Consumption Taxation and Endogenous Growth in a Model with New Generations

This article studies the implications of consumption taxation on capital accumulation in a one-sector endogenous growth model with finite horizons. A tax on consumption, when tax revenues are lump-sum rebated to consumers, redistributes income between living generations and future, still unborn, generations, and therefore depresses aggregate consumption and raises saving, stimulating capital accumulation and economic growth. If however the resources from taxation are used for financing unproductive public spending, the effect of the consumption tax on the endogenous growth rate disappears as no intergenerational redistribution of income occurs. Finally, a consumption tax hike accompanied by a compensatory reduction of public debt increases long-run economic growth and reduces the consumption-output ratio. Our results on consumption taxation differ substantially from those obtained within the endogenous growth literature.     

Taxation,imperfect competition,and discontinuities

Most work on taxation assumes that market adjustments to taxation will be small and continuous and so analyzes the effects of taxation using standard marginal methods. However, the world often changes in large and discontinuous ways. This paper looks at the effects of taxation when discontinuities in market adjustments are allowed because market structure is determined endogenously by the discrete entry and exit decisions of firms. The results indicate that the potential for discontinuities generates tax effects that are considerably different from those that emerge when adjustments are small and continuous. With discontinuities, taxes can have large and discrete effects, for example, by increasing prices far in excess of the tax itself or by changing utility in a highly nonmarginal way. Of more significance, with discontinuities taxes can actually increase welfare even when they lessen competition and raise prices. Taxes can also have markedly different effects on the income and welfare of different groups. Consumers are always made worse off by a tax, but a tax may be supported by the firms in an industry if the tax limits entry and thereby increases firm profits.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

Effects of Capital Gains Taxation on Life-Cycle Investment and Portfolio Management

We examine the impact of capital income taxation, both accrual forms of taxation and taxation of realized capital gains, on total savings and the demand for corporate financial instruments. We find that investors may hold both debt and equity in the face of effective collection of capital gains taxation even in a flat tax system. We also find that the two taxes will have substantially different effects on saving and consumption behavior, making it unlikely that the tax structure can be summarized by any single equivalent accrual tax rate.     

Taxation and international banking

The purpose of this paper is an examination of the relationship between taxation and the working of international banking arrangements. The main task is directed to the ways taxation determinations by national authorities affect the ways international banks go about their business. International coordination through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is a major focus of the analysis. There is no general exposition of principles bearing upon international taxation. Rather, attention is directed to the determination of tax obligations in any one jurisdiction. Thus, there is a close scrutiny of the mechanics of taxation in the international setting bringing out the uncertainties and the imponderables in any application. Much attention is given to structural arrangement in international banking as well as capital arrangements in any one jurisdiction and how this applies to and affects the banking group as a whole. The result is to bring out the complexity of the agenda for tax applications on a common basis across internationally operating groups. Most jurisdictions recognise that they cannot await common agreements because new instruments and arrangements emerge at very frequent intervals and their tax implications have to be addressed. There has to be relief from uncertainty if markets are to develop effectively. Thus, there is in an importance sense of partnership between tax authorities and market participants in many countries. International deliberations have taken too long.     

Taxation and Economic Growth

The development of endogenous growth theory has opened an avenue through which the effects of taxation on economic growth can be explored. Explicit modelling of the individual decisions that contribute to growth allows the analysis of tax incidence and the prediction of growth effects. This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence to assess whether a consensus arises as to how taxation affects the rate of economic growth. It is shown that the theoretical models isolate a number of channels through which taxation can affect growth and that these effects may be very substantial. Although empirical tests of the growth effect face unresolved difficulties, the empirical evidence points very strongly to the conclusion that the tax effect is very weak.     

Optimal factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy

A two-sector trade model with specific factors and perfect international capital mobility is used to analyze the optimal mix of factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy that faces domestic or international constraints on its tax instruments. In the unconstrained benchmark case, the small country will tax specific factors and domestic consumption but chooses zero tax rates for a selective production tax (i.e., an origin-based commodity tax) and a source-based tax on capital income. When commodity taxation must follow a combination of origin and destination principles, then this mixed commodity tax rate will be positive and its production effects are partly compensated in the optimum by a capital subsidy. These international restrictions interact with domestic constraints when rents accruing to fixed factors cannot be taxed by a separate instrument, and a positive tax rate on capital serves as an indirect way of rent taxation.     

关于电子商务税收问题的研究

电子商务的发展对现有的税收征管原则、所得税和增值税的计算和征管都带来了新的冲击与挑战。尽管我国的电子商务尚处于起步阶段 ,我们还是应该尽早提出应对电子商务的税收政策和管理措施。对电子商务进行征税应以现有的税收政策和税种为基础 ,不必开征新的税种 ,但有必要调整现有的税种结构。税收系统要尽早建立“电子征税”系统 ,开发新自动征税软件和稽核软件 ,有必要对企业的电子商务进行单独核算。     

Taxation and skills investment in frictional labor markets

This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments. The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax system provides full loss offset.     

Nonoptimality of the Friedman Rule with Capital Income Taxation

This paper studies the efficient taxation of money and factor income in intertemporal optimizing growth models with infinite horizons, transaction costs technologies, and flexible prices. Second‐best optimality calls for a positive inflation tax and a nonzero capital income tax when there are restrictions on taxation of production factors or profits/rents. Our cases of nonoptimality of the Friedman rule—which differ from those of Mulligan and Sala‐i‐Martin (1997) and extend substantially those of Schmitt‐Grohè and Uribe (2004a) —follow from the violation of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) principle on production efficiency.     

