed price RTOs are more likely than Dutch-auction RTOs to signal undervaluation, the results suggest that insider selling after fixed price RTO announcements are driven largely by insiders who time their trades with the repurchase announcements. In contrast, selling after Dutch-auction RTOs seems to be driven primarily by informed traders who exploit mispricing associated with the repurchase announcements.