The Veil of Uncertainty Unveiled

A central assumption of constitutional economics is that in the process of constitutional decisionmaking the players' uncertainty about their post-constitutional positions (veil of uncertainty) serves the useful purpose of making unanimity and fairness at the constitutional level more rather than less probable. The paper argues that this assertion is false if the conventional assumption holds true that social contracts are threatened by a prisoners' dilemma incentive structure. By means of a simple two-person game-model it is shown that, if players are fully aware of all their partial interests, agreement on a Pareto-efficient rule will be the iterated dominance equilibrium of the game played at the constitutional level. A veil of uncertainty cannot do better. It may, however, induce disagreement or discrimination, if the prisoners' dilemma violates the cardinal property often assumed. This raises the question why the choice of rules which typically takes place in full knowledge of the players' post-constitutional positions poses so many problems although, from a theoretical point of view, unanimity seems so easy to achieve. Finally, it is examined, if there is any salutary role the veil of uncertainty is able to play in view of a post-constitutional prisoners' dilemma.     

A constitutional paradigm is not enough—would sovereign citizens really agree to manipulative nudges?—A reply to Christian Schubert

In this short note I reply to a comment made by Christian Schubert, who argues that my criticism of libertarian paternalism cannot be upheld under a constitutional economics paradigm. I disagree: it is implausible to assume that sovereign individuals behind a veil of ignorance would actually agree on manipulative nudges from the public sector. Resorting to a constitutional economics paradigm does not diminish the force of the manipulation objection—libertarian paternalism remains morally objectionable. Moreover, where sovereign citizens would agree on permissible (morally legitimate) nudges behind a veil of ignorance, these would no longer constitute “paternalism” under its commonly agreed definition. More constructively, the only morally defensible paternalistic nudges would be those that improve welfare while respecting or, better yet, improving individual autonomy. These are not the typical nudges defended by libertarian paternalists.     

Calculation of Self-Interest and Constitutional Consensus: The Role of Ideology

Constitutional political economy's veil of uncertainty prevents citizens from identifying their specific interests under political rules and facilitates agreement on rules by moving all individuals to an average position. But the calculation of self-interest in such settings is not straight-forward; citizens require a model of how the economy works to predict the effect of rules on welfare. Political ideologies typically supply such models. Citizens subscribing to different ideological models anticipate differential treatment under a given constitutional rule, breaking down the ability of the veil of uncertainty to achieve consensus. Constitutional consensus is unlikely in the absence of ideological consensus.     

Institutional Economics as Theory of Policy Change: Impact of Past Policy Failures on Present Policy

Social scientists have developed several theories for understanding or evaluating policy change over time. Since all costs or benefits are not internalized owing to positive transaction costs, policymaking is always implemented under cost underestimation conditions and, therefore, is imperfect. I call this trait policy failure in this article. Furthermore, I show that a new framework combining the social costs approach and the legal/economic approach in institutional economics is suitable and can be applied to evaluating how past policy failures affect present policy, providing as an example the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan.     

ON EQUITY ASPECTS OF IMPERFECT INCOME REDISTRIBUTION

We develop a theoretical analysis of the impact of imperfect targeting, participation costs and incomplete take-up upon the level of progressivity, vertical equity, horizontal inequity and redistribution exerted by state benefits. An illustration using the distribution of British Supplementary Benefits (now Income Support) indicates that progressivity is roughly untouched, vertical equity and horizontal inequity are increased, and total income redistribution is slightly increased by these redistributive imperfections in 1985 Britain.     