外汇体制、税收与腐败

本文研究了外汇体制、税收和腐败之间的关系,比较了在有外汇管制和无外汇管制两种情况下,外汇体制对税收和腐败的影响。研究结果表明,当腐败对产出有正作用时,外汇管制将导致较高的税收和较严重的腐败。如果腐败对产出的正作用较小,那么外汇管制将导致税收增加。如果税收扭曲的作用非常大,那么外汇管制将导致腐败下降。当腐败对产出有负作用时,外汇管制将会导致较轻微的腐败和较高的税收。如果腐败对产出的正作用非常大,足以弥补由于高税收所造成的产出减少时,政府会采取外汇管制措施。如果腐败对产出的正作用较小,并且高税收对产出负作用很大,那么政府将采取没有外汇管制的体制。     

Dividends, Distortion and Double Taxation

It is often claimed the double taxation inherent in the classical system of corporate taxation imposes an extra tax burden on corporate income and causes undesirable distortions in economic behaviour. In anticipation of suggestions for reform, consequent upon a major inquiry into the Australian financial system, this paper questions several of the traditional criticisms of the classical tax system and suggests that the supposed extra tax burden may not exist.     

Financial systemic risk: Taxation or regulation?

This paper describes financial systemic risk as a pollution issue. Free riding leads to excess risk production. This problem may be solved, at least partially, either by financial regulation or by taxation. From a normative viewpoint, taxation is superior in many respects. However, reality shows that financial regulation is adopted more frequently. This paper makes a positive, politico-economic argument. If the majority chooses regulation, the level is likely to be too harsh. If it chooses taxation, then the level is likely to be too low. Due to regressive effects, a tax on financial transactions receives low support from a majority of low polluting portfolio owners. The same kind of majority may strategically choose regulation in order to burden the minority with a larger share of the cost of reducing systemic risk.     

Prospects for Agricultural Land Taxation in Developing Countries

Countries that collect tax revenue from the agricultural sectorthrough export taxes, marketing boards, and overvalued domesticcurrencies are often loath to abandon these distorting policiesbecause of the consequent revenue loss. One potential alternativeis to replace these distortionary taxes with a land tax, whichwould not depress output prices or discourage foreign exchangeearnings and which could be, in theory, a highly progressivetax. The advantages and disadvantages of a land tax are examinedtheoretically and using the specific experiences of Bangladesh,Argentina, and Uruguay. It is concluded that the land tax isnot necessarily more efficient than other types of taxes; theAchilles Heel of land taxation is administration; progressivetax rates based on land holdings are nearly impossible to administer;land taxes have been ineffective at promoting nonrevenue goals;political support by farmers is necessary to implement the tax;and the most promising prospects for a moderate land tax systemare in financing local, rather than central, government expenditures.     

结合逃税的最优税收理论研究评述

最优税收理论主要研究税制的最优设计问题,而逃税理论主要致力于政府的最优执行问题,最近出现了将这两种理论结合起来的研究趋势。结合逃税的最优税收理论,包括最优所得税和最优商品税等内容,研究结果表明:结合逃税的最优税收理论并不能得出比标准最优税收理论更为明确的政策结论,其还有待于进一步的研究和发展。     

论税收撤销权

税务机关如何正确行使撤销权,有关的法律规定过于简单。因而,需要从理论和实践相结合的角度对税收撤销权的成立要件、税收撤销权的行使及效力、税收撤销权的冲突等问题给予明确,以期对税收实践有所裨益。     

Exemption vs. Credit Method in International Double Taxation Treaties

This paper examines the choice of international double taxation relief methods by two small countries that mutually exchange foreign direct investment. At the first stage, each country chooses between the exemption and the credit method (as prescribed by the OECD model treaty) and at the second stage, each country sets nationally optimal non-discriminatory capital tax rates. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium both countries choose the exemption method. Mutual application of the exemption method is also shown to yield the highest welfare for each country. While the tax export effect generally induces both countries to choose inefficiently high tax rates, this effect is weakest when both countries exempt foreign earned profits from domestic taxation.     

Ad Valorem Taxation on Intermediate Goods in Oligopoly

Thepaper compares the efficiency of value added taxation (VAT),in which intermediate goods are not taxed, with that of cascadetaxation, in which they are, when levied on imperfectly-competitivevertically-related industries. One type of commodity taxationis not always superior to the other in terms of welfare. Indeed,when intermediate-goods have close substitutes, VAT is the optimalcommodity tax system. But when input substitutability is weakor absent and input producers have market power, they shouldbe taxed. In fact, in the absence of lump sum taxes and withno input substitutability, it is optimal to tax, not to subsidize,the most monopolistic industry. True cascading, in which bothupstream and downstream industries are taxed, is thus betterthan VAT when, besides no input substitutability and both intermediateand final good producers with market power, the needed revenuerequirement is not small. We therefore submit a rationale forthe coexistence of VAT and cascade taxation.     

税收学:方位与发展--关于拓展我国税收理论研究领域的思考

当前,西方经济学下的税收学研究还存在微观基础不充分的问题,同时税收学的跨学科研究仍需加强。因此,在继续关注当前研究热点的前提下,税收理论研究还应当向企业税收学、税收法律运行及税收伦理学等研究领域拓展。     

国际投资协定框架下的税收问题研究

作为典型的“国家管理权”行为,东道国的税收措施可享有主权豁免。在通常情况下,与税收有关的投资争议不具可仲裁性。然而,晚近的缔约和法律实践却表明,在国际投资领域,东道国税收主权的绝对豁免已被突破,私人可以依据国际投资协定的有关规定将东道国的税收措施诉至国际仲裁庭。为此,需要引入专门的“税收条款”,将可仲裁的税收事项限定于一定范围之内,以平衡东道国与外国投资者之间的利益。此类条款的引入也符合中国身兼投资输入大国和投资输出大国的发展中国家的综合利益。