EXPLOITING UNCERTAINTY—INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES AS REAL OPTIONS: A NEW WAY OF THINKING IN ENGINEERING ECONOMICS

A new trend in corporate planning is to exploit uncertainty by taking investment opportunities as real options. This options approach is to complement the conventional net present value (NPV) criterion in evaluating risky investments. In this paper, we take a broad look at the real options approach to various engineering economic decision problems, laying out how it provides an immediate and important perspective on value creation in an uncertain world. Unlike financial options, real options analysisdeals with investments in real assets, which is one of the primary interest areas in engineering economics. For that reason, we believe that any advancement in the real options decision framework will benefit the field of engineering economics.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

商业地产投资的实物期权特性及应用框架研究

商业地产开发投资中存在投资的不可逆性、外部环境的不确定性和决策的灵活性，因而具有实物期权特性。从确定要解决的问题、分析不确定性的来源、鉴别关键的不确定性因素、识别实物期权类型、构建期权定价模型、计算项目价值、检查计算结果和重新设计8个方面，构建了商业地产投资决策的实物期权分析框架。     

Optimal exploration investments under price and geological‐technical uncertainty: a real options model

This article develops a real options model for valuing natural resource exploration investments (e.g. oil or copper) when there is joint price and geological‐technical uncertainty. After a successful several‐stage exploration phase, there is a development investment and an extraction phase. All phases are optimized contingent on price and geological‐technical uncertainty.
Several real options are considered. There are flexible investment schedules for all exploration stages and a timing option for the development investment. Once the mine is developed, there are closure, opening and abandonment options for the extraction phase. Our model maintains a relatively simple valuation structure by collapsing price and geological‐technical uncertainty into a one‐factor model.
We apply the model to a copper exploration prospect and find that a significant fraction of total project value is due to the operational, development and exploration options available to project managers.     

Real options and MNE strategies in Asia Pacific

Asia Pacific offers a lot of promising growth opportunities, but it also presents high levels of uncertainty for multinational enterprises (MNEs). In this paper, we introduce real options theory as a theory of investment under uncertainty, and we discuss its implications for MNEs and their strategies with a focus on the emerging economies in Asia Pacific. We suggest that MNEs must recognize the various sources of uncertainty, as well as the various options embedded in their investments, and real options theory can help them structure and design their investments to benefit from uncertainty. In particular, MNEs need to develop the dynamic capabilities of managing real options in their investments to respond to the evolving economic and institutional environment in the region. This paper also provides several implications for policy makers in Asia Pacific to stimulate investment activities in the region and to help their firms venture successfully in the international market place.

Evaluating growth options as sources of value for pharmaceutical research projects

The financial value of research projects is difficult to assess because they are highly uncertain. Often, the result is either an overly conservative approach to strategic innovation, based on net present value analyses, or an overly aggressive approach based on optimistic qualitative portfolios. R&D project evaluation requires recognizing threats as well as opportunities from uncertain events, and incorporating flexibility in managerial action in response to them. Real options pricing analysis is a widely discussed tool for evaluating such managerial flexibility. The limitation of options pricing lies in its requirement for complete financial markets, in which a replicating asset can be found that reproduces (or, at least, is correlated with) the project’s payoffs in all possible states of the world. However, the major risks of research projects are typically project specific and cannot be replicated in external markets. In this situation, a decision tree is a better tool to represent managerial options during execution of the project, and to evaluate its value. A decision tree is equivalent to options pricing for risks that can be priced in the financial markets (if trading of securities is explicitly included), and moreover, it can incorporate risks and flexibility that are not traded in financial markets. Using decision trees, we demonstrate a quantitative evaluation of compound growth options from research at BestPharma, a large international pharmaceutical company. A growth option is a future opportunity that may arise from a current R&D investment. The growth option may not be related to the primary purpose of the R&D project, or not even be directly foreseeable. Kester (1984) has argued that growth options may account for a large part of project value. BestPharma faced the problem of choosing among several strategic research initiatives. They developed a decision tree representation of the projects, which helped to provide transparency about project value and strategic options. Most importantly, carefully thinking through the tree helped to identify growth options, represented by additional branches in the tree, and to quantify that they represented major sources of value.     

