Market Maker Quotation Behavior and Pretrade Transparency

We examine the impact of differing levels of pretrade transparency on the quotation behavior of Nasdaq market makers. We find that market makers are more likely to quote on odd ticks, and to actively narrow the spread, when they can do so anonymously by posting limit orders on Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs). From a public policy perspective, our findings suggest that making the level of pretrade transparency on Nasdaq more opaque by allowing anonymous quotes could improve price competition and narrow spreads further.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

Strategic insider trading in foreign exchange markets

Inside traders are well-documented to leverage private idiosyncratic information for personal gain in centralized exchanges such as stock markets. Evidence is rare, however, for decentralized and fragmented over-the-counter markets with microstructure properties that make them particularly vulnerable to stealth trading. The 2015 criminal conviction of Hill and Kamay for foreign exchange insider trading is the first in over-the-counter markets. We analyze their actions to show the complex, strategic decision-making of insiders even in opaque markets where they run a low risk of detection and prosecution: they trade when the market is most sensitive to local information, carefully choose and time their trades to minimize the risk of confounding information disclosures that may affect their profits, as well as act during high noise trading to mask their trades. Our results are consistent with evidence on insider trading in stock markets. We highlight the limitations of regulatory control in over-the-counter markets where technology-based surveillance methods are ineffective, while reinforcing the importance of whistleblowers in detecting and preventing insider trading.     

Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market

Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealermarkets in which price information is costly to gather. We analyzea database of trades between broker-dealers and customers inmunicipal bonds. These data were only released to the publicwith a lag; the market was opaque. Dealers earn lower averagemarkups on larger trades, even though dealers bear a higherrisk of losses with larger trades. We estimate a bargainingmodel and compute measures of dealer’s bargaining power.Dealers exercise substantial market power. Our measures of marketpower decrease in trade size and increase in the complexityof the trade for the dealer. (JEL G0, G24)     

Transparency in the Mortgage Market

This paper studies the impact of transparency in the mortgage market on the underlying real estate market. We show that geographic transparency in the secondary mortgage market, which implies geographic risk based pricing in the primary market, can limit risk-sharing and make house prices more volatile. Ex ante, regions prefer opaque markets to enable insurance opportunities. We discuss the implications for risk based pricing and house price volatility more generally. In addition, we investigate the specific conditions under which competitive lenders would optimally choose to provide opaque lending, thus reducing volatility in the real estate market. We show that in general the opaque competitive equilibrium is not stable, and lenders have incentive to switch to transparent lending if one of the geographic regions has experienced a negative income shock. We propose market and regulatory mechanisms that make the opaque competitive equilibrium stable and insurance opportunities possible.     

The impact of joint participation on liquidity in equity and syndicated bank loan markets

Market liquidity is impacted by the presence of financial intermediaries that are informed and active participants in both the equity and the syndicated bank loan markets, specifically informationally advantaged lead arrangers of syndicated bank loans that simultaneously act as equity market makers (dual market makers). Employing a two-stage procedure with instrumental variables, we identify the simultaneous equations model of liquidity and dual market maker decisions. We find that the presence of dual market makers improves the liquidity of the more competitive and transparent equity markets, but widens the spread in the less competitive over-the-counter loan market, particularly for small, informationally opaque firms.     

Internalisation by electronic FX spot dealers

Dealers in over-the-counter financial markets provide liquidity to customers on a principal basis and manage the risk position that arises out of this activity in one of two ways. They may internalise a customer's trade by warehousing the risk in anticipation of future offsetting flow, or they can externalise the trade by hedging it out in the open market. It is often argued that internalisation underlies much of the liquidity provision in the currency markets, particularly in the electronic spot segment, and that it can deliver significant benefits in terms of depth and consistency of liquidity, reduced spreads, and a diminished market footprint. However, for many market participants, the internalisation process can be somewhat opaque, data on it are scarcely available, and even the largest and most sophisticated customers in the market often do not appreciate or measure the impact that internalisation has on their execution costs and liquidity access. This paper formulates a simple model of internalisation and uses queuing theory to provide important insights into its mechanics and properties. We derive closed form expressions for the internalisation horizon and demonstrate—using data from the Bank of International Settlement's triennial FX survey—that a representative tier 1 dealer takes on average several minutes to complete the internalisation of a customer's trade in the most liquid currencies, increasing to tens of minutes for emerging markets. Next, we analyse the costs of internalisation and show that they are lower for dealers that are willing to hold more risk and for those that face more price-sensitive traders. The key message of the paper is that a customer's transaction costs and liquidity access are determined both by their own trading decisions as well as the dealer's risk management approach. A customer should not only identify the externalisers but also distinguish between passive and aggressive internalisers, and select those that provide liquidity compatible with their execution objectives.     

