International Monetary Reform: A Review Article

Original institutional economics (OIE) has three significant, but apparently contradictory, definitions of institution(s) stemming from Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and J. Fagg Foster. In this first installment of a two-part paper I address this apparent contradiction by developing an "irenic reconciliation" of these definitions using a methodological approach I call "critical institutionalism"— a synthesis of the OIE in the tradition of the Veblen, Commons, and Foster, the pragmatism theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, the critical realist methodology of Margaret Archer, and the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar. In so doing, I provide an alternative discussion to that of some current institutionalists who propose to replace the existing OIE definitions of institution(s) with "consensual definitions" developed in the discourse with non-OIE traditions. I propose that there is still considerable analytical value in the OIE definitions, and that replacing them with non-OIE-originating concepts would unnecessarily carry OIE away from its methodological and philosophical roots. In the second installment of this paper (yet to be published), I proceed to demonstrate the analytical value these "reconciled" definitions have for the OIE project.     

John R. Commons’s Foundations for Policy Analysis

Psychological insights have been present in institutional economics since its beginning. Recently, cognitive aspects of institutional economics have been highlighted. The proposal of this paper is to offer other psychological insights related to institutional economics, which are complementary to a cognitive approach. The goal is to emphasize elements of Psychological Social Learning Theory as a possible foundation of Institutional Economics. This paper argues that people vicariously learn by the observation and interpretation of exemplary behaviors. Vicarious learning relies on the comprehension of people about who/what models are. Vicariously, people are motivated to behave as a model; when they succeed, models are reinforced. As something socially and cumulatively acceptable and/or desirable, exemplary behaviors can take place repetitively and become a habit. Institutions arise as outgrowths of those habits. In this logic, a working definition of institution is a cognitive inertia about the typifications of foreseeable regularities in behaviors of people in a society.     

Social responsibility for living standards: Presidential address,association for social economics, 2007

This address presents a vision of economics—drawing upon social, institutional, and feminist economics—that supports the assertion that there should be social responsibility for living standards. Alternative definitions of what an economy is and what economics should study are related to three definitions of living standards presented in Amartya Sen's 1985 Tanner Lectures on the topic. A social provisioning approach to economic life emphasizes that provisioning needs to be organized to promote human flourishing. One contemporary challenge is to do this in a manner that sustains caring and promotes gender equity. 1 1 Following my Presidential Address and prior to publication, I have benefited from comments by Wilfred Dolfsma, Laurie Nisonoff, Nancy Folbre, Ellen Mutari, Martha Starr, and an anonymous reviewer.      

Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects

Institutions shape social outcomes, yet institutions themselves are products of political choices. When institutional choices are determined by the same political and social processes that they shape, institutions are endogenously selected. Here I address the question of whether this endogenous institutional selection necessarily implies endogenous institutional effects. If it does, the use of institutional parameters as independent variables explaining policy outcomes and properties of the resulting political regimes, widespread in the literature on comparative political institutions, is hard to justify. I argue, however, that strategic choice of the rules of the game implies designers' ability to obtain their preferred institutional effects only under conditions of complete information. Under incomplete information, ex-post institutional effects do not need to be endogenous, since at the time of designing the rules the designers were not in position to control the selection of these effects. The reason why the choice of the rules does not imply the choice of their effects lies in the intervening and interactive (rather than additive) role played by the environmental parameters, including players' own characteristics, that are not revealed at the time of the institutional choice. Additionally to the model which illustrates the logic of the argument and the workings of intervening structural effects, I find supporting evidence in the processes of design of election laws in post-communist Europe, where stages of design and implementation followed each other in a very quick succession yet were characterized by substantial changes in manifested institutional preferences of the key political players.     

The Health Services Industry: Realism in Social Control

The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between institutions and development ethics. In a value context, the center of the discussion between institutions and development ethics is based on confronting ethics as "means of the means," which implies that ethics is not only concerned with the ends of human action but also enters into the value dynamisms of the instruments utilized by development agents in achieving these ends: the means. A common acceptable definition of development ethics is the ethical reflection of the ends and means for any purposeful social-economic activity toward development. Institutions are the social cement that condition and enhance the roles agents play in economic life. We argue that development ethics and institutions are entwined: development ethics influence institutions and institutions influence development ethics.     

