Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting

This paper examines whether fraud allegations affect firms’ contracting with the government. Using a data set of whistleblower allegations brought under the False Claims Act against firms accused of defrauding the government, we find that federal agencies do not reduce the total dollar volume of contracts with accused firms; however, they substitute approximately 14% of the harder‐to‐monitor cost‐plus contracts for fixed‐price contracts. This effect is concentrated in the procurement of services and explained by contract and service substitution. Finally, we find that after the conclusion of the investigation, the government reduces the contract dollar volume by approximately 15% for cases that resulted in a settlement. Our findings indicate that contract‐design changes are used to mitigate uncertainty in suppliers’ reputation.     

Contracting officer workload,incomplete contracting,and contractual terms

This article estimates the causal effect of retirement‐induced workload spikes on the selection of procurement terms. In a sample of 150,000 contracts from 85 procurement offices over 11 years, increases in workload decrease reliance on competitive acquisition procedures, decrease reliance on firm‐fixed‐price contracts, increase risk of renegotiation, and increase costs. These estimates are consistent with a model of endogenously incomplete contracting. The US federal government has experienced exceptional growth in acquisitions contracting over the past decade but limited growth in acquisitions manpower. This article provides some of the facts necessary to evaluate the consequences of these shifts.     

Pairing provision price and default remedy: optimal two‐stage procurement with private R&D efficiency

This article studies cost‐minimizing two‐stage procurement with Research and Development (R&D). The principal wishes to procure a product from an agent. At the first stage, the agent can conduct R&D to discover a more cost‐efficient production technology. First‐stage R&D efficiency and effort and the realized second‐stage production cost are the agent's private information. The optimal two‐stage mechanism is implemented by a menu of single‐stage contracts, each specifying a fixed provision price and remedy paid by a defaulting agent. A higher delivery price is paired with a higher default remedy, and a more efficient type opts for a higher price and higher remedy.     

Political Connections and Allocative Distortions

Exploiting a unique institutional setting in Korea, this paper documents that politicians can increase the amount of government resources allocated through their social networks to the benefit of private firms connected to these networks. After winning the election, the new president appoints members of his networks as CEOs of state‐owned firms that act as intermediaries in allocating government contracts to private firms. In turn, these state firms allocate significantly more procurement contracts to private firms with a CEO from the same network. Contracts allocated to connected private firms are executed systematically worse and exhibit more frequent cost increases through renegotiations.     

Local preferencing for local suppliers: examining the use of locality in public procurement

The academic literature on the selection of suppliers for public contracts, while vast, lacks attention when examining the use of local suppliers. Benefits of local suppliers have been discussed with respect to local economies, but the actual selection of these suppliers has been largely ignored. This paper examines the choice of local suppliers when there is an explicit desire for public procurement agencies to cater to minority-owned and emerging small businesses. The paper provides important insight into local supplier selection, while opening new avenues of future research into the role these suppliers play in the supply chain.     

Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance

We present a model of vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers with nonlinear pricing strategies. Using home‐scan data on bottled water produced by manufacturers and sold by retail chains in France, we estimate a structural demand and supply model allowing for two‐part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers. Using price‐cost margins recovered from estimates of demand parameters, we select the best supply model by performing nonnested tests, and find that manufacturers use two‐part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance. We then perform counterfactual policy simulations that restrict the use of these vertical contracts and assess welfare effects under alternative scenarios.     

Contingent Commissions and the Management of the Independent Agency

Insurance agencies continue to exist as an important distribution mechanism because they give their contracting insurers advantages in risk selection and enable insurance applicants to transfer complex risks. While independent agencies are compensated by upfront commissions, a key component of their profitability is tied to contingent commissions. A contingency arrangement represents ex post compensation normally tied to underwriting profitability, volume, and annual growth. We report two actual contingency contracts in the context of a decision process for choosing among contingency offerings by insurers. We incorporate both uncertainty and correlation among key variables to arrive at values for competing contracts, then use a downside risk approach that helps agency owners select the better contract. The approach offered in this article is scalable to a selection problem for any number of contingency arrangements.     

Strategic Default and Equity Risk Across Countries

We show that the prospect of a debt renegotiation favorable to shareholders reduces the firm's equity risk. Equity beta and return volatility are lower in countries where the bankruptcy code favors debt renegotiations and for firms with more shareholder bargaining power relative to debt holders. These relations weaken as the country's insolvency procedure favors liquidations over renegotiations. In the limit, when debt contracts cannot be renegotiated, equity risk is independent of shareholders' incentives to default strategically. We argue that these findings support the hypothesis that the threat of strategic default can reduce the firm's equity risk.     

Hedging with Two Futures Contracts: Simplicity Pays

We propose to use two futures contracts in hedging an agricultural commodity commitment to solve either the standard delta hedge or the roll‐over issue. Most current literature on dual‐hedge strategies is based on a structured model to reduce roll‐over risk and is somehow difficult to apply for agricultural futures contracts. Instead, we propose to apply a regression based model and a naive rules of thumb for dual‐hedges which are applicable for agricultural commodities. The naive dual strategy stems from the fact that in a large sample of agricultural commodities, De Ville, Dhaene and Sercu (2008) find that GARCH‐based hedges do not perform as well as OLS‐based ones and that we can avoid estimation error with such a simple rule. Our semi‐naive hedge ratios are driven from two conditions: omitting exposure to spot price and minimising the variance of the unexpected basis effects on the portfolio values. We find that, generally, (i) rebalancing helps; (ii) the two‐contract hedging rules do better than the one‐contract counterparts, even for standard delta hedges without rolling‐over; (iii) simplicity pays: the naive rules are the best one–for corn and wheat within the two‐contract group, the semi‐naive rule systematically beats the others and GARCH performs worse than OLS for either one‐contract or two‐contract hedges and for soybeans the traditional naive rule performs nearly as well as OLS. These conclusions are based on the tests on unconditional variance ( Diebold and Mariano, 1995 ) and those on conditional risk ( Giacomini and White, 2006 ).     

