公共产品供给主体及边界确定的交易费用经济学分析——兼论我国公共产品供给过程中交易费用的计量

将新制度经济学中交易费用理论引入公共产品供给分析,给出了供给公共产品的主体确定的理论模型,并在威廉姆森范式扩展的基础上得出了各个主体的边界,认为最优公共产品供给方式的选择和主体边界的确定,取决于公共产品供给过程中发生的交易费用.测算了中国公私部门供给公共产品过程中存在的交易费用,发现就我国公共产品的供给而言,在一定的条件下将公共产品供给由政府部门交给私人部门与第三部门可以节约交易费用,提高公共产品供给的效率.     

TRANSACTION COST IMPAIRMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE: LESSONS FROM EGYPT

Increasing evidence indicates the relative importance of transaction costs in international market penetration by LDC manufactured goods exporters. This paper identifies the sources and nature of these costs and recommends policies capable of helping LDC exporters overcome transaction cost-based obstacles to such exports. Data for the analysis are from questionnaires addressed to samples of manufactures exporters and trading intermediaries in Egypt.     

TRANSACTION COST IMPAIRMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE: LESSONS FROM EGYPT

Increasing evidence indicates the relative importance of transaction costs in international market penetration by LDC manufactured goods exporters. This paper identifies the sources and nature of these costs and recommends policies capable of helping LDC exporters overcome transaction cost-based obstacles to such exports. Data for the analysis are from questionnaires addressed to samples of manufactures exporters and trading intermediaries in Egypt.     

Law, trade, and development

This paper uses a Ricardian model to generate predictions about the influence of institutions on trade in differentiated (complex) and commoditized (simple) products and then uses a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. The model draws the distinction between the role of international transaction costs and domestic production costs in the trade of complex and simple products. The effects of institutions predicted by the model are identified with a three-step estimation procedure. We find that when countries have low quality institutions, institutional reform primarily influences production costs and has little influence on the volume of trade. Institutional reform, however, increases the diversity of exports in complex goods markets. Conversely, in countries with more developed institutions, institutional reform primarily influences transaction costs and is associated with gains in the volume and the diversity of complex exports.     

国际制度的形式选择——一个基于国家间交易成本的模型

根据制度化水平的三个维度,国际制度安排的基本形式可分为非正式协议、自我实施的正式协议、一般的正式国际组织和超国家组织。那么,缔约国如何在上述国际制度安排形式之间进行选择?本文尝试从国家间交易成本的角度为这一问题提供一个解释模型。国家间交易成本包括国家间治理成本与国家间缔约成本两个部分。国家间治理成本随着制度化水平的提高而递减,国家间缔约成本随着制度化水平的提高而递增。缔约国在选择国际制度安排形式时,将在国家间治理成本与国家间缔约成本之间进行权衡。作为理性的国际行为主体,缔约国在交易收益给定的情况下,将选择使国家间交易成本最小化的国际制度安排形式。根据这一制度选择模型,本文进一步提出了分别涉及问题领域敏感性、国家同质性、透明度、资产专用性、不确定性和交易频率的六个假说。     

EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH IN A MONETARY ECONOMY WITH TRANSACTIONS COSTS*

The paper describes a dynamic general equilibrium monetary economy with technological primitives that are consistent with the possibility of asymptotic equilibrium growth. The paper focuses on the relationship between equilibrium financing constraints on investment goods, transaction costs and economic growth. A generalized growth condition is derived that involves both monetary growth rates and transaction costs. The condition is used to show that (i) although inflation taxes can potentially exert a negative influence on long-run economic growth, these growth effects cannot in general be arbitrarily large; and (ii) for some monetary growth rates, money is superneutral in contrast to the models of Stockman and Abel. Numerical work indicates that although the welfare and growth effects of decreasing nominal interest rates from a benchmark are large, the costs associated with raising nominal interest rates from benchmark are not.     

