PE向“前”走, 走向“蓝海”

近年,国内股权投资领域热闹非凡.企业上市方唱罢,PE投资又登场.2009年,中国推出创业板,旋即成了"造富板".企业一上创业板,亿万富翁成群赶.而到了2012年,情况却发生了逆转.企业虽然上市,但有的PE机构却不赚钱了.二级市场的发行价格被挤压到和当年投资价格一样的水平. PE机构的营利模式是什么? 当下,无论被标识为PE(私募股权投资)或者VC(创业投资)的股权投资机构,绝大多数都是以Pre-IPO(指投资于企业上市之前,或预期企业可近期上市时,其退出方式为上市后从公开资本市场出售股票退出)的企业股权为主要投资标的.     

创投持股对IPO盈余管理的影响研究

本文首先运用修正的Jones模型计算了2009—2013年在我国创业板上市的具有创投持股背景的178家IPO样本公司的上市前一年的盈余管理水平,表明在IPO上市前普遍存在着盈余管理行为．然后用回归模型实证研究了这些IPo样本企业的盈余管理程度与创投持股之间的关系。结果发现．创投持股能够在一定程度上抑制IPO的盈余管理。     

机构投资者空间集中度、外部监督与上市公司盈余管理

基于2007-2018年沪深A股上市公司样本,利用手工收集的投资者与上市公司之间的地理距离数据和投资者持股比例数据,本文实证检验了机构投资者空间集中度对上市公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现,机构投资者空间集中度越大,公司盈余管理行为受到的抑制作用越大,且这种影响存在显著的异质性特征。进一步的机制分析发现,机构投资者空间集中度能够通过审计监督、分析师关注对公司盈余管理形成显著的中介因子效应。总体而言,本文结果认为机构投资者彼此之间的空间关系能够对公司盈余管理行为进行一定程度的解释,这为资本市场发展机构投资者,释放监督作用提供了政策制定的经验证据。     

板块差异、上市效应与盈余质量研究——来自创业板和中小板的证据

本文以中小板与创业板近两年首发上市的公司为样本,研究公司首发上市与盈余质量之间的关系。研究发现,公司上市前一年盈余操纵的程度显著下降,但创业板公司盈余操纵程度大于中小板公司。虽然盈余操纵行为推高了发行价,但投资者的认购热情未受到影响,首日投资回报取决于投资者情绪,与盈利能力及成长性无关。首发上市时的盈余操纵程度随着第一大股东持股比例的增加而降低,但董事长兼总经理的现象导致盈余质量下降,而机构投资者和会计师事务所也未能显著提高盈余质量。创业板公司盈余质量整体上低于中小板公司,但规模大、成立时间长的公司盈余质量相对较高。     

异质机构投资者持股对上市公司盈余持续性的影响研究

通过对我国A股市场数据的实证检验和分析,检验不同类型的机构投资者持股行为对公司盈余持续性的影响.研究发现,我国A股市场上市公司存在盈余持续性,并且现金流量的持续性要高于会计应计的持续性;机构投资者持股比例越高,公司盈余持续性越强;独立机构投资者持股比例大的公司盈余持续性较强,非独立机构投资者持股比例对上市公司盈余持续性无显著影响;机构投资者持股集中度越高的公司盈余持续性越强.     

投资组合的权重重要吗?——基于机构投资者对盈余管理治理效应的实证研究

本文从投资组合视角出发,在考虑投资组合权重的前提下,研究机构投资者持股对投资组合中不同企业盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现,机构投资者对投资组合中权重较高的企业发挥了积极监督效应,抑制了该类企业的盈余管理行为。对盈余管理类型细分后发现,机构投资者同时抑制了该类企业正向与负向盈余管理。现有文献主要关注机构投资者持股比例,忽视了投资组合的权重,得出的结论可能存在一定的偏差。     

私募股权投资对企业经营绩效影响研究——基于创业板上市公司数据的经验证据

选择135家创业板上市公司,运用多元回归分析对私募股权投资是否影响企业经营绩效进行了实证研究。结果表明,私募股权投资、私募股权数量对企业的资产收益率产生积极影响;持股比例和是否具有国有背景对经营绩效影响不显著。因此,建议私募机构应该与被投资企业进行长期合作、参与企业的经营管理;企业自身要充分利用私募机构的资源优势,避免盲目引入过多的私募机构。     

