Capital Constraints and Employmen

Abstract
This article considers whether capital is a significant constraint on employment in Australia. We calculate the level of capital-constrained employment for seven sectors of the Australian economy. The calculations suggest that the manufacturing; transport, storage and communication; and recreation, personal and other services sectors have sufficient capital installed to increase employment. In two other sectors, mining and wholesale and retail trade, the potential for increases in employment through increased capital utilisation may be constrained by surplus labour (as of June 1993). While some sectors are capital constrained at the moment, we find that the investment requirements to increase employment in these sectors are not onerous. We also project investment requirements in each of the sectors for employment growth over the next five years. These projections suggest that a jump in investment followed by relatively modest growth is required to sustain growth in employment.     

RETURNS SYSTEM WITH REBATES*

We consider a variant of the newsvendor problem. Atomistic retailers each buy merchandise from a monopoly supplier for resale at a market‐determined common retail price that depends upon the total industry order quantity and upon a stochastic demand. After the orders are filled, the supplier learns the realization of demand but the retailers do not. We show that, in this setting, a returns system with rebates (with previously set buy‐back price for returns and ex post payments from the supplier to each retailer per unit actually sold) implements the optimal production and sales strategy, attaining maximum expected profit in the channel.     

Service sharing,profit mode and coordination mechanism in the Online-to-Offline retail market

How does the sharing economy affect the retail industry? This study investigates the impact of service sharing on the decisions and profits of two profit modes in the Online-to-Offline (O2O) retail market. We find that service sharing always improves the profit of the brand supplier as a service demander in both two profit modes, and improves the profit of the offline franchisee as a service provider in the profit-sharing mode under certain circumstances, but always reduces its profit in the non-profit-sharing mode. This is associated with the double marginalisation effect of the non-profit-sharing mode which leads to channel conflicts. Thus, a service-cost sharing mechanism is introduced to coordinate conflicts and achieve a win-win strategy, thereby improving the performance of the entire O2O supply chain.     

动态风险视域下商业信用融资与研发投资逻辑关系

实施创新驱动发展战略、实现经济高质量发展，是构建现代化战略体系的内在要求。基于2010-2018年A股上市公司经验数据，深入探究商业信用融资对研发投资的作用机理。结果表明：商业信用融资与研发投资呈倒U型关系，企业风险动态变化在其中发挥部分中介作用。而且，在供应商集中度高的企业中，商业信用融资对研发投资的影响更加显著，供应商集中度有助于增强企业风险的中介效应。商业信用融资对企业创新能力和双维绩效的影响存在最优阈值。     

Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement

We consider the supplier’s strategic choice on delivery time in a public procurement setting as the result of the firm’s opportunistic behavior on the optimal investment timing when production costs are uncertain. We model the supplier’s trade-off between the option value to defer the contract execution and the penalty payment in the event of delays. We also take into account the issue of penalty enforcement, which in turn depends on both the discretion of the court of law in voiding contractual clauses and the “efficiency” of the judicial system (i.e. the average length of civil trials). We test our main results on Italian public procurement data showing that the supplier’s incentive to delay is greater the higher the volatility of production costs and the lower the “efficiency” of the judicial system. We then calibrate the model using parameters that mimic the Italian scenario on public works procurement and calculate the maximum amount that a supplier is “willing to pay” (per day) to postpone the delivery date and infringe the contract provisions. Our calibration results are consistent with the theoretical model’s predictions and the empirical findings.     

PRICE DYNAMICS WITH CUSTOMER MARKETS

Using microdata from a U.S. retailer we document that customer turnover responds to pricing. We study the optimal price setting of a firm when its demand has an extensive margin that is elastic to price due to customers' opportunity to search for an alternative supplier. The price pass‐through of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is incomplete, with the most productive firms passing through more. Firm demand is more persistent than price. Higher demand is associated with lower markups due to higher search intensity, despite flexible prices. We find empirical support for these predictions in microdata from the retail industry.     

