腐败与"马路杀手"的经济学解释

道路安全事故多发,可能是一个国家经济成长过程中某个阶段很难避免的现象.而一旦越过这个阶段,道路安全事故比例就会降低.     

特色店应有"特色"

企业与商品经营有生命周期的轮回,商店的经营同样也面临着转型与升级的挑战.由美国零售业的发展历史可知,每一种零售商店都有一个快速成长与辉煌的阶段,也有其不可抗拒的衰退阶段,而且由成长到衰退的大限有愈来愈缩短的趋势,由80年、40年至上个世纪80年代后缩短到只有15年.     

虹星科技侯广琦:引领"刷眼"时代

转变 谈起这三年的创业经历,天津中科虹星科技有限公司(下称"虹星科技")创始人兼总经理侯广琦博士所面临的转变可能比过往任何一个人生阶段都多得多.从中国科学院的副研究员成为科技企业创始人,侯广琦最大的感悟是从事课题研究和从事企业管理之间有着天渊之别.     

融资约束、企业规模与成长动态

利用2001～2010年中国制造业上市公司数据,采用面板数据VAR模型分析融资约束、企业规模与成长动态之间的关系。实证分析表明:削减融资约束可以推动企业的规模扩张与企业的成长,同时企业自身的成长可以降低企业的融资约束、促使企业规模扩大;而企业规模扩张会带来企业成长率的下降,初期受到融资约束较大而后会减缓企业的融资约束。这一研究可以为发展金融市场,削减融资约束、促进企业成长进而为推动中国经济增长提供经验证据。     

企业成长周期与筹资方式选择的关系

企业从注册成立开始会经历不同的成长阶段,而每个成长阶段企业面对的外部坏境,内部特征都各不相同,应该选择和可供选择的筹资方式也存在着差异。由于每个成长周期内外部环境所带来的风险迥然不同,而风险是影响筹资方式选择的主要因素。所以,研究成长周期与筹资方式的关系并根据企业在每一成长阶段的不同特性选择恰当的筹资方式对企业本阶段及下一阶段的发展起着举足轻重的作用。     

贷款卡要"卡"住企业逃债

贷款卡的使用和推广,对于强化信贷管理,防止企业逃废银行债务起到了重要作用,但据调查,当前贷款卡管理中存在的一些问题,对少数企业逃废银行债务的行为难以起到有效的约束作用.     

基于企业生命周期理论的企业可持续发展探讨

一、企业生命周期理论和研究现状 企业的成长过程如同人的成长过程要经历幼年、青年、中年、老年等阶段一样,也要经历不同的阶段.在每一个不同的阶段上,都有不同的特点和危机.企业的这种成长过程和阶段称之为企业的生命周期.     

融资约束下企业波动对企业成长影响的实证研究——基于我国上市公司数据

从我国1991年至2012年上市公司微观面板数据出发,实证检验了我国企业波动对企业成长的影响以及融资约束对这一关系的影响。研究结果表明:企业波动对企业成长的影响随着企业融资约束的变化具有非线性,当企业融资约束程度低于临界值时,企业波动对企业成长的影响由负转为正,并且这一结论对于不同所有制和不同规模的企业是稳健的。还进一步以2008年全球金融危机前后为例对研究结论进行了说明:2008年金融危机后我国民营企业和中小企业遭受了更为严重的融资约束,有很多企业融资约束程度高于临界值,使得企业波动对企业成长存在负向影响,但也有很多企业融资约束程度低于临界值,这些企业仍然存在"机会成本效应",使得企业波动对企业成长有正面影响。     

融资需求、融资约束与盈余管理

本文从企业融资视角,分为融资约束和融资需求研究了融资对于企业盈余管理的作用。通过对盈余管理行为的成本收益分析发现:虽然融资约束和融资需求在理论上都可能导致企业盈余管理行为的增加,但是由融资约束引发的盈余操控成本较大,从而在一定程度上对企业的盈余管理行为起抑制作用;而由融资需求引致的盈余管理行为同样会导致较高的操控成本,但是由于需求较大,相应的盈余管理所带来的效用水平也较高,其愿意承担更高的沉没成本,从而导致较多的盈余管理行为。这从理论上解释了融资对于盈余管理的双重作用问题。该结论在运用我国中小板企业2004-2012年的数据进行检验时成立。     

书评

企业成长之痛(第4版)作者:[美]埃里克·G·弗拉姆豪茨伊冯·兰德尔译者:黄震亚董航出版:清华大学出版社日期:2011年7月市场经济中的中国企业已不同程度地体现出成长周期性,企业有哪些成长阶段,应该如何正确管理企业成长的各个阶段,一直困扰着中国众多管理人员或创业者。本书作者利用企业成长周期理论,结合自身对创业型企业的研究经历和咨询经验,阐述企业     

Are both managerial morality and talent important to firm performance? Evidence from Chinese public firms

Morality and talent are two important factors to consider when selecting managers. This study examines the relation among managerial morality, talent, and firm performance by manually collecting morality data in a sample of non-financial Chinese public firms during 2008–2018. We find that both managerial morality and talent are important to firm performance. In particular, managerial morality is positively associated with firm performance regardless of ownership or legal environment, but managerial talent is associated with better firm performance only in non-state-owned enterprises and in a strong legal environment. On the other hand, managerial talent cannot improve or may even harm firm performance when managerial morality is low, but managerial talent can improve firm performance when managerial morality is high.     

