司法者激励对司法公正影响的模型分析

司法公正与法官激励是当前司法领域中所面临的最为紧迫而关键的问题.本研究运用博弈论来模拟现实的审判过程.通过分析基于个人效用最大化的法官最优选择的基础上来研究法官的法律遵从度、工作勤勉程度、工资收入、外部干预(如贿赂)、司法权的有效配置等重要因素对法官裁判的影响,进而解决社会所获得的公正执法水平.对于不同法律遵从度的法官而言,贿赂、工资等因素的影响是不同的.提高法官法律遵从度并调整法官与社会之间的效用关系,从制度上实现司法权的有效配置,对于实现司法公正至关重要.这为解决当前司法领域所存在的问题提供了理论依据和方法.     

模块化分解与中国金融现代化改革

金融模块化是中国金融现代化的一个思径选择.金融模块化包括模块化分解和模块化集中,本文首先论述了模块化的基本原理及其意义;其次论述模块化分解与中国金融现代化改革包括产权、信息、业务三大模块的建构和模块化分解的现实运用,即模块化分解如何促进金融产权改革、实现金融管理生产力、金融业务创新、模块化分解如何解决股权分置和国有银行分拆上市;第三阐述模块化分解与模块化集中的相互关系及其对于实现中国金融现代化的意义.其中最为创新的地方在于运用模块化原理解决股权分置和国有商业银行分拆上市的当前要务.     

西藏民族文化旅游资源的保护性开发——基于产权经济理论和关联博弈理论双重视角

本文以巴泽尔产权经济模型为理论基础,分析了西藏民族文化旅游资源的特殊产权属性,指出西藏民族文化旅游资源在开发中受到破坏的制度经济学根源,并提出以关联博弈为基础健全社会声誉机制,规范利益博弈强势方的开发行为,基于产业发展的三大维度原则,构建西藏民族文化旅游资源的保护性开发体系。     

John Stuart Mill's Theory Of Justice

John Stuart Mill has traditionally been portrayed as self-contradictory and failing to construct a unified social theory. Recent scholarship, however, has challenged this view, finding Mill's work to be creatively synthetic in bridging the antinomies inherent in liberal democratic thought. This revisionist interpretation of Mill is advanced by an understanding of his theory of justice and its role in shaping his policy positions on issues such as welfare, education, voting rights, property rights, taxation, government intervention, and the future of capitalism.     

Ethnic divisions,contract choice,and search costs in the Guatemalan land rental market

This paper shows how ethnic diversity in a context of weak property rights enforcement can result in market segmentation. The paper analyzes how contract enforcement problems affect the joint decision of partner and contract choice by landlords in the land rental market in Guatemala. The empirical method allows partner choice to be determined not only by the characteristics and relative scarcity of the specific landowner and tenant, but also by the characteristics of other potential tenants. The results show that landowners without formal title are more likely to restrict their partners to tenants from the same ethnic group. Partner choice is found to be less important for renting with interlinked land–labor contracts.     

试论产权激励的两个层面

现代产权激励分为两个层面,一个是微观层面,另一个是宏观层面.西方产权理论侧重于微观与效率分析,却无法解释经济增长和政府职能在宏观层面上对产权激励的影响.中国在经历了30年改革之后,社会的进一步转型需要剖析政府在宏观层面上的产权激励.     

中国产权改革的顶层设计和产权理论的学术前沿——刘诗白经济思想研究之二

刘诗白教授长期以来紧密结合中国社会主义所有制改造的实践,在马克思主义所有制理论的基础上,运用科学抽象的方法,系统地分析了有关产权概念、财产权功能、企业产权和社会主义国有企业产权制度等问题,对中国产权改革进行了"顶层设计",提出了独到的真知灼见,创立了经过实践检验行之有效的产权理论.     

