Corporate Life Cycle and Earnings Benchmarks

We examine whether and how corporate life cycle significantly influences meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (MBE). We find that corporate life cycle plays a significant role in a firm's meeting or beating earnings benchmarks behaviour. Developing strategies that fit into the stage of corporate life cycle is crucial for corporate success. MBE is an important financial goal that requires strategies. In this study, we examine whether and how corporate life cycle significantly influences MBE. Specifically, we focus on the incentives of MBE in growth and mature firms. We find that corporate life cycle significantly influences a firm's tendency to meet or beat zero earnings, prior earnings and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Based on logit regressions for the period from 1988 to 2008, the results indicate that growth firms are more likely to meet or beat all three earnings benchmarks. Overall, the results of this study indicate that a firm's MBE behaviour should be examined in the context of its life cycle stage.     

The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations

This paper finds that firms that meet or beat current analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) enjoy a higher return over the quarter than firms with similar quarterly earnings forecast errors that fail to meet these expectations. Further, such a premium to MBE, although somewhat smaller, exists in the cases where MBE is likely to have been achieved through earnings or expectations management. The findings also indicate that the premium to MBE is a leading indicator of future performance. This premium and its predictive ability are only marginally affected by whether the MBE is genuine or the result of earnings or expectations management.     

Non-GAAP earnings disclosures around regulation G – The case of “implicit non-GAAP reporting”

We identify a phenomenon related to non-GAAP earnings disclosure and examine its prevalence around Regulation G (RegG). Specifically, we analyze to what extent firms only disclose adjustments to GAAP earnings instead of entire adjusted earnings figures thereby not providing the ideal non-GAAP to GAAP reconciliation promoted by RegG. We refer to this reporting behavior as “implicit non-GAAP reporting” and ask three different questions: How is “implicit non-GAAP reporting” related with the adoption of RegG? What type of firm reports implicit non-GAAP measures? What are the motives for “implicit non-GAAP reporting” post-RegG? Our analyses yield three key findings. First, the frequency of “implicit non-GAAP reporting” spikes after the regulatory intervention but to a lesser degree also existed before. Second, during the post-RegG time period, the prevalence of “implicit non-GAAP reporting” is much higher among firms who only started to report non-GAAP earnings after RegG was enacted (starters) than among those, which continued to disclose non-GAAP earnings across the regulatory intervention (continuers). Third, we show that only for starters, “implicit non-GAAP reporting” is associated with motives of beating analyst earnings forecasts as well as experiencing GAAP losses. Our study provides important insights for regulators, firms and academics into "implicit non-GAAP reporting" by examining properties and determinants of implicit vs. explicit non-GAAP earnings for different types of firms around RegG.     

Management of operating cash flows before and after the scandals in the early 2000s: An examination of meeting or beating analyst cash flow forecasts*

We examine whether the stock market premium assigned to meeting or beating analyst estimates of cash flows from operations (hereafter, “CFO”) has changed after the publicized accounting scandals in the early 2000 s (“post-scandals period”). We also examine whether firms’ CFO management behavior associated with meeting or beating analyst CFO forecasts has changed after the scandals. We find that the market reward for firms that meet or just beat analyst CFO forecasts (“small beaters”) has increased in the post-scandals period, especially when the accuracy of CFO forecasts is relatively high. We also find that the extent of CFO management engaged in by small beaters has increased after the accounting scandals and that these firms appear to resort to the timing of CFO. Further, we find evidence that the “underpricing” of CFO is weaker in the post-scandals period that exhibits a greater extent of CFO management than before, suggesting that the reduction in the underpricing of CFO in the post-scandals period is at least partially due to CFO management. Overall, our findings suggest that firms responded to the rising importance of cash flow information after a series of accounting scandals by inflating reported CFO to a larger extent than they did before.     

Adopting a Label: Heterogeneity in the Economic Consequences Around IAS/IFRS Adoptions

This study examines liquidity and cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions. In contrast to prior work, we focus on the firm‐level heterogeneity in the economic consequences, recognizing that firms have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards. Some firms may make very few changes and adopt IAS/IFRS more in name, while for others the change in standards could be part of a strategy to increase their commitment to transparency. To test these predictions, we classify firms into “label” and “serious” adopters using firm‐level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting behavior, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. We analyze whether capital‐market effects are different across “serious” and “label” firms. While on average liquidity and cost of capital often do not change around voluntary IAS/IFRS adoptions, we find considerable heterogeneity: “Serious” adoptions are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, whereas “label” adoptions are not. We obtain similar results when classifying firms around mandatory IFRS adoption. Our findings imply that we have to exercise caution when interpreting capital‐market effects around IAS/IFRS adoption as they also reflect changes in reporting incentives or in firms’ broader reporting strategies, and not just the standards.     

The effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on expectations management: International evidence

We examine whether Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was effective in limiting the expectations management of US firms as well as ADR and foreign-listed firms to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts. Domestic US firms are required to comply with Reg FD; however, ADR firms are explicitly exempted from its provisions. Thus, ADR firms are thought to represent a control against which US firm expectations management is measured. We find a decrease in expectations management for both US and ADR firms. We find that the post-Reg-FD changes for US and ADR firms are not significantly different. This suggests Reg FD was not effective in limiting forecast guidance or, alternatively, both US and ADR firms responded to Reg FD by reducing forecast guidance. We provide additional evidence that ADR firms experienced a significant decrease in expectations management relative to other foreign-listed firms suggesting that ADR firms voluntarily complied with Reg FD. Overall, our evidence suggests that Reg FD worked to reduce expectations management to meet or beat expectations for both US and ADR firms.     

Corporate investment and earnings surprises

ABSTRACT

We find that firm-level investment is negatively related to the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ short-term EPS forecasts. In a 35-year panel dataset of US based companies, we find evidence that suggests firms with the best growth opportunities, opaque firms, and firms with higher than usual bonus compensation, are the ones to alter investment in order to beat benchmarks. Utilizing the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley as a natural experiment we find that firms trade off accruals-based earnings management in lieu of investment cuts. Results are robust to a number of covariates, and endogeneity or reverse causality does not seem to drive our inferences. This study suggests that, consistent with survey results from Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal [2005. “The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 40: 3–73], managers may reduce or delay corporate investment to meet or beat short-term earnings benchmarks.     

The role of corporate governance in meeting or beating analysts’ forecast

Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is a topic of considerable interest in the academic and business communities. Some studies indicate a favorable market response when firms meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, but others suggest managers opportunistically manage earnings to achieve earnings targets. We investigate the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and meeting or exceeding analysts’ expectations and find that attributes of corporate governance are related to the likelihood of consistently meeting or exceeding consensus forecasts. We extend current literature by showing that some attributes of strong corporate governance mechanisms lower agency costs associated with consistently meeting or beating analysts’ expectations. We also find that compensation committees reward managers for consistently meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

A study of firms surrounding the threshold of Sarbanes–Oxley Section 404 Compliance

This study examines whether firms surrounding the Sarbanes–Oxley Section 404 market value compliance threshold behave opportunistically to reduce their market value to avoid compliance with Section 404. We find evidence that those firms reduce their market value temporarily during threshold measurement quarters, whereas control firms experience increasing market value. We find strong evidence of dampened stock returns and some evidence of insider trading as means to reduce the float. Additionally, we find that downward earnings management is used as a mechanism to alter investors’ expectations of firm value in order to temporarily reduce stock prices. We consider this opportunistic evidence of regulatory avoidance. Finally, we find that the likelihood of avoidance increases with the power of the CEO and decreases with the strength of the monitoring of the CEO, which suggest that avoidance is more likely to happen in firms with poor corporate governance mechanisms.     

“好”的不确定性、“坏”的不确定性与股票市场定价——基于中国股市高频数据分析

不确定性并不是都是“坏”的,“好”的不确定性也同样存在。本文采用Barndorff-Nielsen et al.(2010)提出的已实现半方差作为股票市场“好”的不确定性和“坏”的不确定性的代理指标,并在此基础上构建了相对符号变差(RSV),分析RSV对中国股市定价的影响。基于2007-2017年中国A股5分钟高频数据的实证研究发现:(1)与理论解释相一致,RSV与股票收益之间呈现负相关关系。无论是基于单变量分组、双变量分组还是公司层面的截面回归,这种影响在经济上和统计上都显著。(2)RSV是独立于已实现偏度的一个重要定价因子,且RSV对股票的定价能力强于已实现偏度的定价能力。(3)RSV对中国股市的影响是状态依存的,相对于经济景气程度高的状态,在经济景气程度低的状态下RSV定价影响更大。(4)基于RSV构建的投资组合的表现明显优于市场超额收益率组合、SMB组合和HML组合的表现。     

