终极股东超额控制对公司研发投资的影响

以中国沪、深两市主板披露的研发投资上市公司为研究对象,基于终极产权论视角,研究终极股东超额控制如何影响公司研发投资以及上述影响在不同产权性质公司间的差异。结果表明：终极股东超额控制程度越高,代理问题越严重,就越倾向于减少高风险、长周期性质的研发投资,终极股东超额控制程度与公司研发投资显著负相关。与非国有控股公司相比,国有控股公司终极股东超额控制程度对公司研发投资的负向影响较小。     

股权结构与控股股东行为的实证研究

关于股权结构与控制权收益实证分析表明,第一大股东持股比例越高,控制权收益越高;第二大股东与第一大股东之间的相互制衡有利于限制控股股东的掠夺行为,减少控制权收益。因此,降低股权集中度、充分发挥大股东之间的相互制衡作用是规范控股股东行为的关键所在。     

国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论

在我国的上市公司中,本文发现国家持股规模和公司绩效之间呈现左高右低的非对称U型关系。总体而言,国家持股企业的表现不及非国家持股企业。同时,随着国家持股比例的上升,企业绩效起初随之下降;但是,当国家持股比例足够大时,随着国家持股比例的上升,企业绩效上升。这就是说,国家持股对企业的绩效具有两面性的影响。作为事实上的国有股东,政府存在着政治和经济双重利益,从而既通过政治干预攫取企业财富,又借助公司治理和优惠待遇来提升关联企业的价值。国有股减持应该避免U型曲线的底部价值陷阱。     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

Evolving corporate governance and the dividends behaviour regime in Japan

This study investigates empirically the implications which the changing ownership structure and control transfers in the Japanese corporate market may have for the dividend policy of listed firms. The results show that firms with more concentrated ownership may distribute fewer dividends, as ownership concentration reduces distribution pressure from the capital market. Moreover, we show that institutional shareholding, both financial and non-financial, enables corporations to pay lesser dividends and also that the unwinding of the cross-shareholdings allows for efficiency gain and provides impetus to pay higher dividends. The recent pattern of increasing individual shareholding, both of domestic and foreign private individuals, is consistently associated with a higher dividend payment. Furthermore, managerial ownership has negative effects on dividends payouts and is not associated with the earnings of firms. The results suggest that government ownership does not have any significant impact on the payment of dividends. Moreover, our results support the principle of the dividends relevancy and the choice of an appropriate dividends policy affects the value of the firm.     

技术创新对股权结构与企业绩效的中介效应

基于2013-2017年我国277家创业板上市制造业企业数据,采用中介效应检验方法分析股权结构、技术创新与企业绩效三者间的相互关系。结果表明：①第一大股东持股比例与技术创新、企业绩效间均呈显著正相关关系;②股权集中度与技术创新、企业绩效间均呈显著正相关关系;③在股权适度集中的基础上,股权制衡度与技术创新和企业绩效均呈显著正相关关系;④技术创新部分中介了股权结构对企业绩效的影响。研究结果有助于厘清股权结构、技术创新与企业绩效三者间的相互关系,对于我国企业自主创新能力提升及企业绩效可持续增长具有重要意义。     

Ownership structure and diversification in a scenario of weak shareholder protection

This work examines the influences of ownership concentration and insider ownership on corporate strategies for diversification within a scenario characterized by poor protection of shareholder interests. We find evidence of a quadratic relationship between ownership concentration and diversification, and a cubic relationship between diversification and insider ownership. These results point towards the high probability of both expropriation and entrenchment phenomena, respectively, in this kind of scenario. We also find that concentrated ownership requires high levels of insider ownership, in order to prevent negative externalities of diversification. Another result shows that entrenchment externalities affect diversification before they erode firm value, which suggests that for low levels of diversification, firm value is still not negatively affected. Additionally, our results show that control mechanisms, such as debt, director remuneration and compliance with codes of good practice, are negatively related to the level of diversification. Overall, our results confirm the theoretical relevance of agency theory in explaining managerial attitudes towards corporate strategy, i.e. diversification. Furthermore, companies characterized by deficiencies in shareholder legal protection, concentrated ownership structures and a higher likelihood of managers being entrenched, should focus on the correct functioning of corporate governance mechanisms.     

Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation

Abstract. Concentrated ownership of large listed companies is widespread throughout the world, and Germany is typical in this respect. This paper proposes a method of distinguishing empirically between the beneficial and harmful effects of ownership concentration, and applies it to German data. The results show that, for most types of largest shareholder, the beneficial effects on minority shareholders of increased ownership (greater monitoring of management, and reduced incentives to exploit minority shareholders due to greater cash‐flow rights) are at least as large as, and sometimes significantly larger than, the harmful effect (greater private benefits of control due to greater control rights).     

产权改革:谨防非效率资本支配的陷阱

不同资本-市场经济中的赢利能力是不同的,赢利能力较低的国有资本,而赢利能力强的是非公有资本,在执行同股同权的公司制企业中,应当防止形成非效率资本支配效率资本的局面,从而影响产权多元化改革之后经营机制的转变。为此,本提出,在国有企业进行产权多元化改革的过程中,应当坚持以效率资本为主导的原则,要正确理解提高国民经济控制力的要求,要解放思想,对非公有经济的地位、作用应当有一个全面深入的认识,让国有资本在公司制企业中搭其他类型资本的便车。     

政府控制、终极控制人与上市公司债务期限结构

本文在代理理论框架下,基于我国政府干预的制度背景,以2004-2006年A股上市公司为样本研究了终极控制人与其所控制的上市公司债务期限结构选择的关系.实证检验结果表明:国有企业性质的终极控制人所控制的上市公司长期负债比例偏高.进一步区分不同行政级别的政府终极控制人进行回归,发现政府终极控制人的行政级别越低,企业长期债务比例越高.另外,通过对不同控股方式的样本公司分别进行回归分析的结果表明,在终极控制人通过复杂组织结构方式间接控制的上市公司中,终极控制人的不同产权性质及不同行政级别对上市公司长期债务选择的影响更加显著.上述研究发现,为认识政府控制和干预对企业财务决策的影响提供了更深入的证据,进而为厘清中国转轨经济进程中的政企关系提供了新的补充证据,并对理解不同组织结构方式的上市公司债务期限结构的差异性提供了一个新的视角.     

机构投资者持股和会计盈余质量

本文从会计盈余质量的角度来研究机构投资者(’在公司治理中的作用。我们从盈余管理程度、盈余信息含量和盈余稳健性等三个方面来衡量会计盈余的质量。三方面的研究结果显示,机构投资者持股有助于改善会计盈余的质量:机构投资者持股公司的会计盈余质量显著高于其他公司,并且会计盈余的质量随着机构投资者持股比例的增加而增加。进一步研究发现,机构投资者还能够缓解大股东对会计盈余信息含量的恶化,起到一定的制衡作用。本文的研究表明,机构投资者能够在一定程度上改善上市公司的盈余质量,其快速成长有助于公司治理结构的改善,也有助于资本市场信息披露环境的良性发展。     

股权特征对机构投资者与创新投入的调节作用

以2010-2015年沪深A股上市公司为研究对象，采用Tobit回归方法探讨不同类型机构投资者持股对企业创新投入的影响，并深入分析股权集中度与股权性质对机构投资者持股与创新投入关系的调节作用。研究发现，相比于交易型机构投资者，稳定型机构投资者更能提高企业创新投入；股权集中度在交易型机构投资者样本中削弱了机构投资者持股对创新投入的促进作用；机构投资者持股对国有企业提高创新投入的力度显著高于非国有企业。最后提出企业须正视机构投资者和使股东结构多元化，政府应加大证券市场监管力度与深化国企改革等建议。     

The effects of privatization on productive efficiency: evidence from the Baltic republics

By using new and unusual data sets for large samples of firms in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania we find that, since privatization, diverse patterns of enterprise ownership have emerged and ownership configurations are quite dynamic.   To test competing theories on the productivity effects of alternative ownership structures, identical cross sectional production functions specifications are estimated for each country for varying years during 1993 1996. While the effects of private ownership upon productivity are found to vary considerably over time and across countries, productivity effects are always found to be either zero or positive, thus providing partial support for the hypothesis that state ownership is less efficient than private ownership.   Findings are mixed concerning hypotheses on the effects of particular ownership structures. Often (e.g. for Lithuania) estimates indicate that all forms of private ownership have zero productivity effects. However, some estimates for Estonia provide support for the mainstream hypothesis that outside (and especially foreign) ownership is preferred to insider ownership. But in other estimates (again for Estonia) majority ownership by employees is found to deliver better business performance than majority ownership by managers (thus refuting the hypothesis that the preferred form of insider ownership is ownership by managers).     