企业中人力资本产权实现方式与情景因素的匹配分析

合约理论视角下,企业中人力资本产权实现的权利内容包括雇佣性收益、股权性收益、参与权及控制权等权利要素。不同合约下权利要素的不同组合,构成了人力资本产权实现方式的不同类型。人力资本产权实现方式影响员工行为与企业绩效,而人力资本产权实现方式的选择受到许多因素的制约,与具体情景因素相匹配的人力资本产权实现方式,对员工行为与企业绩效会产生显著的正向作用。     

A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis

The tragedy of the anticommons unfolds when separate social agents—be they private owners of a property who intend to use the property for their own economic benefit or political actors who pursue their political objectives—do not hold effective rights to use their economic or political power for their own purposes without consent of the other players of the economic or political game. I shall discuss the Greek government debt crisis and the Eurozone countries’ policies toward Greece within the analytical framework of the tragedy of the anticommons in this paper. I do not intend to dig deep into the structure and long-term trends of public and private finances in Greece. I shall only show that the successive bail-out programs of the Eurozone countries were doomed to fail because of these countries’ competitive and non-cooperative approach to the Greek financial problems. I shall also show that a coordinating agency, say the IMF, can foster the coordinated outcome only under strict informational conditions.     

提高商业银行竞争力:市场结构改革还是产权结构改革

近年来,在如何提升我国商业银行国际竞争能力这一问题上,逐渐形成两大主张:市场结构论和产权结构论.本文认为,这两种观点的前提、政策重点都存在一致性,因而完全可以双管齐下--在加快国有商业银行产权结构改革的同时,优化银行业市场结构,增强银行业市场的竞争性.市场结构改革和产权结构改革同等重要.在具体措施上,市场结构的改革重点应是在给予股份制商业银行"国民待遇"的同时,鼓励它们开展市场化的并购.     

产权的福利效应:基于利益实现机制视角的分析

传统理论对产权的福利效应存在认识上的偏差,应该从产权对个人利益和社会利益两方面的影响来研究产权的福利效应问题。产权通过对人与物、人与人关系的规定,决定了个人利益和社会利益关系的差异———个人利益占主导或社会利益占主导,进一步决定了在促进个人利益和社会利益实现过程中的路径,即利益实现机制是不同的。提出以"利益实现机制"作为分析产权的福利效应的基本工具,为研究不同产权下的福利效应提出了一种可行的思路。     

新常态下科技成果转化政策支撑与法律保障研究

新常态下,中国经济以创新驱动为重要特征,努力实现内涵式发展的增长模式。创新驱动发展战略的内在要求为科技成果转化的法律制度变革提供了明确的导向,但是,科技成果转化率与经济新常态的要求存在现实落差,科技成果转化率不高,未充分发挥对经济社会发展的支撑作用。《促进科技成果转化法修正案（草案）》允许高校对科技成果转化拥有自主权、加大科技成果完成者分成比例、允许科技人员离岗创业等,体现了政策创新和突破。但现行科技成果转化方面的法律法规缺乏可操作性,科技成果转化与知识产权运用的突出问题没有得到根本解决。分析了新常态下科技成果转化中存在的问题,结合国外先进经验,从法律保障和政策支撑方面提出了对策建议。     

THE EMERGENCE OF COPYING TECHNOLOGIES: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

The past few decades have seen dramatic advancements in the technology of copying and the diffusion of copying technology to the general public. This paper surveys some of the recent academic literature dealing with this issue. We focus on (i) the effect of varying the extent of property rights enforcement by the government, and (ii) possible responses by producers of originals to consumers' ability to produce copies. The traditional view is that as the government increases property rights enforcement, there is a decrease in the social welfare loss due to underproduction and an increase in the social welfare loss due to under-utilization. In the first half of the paper, we show how the analyses contained in a number of recent studies throw doubt on this traditional viewpoint. In particular, varying the extent of property rights enforcement has effects that the traditional analysis ignores. As a result, the social welfare losses mentioned above can move in ways not recognized previously. The conclusion is that, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, choosing an optimal level of property rights enforcement by the government should not be viewed as a simple trade-off between these two social welfare losses. In the second half of the paper, we discuss possible market responses to consumers' ability to produce copies. Among other responses, we consider the role of price discrimination and complementary products when copying is possible.     

