基于不完全合同视角的高校教职制度改革研究

本文关注高校组织内部的合同特征,分析了高校组织内部的委托代理关系,提出由于高校教师行动与结果间关系的不确定性、科研教学成果量化和质量确认困难、多种工作任务的加总、教师目标的多重性、科研与教学的团队合作等问题,都会造成高校内部合同关系的不完备。依托于不完全合同理论框架,越是不完全的合同,就越应采取低强度的激励机制。在高校组织内部,相对于晋升制和聘任制,西方终身教职制度是一种弱激励的制度安排,因此,可以将终身教职制度作为未来高校教职制度改革的方向。     

高校教师科研激励机制:终身教职制度的经济学分析

运用委托代理理论,通过建立重复道德风险模型,分析了终身教职制度作为高校科研激励机制的有关特征和相关解释,提供了从经济学领域看待研究型大学实施终身教职制度的新视角,为学校制定有效的激励契约提供了理论依据。研究结果表明,在重复道德风险下,终身教职制度具有重要的激励效果。在这种制度下,学校可以放松对年轻教师的物质激励;而为诱导终身教授的研究努力,学校必须施以高强度的激励。     

构建高校教学管理队伍的激励机制

高校教学管理工作的核心就是为教师传授知识、创造知识,学生接受教育创造优越、便利的条件,为大学组织实施其教育目标服务.高校教学管理的目标需要通过制度安排来实现,执行和实施力度,管理者是关键.激励广大管理者努力工作,保障各项管理制度的有效实施是制度的核心所在.     

强化合同管理,实现企业经济利益最大化

大庆油田工程有限公司在合同管理中坚持以科学发展为统筹、降低成本为中心、规范管理、积极防控生产经营中法律风险,努力提高盈利能力。通过加强合同授权制度的建设、执行合同授权的统一程序、严格受托人的条件,明确受托人的权利和义务、建立健全公司合同管理备案,使合同管理纳入依法有序的轨道运行。在实施过程中采取了四项措施:1.对合同管理的全过程实行跟踪统计和监控。2.重视日常管理,发现问题及时解决,为领导决策提供信息支持。3.坚持法律服务,降低经营风险。4.落实对外合同的管理。     

高校科研创新团队能力跃进机制研究

自2004年教育部提出科研创新团队支持计划以来,不同层次的"高校科研创新团队"如雨后春笋般涌出现。很多高校从形式上组建了科研创新团队,却很少探究科研创新团队的能力成长机制。运用系统理论、知识管理理论,阐述了高校科研创新团队及其能力的内涵,构造了高校科研创新团队能力跃进的一般模型,并讨论了高校科研创新团队能力跃进的动力系统。     

硅谷创新制度结构分析

硅谷已成为高科技产业王国的代名词，是什么使硅谷成为神话？人们易于认同地区科研与工地技术实力等非制度因素。本文着重从制度经济学的角度出发深入地分析了美国硅谷创新的制度结构（包括硅谷创新的正式制度安排与非正式制度安排），强调制度结构在硅谷高技术产业发展中有着不可或缺的重要作用。     

国库集中支付制度对高校财务管理的影响及对策

高校国库集中支付制度是国家财政制度改革在高校中的实际运用,新制度的实施对高校财务管理产生了重大影响.本文结合高校实行该制度的实际情况,深入了分析国库集中支付制度对高校财务管理的影响,并提出相应的改进措施.     

国库集中支付制度对高校财务管理的影响及对策

高校国库集中支付制度是国家财政制度改革在高校中的实际运用，新制度的实施对高校财务管理产生了重大影响。本文结合高校实行该制度的实际情况，深入了分析国库集中支付制度对高校财务管理的影响，并提出相应的改进措施。     