On the efficiency of long intermediation chains

Intermediation chains represent a common pattern of trade in over-the-counter markets. We study a classic problem impeding trade in these markets: an agent uses his market power to inefficiently screen a privately informed counterparty. We show that, generically, if efficient trade is implementable via any incentive-compatible mechanism, it is also implementable via a trading network that takes the form of a sufficiently long intermediation chain. We characterize information sets of intermediaries that ensure this striking result. Sparse trading networks featuring long intermediation chains might thus constitute an efficient market response to frictions, in which case no regulatory action is warranted.     

Do brokers' recommendation changes generate brokerage? Evidence from a central limit order market

We examine the short‐term response to recommendation changes on the Australian Securities Exchange, a central limit order market. In both central limit order markets and dealer‐driven markets, clients may reward the recommending broker with increased trade volumes. But a central limit order market does not have mandatory market makers and hence provides greater opportunity to free ride. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that recommending brokers are rewarded with higher trade volumes and brokerage commission. Consistent with the tipping hypothesis, these rewards are concentrated in the period shortly before the release. There is no evidence of free riding.     

Loan Sales and Relationship Banking

Firms raise money from banks and the bond market. Banks sell loans in a secondary market to recycle their funds or to trade on private information. Liquidity in the loan market depends on the relative likelihood of each motive for trade and affects firms' optimal financial structure. The endogenous degree of liquidity is not always socially optimal: There is excessive trade in highly rated names, and insufficient liquidity in riskier bonds. We provide testable implications for prices and quantities in primary and secondary loan markets, and bond markets. Further, we posit that risk-based capital requirements may be socially desirable.     

US and Domestic Market Gains and Asian Investors’ Overconfident Trading Behavior

We find that subsequent to both US and domestic market gains, both Asian individual and institutional investors increase their trading and that this effect is more pronounced in bull markets, in periods of relatively favorable investor sentiment, in periods of extremely high market returns, and in markets with short‐sale constraints. We also find that individual investors trade more in response to market gains than institutional investors. Moreover, we find that further integration of Asian stock markets with US stock markets after the Asian financial crisis in 1998 is an important reason for Asian investors’ response to US market gains.     

Pricing to market with trade liberalization: The role of market heterogeneity and product differentiation in India’s exports

This paper studies the links between pricing to market (PTM) and trade liberalization using data for India’s exports (at the 4-digit level of classification) during the economic reforms period (1992–2005). We estimate a PTM model for exports to the G3 and three other emerging markets (Brazil, China and South Africa), distinguishing homogeneous from differentiated goods and correcting for changes in the level of protection faced by India’s exporters (import tariffs in destination markets), inflation and openness in the export destination market, a macroeconomic policy index partly reflecting changes in exporter’s costs, the share of the exporter in the destination market and the share of the product in the exporter’s total exports. We find that market heterogeneity changes the level of PTM, but PTM does not significantly differ between homogeneous and differentiated products. Indian exporters practice PTM by absorbing exchange rate changes into their mark-up in G3 markets, where they face tougher competition, but fully pass-through exchange rate changes in emerging markets. On the contrary, Indian exporters seem to be taking advantage of trade liberalisation in destination markets by marginally increasing exporter currency prices into emerging markets but not into the G3. However, in the case of differentiated goods, we find this effect of trade liberalisation for both G3 and emerging markets.     

Economic engagement and within emerging markets integration

We explore the co-movements between emerging markets by employing dynamic conditional correlation approach. We additionally explore the factors that might drive the conditional correlations between emerging markets. We show that trade with the high income countries is a more important driver of the co-movements between emerging markets relative to trade with other emerging markets either within or outside the geographic region of the given country. We further document that the overall health of an economy, investment and market depth explain the correlation between emerging markets. Evidence is also provided that although, the recent emerging markets and global financial crises raised the correlation between emerging markets, not all country pair correlations increased around the period of the crisis. The findings show that economic engagement as opposed to geographic proximity is more relevant in describing within emerging markets integration. The findings suggest that diversification gains could be achieved by strategically investing across some emerging markets even in crisis periods.     

Estimating the Gains from Trade in Limit-Order Markets

We present a method to estimate the gains from trade in limit‐order markets and provide empirical evidence that the limit‐order market is a good market design. Using observations on order submissions and execution and cancellation histories, we estimate both the distribution of traders' unobserved valuations for the stock and latent trader arrival rates. We use the resulting estimates to compute the current gains from trade, the gains from trade in a perfectly liquid market, and the gains from trade with a monopoly liquidity supplier. The current gains are 90% of the maximum gains and 150% of the monopolist gains.     

