Searle, Rationality, and Social Reality

A BSTRACT . This paper makes a critical assessment of some contributions of John Searle of direct relevance to social science—his theory of rationality and his theory of institutions. The former is criticized for being able to account for how people can act for "external reasons," as opposed to their desires, only in cases where an obligation derives from a promise; a rival account is much more general. The latter is criticized on three grounds: (1) his theory of institutions can only account for a narrow range of social reality, that deriving from some kind of "enactment"; (2) his notion of "collective intentionality" is unnecessary to explain institutions and is introduced only so that Searle can stay within an individualistic, Cartesian theory of the mind, something of no interest to social scientists; (3) his account implies that if an institution exists, "we collectively accept it," whereas it may in fact not be accepted, but merely tolerated or submitted to.     

Collective Intentions and Collective Intentionality

A BSTRACT . John Searle believes that collective intentions are crucial to his philosophy, but he is yet to present a coherent account of these entities. No account whatsoever of collective intentions is presented in the book where Searle needs them the most ( The Construction of Social Reality ), or, for that matter, in any other of Searle's major books. The only account, and a defective one at that (so I argue), is found in a short, somewhat obscure article entitled "Collective Intentions and Actions," but in fact what Searle presents there is, at best, an account of collective actions , not of collective intentions. In light of Searle own ground-breaking work in the philosophy of mind, and in particular in light of his far-reaching analyses showing how intentions differ from related mental states, I argue that collective intentions are not consistent with Searle's philosophy of mind.     

Characterizations of logarithmic series distrimtrans

The distributions of X, Y and (X. Y ), where X and Y are random variables with probability functions of a logarithmic series law, are characterized by the regression function of X on Y and the conditional distribution of Y given X. Moreover, characterizations are given for binomial or Pascal conditional distributions in terms of the regression function of X on Y and the marginal distribution of X.     

Real Estate as Institutional Fact: Towards A Philosophy of Everyday Objects

A bstract . Rigorous tools which are well known to philosophers can be put to use in the analyses of many concepts pertaining to social reality. This paper attempts to apply the distinction between brute and institutional facts advanced by John Searle to the analysis of property rights over land. It might be commonplace to suggest that all rights are entities whose existence is an institutional fact, i.e., it is the result of human conventions. In the case of property rights, it is not merely at this level that institutional reality confronts us. The object over which the property right falls, a land parcel, is itself an entity whose existence is an institutional fact. This doubly institutional character of property rights makes it easier to see that property rights over land have many important differences with other sorts of property rights. Of course, some of these differences have been pointed out before, say, by appealing to the seminal distinction between movables and immovables, but never with the rigor or the justification that I attempt here. As a result of taking seriously the nature of the object over which the right falls, we can see that property rights over land have more in common with other sorts of relationships, such as political conceptions of sovereignty, than with other forms of property rights. Real estate is just one of a myriad of social objects that we encounter every day. The ontology developed here is but one example of how philosophical analysis of everyday objects enriches our understanding of the social world, and offers us tools for clearer, practical treatment of these objects.     

A test for equality of two exponential distributions

Abstract Let X ₁., X _n1 and Y ₁., Y _n1, be two independent random samples from exponential populations. The statistical problem is to test whether or not two exponential populations are the same, based on the order statistics X _[1],. X _[r1] and Y [₁],. Y _[rs] where 1 r₁ n ₁ and 1 r₂ n ₂. A new test is given and an asymptotic optimum property of the test is proved.     

Searle's Monadological Construction of Social Reality

A BSTRACT . One aim of this paper is to make visible the connection between Searle's views on social reality and his general ontology, and at the same time to show that some peculiar features of his analysis of social reality are a natural outcome of his general ontology. The paper contains five sections. In the first Searle's naturalism is philosophically situated and its differentia specifica explained. Then, Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is presented. One might say that, according to Searle, each mind is, although caused by a material brain, a Leibnizian monad. This view is related to an important, but neglected, distinction that Searle himself has made between requirement conditions of satisfaction and required conditions of satisfaction. In the third section, it is pointed out that, necessarily, sometimes there has to exist some kind of relation of satisfaction between the two kinds of conditions of satisfaction. Searle, however, has never really discussed what this satisfaction relation may look like. The upshot of all the remarks is that, fourth, Searle's general ontology automatically implies an ontology of social reality according to which a social fact can only exist as a scattered aggregate whose items exist in the brains of the people who constitute it. Finally and fifth, I try to think with Searle against Searle. His monadological view of social reality cannot, Searle notwithstanding, be regarded as being close to the direct realism of common sense. Searle's realism is an indirect realism. However, if Searle's view that intentional states exist only in brains is rejected, then the rest of his ontology has features that may take us closer to a direct realism. Such a move, which in one respect takes us closer to common sense, takes us in another respect away from common sense. The title of the last section is "Social Reality and the Impossibility of Common Sense."     

