中国银行流动性过剩的成因辨析:一个新的视角

本文将银行的流动性资产分为自愿性(预防性)流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分.通过建立银行预防性流动资产需求模型,运用向量误差修正模型(VEC)和方差分解方法实证分析我国银行流动性过剩的原因.实证结果表明:银行间同业拆借利率、汇率波动率、存款波动率和银行存款增加是银行流动性过剩的主要原因,银行的自愿性流动资产过剩和非自愿性流动性过剩并存,银行大量的流动性资产部分是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动等风险而持有的.     

警惕商业银行流动性风险

流动性问题是当今世界金融领域中尚未解决的主要难题之一,是银行的生命线。从美国次贷市场导致银行亏损开始,就引发了人们对流动性风险的忧虑。金融危机对全球银行体系甚至整个金融系统的稳定性带来了巨大的挑战。一般而言,流动性主要有三种层面的含义,即:资产的流动性、市场的流动性与机构的流动性。在各种金融机构中,银行的流动性风险带来的后果最为严重,它不仅会给银行带来信誉上的损失,严重时甚至     

中国银行流动性过剩的成因辨析：一个新的视角

本文将银行的流动性资产分为自愿性（预防性）流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分。通过建立银行预防性流动资产需求模型,运用向量误差修正模型（VEC）和方差分解方法实证分析我国银行流动性过剩的原因。实证结果表明：银行间同业拆借利率、汇率波动率、存款波动率和银行存款增加是银行流动性过剩的主要原因,银行的自愿性流动资产过剩和非自愿性流动性过剩并存,银行大量的流动性资产部分是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动等风险而持有的。     

加强国有商业银行流动性风险管理的对策探讨

银行业是高风险的行业。银行在经营中会遇到各种各样的风险，在诸多风险中，流动性风险往往是直接导致银行倒闭的风险，所以保持充足的流动尾是银行持续经营的基本前提，也是银行经营管理最基本的原则之一，流动性风险管理是银行风险管理不可或缺的重要组成部分，就我国国有商业银行而,当前应从以下几方面加强流动性风险管理：一、加强流动性风险管理意识；二、要处理好流动性风险和信贷风险的关系；三、要处理好流动性风险管理和利率风险管理的关系；四、实行流动性供给的多样化；五、运用科学的流动性风险管理方法。     

我国的商业银行流动性指标探析

商业银行的流动性,是指银行能够在一定时间内以合理的成本筹集一定数量的资金来满足客户当前或未来的资金需求。流动性概念涵盖了三个要素:资金数量、成本和时间。流动性风险则指银行不能随时以合理的价格筹集到足够的资金来满足客户的资金需求。     

我国大额支付系统整体流动性风险研究

近年来,随着我国存款准备金率的不断提高,部分两业银行出现流动性紧缺现象,这为我国大额支付系统流动性风险管理带来了挑战.大额支付系统流动性风险包括单个参与者流动性风险和系统整体流动性风险.本文从中央银行角度分析影响我国大额支付系统整体流动性风险的三个因素,并从降低流动性需求和提供额外流动性两个方面着手,提出加强防范支付系...     

浅析国有控股商业银行的流动性风险管理

流动性风险是银行面临的主要风险,其往往是信用风险、市场风险、操作风险等风险的最终表现形式,是银行倒闭的直接原因.近年来,国有控股商业银行逐步建立起了流动性风险管理体系,对降低流动性风险起到了积极的促进作用.然而,国有控股商业银行流动性管理水平相对较低,风险管理压力较大.本文通过分析当前流动性风险管理现状,对如何提高商业...     

中国国有商业银行的流动性:一个实证分析

银行的流动性一般是指商业银行满足存款者提现、支付到期债务和借款者的正当贷款需求的能力，它对商业银行尤其重要，是商业银行的生命线。流动性问题解决不好，就有可能转化为流动性风险，酿成支付危机，引发大规模的挤提风潮甚至大批银行的倒闭，最终以金融危机的形式爆发出来。因此，流动性是银行稳健经营的前提，也是银行流动性、赢利性、安全性的“三性原则”中的首项。     

中小银行流动性风险管理研究

本文在归纳银行流动性风险有关研究文献基础上,梳理了流动性风险产生的原因,创新性地将流动性风险划分为"即时偿付性流动性风险、中期结构性流动性风险和长期结构性流动性风险"三类,并以某中小银行的管理实践为例,构建了这三类流动性风险的预警监测指标体系.同时,对流动性风险的化解提出了分层缓释的方法体系.     

从资本金角度浅谈商业银行规避流动性风险之路

规避商业银行流动性风险是金融监管和银行风险管理中的一个十分重要的方面,对于资本金的管理也是商业银行经营管理的重中之重,而它们之间的关系也是相辅相成关系慎密的。根据巴塞尔协议的精神,银行资本金的意义,主要是体现在提高负债业务的流动性、保证存款者利益上,其实也就是预防流动性风险。此外,《巴塞尔协议III》还提出了对商业银行流动性覆盖率LCR的要求,这同时也增加了银行资本金的要求。所以,管理银行资本金的某些举措也可以看作是防范流动性风险的过程。     

Sources of Liquidity and Liquidity Shortages

We develop a model of liquidity shortages that incorporates a general equilibrium feature of liquidity: when banks hold more liquidity, other agents in the economy hold less of it and will supply less in times of crisis. We show that the private holdings of liquidity at banks are inefficient, with the direction of the bias being determined by the characteristics of the suppliers of liquidity to banks. Minimum liquidity requirements for banks may reduce welfare; in such cases interest rate policies that stimulate the ex-post supply of liquidity can restore efficiency. Overall, our results show that optimal liquidity policies critically depend on a financial institution’s (marginal) source of liquidity and will hence differ across institutions of different types.     

