杠杆率、企业规模与企业创新

选取2010-2015年沪深A股上市公司的面板数据,借助门槛模型研究企业杠杆率与企业创新的关系。结果显示：杠杆率对企业创新有显著影响,存在既能促进创新同时降低风险的企业最优杠杆率区间,即当杠杆率处于9.3%~37.1%的范围时,杠杆率的提升能够最大地促进创新投入与创新产出,同时降低创新风险;但当前我国大部分企业并未达到增加创新产出与降低创新风险的最优均衡。同时,不同规模企业杠杆率与创新的关系具有差异性,大型企业促进创新且可规避风险的最优杠杆率的区间为杠杆率低于67.0%,中型企业为杠杆率低于22.5%,小型企业则是7.8%~17.0%的区间范围。应正确理解中央“去杠杆”政策,推进结构性去杠杆,力求在“降杠杆”和“促创新”之间达成最优平衡。     

Debt-overhang banking crises: Detecting and preventing systemic risk

This paper shows how the debt-overhang distortion on bank lending can generate a self-fulfilling-expectations banking crisis accompanied by a plunge in the value of banks’ assets and a contraction of bank lending and economic activity. Moral hazard in banking adds an additional channel that can generate multiple equilibria, worsen the debt-overhang distortion, and deepen the crisis. Some signals of systemic risk include: high volatility and the presence of two modes in the probability distribution functions of the returns on bank-issued bonds and on portfolios of bank-issued bonds and equities; and high correlation between the returns on bank-issued bonds. Macroprudential regulation should discourage the exposure of banks to the economic and financial cycle by raising the capital requirements for banks with more cyclical assets.     

When does leverage hurt productivity growth? A firm-level analysis

In the wake of the global financial crisis, several macroeconomic contributions have highlighted the risks of excessive credit expansion. In particular, too much finance can have a negative impact on growth. We examine the microeconomic foundations of this argument, positing a non-monotonic relationship between leverage and firm-level productivity growth in the spirit of the trade-off theory of capital structure. A threshold regression model estimated on a sample of Central and Eastern European countries confirms that TFP growth increases with leverage until the latter reaches a critical threshold beyond which leverage lowers TFP growth. This estimate can provide guidance to firms and policy makers on identifying “excessive” leverage. We find similar non-monotonic relationships between leverage and proxies for firm value. Our results are a first step in bridging the gap between the literature on optimal capital structure and the wider macro literature on the finance-growth nexus.     

On the Interaction of Real and Financial Decisions of the Firm Under Uncertainty

This study analyzes the interaction between the optimal level of investment and debt financing. For this purpose, a model is structured in which a firm, facing an uncertain price, has to decide on its optimal level of investment and debt. The amount of investment sets a limit on output whose optimal level is determined after price is realized. The debt involved is risky (there exists a possibility of bankruptcy). The analysis proves that investment and its optimal financing have to be simultaneously determined and that a negative relationship exists between operating and financial leverage. We also demonstrate that as the tax rate increases, optimal capacity decreases and optimal leverage increases. An analysis of the impact of changes in the expected price shows that under some conditions, an increase in expected price would lead to an increase in optimal investment (firm size) and a decrease in optimal debt.     

INFORMATION CONTENT OF FINANCIAL LEVERAGE: A COMMENT

Kim, Chen and Nance in a previous article in this journal (January 1992) classified sample firms into two groups based on the relationship between change in stock prices and financial leverage to test the existence of optimal financial leverage. The inherent weakness of this methodology is that interpretation of test results on the existence of optimal financial leverage can be misleading in the case of serious confounding events.     

Leverage Choice and Credit Spreads when Managers Risk Shift

We model the debt and asset risk choice of a manager with performance‐insensitive pay (cash) and performance‐sensitive pay (stock) to theoretically link compensation structure, leverage, and credit spreads. The model predicts that optimal leverage trades off the tax benefit of debt against the utility cost of ex‐post asset substitution and that credit spreads are increasing in the ratio of cash‐to‐stock. Using a large cross‐section of U.S.‐based corporate credit default swaps (CDS) covering 2001 to 2006, we find a positive association between cash‐to‐stock and CDS rates, and between cash‐to‐stock and leverage ratios.     

Capital Structure Determinants in Real Estate Limited Partnerships

This paper models the capital structure decision facing partnerships and tests the implications using panel-data regression analysis for a sample of real estate limited partnerships. The model shows that if an optimal capital structure exists for non-taxed firms, it is a function of personal tax effects, costs of financial distress, and substitute tax shields. The empirical tests indicate a positive relationship between leverage and the proportion of real estate assets held, and a negative relationship between leverage and both growth rates and non-debt tax shields. Furthermore, the findings suggest that changes resulting from the Tax Reform Act of 1986 are positively related to partnership leverage.     