高校教师工作绩效的影响因素研究

高校教师工作绩效是直接反映其教学水平和科研能力的高低,因此关注高校教师工作绩效的影响因素具有重要意义。已有研究对于高校教师工作绩效影响因素的选择过于单一,缺乏多个层面影响源的综合分析。文章从教师个体、工作、高校及社会等层面出发,依据288份来自高校教师的有效问卷,通过因子分析法归纳影响高校教师工作绩效的主要因素,并运用多元回归分析判别诸因素的影响程度。研究结果发现：影响高校教师工作绩效的主要因素是教师个体的积极心理能力、高校的制度及外部资源、领导及团队支持、物质与精神激励、个体知识与技能和教师组织承诺;其中制度及外部资源、积极心理能力和领导及团队支持对科研绩效和教学绩效的正向影响效果最为明显;物质与精神激励、个体知识与技能对科研绩效的影响效果不显著,但对教学绩效具有显著的正向作用;教师组织承诺影响效果最小,且对科研绩效具有负向影响,对教学绩效具有正向影响。     

中国村民自治制度"内卷化"现象的思考

改革开放以来,中国实行了村民自治制度.对于村民自治制度实施的效果,不同的学者有不同的看法.本文认为,对中国村民自治制度的研究,不仅要注意制度创新的条件与原因,也应注意制度创新后影响该制度继续演进的轨迹与因素.被创新出来的制度,不应被理所当然地认为会不断地自我强化并进行线性发展,应注意到"制度内卷"在中国的现象.     

Incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information

This paper examines the incentives in academic tenure under asymmetric information where neither types nor actions of the agents are observable. The different contractual forms are compared, including short-term non-tenured contract and tenure contract with or without probationary period. It is shown that tenure track may help reduce information rent for the department in the situation where a smaller portion of high productive researchers are entitled to undertake very costly and time-consuming research project with a high potential value. However, when the probationary period cannot efficiently screen out the low productive researchers, providing both short-term non-tenured contract and tenure contract without probationary period or merely providing short-term non-tenured contract will be more likely taken by department. Therefore, the coexistence of different contractual forms in higher educational system, including the growing use of non-tenure track in some academic sectors can be economically explained.     

THE TENURE GAME: BUILDING UP ACADEMIC HABITS*

Why do some academics continue to be productive after receiving tenure? This paper answers this question by using a Stackelberg differential game between departments and scholars. We show that departments can set tenure rules and standards as incentives for scholars to accumulate academic habits. As a result, academic habits have a lasting positive impact on scholar's productivity, leading to higher productivity growth rates and higher productivity levels.     

董监高任职网络如何助推企业技术创新——基于同群效应视角

基于同群效应理论视角构建董监高任职网络,利用2010—2021年沪深A股上市公司样本,研究焦点企业的技术创新行为是否受到同群企业技术创新的影响,即董监高任职网络中是否存在企业技术创新同群效应,并进一步分析传导机制。研究结果表明：第一,同群企业的技术创新对焦点企业技术创新有显著促进作用。第二,同群企业技术创新通过激发焦点企业创新动机、优化焦点企业创新过程来促进焦点企业创新。第三,由于基于网络关联的内部信息渠道与外部信息渠道存在替代关系,董监高任职网络中的同群效应在外部信息环境较差时发挥更大作用。本文基于新的网络视角深化和丰富了企业创新同群效应及其机制研究,为创新重要性日益突出、企业联结日益密切背景下的企业技术创新提供了政策新思路。     

A Theory of Tenure for the Teaching University

In this paper we challenge the presumption that academic tenure is an outmoded institutional form for the small teaching university. Starting from the premise that tenure is granted on the basis of research (reflected in a minimum required number of publications), we argue that tenure has value for a university concerned solely with teaching (as opposed to research) because research enhances human capital and incentives for its accumulation are necessary to improve the quality of faculty teaching over the lifecycle. However, while human capital accumulation and research effort create future value, contracting on either basis is not feasible because neither can be measured objectively. Numbers of publications, the usual proxy for research, meter the desired activity only imperfectly due to randomness in the publication process. In these circumstances, an employment contract that offers tenure, compared with contracts that a) reward only teaching and b) supplement teaching payments with a direct reward for publications, can better generate the optimal level of human capital. The minimum publication requirement of the tenure contract induces the optimal level of research with less variation in expected income, avoiding inefficient behavioural responses to the greater riskiness of a contract rewarding only realised publications.     