私募股权投资(PE)与公司盈余管理的关系

私募股权投资(PE)作为一项金融创新,近年来快速成长,引起人们的高度关注。本文以2009年在中小板和创业板上市的公司为研究对象,将其分为有PE和无PE两组,从一个全景的角度比较两组样本公司2007-2011年的可操纵性应计利润(DA),进而构建可操纵性应计利润回归模型来分析PE与公司盈余管理的关系。研究结果表明,由于PE拥有丰富的投资经验、扎实的专业基础、庞大的社会网络,相比于无PE持股的公司,有PE持股的公司会更多地利用可操纵性应计利润进行盈余管理,而且可操纵性应计利润各年比较均衡。     

创业板业绩“变脸”及私募股权资本影响分析

自我国创业板市场开启以来,创业板企业上市后业绩“变脸”的现象一直引人注目。在创业板市场中,私募股权资本扮演着为企业提供便捷的融资渠道、帮助其完善治理结构和提高经营绩效的重要角色。立足于西方成熟市场的研究和中国创业板市场的现状,笔者进一步探究了创业板业绩“变脸”的原因,以及私募股权资本对其的影响。     

机构投资者、信息披露与盈余管理

本文以反映公司治理效率的信息披露与盈余管理作为关注要点,深入研究了机构投资者持股的治理效果问题.本文研究表明,机构投资者持股公司的盈余管理程度显著低于无机构投资者持股公司,并且盈余管理程度随着机构投资者持股的增加而显著降低.本文还检验了机构投资者持股能否有效提高公司信息披露的质量,发现机构投资者持股公司的信息披露质量显著高于无机构投资者持股公司,而且信息披露质量随着机构投资者持股的增加而提高.本文还发现,机构投资者持股公司信息披露对于盈余管理的监控作用更为显著,并且随着机构投资者持股的增加促进作用更为明显.以上发现意味着目前我国机构投资者已经参与到公司治理中,并在一定程度上发挥了积极的治理作用.     

基于深市上市公司IPO盈余管理实证研究

在分析IPO盈余管理动机的基础上,研究了IPO公司进行盈余管理的手段及其影响。以2008年在深圳证券交易所上市的71家公司为对象,通过研究其2006-2010五年的经济数据,运用改进后的Jones模型,得出两个结论：上市公司的业绩在IPO前后存在明显的差异,并且上市前两年的业绩高于IPO当年及IPO后两年;上市公司通过调整应计利润进行盈余的操纵。最后针对分析结果提出相应对策,以期对加强证券市场监管,完善公司治理结构,帮助投资者进行投资决策做出贡献。     

Earnings Conservatism, Litigation and Contracting: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

Abstract:   We compare earnings conservatism of UK companies cross‐listed in the US to that of UK companies without a US‐listing. We expect that conservatism will be more pronounced for cross‐listed firms than for firms with a UK listing only, because the cross‐listed firms face a stricter enforcement regime. Furthermore, cross‐listed firms may use a listing on a US exchange to signal high‐quality reporting to investors. Using a matched‐pairs research design, we find that earnings of UK cross‐listed firms are significantly more conservative than earnings of UK firms without a US listing. Moreover, cross listed firms display particularly high levels of conservatism during the early years of their cross‐listing. This indicates that firms use earnings conservatism to commit to highly demanding reporting requirements and in doing so communicate a perception of investor care.     

Information asymmetry,mutual funds and earnings management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how information asymmetry and mutual fund ownership affect listed companies’ earnings management. We show that (1) reducing information asymmetry improves firms’ earnings management behavior; (2) relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term mutual funds promote earnings quality by adopting a monitoring role; and (3) by dividing firms into high/low information asymmetry groups, we find that the information environment significantly increases the effect of long-term mutual funds on firms’ earnings management. In this paper, we provide new evidence for the role that institutional investors play in a typical emerging capital market. Our results have clear policy implications: to increase earnings quality, it is essential to improve information transparency and develop long-term institutional investors.     