Leverage, excess leverage, and future returns

We examine the cross-sectional relation between leverage and future returns while considering the dynamic nature of capital structure and potentially delayed market reactions. Prior studies find a negative relation between leverage and future returns that contradicts standard finance theory. We decompose leverage into optimal and excess components and find that excess leverage tends to drive this negative relation. We also find that excess leverage predicts firm fundamentals and that the negative relation between excess leverage and future returns may be explained by investors’ failure to react promptly to information contained in excess leverage about future financial distress and asset growth.     

Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation

In this paper, a model of corporate leverage choice is formulated in which corporate and differential personal taxes exist and supply side adjustments by firms enter into the determination of equilibrium relative prices of debt and equity. The presence of corporate tax shield substitutes for debt such as accounting depreciation, depletion allowances, and investment tax credits is shown to imply a market equilibrium in which each firm has a unique interior optimum leverage decision (with or without leverage-related costs). The optimal leverage model yields a number of interesting predictions regarding cross-sectional and time-series properties of firms' capital structures. Extant evidence bearing on these predictions is examined.     

Local social environment and the speed of leverage adjustment

This study examines the impact of social capital on firms’ leverage adjustment speed. Using a comprehensive dataset of 83,374 firm-year observations for 744 US counties for 1990–2016, we find that both underleveraged and overleveraged firms located in US counties with higher levels of social capital incur slower leverage adjustment towards their optimal target capital structure. This finding is robust to alternative measures of leverage and social capital, different model specifications, controlling for county- and firm-level characteristics, and endogeneity. We further identify two mechanisms through which social capital affects leverage adjustments: monitoring (channel for underleveraged firms) and disciplinary (channel for overleveraged firms) mechanisms.     

债务杠杆、财务脆弱性与家庭异质性消费行为

本文通过引入财务脆弱性来描述家庭无法及时或完全履行偿债义务而发生的财务困境,实证分析了债务杠杆对家庭消费的异质性影响。理论机制分析和基于中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据的实证研究表明,家庭债务杠杆会提升财务脆弱性,从而弱化跨期消费平滑能力,强化消费预算约束,导致家庭落入“高边际消费倾向、低消费支出水平”的低层次消费路径上。进一步分析发现,对于通过负债投资多套房的家庭而言,高债务杠杆会明显增加不确定冲击下的财务脆弱性,进而对消费产生更大的抑制效应;亲友民间借贷的履约机制相对灵活,可以缓解财务脆弱性对家庭消费的抑制效应;债务杠杆上升引致的财务脆弱性,对耐用消费品支出的压缩效应大于非耐用消费品,对农村家庭消费支出的挤占效应大于城镇家庭。本文的研究为我国“不宜依赖消费金融扩大消费”“规范发展消费信贷”等提供了理论解释,对金融服务促进消费发展具有一定政策启示。     

Maturity and exercise price of executive stock options

Using a simple three-period model in which a manager can gather information before making an investment decision, this paper studies optimal contracts with various stock options. In particular, we show how the exercise price of executive stock options is related to a base salary, the size of the option grant, leverage, and the riskiness of a desired investment policy. The optimal exercise price increases in the size of grant and the base salary and decreases in leverage and the riskiness of a desired investment policy. Other things equal, the optimal exercise price of European options with a longer maturity should increase more for an increase in the base salary and the size of grant and decrease more for an increase in leverage than the one with a shorter maturity. The optimal exercise price of American options is determined by the optimal exercise prices of European options with different maturities. Given the fixed exercise price, the size of the option grant does not decrease in the face value of debt.     

A comparative analysis of proxies for an optimal leverage ratio

Previous studies that test the tradeoff theory commonly use one of the following debt ratio measures to proxy for a firm's hypothesized optimal ratio: firm's time-series mean leverage, moving average leverage based on a firm's historical debt ratios, industry median leverage, and predicted leverage ratio based on cross-sectional regressions. We find that these alternative proxies yield results that are significantly different from each other. Further, regression results of models that use the optimum target leverage and the conclusions drawn from the findings are sensitive to the model's proxy. Of the proxies that are commonly used in the literature, the moving average debt measure exhibits characteristics that are most consistent with the theoretical optimal leverage ratio.     