The transaction costs perspective on international supply chain management; evidence from case studies in the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands

Transaction costs are barriers for internationalisation processes. This paper investigates the practical relevance of transaction costs economics (TCE) for international supply chain management (SCM) in this era of globalisation, which is characterised by splitting up the supply chain in more and more parts. The analysis is based on data from in-depth interviews with seven manufacturing companies in the Netherlands which are actually engaged in this modern way of organising production. It is shown that the balance between transaction costs and sheer production costs (transformation costs) plays a prominent role in the strategic decisions on how and where to organise production. Especially intangible (or ‘soft’) transaction costs are important in this respect. The analysis provides insight in practical experience in the manufacturing industry in the Netherlands with transaction costs and shows how transaction costs affect decisions on transaction management, personnel policy and internationalisation of R&D. This study is to our knowledge the first to confront the theory of TCE with practice of manufacturing firms in their internationalisation decisions using in-depth interviews instead of survey data.     

A NEW THEORY OF DEMAND AND SUPPLY AND EMERGENCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FROM DOMESTIC TRADE

Abstract. In the paper a fixed learning cost is introduced into a framework with consumer-producers and transaction costs. The fixed learning cost yields a rate of return on the investment in individual specific learning and training which is increasing in its rate of utilization. Division of labor can avoid duplicated learning costs and generate economies of specialized learning. The tradeoff between economies of specialization and transaction costs can be used to explain concurrent increases in the extent of the market, aggregate demand, productivity, trade dependence, the degree of market integration, the degree of production concentration, diversity of economic structure, variety of different professions, each person's level of specialization, and the extent of endogenous comparative advantage and the emergence of international trade from domestic trade. This model explains demand and supply as two sides of the level of division of labor which is determined by a transaction cost coefficient. Hence, the demand law may not hold even for normal goods owing to complicated interdependencies between the level of specialization and demand and between the level of specialization and prices of traded goods. The extended version of this model with the CES function is used to endogenize variety of consumption in addition to the endogenization of individuals'level of specialization.     

Real exchange rate dynamics in the presence of non-traded goods and transaction costs

This paper studies the role of non-traded goods and transaction costs in accounting for the puzzling behavior of real exchange rates. We show that introducing the transaction costs and non-traded goods in an otherwise standard competitive model dramatically improves its ability to rationalize observed real exchange rate dynamics.     

International Provision of Trade Services, Trade, and Fragmentation

This paper examines the special role that trade liberalization in service industries can play in stimulating not only trade in services but also in goods. International trade in goods requires inputs from several services industries (trade services, such as transportation, insurance, and finance) in order to complete and facilitate international transactions. Restriction on the ability of national service providers to provide these services across borders and within foreign countries creates additional costs and barriers to international trade above those that would arise in otherwise comparable intranational exchange. As a result, trade liberalization in services can yield benefits, by facilitating trade in goods, that are larger than one might expect from analysis of the services trade alone. This paper explores this idea using simple theoretical models to specify the relationships between services trade and goods trade. The paper also notes the role of services trade in a model of international industrial fragmentation, where production processes can be separated across locations but at some cost in terms of additional service inputs. The incentives for such fragmentation can be larger across countries than within countries, owing to the greater differences in factor prices and technologies available. However, the service costs of international fragmentation can also be larger, especially if regulations and restrictions impede the international provision of services. As a result, trade liberalization in services can also stimulate fragmentation of production of both goods and services, thus increasing international trade and the gains from trade even further.     

公共物品、分工演进与经济增长

在新兴古典经济学框架内,公共物品既能通过提高交易效率来促进分工演进并最终带来经济增长,也可通过改善劳动效率直接促进产出的增加,经济增长中的两难冲突发生于专业化经济和公共物品对劳动时间这一资源的争夺,资源的最终分配取决于三个重要的经济参数即专业化经济系数、公共物品的交易效率系数和劳动效率系数的大小和变化情况。文章最后从历史经验的角度来论证主要结论的正确性。     

Labor Mobility and East Asian Integration

East Asian economic integration is commonly analyzed in the context of trade in goods and services and capital flows, while labor flows have been very much neglected. Yet labor flows in the region are rapidly growing, given the diversity in levels of economic development, employment opportunities and wage levels, and the existence of labor surplus and deficit countries. Labor migration poses more benefits than costs for both sending and receiving countries, but there are more sensitivities toward labor flows than trade and capital flows. The characteristics and government policies are different for the unskilled and semiskilled foreign workers and for the professionals and highly skilled. Regional cooperation among countries is needed to manage the flows, reduce the incidence of illegal and undocumented workers, reduce the transaction costs of migration, and protect the rights of these workers.     