“原罪”嫌疑、制度环境与民营企业慈善捐赠

2018年11月1日,习近平同志在民营企业座谈会上的讲话指出,要落实按照罪刑法定、疑罪从无的原则,切实保护民营企业家的人身和财产安全,这是因为"原罪"嫌疑是中国民营企业发展史上无法回避的一个重要问题,长期使得企业家面临企业合法性地位能否获得政府与社会公众认可的担忧,产生了诸多的微观经济后果。本文以2004-2016年间中国A股民营上市公司作为研究样本,根据企业初始产权获取过程中是否涉及公有产权到私有产权的转变作为对民营企业"原罪"嫌疑的度量,实证检验了"原罪"嫌疑是否以及如何影响民营企业的慈善捐赠行为。结果发现,由于"原罪"嫌疑所引致的民营企业合法性得不到正式认可与保护的威胁,背负"原罪"嫌疑的民营企业有动机通过慈善捐赠来讨好政府和社会公众以便降低这种威胁,而且这一正向影响关系随着企业所在省市的制度环境的完善而减弱。进一步本文还发现,"原罪"嫌疑对民营企业慈善捐赠水平的正向影响关系在不存在政治联系的企业以及实际控制人登上富豪榜后表现得更为明显。     

The determinants and valuation effects of classification choice on the statement of cash flows

In this paper we exploit the choice allowed by International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) regarding the presentation of interest payments on the cash flow statement to answer two related questions: First, whether the classification choice is explained by firm reporting incentives and second, whether it is value relevant. Using a UK sample, we find that firms reporting losses, with a greater proportion of their debt stemming from public sources, with CFO-based covenants and greater increases in leverage in the year of adoption are less likely to report interest payments in cash flows from operating activities (CFOA). Results also suggest that the incentive to meet or beat analyst CFO forecasts decreases, but strong corporate governance increases the probability of including interest payments in CFOA. Based on the assumption that the decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA captures lower disclosure quality or poor future expected performance, we posit that these firms should also exhibit lower valuations. Results obtained after correcting for self-selection bias confirm this assertion. We conclude that managers’ decision not to classify interest payments in CFOA is consistent with the opportunistic use of the choice allowed by IFRS.     

Beating market expectations and the pricing of firms’ probability of default

This study explores the impact of beating analysts' forecasts on investors' perceptions about firms' default probability. The information contained in analysts’ forecasts, both earnings and revenues, provides additional information to investors in pricing CDSs. While previous research has focused on the impact of beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, this study shows that firms that beat analysts' revenue forecasts also experience, on average, a decrease in the CDS premium around the earnings announcement date. This study also documents that the effect is stronger when firms beat/miss both earnings and revenue forecasts. When firms beat (miss) earnings and miss (beat) revenues, the effect of earnings is the dominant signal. These effects are stronger for firms with high levels of default risk.     

The Effects of Guidance Frequency and Guidance Goal on Managerial Decisions

We conduct an experiment to examine the effects of guidance frequency (frequent vs. infrequent) and guidance goal (accuracy vs. meet/beat vs. truthful) on managers’ operating decisions. We find that frequent guiders sacrifice total earnings for quarterly earnings predictability irrespective of their guidance goals. Furthermore, when guidance is infrequent, guiders with accuracy goals opt for quarterly earnings predictability over total earnings more often than do guiders with either meet/beat goals or truthful goals. These findings have implications for regulators and investors in terms of the unintended consequences of requesting frequent earnings guidance. Further, while managers may perceive that accuracy goals can help their firms establish forecasting and reporting reputations, we show that accuracy goals may result in dysfunctional internal managerial decisions, particularly when guidance is issued infrequently.     

Mandatory Environmental Disclosures by Companies Complying with IASs/IFRSs: The Cases of France,Germany, and the UK

This study investigates whether the adoption of a single set of accounting standards, such as IASs/IFRSs, guarantees the harmonization of accounting practices within a country and across countries, or whether differences in reporting practices persist because of dissimilarities in reporting habits and institutional settings. To this end, we investigate whether the level of environmental disclosure under IFRSs is related to the size of the reporting firm, and the strength of legal and regulatory constraints on environmental disclosures in the country where the firm is domiciled. Results indicate (1) that environmental disclosures imposed by IFRSs increase with firm size, and (2) that firms domiciled in countries with constraining environmental disclosure regulations (i.e., France and the UK) report more on environmental issues than firms domiciled in countries with weakly constraining regulations (i.e., Germany). This suggests a strong impact of national regulations on IFRS reporting. Taken as a whole, our results support the view that IFRSs are not applied consistently across firms and across countries, notably because of persistence of reporting traditions and discrepancies in national legal requirements.     

