Institutionalism and the “Common Man” Through the Lens of Philip Klein: Business Cycles,the Public Sector,and Keynes’s Economics

This article reviews and assesses Philip Klein’s work on business cycles and macroeconomics, the public sector, and the economics of John Maynard Keynes. The article makes several findings. First, Klein built on the pioneering efforts of Wesley Mitchell to advance the development of cycle indicators and to outline an eclectic theory of cycles that remains useful for synthesizing a broad literature. Second, Klein’s essays on macroeconomics contain enduring discussions of the malleability of the “natural” rate of unemployment and the value of a behavioral approach to expectations. Third, he refocused the institutionalist attention on the public sector by introducing “higher efficiency” and other concepts to help explain how government policy plays a role in economic life. Fourth, Klein emphasized the role of fiscal policy in moderating business cycles. Fifth, his work points in the direction of today’s post-Keynesian institutionalism, both by stressing that Keynes was “profoundly institutionalist” in his approach and by arguing that conjoining Keynes and institutionalism would provide a stronger foundation for macroeconomic theory and policy.     

Lachmann and the wilderness: On Lachmann's radical subjectivism

Abstract

This paper deals with the question why in the 1940s and 1950s Ludwig Lachmann (1906–1990) failed to revive Austrian economics. Lake Keynes and Hayek, Lachmann pointed out that expectations, and hence knowledge, are important determinants of (cyclical fluctuations in) investment and economic activity. He thereby emphasized that the process of knowledge acquisition is indeterminate and open‐ended. This indeterminateness is difficult to reconcile with neoclassical attempts to provide economics with internally consistent microfoundations. This fundamental difference between his and the neoclassical research agenda explains Lachmann's failure to revive Austrian economics.     

Joan Robinson's disillusion with economics

In her last public comments on the state of economics, Joan Robinson made some extraordinary remarks that conveyed profound pessimism and theoretical nihilism. To account for the bleakness of Robinson's later views on economics and economic policy this article examines her last decade. These years were marked by an array of reverses to the causes she espoused. While ill health and a propensity to be provocative coloured her disposition, her comment about economic theory disintegrating in her hands was not made casually; it was, rather, an acknowledgement that her project to integrate Keynes with the classical surplus theory had failed. This acknowledgement crystallised into her rejection of the long-period equilibrium interpretation of Keynes's theory of unemployment. At the end of her life Robinson was willing only to embrace the more traditional short-period Keynesian model grounded in uncertainty and expectations.     

Profit Expectations and Confidence: Some unresolved issues in the Austrian/Post-Keynesian debate

Austrian and Post-Keynesian economists both continue to make important contributions to subjectivism in economics. Yet, as the ongoing debate between members of the two schools demonstrates, Austrians and Post-Keynesians have very different views about the possibility of intertemporal coordination in a market economy. This paper returns to the debate between Hayek and Keynes in order to respond to a contemporary Austrian critique of Keynes's theory of expectations. The paper shows that the fundamental difference between the two schools ultimately boils down to the nature of conventional expectations and the question of confidence. If the conventional expectation holds to assume the future will look enough like the present to give investors confidence in their decisions, Hayek's arguments about the possibility of intertemporal coordination merit attention. If, however, this convention does not hold, as Keynes thought was sometimes likely, the self-regulating potential of a market economy is called into question.     

Hayek and the Great Depression of 1929: Did he really change his mind?

The aim of this research is to establish whether, and if so in what way, Hayek changed his mind about the Great Depression of 1929.The work is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the ‘early’ Hayek of the 1930s. Hayek was the great rival of Keynes. Both explained the Great Depression, applying opposing business cycle theories. For Keynes, the crisis was caused by an excess of saving over investment; for Hayek, on the contrary, by an excess of investment over saving. In the early 1930s, Röpke attempted a synthesis, positing that a recession due to overinvestment can degenerate, as in 1929, into a depression caused by oversaving. Hayek examined and rejected Röpke's theory. In the second part, I present the ‘later’ Hayek of the 1970s. After years of silence and solitude, Hayek was unexpectedly awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, precisely for the contribution he made in the 1930s to the theory of the business cycle. Hayek returned to his pursuit of the ghost of Keynes, debated with his friend and rival Friedman, re-examined Röpke's special case and, according to Haberler, changed his mind. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve the dilemma.     

Keynes against Kalecki on economic method

In the past twenty years, there has been considerable debate on the “coherence” of post Keynesian economics, in view of post Keynesian economists’ ambitions to develop a paradigmatic alternative to neoclassical economics. Given the growing importance of methodological aspects in this discussion, this article addresses the differences of approach to economic theory between the fathers of the two most important strands in post Keynesian economics. We thus focus on Keynes’s criticism of Kalecki’s theory of the business cycle and the tensions between Keynes’s logical approach and Kaleki’s formal modeling. We show that in criticizing Kalecki’s theory, Keynes made use of the same methodological criticism (based on detecting logical fallacies in reasoning) he had employed to attack both the classical theory and contemporary “pseudo-mathematical” models. After illustrating these fundamental differences between Keynes and Kalecki about the proper way of doing economics, we draw some conclusions on the possible future evolution of post Keynesian economics.     