On the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions for small developing countries

We analyze the costs of trade restrictions for a small developing economy (LDC). Intermediate goods invented elsewhere are only introduced on the LDC market if it is profitable to do so. The LDC economy evolves to a balanced growth path in which income, welfare, and the share of available goods increase if trade restrictions fall. The adjustment path is asymmetric: an increase in trade restrictions leads to a slow-down of economic growth, while a decrease may lead to a rapid catch-up process. The dynamic costs of trade restrictions are in general substantially larger than the static costs.     

Transaction cost measurement for evaluating environmental policies

Policy choice and policy design need to take account of transaction costs in order to increase the efficiency and sustainability of policies. However, transaction costs must first be measured to be included in the evaluation of alternative environmental or natural resource policies. While a number of studies measure transaction costs, there has been no systematic treatment of the fundamental issues involved. This article examines the issues involved in transaction cost measurement and makes recommendations regarding a typology of costs as well as the measurement methodologies themselves. In particular, methods used for nonmarket valuation of environmental goods may have potential for the measurement of transaction costs.     

Nonlinear Adjustment in Law of One Price Deviations and Physical Characteristics of Goods

At a level of individual goods, heterogeneity of marginal transaction costs, proxied by price-to-weight ratios and stowage factors, explains a large part of the variation in thresholds of no-adjustment and conditional half-lives of law of one price deviations. Prices of heavier (more voluminous) goods deviate further before becoming mean-reverting. Moreover, after becoming mean-reverting, prices of heavier goods converge more slowly. Together with measures of pricing power, market size, distance, and exchange rate volatility, these factors explain up to 43% of variation in no-adjustment threshold estimates across 52 goods in US–Canada post-Bretton Woods monthly CPI data and are robust in a broader five-country dataset. They open two avenues for the importance of marginal transaction costs in accounting for real exchange rate persistence: through (a) generating persistence in individual real exchange rate components, and (b) accentuating it by the aggregation of heterogeneous components ("aggregation bias" of Imbs et al., 2005a ).     

The Optimal Rate of Inflation When Capital is Taxed

A simple ‘AK’ model of growth is developed in which consumers hold money to reduce transaction costs associated with their purchases of both consumption and investment goods. The government is constrained to choosing between an income tax and inflation as means of financing its expenditure. As a result, there is no presumption in favor of Friedman’s (1969) rule. Numerical simulations are conducted and generally find a low to moderate welfare maximizing rate of inflation.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND ROUNDABOUT PRODUCTION: ALLYN YOUNG REVISITED

Abstract.  This paper investigates Allyn Young's two important doctrines concerning the division of labor and roundabout production. First, apart from advancing the state of knowledge, the progressive division of labor that can occur within a given population encourages the adoption of more specialized, differentiated intermediate goods in the production process. Second, the level of division of labor and the extent of the market depend on each other. Using a general equilibrium model with increasing returns to specialization, economies of complementarity between intermediate goods, and transaction costs, we demonstrate that the level of division of labor and the number of intermediate goods increase concurrently as transaction conditions are improved.     

Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs

This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, provides a dynamic foundation for the Coase theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient bargaining/negotiation outcomes. We show, when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, the Coase theorem holds in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs if and only if there are no transaction costs. Specifically, complexity considerations select only efficient equilibria in these models without transaction costs while every equilibrium induces perpetual disagreement and inefficiency with transaction costs. We also show the latter is true in the Rubinstein bargaining model with transaction costs.     

On the Efficiency of Decentralized Exchange with Resale Possibilities

This paper studies decentralized exchange by bilateral matching and bargaining when resale is possible. Decentralized exchange involves the risk that goods and services may be allocated inefficiently; if low-valuation buyers consume while high-valuation buyers do not, then social welfare is reduced. If resale is possible and transaction costs are negligible, we would nevertheless expect an efficient allocation to result from decentralized exchange. This paper suggests that this depends on the nature of the commodity; while the allocation of a durable good will be efficient, the allocation of a "consumable" good need not.