Pricing real growth options when the underlying assets have jump diffusion processes: the case of R&D investments

Numerous previous studies have demonstrated that research and development (R&D) investments can be evaluated by a real growth options approach. However, few studies have constructed evaluating models which consider the important R&D characteristics, including uncertainty regarding the project value, investment cost, and jump diffusion processes. The contribution of this study is not only to derive a model for evaluating R&D investments to conform to these key characteristics of R&D activities but also to build a real option pricing method that is more general than comparative important models, such as the theoretical papers of Black and Scholes (1973), Merton (1976), and Fischer (1978), and the application paper of Brach and Paxson (2001). This study also presents sensitivity analyses which illustrate the dynamic relationship between the real growth option value and the project value, investment cost, and main jump parameters. Hopefully, the results of this study can provide a useful reference for managers, and help them make better evaluations of R&D investments.     

Strategic NPV: Real Options and Strategic Games under Different Information Structures

Research summary : Among the most difficult firm strategic choices is the trade‐off between making a long‐term commitment or holding off on investment in the face of uncertainty. To operationalize strategic management theory under demand, technological and competitive uncertainty, we develop a Strategic Net Present Value (NPV) framework that integrates real options and game theory to quantify value components and interactions at the interface between NPV, real options, and strategic games. Our approach results in new propositions clarifying the way learning‐experience conditions, technological uncertainty, and proprietary information interact to tilt the balance in the interplay between wait‐and‐see flexibility and strategic commitment. As such, Strategic NPV adds to our understanding of the conditions where NPV, real options, or strategic thinking are more relevant. Managerial summary : This study develops and elucidates implementation of a new valuation construct, “Strategic Net Present Value (NPV),” that integrates real options and game theory to more accurately portray strategic decisions underlying management theory. Among the most difficult firm strategic choices in capital intensive industries, such as energy, mining, chip manufacturing, and infrastructure development, is the trade‐off between making a long‐term commitment or holding off on investment in the face of demand, technological, and competitive uncertainties. The study provides new insights on the way various conditions, such as learning‐experience effects, technological uncertainty, and proprietary information, interact to tilt the balance in the interplay between commitment and wait‐and‐see flexibility. As such, Strategic NPV adds to our understanding of when NPV, real options, or strategic thinking matter more critically for decision making. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Real options and real value: the role of employee incentives to make specific knowledge investments

Real options reasoning emphasizes the strategic value of making flexible investments in a turbulent environment. Employees' investments in specific human capital are often critical to the success of a real option project, but the very flexibility that allows a firm to change course in response to new information also affects employees' incentives to make such specific human capital investments. We develop a model of real option investment that explicitly incorporates the role of employee incentives. The model suggests that the effect of investing in a real option project on employee incentives may be positive, further increasing the value of the project, or negative, sometimes more than offsetting the benefit of flexibility and resulting in reduced project value. Therefore, firms and managers should take into consideration the role of employee incentives when applying real options logic to investment decision making. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Variance-enhancing corporate entrepreneurship under deregulation: An option portfolio approach

The current study draws upon the real option portfolio theory to examine the relationship between deregulation and corporate entrepreneurship. We propose that a firm could respond to deregulation with variance-enhancing corporate entrepreneurial activities (CEAs), which increase the portfolio value of real options to exploit the upside opportunities and constrain the downside loss. We develop two dimensions of CEAs—frequency and diversity—to capture the value of the option portfolio, and we propose that these two dimensions contribute to a company’s long-term equity return and innovation performance. We test these arguments with 526 Chinese listed firms in five innovative industries from 2001 to 2005, and we find significant support for our hypotheses. Our empirical findings and the option portfolio approach carry important implications for entrepreneurship theory and policy. The CEA portfolio could be a useful tool to configure and allocate strategic investments proactively.     