On statistics at level crossings by a stationary process

The main purpose of this paper is to indicate formal theorems and conditions for the extensions of Rice's Formula for intensities of crossings of a fixed level u by a stationary process X(t) in order to provide the conditional (Palm) distribution of an associated process Y(t) at the level crossing instants. Sections 1 and 2 provide brief background material on Rice's Formula and Palm distributions, while relevant historical comments and basic results are given in Section 3. These are stated with some indications of proof in Section 4 and calculation of the Palm distributions shown in Section 5. Two cases of importance in applications are considered: (a) where (roughly) X(t) , Y(t) and the derivative X'(t) have a joint density and (b) where Y(t) = X'(t) . The resulting Palm distributions are each absolutely continuous with readily calculable densities. These are evaluated for Gaussian processes in Section 6 and applications to motivating 2 structural safety questions indicated in Section 7.     

An alternate development of conditioning

Abstract  The "classical" development of conditioning, due to K olmogorov , does not agree with the "practical" (more intuitive, but unrigorous) way in which probabilists and statisticians actually think about conditioning. This paper describes an alternative to the classical development. It is shown that standard concepts and results can be developed, rigorously, along lines, which correspond to the "practical" approach, and so as to include the classical material as a special case. More specifically, let Xand Y be random variables (r.v.'s) from (Ω, f, P) to ( x, f_x ) and (y. f^y.), respectively. In this paper, the fundamental concept is the conditional probability P(AX = x ), a function of xε x which satisfies a "natural" defining condition. This is used to define a conditional distribution P_y/x, as a mapping x × f^y-R such that, as a function of B, P_ylx=x,(B ) is a probability measure on f^y. Then, for a numerical r.v. Y , conditional expectation E(Y/X) is defined as a mapping x → whose value at x isE(Y/X = x) = ydP_Y/x=i(y ). Basic properties of conditional probabilities, distributions, and expectations, are derived and their existence and uniqueness are discussed. Finally, for a sub-o-algebra and a numerical r.v. Y , the classical conditional expectation E(Y) is obtained as E(Y/X) with X = i , the identity mapping from (Ω, f) to (Ω).     

The New Role of the Constitutive Rule

A BSTRACT . Searle used to analyze institutional facts in terms of the constitutive rule. In his more elaborate account in The Construction of Social Reality he introduces the notion of a status function. The "counts as" locution is central to both the constitutive rule and the status function. The main question I ask is what role is left for the constitutive rule after the introduction of the status function. In order to answer this question, I start by analyzing the notion of a status function. An examination of the relation between status functions and the function of representation reveals that the former is a species of the latter. An exploration of the relation between status functions and collective acceptance reveals that Searle does not provide an argument as to why collective acceptance is required for institutional facts. Searle's new account goes beyond his old analysis of institutional facts in terms of the constitutive rule. Rather than declaring the notion to be redundant, Searle assigns the constitutive rule a new role: it is to account for the fact that there can be counterfeit instances of a subclass of institutions, including, for example, that of money. This subclass consists of institutions that are codified.     

应用Excel绘制散点组合图

我们在工作中经常需要绘制组合图，例如在同一图上绘制同一组X（Y）值数据对应两组不同单位和范围的Y（X）值数据，或绘制两组不同单位和范围的x值数据对应两组不同单位和范围的Y值擞据的图表。要在Excel的绘图工具中实现这一目的，需要一定的技巧。文章通过实例，叙述了实现绘制组合图的方法。     