Trade credit use and competition in the value chain

Trade credit is a major source of finance in value chains in developed and emerging economies. Despite its ubiquitous use, this is one of the first empirical studies that analyzes why the use of trade credit varies along the value chain. We argue that competition faced by firms at different stages in the value chain and enforcement mechanisms that stimulate repayment jointly determine the use of trade credit. We distinguish two dimensions of competition, that is, rivalry and customer bargaining power. Competition may stimulate firms to provide trade credit to keep customers from switching to other suppliers. Yet, high contract enforcement costs relative to the value of the transactions, reduce the willingness to offer trade credit. We find empirical evidence showing that competition does not (strongly) influence the use of trade credit in the retail market, whereas it does in the markets for wholesalers and millers. We interpret these results as suggestive evidence that the retail, wholesale and milling market segments differ in terms of the enforcement costs involved in the provision of trade credit. Rivalry at the retail market segment makes switching easy for customers, even in case of default. As enforcement of repayment in this market segment is difficult and costly, trade credit appears to be a risky and less attractive marketing instrument for retailers. In contrast, in the wholesale and milling market segment, trade credit is widespread as stakeholders know each other, making informal mechanisms effective in supporting the enforcement of trade credit repayment.     

参考价格影响下的两阶段回报型众筹定价策略研究

在众筹发起过程中,策略型消费者将对比众筹价格与零售价格,选择最优购买时机。基于此背景,构建了参考价格效应影响下的两阶段众筹定价模型,设计了众筹发起人的两阶段动态定价策略。发起人根据消费者的耐心程度和参考价格效应强度,选择是否公布零售价格,以及溢价或降价销售。利用理性预期均衡理论和逆向归纳法,得到了发起人与消费者博弈的均衡价格和最优发起策略。结论表明,发起人的策略选择并非单一的,同时受到消费者耐心程度和参考价格效应强度的影响。为众筹发起人的两阶段价格决策提供了理论参考和管理学建议。     

Imports and the structure of retail markets

Abstract We construct a model of trade with heterogeneous retailers to examine the effects of trade liberalization on retail market structure, imports and social welfare. We are especially interested in investigating the transmission of lower import prices into consumer prices and the effects of retail market regulation. The paper shows that changes in import prices may have large effects on consumer prices and import volumes when changes in retail market structure are taken into account, and that restrictions on retailing, as they occur in several countries, may significantly alter this transmission mechanism by reducing imports and raising consumer prices.     

The role of price risk in China’s agricultural and fisheries exports to the US

This article explores the effect of price risk on the US importers’ optimal allocation of agriculture imports between the major supplier, China, and other competing countries. We first modify a demand system to account for the impacts of own-price risk and cross-price risk, and then apply the model to 16 agricultural and fisheries commodities exported to the US. The estimation results show that importers are sensitive to price risks of 14 Chinese commodities. Comparisons between price risk–trade relations of agricultural and fisheries products and between trade effects of cross-price risk on Chinese goods and substitutes provide strong evidence for explaining the observed trade patterns. Our study highlights the importance of price stability in promoting international trade, especially from developing countries to developed countries.     

The evasion of fiscal and labor regulations: Firm behavior and optimal tax policy

Firms face many fiscal and labor regulations, but they may evade these legal requirements in several different ways. We develop a model that captures these two types of evasion decisions and unlike existing literature assume firms can evade labor regulations independently from income tax responsibilities. We characterize firms’ entry and evasion behavior and find that the design of the tax system can generate both positive and negative correlations between evasion decisions consistent with what is observed empirically. We then characterize optimal government policies given the firms’ decisions. We obtain intuitive optimal tax rules that highlight the trade‐offs the government faces when firms have multiple margins on which to evade.     

Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design

We study how securities and issuance mechanisms can be designed to mitigate the adverse impact of market imperfections on liquidity. In our model, asset owners seek to obtain liquidity by selling claims contingent on privately observed future cash-flows. Liquidity suppliers can be competitive or strategic. In the optimal trading mechanism associated with an arbitrary given security, issuers with low cash-flows sell their entire holdings of the security, while issuers with high cash-flows are typically excluded from trade. By designing the security optimally, issuers can avoid exclusion altogether. We show that the optimal security is debt. Because of its low informational sensitivity, debt mitigates the adverse selection problem. Furthermore, by pooling all issuers with high cash-flows, debt also reduces the ability of a monopolistic liquidity supplier to exclude them from trade in order to better extract rents from issuers with lower cash-flows.     

Herding,contrarianism and delay in financial market trading

Herding and contrarian behaviour are often-cited features of real-world financial markets. Theoretical models of continuous trading that study herding and contrarianism, however, usually do not allow traders to choose when to trade or to trade more than once. We present a large-scale experiment to explore these features within a tightly controlled laboratory environment. Herding and contrarianism are more pronounced than in comparable studies that do not allow traders to time their decisions. Traders with extreme information tend to trade earliest, followed by those with information conducive to contrarianism, while those with the theoretical potential to herd delay the most. A sizeable fraction of trades is clustered in time.     