Jacob Mincer: A Founding Father of Modern Labour Economics

Dennis Robertson's cycle theory, particularly as developed in A Sludy of Industrial Fluclualions (1915) and Bankins Policy and the Price Lcucl (1926) is described, and the affinity between his treatment of forced saving and that of Hayek and Robbins is noted. Robertson's theoretical eclecticism and policy pragmatism are contrasted with the more rigid positions of the Austrians. It is argued that the similarities between their work stem from the common influence of English classical economics. Finally, it is suggested that Robertson, and by implication Keynes, had little to learn from the Austrians in the early 1930s.     

Keynes’ Preface to the German Edition of the General Theory: Nazi Sympathies or Methodological Empathies?

In the (1936) preface to the German edition of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes contrasts his methodology with that of Classical laissez-faire economics. He also compares and contrasts his methodology with German economics, which members of the German Historical School had heavily influenced. Unfortunately, some view Keynes as arguing in this Preface that his theory could more deductively apply to fascism than to laissez-faire economies. This would suggest an endorsement of Nazism. Of course, any support offered for Nazism should be condemned. However, instead of displaying Nazi sympathies, this paper argues that the Preface more likely supports the widespread methodological rejection in German economics of deducing laissez-faire outcomes from Classical postulates. Furthermore, Keynes criticizes the more inductive approach of many German economists, and states that he provides them with the theoretical framework which they could deductively apply to their totalitarian economy. Keynes should be read as arguing that his theoretical framework would prove more applicable to a totalitarian system than would a theory based on Classical laissez-faire economics. Comments in the Preface which seem to some to support Nazism should be taken, then, as support for the applicability of his theory to such a system. Keynes’ methodological arguments in the prefaces to the other editions, which reflect his overall methodological approach in the General Theory, his familiarity with German economics, his support for liberal economic and political institutions, and his anti-Nazism, all support this alternative interpretation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Midwest Economics Association Meetings in Chicago on March 16, 2008.     

Changing knowledge in the early economic thought of Michael Polanyi

How did Polanyi, a middleman between Keynes and Hayek, see economics education as a way to save the challenged liberal economic system of the 1930s? The first part of the article explores how experts and non-experts were engaged in making and disseminating economic knowledge, what role perception had in these engagements, and how such practices contributed to a kind of mental division of labor in the early economic thought of Michael Polanyi. The second part reconstructs Polanyi’s endeavors to show how the visual presentation of social matters could foster these engagement practices and the construction of economic knowledge. The third part points out that top-down and bottom-up approaches were both present in Polanyi’s economic thought and explains why the latter is evolutionary in a sense that it is based on changing knowledge in cognitive, behavioral, social and technical domains. The fourth part discusses how public understanding of economic ideas connected interactional expertise and boundary work in Polanyi’s account, and how he was engaged in developing both as part of his social agenda. The article concludes by showing how Polanyi positioned his growth theory and social agenda to save liberal economic thought and our civilization.     

Keynes’ Preface to the German Edition of the General Theory: Nazi Sympathies or Methodological Empathies?

In the (1936) preface to the German edition of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes contrasts his methodology with that of Classical laissez-faire economics. He also compares and contrasts his methodology with German economics, which members of the German Historical School had heavily influenced. Unfortunately, some view Keynes as arguing in this Preface that his theory could more deductively apply to fascism than to laissez-faire economies. This would suggest an endorsement of Nazism. Of course, any support offered for Nazism should be condemned. However, instead of displaying Nazi sympathies, this paper argues that the Preface more likely supports the widespread methodological rejection in German economics of deducing laissez-faire outcomes from Classical postulates. Furthermore, Keynes criticizes the more inductive approach of many German economists, and states that he provides them with the theoretical framework which they could deductively apply to their totalitarian economy. Keynes should be read as arguing that his theoretical framework would prove more applicable to a totalitarian system than would a theory based on Classical laissez-faire economics. Comments in the Preface which seem to some to support Nazism should be taken, then, as support for the applicability of his theory to such a system. Keynes’ methodological arguments in the prefaces to the other editions, which reflect his overall methodological approach in the General Theory, his familiarity with German economics, his support for liberal economic and political institutions, and his anti-Nazism, all support this alternative interpretation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Midwest Economics Association Meetings in Chicago on March 16, 2008.     

Truth or precision? Some reflections on the economists’ failure to predict the financial crisis

The failure of professional economic forecasters to predict the financial crises has led many to question the credibility of modern economics as a reliable foundation for economic policy. If economists were unable to foresee so big a crisis, how can they be trusted to cure or prevent it? Several accounts of this failure exist. The paper offers a tentative answer based on the lessons that may be drawn from the wisdom of a short list of past and present economists: Hayek, Neville Keynes, Mankiw, Tinbergen, Maynard Keynes and Lucas. The glue to keep such an odd bunch together is the distinction between truth and precision provided by science historian Ted Porter.     