总量型和结构型货币政策工具的选择与搭配——基于结构性去杠杆视角下的分析

本文基于我国34类工业行业的年度数据,识别信贷配置偏向特征对结构性杠杆的影响,以及货币政策应对效应的特征事实:信贷偏向的存在导致不同产权性质企业杠杆变化呈现异质性,这种异质性所产生的结构性杠杆现象因经济周期不同阶段而异,传统总量型货币政策工具难以有效解决结构性杠杆问题。为更深入理解这一现象以及结构性去杠杆下货币政策最优选择问题,本文通过构建一个同时包含信贷配置偏向特征、企业杠杆结构变化特征、总量型与结构型货币政策工具影响特征的DSGE模型进行分析,研究结果表明:总量型货币政策数量工具的宽松操作可以有效应对技术冲击下结构性杠杆问题;总量型工具紧缩资金供给,结合结构型工具定向紧缩,是应对成本推动冲击下结构性高杠杆问题的较好选择;当经济面临风险冲击下结构性杠杆和经济下行并存问题时,需要结构型货币政策数量工具和价格工具同时操作,紧缩国企贷款,同时降低民企融资成本。     

Capital Structure as an Optimal Contract Between Employees and Investors

The ex ante optimal contract between investors and employees is derived endogenously and is interpreted in terms of debt, equity, and employees' compensation. Although public equity financing is feasible in this model through verified accounting income, debt is needed to force value-enhancing restructuring before the income realizes. The optimal debt level, however, is lower than that which maximizes the value of the firm when there is nonmonetary restructuring-related cost to employees. The paper explains how stock prices react to exchange offers, how earnings can be diluted by a decrease in leverage, and why employees' claims are generally senior to those of investors. New testable implications about leverage and compensation levels are derived.     

Capital structure,executive compensation,and investment efficiency

This paper examines how the similarity between the executive compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio affects the quality of the firm’s investment decisions. A larger leverage gap (i.e., a bigger difference between these two ratios) leads to more investment distortions. Managers with more debt-like compensation components tend to under-invest, whereas managers with larger equity-based compensation engage more in over-investment. Furthermore, investment distortion is likely to increase the equity (debt) value when compensation leverage is lower (higher) than firm leverage. These findings suggest that managers can deviate from an optimal investment policy to increase the value of their portfolio, and that a lower leverage gap can reduce agency costs.     

Optimal capital structure and the impact of time-to-build

We develop a dynamic investment options model with optimal capital structure and evaluate the effect of time-to-build on firm value and leverage choices. With time-to-build the firm increases initial leverage in order to reduce the impact of delayed cash flows resulting from time-to-build. The impact of time-to-build is more severe the higher the revenue volatility and competitive erosion, and when the firm issues long-term debt. Time-to-build is shown to have a substantial impact on firm values for plausible parameter values.     

Leverage-induced systemic risk under Basle II and other credit risk policies

We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit regulation policies. The first is the unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum leverage. The second is Basle II and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options. When compared to the unregulated case both Basle II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is low but increase it when leverage is high. This is because both regulation policies increase the amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which can destabilize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: risk neutral investors prefer the unregulated case with low maximum leverage, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage. No one prefers Basle II.     

Shareholders' control rights,family ownership and the firm's leverage decisions

We investigate the association between controlling shareholders' ownership (CS_Own) and firms' leverage decisions in the Singaporean context. We examine whether the impact of ownership concentration on leverage differs across excess and lower control. We report that shareholders with excess control prefer leverage financing for an optimal capital structure and focus on value maximisation rather using leverage as a tool of minority shareholders' expropriation. Our analysis shows that firms capital structure significantly influences by the coalition of shareholders particularly decisions about leverage financing in addition to the firms' specific characteristics and institutional arrangements. Our empirical evidence shows that controlling shareholders with a lower fraction of equity are more concerned about limited holding thus prefer leverage over equity financing to inflate their equity stake to protect them from the potential takeovers and mergers. We report that capital structure decisions in Singapore are linked with the trade-off between the controlling shareholders' target of mitigating firm risk and their non-dilution entrenchment needs. Further, we found an inverted U-shaped association between control ownership and leverage financing. In terms of moderating effect of family-controlled ownership, our findings exhibit that leverage financing is less pronounced for family firms in Singapore due to the under-diversified investment portfolio.     

Optimal leverage strategy: Capital structure in real estate investments

This article examines the optimal leverage strategy for real estate investors who are investing in income-producing properties. Within a discounted cash-flow context, the investment objective for the equity investor is to maximize the contribution to net present value of using mortgage financing. Utilizing more debt decreases the required equity investment and increases the size of the tax shelter. On the other hand, as the loan-to-value ratio increases, the interest rate charged by the lender increases, which indicates a higher cost of debt. This article goes beyond the simple conventional wisdom that debt financing should be used when financial leverage is positive by developing an equation that allows one to determine the optimal level of debt financing to use when positive leverage is possible. The optimal loan-to-value ratio is found to be a function of the investor's characteristics. Several hypotheses about the relationships between such an optimal loan-to-value ratio and the investor's characteristics are derived.