定向增发新股折扣率的影响因素及其与公司短期股价关系的实证研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文分析了影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素,并研究了中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率对公司短期股价表现的影响。本文认为,影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素与外国不同,中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的高低与股东的身份有关,向控股股东及关联投资者定向增发新股的折扣率要低于向非关联投资者定向增发新股的折扣率。并且,中国上市公司定向增发新股的折扣率越低,投资者获得的超额累积收益率越高。本文运用中国证券市场定向增发新股的数据,对影响中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率的因素及中国上市公司定向增发新股折扣率对公司短期股价表现的影响分别进行了实证研究,实证研究结果证明了本文理论分析的结论。     

Capital market pressure,real earnings management,and institutional ownership stability - Evidence from Poland

This study investigates whether and how institutional ownership stability influences real earnings management. We find that institutional investors holding stable equity stakes play an important monitoring role in reducing real earnings management by managers pressured by capital market forces to “meet or beat” earnings targets. We also document no relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management in companies with entrenched managers protected from capital market pressure by a dual-class ownership structure. Our findings of the negative association between real earnings management and institutional ownership stability also indicate that firms with more stable ownership are engaged in lesser sales manipulation and overproduction. In addition, we reveal that pressureresistant institutions (pension funds and mutual funds) that reduce real earnings management are an essential part of the external governance mechanism in an emerging economy.     

The Effects of Taxes,Agency Costs and Information Asymmetry on Earnings Management: A Comparison of Public and Private Firms

The realization of securities gains and losses to manage earnings in publicly-traded bank holding companies has been documented in a large number of studies, but very little is known about why managers engage in this behavior. Two possible explanations for earnings management put forth by Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) are that managers engage in this behavior either to circumvent accounting-based contracts designed to mitigate agency problems, or to reduce information asymmetry.We compare public and private banks' realizations of securities gains and losses to determine how their earnings management differs. We find that public banks consistently engage in more earnings management than private banks, and that the portion of their current period securities gains and losses attributable to earnings management is more positively associated with next period's earnings before securities gains and losses. These findings are consistent with earnings management occurring due to greater information asymmetry in public firms, and suggest that earnings management may not necessarily lead to the erosion in the quality of earnings suggested by Levitt (1998).     

Earnings Quality in a Bubble Period: The Case of Construction Activity Firms in Spain

Housing bubbles may result in deep crises that affect all economic systems. This study investigates how the recent housing bubble in Spain has affected earnings quality during the whole bubble. To this end, we use data on mostly private construction activity firms in Spain, that is, construction and real estate companies. Earnings quality is studied by means of the predictive ability of earnings, conservatism, discretionary accruals and real earnings management. The results indicate a progressive decrease in the quality of financial reporting as the bubble develops, as managers try to conceal an underlying downward trend. We further show that earnings quality continues to decline even after the bubble bursts. Overall, this contribution, together with those of other environments, may suggest that, in a bubble context, we have to take care of firms’ earnings quality even some years before the crisis comes to the fore.     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

Institutional ownership stability and real earnings management

We examine the relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management. Our findings indicate that firms held by more stable institutional owners experience lower real activities manipulation by limiting overproduction. We further examine how the stability in the shareholdings of pressure-sensitive and insensitive institutional investors affect target firms’ use of real earnings management, respectively. Unlike pressure-sensitive institutional investors, the stability in the share ownership of pressure-insensitive institutional investors (i.e., investment advisors, pension funds and endowments) mitigates target firms’ use of real earnings management. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that institutional investors presence acts as a monitor on target firms’ use of real earnings manipulation activities.     

Institutional stakeholdings and better-informed traders at earnings announcements

Utama and Cready [Utama, S., Cready, W.M., 1997. Institutional ownership, differential predisclosure precision and trading volume at announcement dates. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 129–150] use total institutional ownership to proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders, an important determinant of trading around earnings announcements. We argue that institutions holding small stakes cannot justify the fixed cost of developing private predisclosure information. Also, institutions with large stakes generally do not trade around earnings announcements since they are dedicated investors or face regulations that make informed trading difficult. However, institutions holding medium stakes have incentives to develop private predisclosure information and trade on it; we show that their ownership is a finer proxy for the proportion of better-informed traders at earnings announcements.