The theory of probability: A key element in Keynes' revolution

Keynes believed that the "general theory" would create a revolution in economics. The extent to which his prophesy was realized, in part, depends on the definition of "key elements" in the general theory itself. This paper presents one of the key elements that led Keynes to believe the general theory might indeed create such a revolution. This key element is his theory of probability. Keynes' theory of probability evolved over time and resulted in his employing two distinctly different theories of probability in the general theory—one, implicitly, the other, explicitly. The first was an objective degree of belief theory of probability that was implicitly employed in the general theory. The second was a subjective degree of belief theory of probability that Keynes explicitly developed in the general theory. A previous version of this paper was presented at the Forty-Fourth International Atlantic Economic Society Conference in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 9–12, 1997, in the session entitled, "Macroeconomic Theory and Aggregative Models."     

"The Reality of the Present and the Challenge of the Future": J. Fagg Foster for the Twenty-First Century

This paper revisits J. Fagg Foster’s early assessment of the relevance of John Maynard Keynes’s theory of institutional economics. In his view, neither institutionalists nor most of Keynes’s followers really recognized the importance of Keynes’s theoretical insights. I examine Foster’s views on economic theory, with a particular focus on monetary theory. I apply Foster’s approach to what is now called modern money theory, an approach developed by heterodox economists working in the institutionalist and post-Keynesian traditions. I argue that this approach is consistent with Foster’s, and it offers a way forward to policy formation for the twenty-first century.     

The neglect of replacement investment in keynesian economics

Abstract

This article describes Keynes's early analysis of replacement investment and his subsequent neglect of the subject, especially by his followers. It goes on to explain how this deficiency helped to mislead later economists who attempted to use Keynes as a guide for economic policy and theory and the consequences of the errors of these economists.     

Keynes,the socialisation of trade,and international monetary institutions

While Keynes began formulating his ideas concerning the post-WWII international financial system in the early 1940s, the genesis of these ideas can be traced to his earlier work. The Keynes Plan represents the culmination of his search for adequate institutions that guide economic activity for the public good. The reasons given by Keynes for the establishment of an International Clearing Bank are relevant in the modern international economy, given the current imbalances in international trade. As Keynes argued for the socialisation of investment as a method to achieve full-employment in the domestic economy, he argued for the “socialisation of trade” as a method to achieve international economic balance among nations.     

Hayek’s monetary theory and policy: A note on alleged inconsistency

Challenging the dominant view, we claim that Hayek’s monetary views did not significantly change over his lifetime. The prevalent perception of early Hayek as a money stream stabilizer and late Hayek as a price level stabilizer is attributable to an unjustified normative interpretation of Hayek’s positive analysis. We argue that in his contributions to monetary theory, Hayek took the goals of monetary policy as exogenously given and analysed the efficiency of different means of achieving them. Hayek’s allegedly inconsistent transformation from a critic to an advocate of price level stabilization is explained by a change of issues under his focus, rather than by a change in his positive views. We also claim that Hayek was always aware that every practical monetary policy involves difficult trade-offs and that he was therefore reluctant to impose his own value judgments on what people should strive for.     

Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs

The hard core of conventional economics consists of a set of four main premises regarding the economy. Simply put they are the law of nature, the individual, certainty, and contracts. Juxtapositioned to these four premises of conventional economics, there are four from personalist economics: institutions, the person, uncertainty and status. In sharp constrast with the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in economics whose views on economic affairs are grounded in individualism, we think about economic affairs in a market system in terms of personalism. Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs. Here our presentation focuses on three central economic activities: consumption, work and leisure. In addressing these activities we emphasize that (1) human persons are materialized spirits and (2) human nature is two dimensional — individual and social. In our remarks we rely heavily on Emmanuel Mounier and John Paul II.     

The Hayekian Puzzle: Spontaneous Order and the Business Cycle

In his early years, F. A. Hayek focused his research on the theory of capital and the business cycle. Later he turned to social philosophy and the theory of a spontaneous economic order. The two phases, it is argued in this paper, correspond to two basically incompatible research programs—general equilibrium theory vs. a theory of adapting, collective learning, and expectation formation. Hayek never reconsidered business cycle theory in the light of his later thought. The paper asks why and discusses what role cyclical fluctuations in aggregate economic activity may have to be play in the theory of spontaneous economic order.     

Permanent On-The-Spot Job Creation—The Missing Keynes Plan for Full Employment and Economic Transformation

The paper rejects the conventional view that Keynes had an aggregate demand approach to full employment. Instead, it proposes that he advocated a very specific labor demand targeting approach that would be implemented both in recessions and expansions. Modern policies, which aim to “close the demand gap” between current and potential output are inconsistent with Keynes's work on theoretical and methodological grounds. There is considerable evidence to suggest that a permanent program for direct or (in his words) “on-the-spot” job creation is the missing Keynes Plan for full employment and economic transformation. The current crisis presents the social economist with a unique opportunity to set fiscal policy straight along the original Keynesian lines. The paper suggests what specific form such a policy might take.