Control rights, pyramids, and the measurement of ownership concentration

The recent corporate governance literature has emphasised the distinction between control and cash-flow rights but has disregarded measurement issues. Control rights may be measured by immediate shareholder votes, the voting rights as traced through ownership chains, or voting power indices that may or may not trace ownership through chains. We compare the ability of various measures to identify the effects of ownership concentration on share valuation using a German panel data set. The widely used weakest-link principle does not perform well in this comparison. Furthermore, measures that trace control through ownership chains do not outperform those that rely on immediate ownership, thus questioning the role of pyramids in the separation of control and cash-flow rights. The paper emphasises that there is a distinction between these two aspects of ownership even without pyramids or preferred stock, identification of which requires measures that, like the Shapley–Shubik index, do not simply equate control rights with voting rights.     

Origin and concentration

We analyse the effects of different types and concentration of ownership on performance using a large population of firms in the Czech Republic after mass privatization. Specifications based on first‐differences combined with instrumental variables show that the performance effects of different types and concentration of ownership are limited when compared to earlier studies. Often, concentrated ownership has a positive effect, a finding that supports the agency theory. The positive effect of foreign ownership is detected primarily for majority ownership and for ownership by foreign industrial firms. The state as a holder of the golden share has a positive effect on employment and sometimes, also on output and profitability. Overall, our results highlight the benefits of strategic restructuring accompanied by an inflow of new capital and managerial culture.     

后股权分置时代控股股东减持与上市公司的价值关系——基于双重差分模型的分析

笔者以深交所上市公司为例,实证研究控股股东减持对公司价值的影响。结果表明无论是国家控制的上市公司还是非国家控制的上市公司,控股股东减持都可以提升上市公司价值。但是,国家控制公司控股股东减持所带来的公司价值的提高低于非国家控制公司价值的提高。控股股东减持有利于公司股权结构的优化,对其应该进行正确的引导,既有控股股东又有制衡股东的股权结构应该成为后股权分置时代上市公司股权结构调整的方向。     

关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据

近年的大量恶性案例表明关联交易已经成为我国上市公司治理的一个严重问题。本文在全面分析1998—2 0 0 2年间我国上市公司关联交易总体状况的基础上,从不同角度考察了关联交易与股权结构之间的关系。研究结果表明,关联交易的发生规模与股权集中度显著正相关,持股比例超过10 %的控股股东数目的增加会降低关联交易的发生金额和概率。此外,控股股东间的制衡能力越强,发生关联交易的可能性越低、金额越小。这些发现为通过增加控股股东数目,改“一股独大”为“多股同大”来改善我国上市公司治理结构、保护投资者利益的改革思路提供了实证证据     

最终控制人特征、政府控制与公司价值

本文采用中国A股上市公司最终控制人属性、控制权比例、控制权与所有权背离程度、控制链长度等因素对上市公司价值进行了研究。回归结果表明最终控制人对上市公司的控制权与公司价值之间呈非线性的正U型关系，而所有权与控制权背离程度与公司价值的关系并不显著。政府目标多元化导致政府控制的上市公司其目标并不一定是股东价值最大化，政府附加的社会责任给上市公司的价值带来负面影响，这种负面影响主要来自于下级政府部门。政府对上市公司控制链越长，企业受到政府的干预就越少，公司的价值就会越高；而控制链对于非国家最终控制的公司的价值影响并不显著。本文还发现不同非政府实体最终控制的上市公司之间价值不存在显著差异。     

国内上市公司的股权融资偏好的原因分析

国内上市公司融资的啄食顺序和成熟市场经济国家相反,表现出较强的股权融资偏好特征;融资结构中股权融资比重偏高,内部融资比重偏低。本文从公司金融角度出发,结合目前中国国情,分析得出国内上市公司对股权融资如此热衷的原因主要有：股权融资的成本优势、股权分置和国有股一股独大、公司治理结构不完善以厦经济高速发展期企业的扩张冲动。     

持股结构、决议机制与上市公司控制权

控制权的界定和度量一直是困扰公司治理领域的重大难题,完全控制、绝对控制、通过金字塔等手段控制、相对控制、管理层控制的传统分类方法,单纯以最大股东的持股比例为标准,忽略了其余股份的持股差异,即持股结构的影响。考虑持股结构的概率投票模型有效地弥补了这一缺陷,但由于该方法刚刚兴起,其理论基础尚不完备。本文在三种决议机制下,考虑到股东出席会议的状况,对此模型进行了修正和扩展。结果显示,所有权并不是控制权的惟一途径,还受持股结构、决议机制、股东出席会议和投票状况的影响。