Endogenous timing,strategic tariff game and bilateral trade in vertical oligopoly

This paper builds an observable delay game in endogenous timing to study the possible occurrence of trade wars in a vertical, bilateral trade model. It examines the effects of production cost differences and order of moves on optimal tariffs, market equilibria, dumping margin and social welfare in both fixed timing and endogenous timing games. In a fixed timing game, it shows that price dumping in the intermediate good market arises from differences in country-specific final good production costs. Different from Bernhofen (1995; Journal of International Economics), trade costs resulting from reciprocal tariffs in upstream markets can reverse the price dumping under certain conditions. In an endogenous timing game, this paper finds that the magnitude of cost differences significantly influences countries’ decisions on the order of moves in a strategic tariff-making game. Both countries want to be the first movers under a small cost difference and consequently reach a simultaneous equilibrium result. This demonstrates that the second-best equilibrium proceeds under certain conditions. Under a large cost difference, sequential policy-making is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. If the cost difference is sufficiently large, both countries have an incentive to launch a trade war as a multiple equilibrium game.     

供应商-客户关系会影响企业的商业信用吗*——基于中国上市公司的实证检验

本文以我国上市公司为样本,实证检验了供应商-客户关系对企业商业信用融资规模和期限的影响。结果表明：供应商集中度越高,企业的商业信用融资规模越小,融资期限越短;当企业更容易获得银行贷款、企业所在地的产品市场发育程度更高时,供应商集中度与商业信用融资规模、融资期限之间的相关关系显著弱化。本文从新的视角丰富了企业战略与商业信用研究领域的文献,也为我国进行信贷市场及产品市场建设提供了证据支持。     

买方抗衡势力与制造商定价决策

本文研究了买方抗衡势力的存在对上游制造商定价决策的影响,讨论了制造商在不同定价形式（线性定价、两部收费制和转售价格维持（RPM））之间的选择问题,并构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,引入买方抗衡势力,比较分析了制造商在零售商具有和不具有买方抗衡势力两种情况下,制造商最优定价形式的选择。研究发现当零售商不具有买方抗衡势力时,制造商选择两部收费制和RPM是无差异的,都能使上游制造商获得相等的最优利润;当零售商具有买方抗衡势力时,对于上游制造商来说两部收费制优干RPM,RPM又优于线性定价。此外,本文还发现存在一个由抗衡势力和零售商替代程度决定的临界条件,当满足这一条件时,两部收费制是上游的最优选择;一旦这一条件不满足时,RPM就成了上游的最优选择。     

Optimal sequential contract with a risk‐averse supplier

We study optimal contracts in environments where a risk‐averse supplier discovers cost information privately and gradually over time: the supplier is privately informed about its cost uncertainty at the time of contracting and discovers the realization of cost condition privately after contracting and before production. We show that both the buyer and the supplier prefer more cost uncertainty when the supplier is not very risk‐averse but less cost uncertainty when the supplier is sufficiently risk‐averse. However, the buyer always prefers to contract before the cost uncertainty resolves regardless of the supplier's degree of risk aversion. The nature of the optimal contract also depends on the supplier's risk preference. A separating contract is optimal when the supplier is not very risk‐averse; however, a pooling contract, which offers the same contract terms regardless of the cost uncertainty, can be optimal when the supplier becomes sufficiently risk‐averse. Moreover, the optimal production schedule is often characterized by “inflexible rules.”     

零售业应用RFID分析

RFID在零售业的推广应用,是当前国际零售技术发展的一大热点。本文对RFID与条形码作了比较,然后分析了零售业应用RFID的前景、现状和瓶颈。     

Unconventional gains from trade

Unconventional gains from trade are defined as the nonmarket benefits of bilateral agreements that are secured through preferential trade treatment. They arise because (1) nonmarket benefits traditionally are purchased in a hidden manner, partly because of conflicts between governments and populations, and (2) preferential trade treatment is a reasonable way of covert purchase. The optimal strategy for the economy receiving nonmarket benefits when making marginal trade decisions involves choosing between world-market terms of trade and marginal barter terms of trade inclusive of external benefits.     

基于供应商有次品的损失规避性零售商的易逝品订货策略

以获得最大期望效用为目标,考虑到制造商供货有次品的情况下,笔者借鉴展望理论建立了损失规避偏好型零售商的易逝品订货模型,对模型的最优条件和性质进行了讨论,并分析了产品次品率及损失规避程度、产品零售价格、批发价格对于零售商最优订货量的影响,得到了最优订货策略和一系列有意义的性质和管理原则。