Property Investment and Rental Rate under Housing Price Uncertainty: A Real Options Approach

The conventional wisdom that housing prices are the present value of future rents ignores the fact that unlike dividends on stocks, rent is not discretionary. Housing price uncertainty can affect household property investments, which in turn affect rent. By extending the theory of investment under uncertainty, we model the renter's decision to buy a house and the landlord's decision to sell as the exercising of real options of waiting and examine real options effects on rent. Using data from Hong Kong and mainland China, we find a significant effect of housing price on rent and draw important policy implications.     

Time delays,competitive interdependence,and firm performance

Research summary: Competitors' experiences of prior interactions shape patterns of rivalry over time. However, mechanisms that influence learning from competitive experience remain largely unexamined. We develop a computational model of dyadic rivalry to examine how time delays in competitors' feedback influence their learning. Time delays are inevitable because the process of executing competitive moves takes time, and the market's responses unfold gradually. We analyze how these lags impact learning and, subsequently, firms' competitive behavior, industry profits, and performance heterogeneity. In line with the extant learning literature, our findings reveal that time delays hinder learning from experience. However, this counterintuitively increases rivals' profits by reducing their investments in costly head‐to‐head competition. Time delays also engender performance heterogeneity by causing rivals' paths of competitive behavior to diverge. Managerial summary: While competitive actions such as new product launches, geographical expansion, and marketing campaigns require up‐front resource commitments, the potential lift in profits takes time to materialize. This time delay, combined with uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of competitive actions, makes it difficult for managers to learn reliably from previous investment decisions. This results in systematic underinvestment in competitive actions. The severity of the underinvestment grows as the time delay between an investment and its positive results increases. Counterintuitively, however, competitors' collective underinvestment increases profit‐making opportunities. In industries with large time delays, companies that do invest in competitive actions are likely to enjoy high returns on investment. It is also likely that rivals' paths of competitive behavior bifurcate. Together, these mechanisms generate large differences in competitors' profits. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Valuation of Learning Options in Software Development Under Private and Market Risk

Commercial software development is an inherently uncertain activity. Private risk is high, schedule and cost overruns are common, and market success is elusive. Such circumstances call for a disciplined project evaluation approach. This paper addresses the use of market and earned value management data in assessing the economic value of commercial software development projects that are simultaneously subject to schedule, development cost, and market risk. The assessment is based on real options analysis, a financial valuation technique that can tackle dynamic investment decisions under uncertainty. The paper demonstrates the application of real options analysis to a development scenario that consists of two consecutive stages: a mandatory prototyping stage and an optional full-development stage. The full-development stage is undertaken only if the prototype is successful and the market outlook is sufficiently positive at the end of the prototyping stage, thus giving the full-development stage the flavor of an option. The project's staged design increases its value. Real options analyses capture the extra value due to optionality.     

Real options reasoning and a new look at the R&D investment strategies of pharmaceutical firms

Real options reasoning (ROR) is a conceptual approach to strategic investment that takes into account the value of preserving the right to make future choices under uncertain conditions. In this study, we explore firms' motivations to invest in a new option. We find, based on an analysis of a large sample of patents by firms active in the pharmaceutical industry, that their investments in R&D are consistent with the logic of ROR. We identify three constructs—scope of opportunity, prior experience, and competitive effects—which have an influence on firms' propensity to invest in new R&D options and which could usefully be incorporated in a strategic theory of investment. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploration and Resource Commitments in Unequal Partnerships: An Examination of Corporate Venture Capital Investments