The Bioeconomics of Cooperation

When transactions and information are costly and exchange is non-simultaneous, ‘institutions matter’. They matter because exchange under these circumstances subjects the participants to potentially harmful behaviors by other participants, among which are: opportunistic behavior, agency, the free-rider problem, cheating, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Institutions constrain these behaviors, allowing the participants to take advantage of the gains from trade and specialization, and thereby facilitating cooperation. Individuals adhere to institutional rules because they gain by doing so. Because the individual gains are inseparable from the structure of the institutions, the institutions themselves necessarily become the focus of the analysis—as we see in the new institutional economics (NIE). The new group selection position in biology involves a similar shift in focus from the level of the individual to the group when studying the evolution of altruism. But some of the proponents of group selection go further, arguing that altruism in biology evolves because it is in the interest of the group, but not the individual. In fact, group level analysis is necessary in biology, as in the NIE, because it allows for the discovery of ‘institutions’ that constrain cheating, opportunistic behavior, etc., thereby making participation in the group in the long-run self-interest of the individual. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Institutional Approaches to Economic Development: The Current Status of the Debate

The recent publication of "Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History" (Chang 2011a) has stimulated a thought-provoking debate, and has brought forth a wide-ranging demonstration of the theoretical arsenal of the new institutional economics. The debate proves that, as of yet, no satisfactory theory of institutions has been articulated, nor is there an agreement on the relationship between institutional change and the politics of development. It also demonstrates the presence of two distinct lines of research: ideological and political, both of which rely on different theoretical legacies, and embody distinct economic worldviews. This scenario allows a summary of the argument in the most recent literature to be made on the relationship between institutions and development, as well as to relate the debate to the concept of development as a process of expansion of capacities.     

The Bard of Savagery: Thorstein Veblen and Modern Social Theory

The hypothesis of this paper is that a detailed history of a specific location and period is more effective for isolating the important characteristics of institutions than studies which span multiple millennia across the globe. To illustrate this hypothesis, I examine three Italian city-states in the period between eleventh and sixteenth centuries. This was a time when the "commercial revolution" was underway in these city-states. As a result, there were institutional innovations in settlement patterns, work organization, and self-governing institutions to help provide for mutual defense and for the internalization of gains from long-distance trade. I contrast this case study with the methodology and findings employed by Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast (2009) in Violence and Social Orders. Rather than analyze the importance of beliefs and the protection of property rights as in prior work of theirs, the authors here focus on the "Schumpeterian competition" between impersonal organizations as an effective institutional form to control violence. Moreover, the timeframe of their book extends to "all recorded human history." In contrast to North, Wallis, and Weingast's approach, I concentrate on Genoa, Florence, and Venice in an effort to explain more effectively the emergence of the public/private divide and the relationship between politics and economics in modern industrial society. Experimentation in medieval Italy in mediating conflict between newly emerging classes, innovating in public finance to support the military, and focusing on broad civic participation in the political process had a lasting impact on the development of the state as an institution.     

Choosing a future based on the past: Institutions,behavior, and path dependence

Institutions do not always produce behavior consistent with what theory predicts, leading comparative scholars to turn to explanations based on historical or cultural exceptionalism. Context can influence not only how an institution performs but also the very choices of institutions that societies choose to govern themselves. In this paper, we construct a model that produces contextual effects that result in institutional path dependence. In doing so, we provide formal foundations for qualitative arguments that context matters and identify a contributing causal mechanism: behavioral spillovers. Using both mathematical and computational techniques, we show that spillovers provide a mechanistic explanation for how pre-existing institutions affect the performance of new institutions as well as the optimal choice among institutions. We find that these spillovers can depend on either the set or the path of previous institutions. Both results support qualitative arguments that historical institutional contexts influence outcomes in current institutions. Importantly, the spillovers depend not only on the outcomes produced in the institutions but also on the specific behavior that produces the outcomes. As a result, we show that institutions that create diverse ensembles of behaviors generate better outcomes and less path dependence than those that cause all agents to converge on the identical strategy.     

An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

Imagination and society. The affective side of institutions

Since the contributions by D. North [(1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: CUP] and his Nobel Prize lecture [(1994). Economic performance through time, Nobel Prize Lecture. The American Economic Review, 84(3), 359–368], the relationship between mind and institutions has been increasingly investigated by economists. Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq [(2004). Learning, institutions, and economic performance. Perspectives on Politics, 2(1), 75–84] introduced the expression cognitive institutionalism in order to define this stream of research. In the first part of the paper we discuss some recent findings of the cognitive approach to institutions and its roots in the history of economic ideas. We also claim that in such an approach, no place has yet been found for a crucial faculty of the human mind, imagination. We then explore the concept of radical imaginary developed by Cornelius Castoriadis in his book The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975; 1987). From the perspective of cognitive economics, and on the grounds of Castoriadis’ legacy, we aim at highlighting some basic mechanisms of interaction between imagination, affectivity and institutions.