流动性过剩与流动性悖论

造成当前流动性过剩的一个重要原因是由于我国存在着一种"流动性悖论".而造成流动性悖论的原因又可以上溯到国内金融结构的体制性缺陷,具体包括银行体系、资本市场、人民币汇率制度和资本账户管制等四个方面的结构性问题.要根本上解决国际收支"双顺差"以及流动性悖论,长期看需要从经济与金融结构层面进行调整,近期则主要是汇率的调整,取消强制结汇制以及加强周边国家(地区)的政策协调.     

Asset Liquidity and Stock Liquidity: International Evidence

This study examines the relationship between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 47 countries. In support of the valuation uncertainty hypothesis, we find that firms with greater asset liquidity on average have higher stock liquidity. More importantly, our study shows that asset liquidity plays a more significant role in resolving valuation uncertainty in countries with poor information environment. For example, we find that the asset–stock liquidity relationship is stronger in countries with poor accounting standards. We further find evidence that after the adoption of IFRS, the improved accounting information environment results in a weaker asset–stock liquidity relation, but only in countries with a strong legal regime. Finally, our study shows that the positive asset–stock liquidity relationship may be attributed to transparency and/or liquidity reasons.     

Banks' Liquidity and the Cost of Liquidity to Corporations

We consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks' liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations. We find that banks that borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Bank system or the Federal Reserve's discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period. This increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the ABCP market, credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks, and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit‐line provider. Our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.     

Liquidity skewness

Bid–ask spreads in equities have declined on average but have become increasingly right-skewed. This finding holds across exchanges as well as size, price, and volume quartiles. Higher right-skewness is consistent with more competition among market makers; which may reduce cross-subsidization across periods of high and low asymmetric information, unlike a monopolistic regime that can maintain a relatively constant spread. Confirming this intuition, proportional differences in spreads between earnings announcements and normal periods have increased considerably even as trading costs have declined on average. Skewness also is cross-sectionally related to information proxies such as institutional holdings and analyst following.     

Liquidity mergers

We study the interplay between corporate liquidity and asset reallocation. Our model shows that financially distressed firms are acquired by liquid firms in their industries even in the absence of operational synergies. We call these transactions “liquidity mergers,” since their purpose is to reallocate liquidity to firms that are otherwise inefficiently terminated. We show that liquidity mergers are more likely to occur when industry-level asset-specificity is high and firm-level asset-specificity is low. We analyze firms' liquidity policies as a function of real asset reallocation, examining the trade-offs between cash and credit lines. We verify the model's prediction that liquidity mergers are more likely to occur in industries in which assets are industry-specific, but transferable across firms. We also show that firms are more likely to use credit lines (relative to cash) in industries in which liquidity mergers are more frequent.     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。     

流动性、银行间市场摩擦与借贷便利类货币政策工具

通过内生引入流动性短缺银行(拆入行)对流动性盈余银行(拆出行)的流动性需求机制,本文构建了一个包含银行间市场的DSGE模型,对借贷便利类货币政策工具的传导机制和传导效果进行了理论和实证研究。研究表明:(1)负向冲击会同时增加拆入行和拆出行对流动性的预防性需求,在经济形势不确定的情形下,拆出行不会很快恢复对拆入行的流动性供给,引起银行间市场流动性缺口放大和市场失灵。(2)由于仅依赖银行间市场自发回归稳态的过程太过缓慢,需要央行进行流动性干预。借贷便利类工具可以通过引导贷款市场定价和流动性效应这两个渠道来影响银行融资可得性,进而降低银行间市场流动性风险对宏观经济的负面影响。(3)借贷便利类货币政策工具的影响效果边际递减,央行可根据借贷便利操作的收益和成本,制定最佳的反应程度参数。     

流动性过剩的形成机制

对流动性这个词汇的运用需要非常谨慎．在不同的文献里有不同的角度。在目前的讨论中．比较多是分析、防范、恐慌的．本身有负面的判断，但从全球化的发展趋势来看，它会持续相当长一段时间．是我们必须正视和加以利用的。     

Information and Liquidity

We study how recognizability affects assets’ acceptability, or liquidity. Some assets, like U.S. currency, are readily accepted because sellers can easily recognize their value, unlike stock certificates, bonds or foreign currency, say. This idea is common in monetary economics, but previous models deliver equilibria where less recognizable assets are always accepted with positive probability, never probability 0. This is inconvenient when prices are determined through bargaining, which is difficult with private information. We construct models where agents reject outright assets that they cannot recognize, at least for some parameters. Thus, information frictions generate liquidity differences without overly complicating the analysis.