Financial intermediation and the role of price discrimination in the foreign exchange market

Foreign exchange trading is performed in opaque and decentralized markets. The two-tier market structure consisting of a customer segment and an interdealer segment to which only market makers have access gives rise to the possibility of price discrimination. We develop a theoretical pricing model that accounts for market-power considerations and analyze a database of the trades of a foreign exchange market maker. We find that the market maker generally exerts low bargaining power vis-á-vis customers. The dealer earns lower average spreads on trades with financial customers than commercial customers, even though the former are perceived to convey exchange-rate-relevant information.     

Is market fragmentation harming market quality?

We examine how fragmentation is affecting market quality in US equity markets. We use newly available trade reporting facilities (TRFs) data to measure fragmentation, and we use a variety of empirical approaches to compare execution quality and efficiency of stocks with more and less fragmented trading. We find that fragmentation affects all stocks; more fragmented stocks have lower transactions costs and faster execution speeds; and fragmentation is associated with higher short-term volatility but greater market efficiency, in that prices are closer to being a random walk. Our results that fragmentation does not appear to harm market quality are consistent with US markets being a single virtual market with multiple points of entry.     

Two shades of opacity: Hidden orders and dark trading

Regulators are concerned that large volumes of trading outside lit venues (i.e., dark trading) harms the functioning of financial markets. In contrast, regulators are neutral about hidden-order trading as these occur on lit venues and are associated with positive effects on market quality. An unanswered economic question concerns the interrelation between these two types of opaque trading, i.e., hidden orders and dark trading. Employing two different empirical methodologies we find that dark and hidden-order trading are substitutes. We also show that both types of opaque trading increase when markets are volatile and fewer algorithmic trading occurs. Smart order routing increases dark trading but reduces hidden-order activity.     

Informational linkage and price discovery between China's futures and spot markets: Evidence from the US–China trade dispute

This study examines the effects of the US–China trade dispute on the informational linkages and price discovery between China's futures and spot markets. Using the daily price data of four assets representing the real and financial sectors in China during 2016–2019, empirical findings suggest that the futures–spot correlations for the stock index, copper, and corn markets have increased significantly during the trade dispute. In contrast, sharp declines in the dynamic correlations between gold futures and spot markets, as gold is a safe haven asset, are observed during the event window. During uncertainty disturbance (i.e., the trade dispute), the futures–spot cointegrated relationships in the gold and corn markets are found to adjust more quickly and efficiently, whereas the correction speeds of the market deviations for the stock index and copper market are moderately slower. With the intensive integration of market expectations with uncertainty shocks, the economic shocks of trade disputes tend to remarkably improve the pricing efficiency of China's futures markets, except for the gold futures market. China's spot markets, however, seem to be more sensitive to the noise trades and information disturbances arising from the trade dispute.     

Consolidation, fragmentation, and the disclosure of trading information

It is commonly believed that fragmented security markets havea natural tendency to consolidate. This article examines thisbelief, focusing on the effect of disclosing trading informationto market participants. We show that large traders who placemultiple trades can benefit from the absence of trade disclosurein a fragmented market, as can dealers who face less price competitionthan in a unified market. Consequently, a fragmented marketneed not coalesce into a single market unless trade disclosureis mandatory. We also compare and contrast fragmented and consolidatedmarkets. Fragmentation results in higher price volatility andviolations of price efficiency.     

The Dynamic Extreme Co-Movement between Chinese Stock Market and Global Stock Markets

ABSTRACT

We use time-varying Symmetrized Joe-Clayton Copula model to study the extreme co-movement (boom or crash together) between the Chinese stock market and major stock markets in the world from 2007 to 2017, including developed markets and stock markets on “Belt and Road Initiative” (hereafter B.R.I.). We find that the extreme co-movement probability between Chinese market and “Belt and Road Initiative” markets is higher than developed markets at both tails. Then we study important “real” and “non-fundamental” factors affecting the excess co-movement probability, including bilateral trade openness, financial integration, and economic policy uncertainty. The results of panel regression analysis show that: the bilateral financial integration has significant effects over the lower tail dependence between Chinese and developed markets, but does not affect the extreme co-movement between Chinese and B.R.I. markets. And the bilateral trade openness is an important factor for the extreme co-movement at both tail between Chinese and global markets. The economic policy uncertainty index, especially China’s economic policy uncertainty, plays a key role in the extreme co-movement between Chinese and developed markets at both tails. However, it has sizable effects only at the upper tail co-movement between Chinese and B.R.I. markets.