Searle and Collective Intentionality

A BSTRACT . Several key elements go into Searle's construction of social reality, namely, collective intentionality, constitutive rules, and status functions. But by far the most important and arguably contentious of these is collective intentionality. Searle postulates his notion of collective intentionality as a solution to a conflict between two of his own problematic claims: the irreducibility of collective intentions to singular intentions and what he sees as the requirements of methodological individualism. According to Searle, methodological individualism seems to require that we reduce collective intentionality to individual intentionality; however, this contradicts his claim that collective intentionality is irreducible to individual intentionality plus some mutual beliefs. I will show that at least part of what is really at stake here is Searle's internalism or, as he puts it, his "brain in a vat condition." My strategy will be to examine his internalism and show that Searle's account is far more radical than other internalists in that he extends internalism beyond its usual domain of the mental to incorporate social facts. While there are no knockdown arguments in favor of either internalism or externalism as normally construed in the philosophy of mind, I will show that Searle's account of collective intentionality introduces an element of privacy to social facts that denies us the public access to the conditions on the basis of which we normally take collective facts to obtain.     

坐标方位角计算实用公式

通过理论推导,提出一种简洁、实用的坐标方位角计算新方法,根据荪X、荪Y以及荪Y的符号能够实现象限自动判断,从而直接求出正确的坐标方位角,该坐标方位角通用计算公式具有广泛的实用价值。     

IN A WORD OR TWO,PLACED IN THE MIDDLE: THE INVISIBLE HAND IN SMITH'S TOMES

We explore the conjecture, first hinted at by Peter Minowitz, that Smith deliberately placed his central idea, as represented by the phrase ‘led by an invisible hand’, at the physical centre of his masterworks. The four most significant points developed are as follows: (1) The physical evidence: the expression ‘led by an invisible hand’ occurs pretty much dead centre of the 1st and 2nd editions of The Wealth of Nations (WN), and of the final edition of the tomes containing The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). (2) The rhetoric lectures show that Smith not only was conscious of deliberate placement of potent words at the centre, but thought it significant enough to remark on to his pupils, noting that Thucydides ‘often expresses all that he labours so much in a word or two, sometimes placed in the middle of the narration’. (3) The invisible‐hand paragraphs in TMS and WN both contend with Rousseau and hearken back to the Rousseau passages that Smith had translated and provided in his 1756 article on literature. (4) There are numerous and rich ways in which centrality and middleness hold special and positive significance in Smith's thought.     

Opting-Out: the Constitutional Economics of Exit

The central aspect, which makes markets operate differently than governments, is the ability of market actors to "exit" from future interactions. This point is applied to constitutional analysis, with an emphasis on the constitutional possibility of individuals or groups in a society "exiting," wholly or partly, from the political community or from specific institutions within such. Hobbesian and Lockean states-of-nature are sketched using a common framework of some simple games, and the Lockean solution to the danger of tyranny is formalized. This solution is compared to the typical interaction in a market economy, where the possibility of "exit" from future interactions with disagreeable parties introduces severe restrictions on the possible exploitation. This analysis is extended to the political sphere, and it is argued in general terms that a constitutional set-up utilizing a semi-Lockean right to "exit" (e.g., federal structures with rights of secession, voucher systems, etc.) could be an efficient guarantee against sub-optimal solutions and function so as to reduce redistributive conflicts and make welfare-increasing transactions possible.     

Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade

We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model - where a finite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a finite number of individuals - to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred (objects inherited) as the allocation process unfolds, under the retained assumption that an individual consumes at most one object. In this environment we analyze the core of the economy and characterize the set of strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms. As an alternative approach, we consider property rights implicitly defined by a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism and show a core property for the mechanism-induced endowment rule.Received: 19 February 2004, Accepted: 14 April 2005, JEL Classification: C71, C78, D71, D78We would like to thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Financial support from The Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences is gratefully acknowledged by Lars-Gunnar Svensson. Financial support from The Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation is gratefully acknowledged by Bo Larsson.     

Adam Smith's Analysis of Bounties as an Early Example of the Concept of Noneconomic Objectives

A bstract .   Smith uses his analysis of bounties to form one aspect of his overall critique of the mercantile system. He stresses the fact that the system of bounties has not promoted the development of the English economy. However, Smith also stresses that, as destructive as the system of export bounties is to public welfare, these bounties are not significant enough to greatly retard the growth of the English economy, which has more to do with secure property rights and securing investors their return on their investments.     