While established firms' relationships with external ventures may have significant strategic benefits, the realization of such benefits is fraught with considerable uncertainty. The real options and interorganizational learning literatures present an interesting trade‐off for established firms regarding commitment of resources in a partnership. This study seeks to enhance our understanding of how firms manage these trade‐offs when committing resources to external venturing initiatives. We examine the magnitude of resources initially committed by an established firm to an external venturing partnership in the context of corporate venture capital (CVC) investments. While a real options approach suggests that resource commitments should be lowered in the presence of uncertainty regarding realization of benefits, the interorganizational literature emphasizes that resource commitments may be essential for building quality relationships that expedite learning. Corporate investors, who invest in new ventures in order to gain strategic benefits, face higher uncertainty when their investment objectives involve greater exploration. However, greater exploration also increases investors' need to learn from their portfolio ventures. We, therefore, predicted that the degree of exploration would have a U‐shaped relationship with the investor's resource commitment in a venture. We also expected that factors that serve to decrease the investor's uncertainty, i.e., investor experience diversity and venture affiliation to prominent venture capitalists, would moderate the U‐shaped relationship between exploration and resource commitment. The predictions of the study are tested on a sample of 248 initial investments in private ventures made by incumbent firms in the computer, semiconductor, and telecommunications industries between 1996 and 2000. We find some support for our hypotheses. This study contributes to the external venturing literature on CVC investments by examining the determinants of the magnitude of resource commitment to new ventures, and integrates real options perspective, which advocates low resource commitments under uncertainty, with the organizational learning literature, which argues for greater resource commitment to secure partner cooperation. The results of this study reveal interesting insights into how CVC investors manage individual investments to generate strategic benefits.     

Going short‐term or long‐term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack

Research summary: We draw on behavioral agency theory to explain how decision heuristics associated with CEO stock options interact with firm slack to shape the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategies (temporal orientation). Our findings suggest CEO current option wealth substitutes for the influence of slack resources in encouraging a long‐term orientation, while prospective option wealth enhances the positive effect of slack on temporal orientation. Our theory offers explanations for non‐findings in previous analysis of the relationship between CEO equity based pay and temporal orientation and provides the insights that CEO incentives created by stock options (1) enhance the effect of available slack upon temporal orientation and (2) can both incentivize and de‐incentivize destructive short‐termism, depending upon the values of current and prospective option wealth. Managerial summary: We explore how compensation design can play a role in affecting the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategic projects. When the CEOs have accumulated option wealth, they are more likely to invest in the long term. Yet when they have a large number of recently granted options with the potential to generate significant wealth in the event of successful risk taking, the CEO is more likely to prefer the short term in order to achieve personal wealth gains more quickly. The more liquid assets the firm holds, the weaker both of the aforementioned effects. An implication for boards is that they should anticipate CEO short‐termism if the CEO has been granted new options, underlining the potential negative consequences of option compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Confounding changes in averages with marginal effects: How anchoring can destroy economic value in strategic investment assessments

Profit maximization requires that decision makers assess marginal profits. We demonstrate that decision makers often confound marginal profits with changes in average profits (e.g., changes in return‐on‐investment). This results in systematic deviations from profit maximization where decision makers forgo profit‐enhancing investments that reduce average profits or engage in loss‐enhancing investments that decrease average losses. In other words, average profit becomes an anchor by which new investments are assessed. We conduct two decision‐making experiments that show this bias and demonstrate it is pronounced when average profit data are accessible or task‐relevant. Moreover, we find within‐subject effects across experiments, which helps demonstrate the mechanism that invokes the bias. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Option value and entry timing

When facing uncertainty, firms entering new markets can make initial foothold investments rather than undertake large sunk investments. Such investments are real call option purchases. They offer management flexibility, but also raise questions about whether and when to increase commitments to new markets. We present an entry timing decision criterion and discuss its application to a variety of market entry situations. Optimal timing for exercising real options depends on current dividends, possibilities for preemption, and whether the option is simple or compound, proprietary or shared. Our analysis reveals critical assumptions and new theoretical insights regarding market entry timing. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.