Contract Type and the Cost of Provision: Evidence from Maintenance Service Contracts*

More than half a billion dollars are spent each year on the maintenance of Australia's urban water and sewerage networks. Expenditure is governed through a mix of in‐house and outsourced maintenance service contracts. We re‐examine issues relating to the relationship between the cost of maintenance service provision and the type of contract used. We take advantage of the fact that water retailers in Melbourne use a mix of contract types – including fixed‐price (FP) and cost‐plus (C+) contracts – for the provision of water and sewerage network maintenance services. Our results suggest that the C+ contract results in substantial savings.     

Market power,price discrimination,and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets

We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of two‐part tariff contracts when downstream firms are asymmetric. We find that the optimal discriminatory contracts amplify differences in downstream firms' competitiveness. Firms that are larger—either because they are more efficient or because they sell a superior product—obtain a lower wholesale price than their rivals. This increases allocative efficiency by favoring the more productive firms. In contrast, we show that a ban on price discrimination reduces allocative efficiency and can lead to higher wholesale prices for all firms. As a result, consumer surplus, industry profits, and welfare are lower.     

Regulating bidder participation in auctions

Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first‐price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first‐price auctions with free entry for bridge‐building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

Market‐share contracts as facilitating practices

This article investigates how the use of contracts that condition discounts on the share a supplier receives of a retailer's total purchases (market‐share contracts) may affect market outcomes. The case of a dominant supplier that distributes its product through retailers that also sell substitute products is considered. It is found that when the supplier's contracts can only depend on how much a retailer purchases of its product (own‐supplier contracts), intra‐ and interbrand competition cannot simultaneously be dampened. However, competition on all goods can simultaneously be dampened when market‐share contracts are feasible. Compared to own‐supplier contracts, the use of market‐share contracts increases the dominant supplier's profit and, if demand is linear, lowers consumer surplus and welfare.     

A Pricing Framework for Real Estate Derivatives

New methods are developed here for pricing the main real estate derivatives — futures and forward contracts, total return swaps, and options. Accounting for the incompleteness of this market, a suitable modelling framework is outlined that can produce exact formulae, assuming that the market price of risk is known. This framework can accommodate econometric properties of real estate indices such as predictability due to autocorrelations. The term structure of the market price of risk is calibrated from futures market prices on the Investment Property Databank index. The evolution of the market price of risk associated with all five futures curves during 2009 is discussed.     

The Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: Accomplishments and Limitations*

The Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 is widely described as the most ambitious and far‐reaching overhaul of financial regulation in the United States since the 1930s. Together with other regulatory reforms introduced by regulatory agencies globally, the Act aims to put an end to the too‐big‐to‐fail problem and is expected to alter the structure of financial markets in profound ways. This article provides an overall assessment of the Act in three different ways: first, in light of first economic principles, or how theory suggests we should regulate the financial sector, given the systemic risk externality each financial firm imposes on other firms and the rest of the economy; second, from a comparative perspective that views the proposed reforms in relation to those undertaken in the 1930s following the Great Depression; and, finally, in the form of an assessment of how the proposed reforms would have fared in preventing and dealing with the crisis of 2007–2009 had they been in place at the time. The article also highlights key areas that are left wholly or partly unaddressed by the Dodd‐Frank Act—notably, the pricing of explicit and implicit government guarantees; dealing with inevitable opportunities for the financial sector to engage in regulatory arbitrage; and containing the systemic risk arising from collections of small institutions and markets such as money market funds and repo contracts.     

Nominal contracting in a world of uncertainty

This paper evaluates corporate sensitivity to relative price risk and inflation risk and suggests how the existence of various nominal contracts, particularly debt and forward contracts, may modify firm behavior under uncertainty. By differentiating between the two types of price risk, this paper demonstrates the distinct risk reduction functions served by forward contracts and debt. Debt primarily protects against inflation risk whereas forward contracts can be used to protect against relative price risk. Complications arise, however, because forward contracts, which are denominated in nominal terms, also have an impact on the firm's degree of inflation risk.     

Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts

This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions. I estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in‐house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation. I model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation. The results highlight the cost implications of incomplete contracting frictions, subcontracting decisions, and bidding distortions. In conclusion, I propose alternative auction mechanisms that could improve outcomes.     

Testing Greeks and price changes in the S&P 500 options and futures contract: A regression analysis

We use a regression model to test observed price changes with Greeks as regressors. Greeks are computed using implied volatility, price-change implied volatility and historical volatility. We find sufficient evidence to reject model Greeks as unbiased responses to underlying price as well as sufficient evidence that the American version of binomial model results in biased estimates of price changes. We use options on the S&P 500 futures contracts and their underlying. We also evaluate the frequency of “wrong signs.” Call prices and their underlying move in the opposite direction almost 10 percent of the time.     

The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios

We offer evidence that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEOs’ incentive contracts influences the effect of risk‐taking incentives on both the magnitude and composition of firm risk. We find that, when the incentive design lacks RPE features, the incentive portfolio vega motivates CEOs to increase total risk through the systematic component because it can be hedged. In contrast, when the incentive design includes RPE features, CEOs prefer idiosyncratic risk because RPE filters out the systematic component of firm performance. We also document that the use of RPE reinforces the incentive portfolio vega's effect on the total risk.