THE TAXABLE SURPLUS IN WATER RESOURCES

Taxes or rental charges for water use are bearable and legal and would spur water economy, but the following fallacies impede acceptance of these ideas: (i) water rights are real property, (ii) a charge on water would be passed on to consumers, (iii) the cost of water is just its development cost, (iv) markets solve most problems if property rights are firm, (v) only consumptive use is a social cost, and (vi) common rights must spell tragedy. This paper dispels these fallacies while advocating taxation and/or rental charges for water use.     

我国知识产权保护中的企业与政府行为分析

文章以知识产权得到有效保护时计算机软件的价格和产量为比较标准,分析了我国知识产权保护中的企业与政府行为及其后果。文章得出结论认为:与知识产权完全实施时相比较,侵犯知识产权的行为不仅降低了国内类型软件产量,提高国内软件的价格,而且也降低了国外软件开发商在中国市场的利润,而这正是发达国家与我国在与贸易相关的知识产权问题上存在摩擦的主要原因。从短期静态利益考虑,地方政府在追求社会福利最大化时,零查处概率是最佳选择。政府查处盗版的最优概率是查处侵犯知识产权的边际收益等于边际成本时的概率,盗版现象虽不可能被完全杜绝,但却可以被控制在一定的范围和程度内。     

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.     

低碳经济下企业社会责任审计模式研究

在低碳经济成为全球经济主旋律、碳交易市场蓬勃发展的今天,企业契约机制中的产权主体对企业低碳经济下社会责任履行情况披露要求日益提高,呈爆发式增长的社会责任报告的发布使低碳经济下企业社会责任审计活动越来越呈现其重要性.本文基于契约论与产权动因论视角,从低碳经济下企业运营过程的各种特征出发,认为低碳经济下社会责任审计模式应从审计主体、审计内容及审计程序与方法上进行构建.     

社会资本规制与产权安排的替代效用和替代规则

按照科斯定理的逻辑,可以证明社会资本规制与产权安排具有相互替代的效用;而两者之间的替代规则,可以在交易成本理论的平台上,从交易的频率、专用性、异质性三个维度进行刻画;对于现实中的社会资本规制和产权安排的互补现象,也可以通过交易成本递增和外部性分析,在满足两者效用替代的基础上得到解释。     

Effective property rights, conflict and growth

This paper shows how the interaction between conflict and growth can give rise to a nonmonotone relationship between property rights and social welfare. This interaction is illustrated in a model of endogenous growth in which equilibrium diversion of resources is the cost of securing effective property rights. A symmetric equilibrium allocation associated with more secure property rights and faster growth can be Pareto dominated by one associated with poorer property rights and slower growth. Faster growth can exacerbate the problem of diversion whenever property rights are sufficiently poor. These results call for caution before a society decides to pursue economic growth independently of the institutional structure of property rights. Furthermore, if this structure is inappropriate piecemeal reform might not be in the interest of society, and a substantial reform might be necessary if it is to be welfare-improving.     

Foundational explorations for a normative theory of political economy

I set out an individualistic and pragmatic choice framework for a normative theory of political economy, and argue that, given pluralism with respect to individual ends, a consensus on any political or economic institution presupposes that it is perceived to serve as a public means to private ends. Concerning the crucial question of the distribution of the benefits that political and economic cooperation can make possible, I argue that the various models typically employed—those pertaining to competitive market interaction, decision making under uncertainty, bargaining theory, and social choice theory—fail to provide for a stable consensus, i.e., one that is resistant to non-compliance and renegotiation. Since, however, such instabilities are mutually disadvantageous, these approaches fail to establish how rational individuals can capture all the gains that cooperation makes possible. Appealing to a modified version of the social-psychological construction that Rawls introduces in chapter 8 ofA Theory of Justice I argue that stability is a function of a perceived sense of mutual concern. I conclude by arguing that Rawls own egalitarian/efficiency principle gives natural expression to such a concern, and thus can serve as the object of a stable consensus.