Managerial talent and managerial practices: Are they complements?

We examine the role of managerial talent and its interaction with managerial practices in determining firm performance. We build a matched firm-director panel dataset for the universe of limited liability companies in Italy, tracking directors across different firms over time. We define managerial talent as the individual contribution to the variation of the firms’ total factor productivity, estimated using a two-way fixed effects model. Combining the data with survey information on a representative sample of firms, we then document that our measure of talent correlates with ex-ante and ex-post indicators of ability, i.e. managers’ educational attainment and their forecast precision with respect to the firm’s future performance. Most important, we leverage information on the adoption of managerial practices within the firm to examine potential synergies between managerial talent and structured managerial practices, thus bridging two separate strands of the literature. While talent and structured practices are positively associated with firm productivity on their own, there is evidence of complementarities between the two. These findings hold both in a cross-sectional setting and in a panel analysis that accounts for time-invariant firm heterogeneity. Overall, our results indicate that the effectiveness of managerial practices varies with managers’ ability to implement them.     

Reexamining the managerial ownership effect on firm value

Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership align the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.     

管理层权力对企业绩效的影响研究——基于企业内部治理机制视角

以我国主板上市企业数据为基础,实证检验了上市企业管理层权力对企业绩效的影响,内部治理机制对管理层权力——企业绩效敏感性的影响。实证结果表明,内部治理机制影响管理层权力与企业绩效之间关系的敏感性,当不考虑内部治理机制时,企业绩效与管理层权力综合变量在1%水平上显著正相关,具有较高教育背景和持有企业股权的管理层,能为企业带来更好的业绩。当考虑内部治理机制时,企业绩效与管理层权力综合变量仅在10%水平上正相关。管理层权力综合变量对股权制衡度较低和独立董事比重较高的企业的绩效具有显著正向影响。     

The effect of managers on M&As

In this paper, we document diverse levels of managerial ability and firm performance in the cross section of acquiring firms. Acquirers with strong managerial ability realize higher announcement-period abnormal returns and experience better post-merger firm performance than their low-ability counterparts. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns and show that the observed variation in acquirer abnormal returns is attributed to the heterogeneity of managerial ability fixed effects across acquirers. Managerial ability adds value to acquirers, especially in stock-financed acquisitions, implying that the method of payment is not driving the negative stock-financed valuation effect documented in previous literature. Moreover, we find that target firms with strongly ingrained growth potential and low levels of financial constraint and bankruptcy risk are highly favored by skilled acquiring managers.     

Identifying and boosting “Gazelles”: Evidence from business accelerators

Why is high-growth entrepreneurship scarce in developing countries? Does this scarcity reflect firm capabilities constraints? We explore these questions using as a laboratory an accelerator in Colombia that selects participants using scores from randomly assigned judges and offers them training, advice, and visibility but no cash. Exploiting exogenous differences in judges’ scoring generosity, we show that alleviating constraints to firm capabilities unlocks innovative entrepreneurs’ potential but does not transform subpar ideas into high-growth firms. The results demonstrate that some high-potential entrepreneurs in developing economies face firm capabilities constraints and accelerators can help identify these entrepreneurs and boost their growth.     

Managerial Private Benefits and Overinvestment

According to agency theory, we hypothesize that underpayment of top management motivates management to overinvest. Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies for the period 2005-10, we assess the effect of managerial compensation on overinvestment and the effect of overinvestment on managerial private benefits, including future compensation and perquisites, as well as on firm performance. We find that underpayment does motivate overinvestment, which increases managerial private benefits but not firm value.     

An Agency Analysis of Firm Diversification: The Consequences of Discretionary Cash and Managerial Risk Considerations

Firm diversification is shown to be a function of excess discretionary cash flow and managerial risk considerations. We measure firm diversification using the concentric diversification index. The index is positively related to both the number of business units in the firm and the extent to which the business firm's segments differ. Consequently, the measure provides a proxy for how firm diversification decisions impact the risk of the firm, and the measure is found to be inversely related to both total risk and unsystematic risk. Consistent with the agency arguments of discretionary cash flow, we find the level of excess discretionary funds in the firm to be a significant positive determinant of the level of firm diversification. We also find support for both a wealth transfer hypothesis over low levels of managerial ownership, and a managerial risk aversion hypothesis over high levels of managerial ownership.     

Managerial compensation: Luck,skill or labor markets?

Luck, skill and labor markets all have empirical support as determinants of managerial compensation. We examine the relative importance of pay for luck, managerial skill and labor market opportunities in determining compensation. We measure luck as the predictable component of firm performance, measure skill using managerial fixed effects and measure labor market opportunities as the compensation of executives at matched firms. Our results imply that managerial skill is the most important determinant of managers' compensation, followed by firm size and labor market opportunities, and that luck is not an important determinant of managerial compensation.