排他性与非排他性策略下创新授权契约机制研究

分析了不完全信息下,拥有提高产品质量技术的创新企业,在（非）排他性授权策略下,向进行Cournot竞争生产低质量产品的生产企业技术授权的契约优化问题。研究表明,在排他性授权策略下,双重收费契约下信息不完全能使接受授权生产企业赢取更多的创新企业特许权补贴;在非排他性授权策略下,不完全信息能够削弱创新企业通过双重收费契约设计对产品间接市场的垄断程度。在排他性授权交易下,信息不完全使特许权收费契约优于固定收费契约成为可能,这不同于Li and Wang的研究结论。基于提高社会创新能力视角,政府应鼓励创新企业更多采用特许权收费授权契约,削弱信息不对称的影响,赢取更多研发投资利润回报。     

考虑革新程度认知差异的新产品技术授权研究

建立博弈模型，探讨技术革新认知差异情形下，外部技术创新者向寡占竞争格局的生产企业授权生产新产品专利的最优决策问题。研究发现，创新授权者关于新产品市场的认知劣势使固定收费契约不具备完全优于特许权收费契约的绝对优势；在双重收费契约下，专利人授权对象选择因认知差异影响，由排他性授权向非排他性授权决策转变；认知差异性削弱了创新企业市场势力，从而提高特许权收费契约优势，而拍卖、股权投资等有助于创新企业克服认知劣势。据此，建议创新企业明晰创新专利长期回报，综合搭配应用多种授权契约；以非排他性授权策略配合特许权收费、双重收费和股权投资等契约模式，实现技术交易产业链激励共容下的利润最大化，促进技术创新传播应用，提高社会福利水平。     

Firm age and the probability of product innovation. Do CEO tenure and product tenure matter?

This paper examines the influence that the age of a firm has on the probability of product innovation by taking into account two factors: the role of the CEO’s tenure and the lifecycle of the last product introduced. In a sample of Italian manufacturing firms (n = 2163), analysis reveals that the new entrants’ high innovative activity is mainly driven by the new CEO’s innovation propensity, which is strictly dependent on his tenure. Likewise, the lower innovation activity observed in mature firms is mostly explained by the dynamics of the product’s lifecycle and the CEO’s tenure. More generally, the existence of a negative relationship between innovation and firm age is questioned, as controlling for time-related variables that overlap during the company’s lifecycle —product age and CEO’s tenure — turns the relationship positive. Finally, the innovative behavior of incumbent companies turns out to be dependent on the renewal abilities of newly appointed external CEOs, whereas CEOs from within the family play a minor role.     

解析存款保险与中央银行LLR的关系

我国将建立存款保险制度已是不争的事实,但国内学术界对有关存款保险制度组织形式问题的研究还不够深入,绝大多数仅局限于对国外现有的存款保险制度的优缺点加以比较分析,或是对相关文献做一些整理综述的工作,即使有个人观点,也是描述性地加以阐述.本文借鉴不完全契约理论,从微观经济学角度出发,分析了在不同条件下,存款保险与中央银行LLR之间的关系,得到了比较有意义的结果.从方法论上讲,这与前人的工作有很大的不同.最后,根据本文模型,作者提出了对我国存款保险制度组织形式选择的个人观点,并指出模型有待进一步改进的地方.     

Autocratic governors in public procurement

The personal role of sub-national rulers is crucial for regional development in countries with weak institutions. This paper studies the impact of regional governors’ tenure in office and their local ties on procurement performance in Russia. To identify the causal effect, we construct instruments for governor’s tenure by exploiting the regional vote share of ruling party in past parliament elections. We find the evidence that governors who do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared to governors with local ties (insiders). Namely, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at awarding stage significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, for governors-outsiders this restriction becomes stronger with tenure in office, while governors-insiders do not demonstrate such negative tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition by governors-outsiders cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution: the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination either increase or keep stable with tenure for governors-outsiders and these outcomes decrease with tenure for governors-insiders.     

Earnings Instability and Tenure

We study the effect of tenure on earnings instability in Italy using the reforms of temporary employment contracts, which affected the average tenure of workers differentially across cohorts. We develop a model of earnings dynamics, and we exploit the variation of tenure and instability over time and across birth cohorts to estimate policy‐relevant parameters. Our results indicate that each year of tenure on the job reduces earnings instability by 11 percent; the drop is faster in the first three years of the match. Workers on a temporary contract have an earnings instability up to 100 percent higher than workers on a permanent contract.