Overvalued equity,benchmark beating and unexpected accruals

We investigate the extent to which the overvaluation hypothesis provides incentives for managers to beat earnings benchmarks, and whether this benchmark beating can be reliably interpreted as evidence of earnings management. We carefully identify firms immediately above earnings benchmarks that have a priori, overvaluation‐based incentives to achieve the benchmark. We therefore focus on benchmark‐beating observations where manipulation is most likely, providing a more powerful test of the existence of opportunistic financial reporting. Consistent with overvaluation‐related incentives encouraging earnings management, we find that overvalued firms that just exceed levels‐related earnings benchmarks have higher unexpected accruals than firms with less extreme valuations.     

Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts’ targets through tax expense decreases

Returns are positive when firms meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts, but negative when firms miss. Prior research finds little substantial discount for managing earnings to beat the forecasts via accruals generally. We consider whether the market reward for beating the forecast is smaller when firms use tax expense decreases, which are visible and transparent at the earnings announcement date, unlike accruals. When firms beat analysts’ forecasts by decreasing their tax expense relative to the third-quarter rate, the market discounts the reward by an economically significant amount: approximately 86%. We document lower persistence of current-year tax changes for those firms that decrease tax expense to beat the target. The observed discount for beating the forecast only because of a third to fourth quarter tax decrease may reflect market perceptions of the lack of persistence of the decrease.     

Creating a Bigger Bath Using the Deferred Tax Valuation Allowance

Abstract:  The provisions of SFAS No. 109 allow US companies to make an earnings big bath even bigger through the establishment of a deferred tax valuation allowance. At the time a firm recognizes a non-cash charge, it also recognizes a deferred tax asset to represent the future tax benefits of the charge. Recognition of the deferred tax asset partially mitigates the negative earnings impact of the special charge. However, if the firm does not expect to have sufficient future taxable income to utilize the future tax benefits of the charge, SFAS No. 109 requires the firm to establish a deferred tax valuation allowance, effectively eliminating the recognized deferred tax asset. Thus, the establishment of the valuation allowance amplifies the negative earnings impact of the non-cash charge. We use a valuation allowance prediction model to identify firms that create a larger-than-expected valuation allowance; these firms may be creating a large valuation allowance as a reserve to be used to manage earnings in a subsequent period. We find that the vast majority of these larger-than-expected valuation allowances apparently reflect informed management pessimism about the future in that these firms actually do have poorer operating performance in subsequent periods. We do not find any evidence that subsequent reversals of valuation allowances are used to turn a loss into a profit. However, we do find a very small number of firms that appear to have used a valuation allowance reversal to meet or beat the mean analyst forecast.     

Liquidity risk,leverage and long-run IPO returns

We examine the risk-return characteristics of a rolling portfolio investment strategy where more than 6000 Nasdaq initial public offering (IPO) stocks are bought and held for up to 5 years. The average long-run portfolio return is low, but IPO stocks appear as “longshots”, as 5-year buy-and-hold returns of 1000% or more are somewhat more frequent than for non-issuing Nasdaq firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. The typical IPO firm is of average Nasdaq market capitalization but has relatively low book-to-market ratio. We also show that IPO firms exhibit relatively high stock turnover and low leverage, which may lower systematic risk exposures. To examine this possibility, we launch an easily constructed “low-minus-high” (LMH) stock turnover portfolio as a liquidity risk factor. The LMH factor produces significant betas for broad-based stock portfolios, as well as for our IPO portfolio and a comparison portfolio of seasoned equity offerings. The factor-model estimation also includes standard characteristic-based risk factors, and we explore mimicking portfolios for leverage-related macroeconomic risks. Because they track macroeconomic aggregates, these mimicking portfolios are relatively immune to market sentiment effects. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the realized return on the IPO portfolio is commensurable with the portfolio's risk exposures, as defined here.