Uncertainty and insurance in strategic market games

Summary. For perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and one with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over to a particular form of imperfect competition. Specifically, I look at three Shapley-Shubik strategic market games: one with contingent commodities, one with Arrow securities traded under imperfect competition and one with Arrow securities traded under perfect competition. First I compare the feasibility constraints of these three games. Then I compare their equilibrium sets. As in Peck and Shell (1989), the only common equilibria between the first and the second game are those which involve no transfer of income across states. However, if the securities markets are competitive, then the set of equilibria of the contingent commodities game and the securities game coincide. Received: June 16, 1997; revised version: April 30, 1998     

Vertical product differentiation under demand uncertainty

In this paper, I examine a quality-then-price game in a fully covered market where firms are uncertain about consumer tastes regarding quality. The equilibrium is characterized under the fixed costs and variable costs of quality improvement, respectively. It is shown that the uncertainty is a differentiation force, and the quality differentiation increases more under variable costs than under fixed costs. In addition, an increase in uncertainty leads to higher profits and higher social welfare regardless of whether under fixed or variable costs. This result contrasts with the lower welfare in the Hotelling model with uncertainty. Finally, an analysis of the case of partial market coverage with uncertainty completes this paper.     

Economic integration and fiscal devolution

In this paper we investigate how economic integration influences the political decision of integration and separation of jurisdictions. In a model with (imperfect) capital mobility, we consider that, not only the redistributive policy itself, but also the level of policy centralization is decided by a majority vote. We find that the net benefit from integration is not monotonic with the level of world capital market integration and present a case where integration of two regions occurs only for intermediate levels of mobility. This conclusion relies on the comparison of the regional majorities’ utility under the various regimes. The benefits from integration arise from the elimination of tax competition across jurisdictions, which allows for more income redistribution, whereas the costs are linked to the diversity of preferences across regions, namely that of the decisive voters. We also show that a federal regime is better than complete centralization in keeping a nation united.     

Governing the commons: future directions for the Ostrom Project

Now, when longitudinal data are available or soon will be, it is important to carefully consider research strategies for the second phase of the Ostrom Project. I recommend a problem oriented approach aimed at answering questions and solving puzzles that have emerged in the last 25–30 years and a focus on the political dimensions of the commons. Reading Lin’s paper in this issue, I found her proposal valuable but too narrow. I suggest that the longitudinal phase of the Project should deal explicitly with institutions and mechanisms for solving conflicts among local participants over how to divide the costs and benefits of using common resources. I offer, as an illustration, a number of research questions that emphasize institutions in the policy and constitutional spheres rather than in the operational one.     

经济改革和宪政转轨

该文研究经济改革和宪政转轨之间的关系,论证国家之间和国家内部不同政治力量间的竞争是宪政转轨的推动力量.通过对俄罗斯和中国的例证,该文分析了两种转轨模式下的特征和问题.结论是,在政治垄断下的经济转轨将被国家机会主义所挟持.经济转轨双轨制产生了宪政转轨的非常高的长期代价,大大超过它赎买既得利益平滑转型的短期好处.经济转轨是后社会主义国家的制度与WTO规则下的全球经济趋同的过程,而不是创造一个本质上不同的制度的创新过程.     

Expressive and Instrumental Voting: The Scylla and Charybdis of Constitutional Political Economy

Brennan and Hamlin [(2002) Constitutional Political Economy 13(4): 299–311] noted that expressive voting still holds at the constitutional phase. The argument, when taken to its necessary conclusion, proves quite problematic for Constitutional Political Economy. Veil mechanisms following Buchanan induce expressive voting at the constitutional phase, removing the normative benefits ascribed to the hypothetical unanimity principle. If the constitution is authored by a small group and the veil is thereby removed, instrumental considerations come to bear and the authors of the constitution establish themselves as Oligarch.     

ANARCHY, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

This paper investigates whether Lockean first claimer property rights should be expected to emerge in anarchy. Individuals behind a veil of uncertainty about their future wealth decide independently whether to commit to using fcrce. Neither the contractarian hypothesis that a thicker veil of uncertainty supports more co-operation nor Demsetz's hypothesis that well-defined property rights emerge as the value of the externality from not having private property increases is unambiguously implied by the model.     

Efficient constitution formation and maintenance: The role of “exit”

A constitution will create mutual gains for all parties only if it is negotiated within an environment in which all parties possess viable exit options. The availability of exit options can substitute for a veil of uncertainty, which is difficult to operationalize in real-world settings. An efficient constitution also will be self-enforcing if it contains rules and principles geared to support political and market competition in the post-constitutional society. Again, the notion of exit is a useful way to characterize this condition for constitutional maintenance.     