ADAM SMITH AND THE ROLE OF THE METAPHOR OF AN INVISIBLE HAND

Daniel Klein and Brandon Lucas's ‘In a Word or Two, Placed in the Middle: The Invisible Hand in Smith's Tomes’, following a vague hint by Peter Minowitz (2004) , offers original physical evidence that Smith ‘deliberately placed the phrase “led by an invisible hand”– at the physical centre of both his masterworks’. Further, it suggests that the invisible‐hand paragraphs are a response to Rousseau (1755 ); and that in ‘numerous and rich ways’, centrality holds ‘special and positive significance in Smith's thought’. This paper acknowledges the physical centrality of the invisible‐hand metaphor, but questions whether centrality alone gives weight to wider claims that the ‘invisible hand’ was Smith's ‘central idea’. It draws upon Smith's Rhetoric Lectures (1763), and argues that the invisible‐hand paragraphs in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations identify the actual objects of the invisible‐hand metaphor. This paper insists that Adam Smith is the most reliable source for revealing what he meant. In contrast, most modern attributions of special meaning to Adam Smith's use of the metaphor ignore Smith's teaching on the use of metaphors and, instead, make numerous, and often mutually exclusive, claims that Smith had a ‘doctrine’ of ‘an invisible‐hand’.     

Collective Acceptance, Social Institutions, and Social Reality

ABSTRACT . The paper presents an account of social institutions on the basis of collective acceptance. Basically, collective acceptance by some members of a group involves the members’ collectively coming to hold and holding a relevant social attitude (a “we‐attitude”), viz. either one in the intention family of concepts or one in the belief family. In standard cases the collective acceptance must be in the “we‐mode,” viz. performed as a group member, and involve that it be meant for the group. The participants must be collectively committed to what they have accepted. Social institutions are taken to be norm‐governed social practices introducing a new social and conceptual status on the practices or some elements involved in those practices. This requires that some of the involved norms be constitutive norms as opposed to merely “accidentally” regulating ones. A classification of social institutions is presented. The account is broader in scope than is Searle’s.     

Parametric and Nonparametric Regression in the Presence of Endogenous Control Variables

The aim of this paper is to convey to a wider audience of applied statisticians that nonparametric (matching) estimation methods can be a very convenient tool to overcome problems with endogenous control variables. In empirical research one is often interested in the causal effect of a variable X on some outcome variable Y . With observational data, i.e. in the absence of random assignment, the correlation between X and Y generally does not reflect the treatment effect but is confounded by differences in observed and unobserved characteristics. Econometricians often use two different approaches to overcome this problem of confounding by other characteristics. First, controlling for observed characteristics, often referred to as selection on observables, or instrumental variables regression, usually with additional control variables. Instrumental variables estimation is probably the most important estimator in applied work. In many applications, these control variables are themselves correlated with the error term, making ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares inconsistent. The usual solution is to search for additional instrumental variables for these endogenous control variables, which is often difficult. We argue that nonparametric methods help to reduce the number of instruments needed. In fact, we need only one instrument whereas with conventional approaches one may need two, three or even more instruments for consistency. Nonparametric matching estimators permit     consistent estimation without the need for (additional) instrumental variables and permit arbitrary functional forms and treatment effect heterogeneity.     

On Some Nonparametric Tests of Dispersion

Let X and Y be random variables with distribution functions F and G and medians ζand η, respectively. X will be said to be more dispersed about the median than Y if F(x+ζ) – F(–x+ζ) G (x+η) – G (–x+η)for all x > O, with sharp inequality holding for some positive x. Asymptotically nonparametric tests for the hypothesis that F (x+ζ) = G (x+η) against alternatives of the above type (for ζ and η unknown), provided F(x+ζ) (but not necessarily G (x+η)) is symmetric and Fand G have bounded densities, are constructed from a subclass Of SUKHATME'S modified generalized U - statistics [12]. One simple test of this subclass turns out to be the MANN-WHITNEY test as performed on the |X_i–ζ| and | Y_j–η| where ζ and η are the corresponding sample medians. Consistency and PITMAN efficiencies of some of the tests proposed are discussed under two families of alternatives in which the Y's differ from the X's through departure from symmetry as well as by being more (less) dispersed: a model of “heterogeneous response” and the wellknown gross error model. The usual scale alternatives are also studied and the relationship of our tests to those previously given in the literature is pointed out.