Institutional Economics as Theory of Policy Change: Impact of Past Policy Failures on Present Policy

Social scientists have developed several theories for understanding or evaluating policy change over time. Since all costs or benefits are not internalized owing to positive transaction costs, policymaking is always implemented under cost underestimation conditions and, therefore, is imperfect. I call this trait policy failure in this article. Furthermore, I show that a new framework combining the social costs approach and the legal/economic approach in institutional economics is suitable and can be applied to evaluating how past policy failures affect present policy, providing as an example the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan.     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

Institutions and Values: A Methodological Inquiry

Economics entails a study of institutions regardless of the school of thought, and it is inherently an analysis of institutional transformation with a vision toward creating positive social change through economic arrangements. However, the conceptions of institutions, identity of individuals, human nature as it pertains to economics, identification of the economic sphere, its concerns, and studying its evolution, all vary substantively across schools of thought. We examine the following issues: (i) the differences in the ontological identity of the individual between heterodox approaches, new institutional economics (NIE), and the neoclassical school; (ii) the central point of divergence between original institutional economics (OIE) and NIE, despite both schools being committed to the project of an “institutionally” centered approach to economics; and (iii) the absence of a cohesive project to explore foundational theoretical congruencies among those heterodox approaches that have a shared vision, values, and a common ontological identity of socially embedded people.     

Solving the U.S. Trade Deficit and Competitiveness Problem

We compare the analytical approach of John R. Common and Ronald H. Coase to institutional analysis and social provisioning. In particular, we examine their similarities in (i) the definition and role of institutions in the economy, (ii) the allocative (social provisioning) role of institutions in the economy, and (iii) the inescapable and unchanging role of institutions in shaping the social provisioning process. We contend that Commons and Coase had more in common than did Coase and many of his followers in the “new institutional economics.” In particular, the two had strong similarities in both (a) their insights into the nature of institutions in the legal-economic nexus that is the foundation of the economy and (b) their methods for conducting economics research. Because this role of institutional evolution is, as Warren Samuels noted, an inescapable and unchanging part of an economy’s social provisioning process, it will remain an integral part of any such work in the future, regardless of the “school of analysis” or methodological approach.     

Bringing institutions into evolutionary economics: another view with links to changes in physical and social technologies

Like Nelson (2002), I make a case for bringing institutions into evolutionary economics. But unlike Nelson, who defines institutions as social technologies consisting of rules-routines, I define them in agreement with North (1990) as humanly devised rules-constraints - such as formal law and informal social norms - but also view them, to accommodate most of Nelson's approach, as constraining the variety of rules-routines employable by agents. I show that this definition has advantages for communicating with modern institutional analysis, for clarifying how institutions can influence, and be influenced by, changes in physical and social technologies, and for producing policy implications.JEL Classification: B52, B15, N01, A10I thank Niclas Berggren, Thrainn Eggertsson, Gunnar Eliasson, Geoffrey Hodgson, Dan Johansson, Nils Karlson, Staffan Laestadius, Richard Nelson, Mark Perlman, Viktor Vanberg, Gerhard Wegner, the participants of seminars at the University of Jena and the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments on earlier drafts.     

Contractual exchange and the timing of payment

In this paper we stress the informal institutions that have evolved alongside formal contracts to mitigate agency costs. The timing of payment is a pervasive example of such an informal institution. The basic result of our analysis is that ex post payment is a rational institutional choice of buyers and sellers designed to control the significant transactions costs inherent in certain types of exchanges characterized by interpersonal differences in information. Moreover, the selection of a payment scheme allocates the roles of principal and agent, with the party having the greater likelihood of cheating becoming the agent.     

Robust Institutions

I propose to show how to translate the economic analysis of institutions developed in the tradition of worst case political economy into the lingua franca of robust statistics. An institution will be defined as contingent upon a design theory and the difficulty we consider is the use of the institution by the designer.The technical bridge between institutional robustness and statistical robustness is the the possibility of exploratory data analysis [EDA] with respect to the design theory. In an institutional context with EDA comes the recognition that the model is not completely specified, that we do not fully understand the structure of world before studying it. In a statistical context with EDA comes a non-normal error distribution.The relationship between evolutionary institutions and robust institutions is discussed. A conjecture that rule utilitarianism can be thought of as robust utilitarianism is defended with the historical example of William Paley's discussion of the utility of murder.     

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.