Ecological discounting

Which rates should we use to discount costs and benefits of different natures at different time horizons? We answer this question by considering a representative agent consuming two goods whose availability evolves over time in a stochastic way. We extend the Ramsey rule by taking into account the degree of substitutability between the two goods and of the uncertainty surrounding the economic and environmental growths. The rate at which environmental impacts should be discounted is in general different from the one at which monetary benefits should be discounted. We provide arguments in favor of an ecological discount rate smaller than the economic discount rate. In particular, we show that, under certainty and Cobb-Douglas preferences, the difference between the economic and the ecological discount rates equals the difference between the economic and the ecological growth rates. Using data about the link between biodiversity and economic development, I estimate that the rate at which changes in biodiversity should be discounted is 1.5%, whereas changes in consumption should be discounted at 3.2%.     

To draft or not to draft? Inefficiency, generational incidence, and political economy of military conscription

We study the military draft as a form of intergenerational redistribution, taking into account endogenous human capital formation. Introducing the military draft initially benefits the older generation while it harms the young and all future generations. As it distorts human capital formation more severely than an equivalent intergenerational transfer using public debt or pay-as-you-go pensions, the draft can be abolished in a Pareto-improving way if age-dependent taxes are available. In the absence of age-specific taxes, the political allure of the draft can be explained by the specific intergenerational incidence of its costs and benefits.     

The political economy of contributive pensions in developing countries

This paper sheds light on the role of public institutions as a way to reduce tax evasion through a close link between payroll taxation and pension benefits. We use a political economy model in which agents have the possibility to hide part of their earnings in order to avoid taxation and, where the public system is more efficient in providing annuitized pension benefits than the private sector. We show that in the absence of evasion costs, agents are indifferent to the tax rate level as they can always perfectly adapt compliance so as to face their preferred effective tax rate. There is unanimity in favour of the maximum tax rate and, the public pension system is found to be partially contributive in order to increase tax compliance and thus the resources collected. This, in turn, enables higher redistribution toward the worst-off agents. When evasion costs are introduced, perfect substitutability between compliance and taxation breaks down. At the majority-voting equilibrium, individuals at the bottom of the income distribution who are in favour of more redistribution, and those at the top who want to transfer more resources to the old age, form a coalition against middle-income agents, in favour of high tax rates. In addition to the previous tax base argument, the optimal level of the Bismarkian pillar is now chosen so as to account for political support.     

Benefits Transfer: Current Practice and Prospects

This paper introduces a special issue devoted to the benefits transfer methods used as part of benefit costs analysis for policy analysis. Benefits transfer methods, as they are applied for environmental policy analyses, use economic concepts together with existing empirical estimates to predict the incremental benefits from a change in some feature of an environmental resource. After giving two examples of the decisions that analysts confront in performing these analyses, I discuss the interconnections between the papers in this issue and the research challenges that emerged from discussions of them.     

Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty

Abstract. I evaluate a new German regulation that requires retail discounters to guarantee the availability of their products in bargain sales. The regulation is meant to prevent loss leaders. Retailers undermine the regulation's rationale by claiming that rationing is due to demand uncertainty. This paper shows that under demand uncertainty the regulation has ambiguous welfare effects. Effectively, it raises production, which, under imperfect competition, tends to be beneficial. However, the regulation overshoots and decreases welfare if it requires availability for a state of high demand that is relatively unlikely. In this case more sophisticated regulation is required.     

Constitutional Constraints and Redistributive Activities

This paper shows that non-productive activities aimed at influencing the distribution of income might increase when constitutional constraints against redistribution are imposed or strengthened. By facilitating redistribution, on the other hand, influence activities could be limited, and the economic performance improved. We argue that these effects could be important in countries with poorly developed democratic institutions, and that research in constitutional economics needs to be more aware of perverse effects of this kind.