How well do conservation auctions perform in achieving landscape‐level outcomes? A comparison of auction formats and bid selection criteria

This paper studies the performance of auction design features regarding pricing mechanisms and bid selection criteria for securing wildlife zones across different holdings. We compare two pricing mechanisms: a discriminatory‐price auction and a uniform‐price ascending auction, and four bid selection criteria on the basis of: total bid, bid‐per‐value ratio, bid‐per‐area ratio and a mixed criterion where bids are formed on the basis of cost but they are selected based on the bid‐per‐value ratio. We develop a best‐response group‐bidding model for a discriminatory‐price auction where bidders form optimal group bids for individual wildlife zones. In the uniform‐price ascending auction, individual landholders respond to prices, which are successively raised by the auctioneer and whenever all the landholders from a single zone agree to participate (i.e. the first zone is formed), the auction stops. Based on numerical simulations using a bio‐economic model of malleefowl conservation, we observe that the discriminatory‐price auction is more cost‐effective than the uniform‐price ascending auction. However, the budgetary cost‐effectiveness of a discriminatory‐price auction is sensitive to bidder uncertainty about the number of competing bidder groups and the highest cost of establishing a wildlife zone among these groups. In terms of bid selection, the mixed bid selection criterion performs best. We discuss the policy implications of these findings.     

Do Japanese consumers care about sustainable fisheries? Evidence from an auction of ecolabelled seafood

This paper investigates Japanese consumers' willingness to pay for Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) ecolabelled seafood using a sealed bid, second price auction. Participants in an experiment in Tokyo were provided varying degrees of information about the status of world and Japanese fisheries and the MSC program in sequential rounds of bidding on ecolabelled and nonlabelled salmon products. A random‐effects tobit regression shows that there is a statistically significant premium of about 20 per cent for MSC‐ecolabelled salmon over nonlabelled salmon when consumers are provided information on both the status of global fish stocks and the purpose of the MSC program. This premium arises from a combination of an increased willingness to pay for labelled products and a decreased willingness to pay for unlabelled products. However, in the absence of experimenter‐provided information, or when provided information about the purpose of the MSC program alone without concurrent information about the need for the MSC program, there is no statistically significant premium.     

The impact of deal‐proneness on WTP estimates in incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods

Even after controlling for hypothetical biases, some incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods still produce different willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) estimates. In this study, we compare WTP estimates from three incentive‐aligned value elicitation methods: real choice experiment (RCE), real double‐bounded dichotomous contingent valuation (RCVM), and Becker–DeGroot–Marschak auction (BDM). We find that participants’ aggressiveness in obtaining low prices (i.e., “deal‐proneness”) influences WTP estimates in the BDM auction, but not those elicited from the RCE and RCVM. The participants with higher levels of deal‐proneness tend to submit lower bids in the BDM auction. The discrepancies in WTP estimates between different incentive‐aligned procedures are narrower for participants with lower levels of deal‐proneness. Our results indicate that the bids in BDM auctions may be understated and the auction mechanism may induce the “gambling behavior” of people who are deal‐prone. That is, whether the BDM auction is truly incentive‐aligned is again called into question. We also discuss the practical implications for food retailers.     

The Usefulness of Experimental Auctions in Determining Consumers' Willingness-to-Pay for Quality-Differentiated Products

The validity and effectiveness of using experimental auctions to elicit consumers' willingness-to-pay for closely related, quality-differentiated products is examined. The effect of panelists' demographics on bid values and auction winners, and the impact of experimental procedures on auction prices are analyzed. Demographic variables are poor predictors of bids and auction winners. Experimental procedures such as panel size and initial endowment influence market price level. Relative bid differences for paired samples are primarily influenced by relative differences in taste panel ratings. Relative willingness-to-pay values elicited through experimental auctions appear valid, while actual willingness-to-pay values are influenced by experimental design.     

An experimental examination of target based conservation auctions

Conservation auctions are increasingly employed to increase the provision of Ecological Goods and Services (EG&S) for achieving environmental goals. Most applications of conservation auctions concern the efficient allocation of a fixed conservation budget. However an important and under-explored application of conservation auctions is in meeting environmental targets, either as part of regulatory compliance by industry or by governments in meeting specified policy objectives. This paper examines the ability of a conservation auction to meet an environmental target. We use experimental economics methods benchmarked to a wetlands restoration case study to examine bidder behavior and efficiency in both budget constrained and target constrained auctions when landowners with increasing marginal costs can offer increasing sized bundles of wetland acres. The target constrained auction is characterized by an all or nothing rule, where there is no payout if the target is not met. We find that rent seeking and average cost in the target constrained auction is less than in a budget constrained auction, but that efficiency eroded in repeated rounds suggesting learning effects as participants realize there is no budget cap. Even with learning effects the target based auction out-performs the budget based auction. Adding a reserve price to the target based auction significantly reduced rent seeking but also increased the probability that the target was not met. The results have important implications for auction design in real world settings.     

Informal government preferences and asymmetric land allocation in China

Whether governments have informal preferences toward firms when allocating land resources and the effects of such preferences on regional development remain unclear, particularly in countries with weak formal institutions. This paper investigates the government’s informal preferences in land allocations in China. Substantial evidence is found that politically connected firms are preferred to win land auctions at lower prices due to two different reasons. These preferences are informally achieved through a two-stage auction mechanism rather than formal bid preference programs, and result in the asymmetrical allocation of urban land in terms of land quality, quantity, and price, across politically and non-politically connected firms in China. The state-owned enterprises are allocated poor quality land parcels at 55% land price discounts. In comparison, the manager-based politically connected firms are allocated regular land parcels at 6% price discounts, and other firms without connections with the government are allocated regular land at higher prices.     

Valuing an EU Animal Welfare Label using Experimental Auctions

The aim of this article is to determine consumers’ valuation for an EU Animal Welfare (EU‐CAW) Label for products providing higher animal welfare standards than the current legal requirements. Using revealed preference data from random nth price auction mechanism and two auction procedures, our results generally suggest that consumers are willing to pay a premium for an EU Animal Welfare (EU‐CAW) Label for cured ham. This finding is consistent in both the endowment and full‐bidding auction approaches we employed in our experiments conducted in Spain. The average premium that consumers are willing to pay for a cured ham with the EU‐CAW Label ranges between 19% and 23% of the average price of the regular cured ham that is currently available in supermarkets.     

The role of retail market power and state regulations in the heterogeneity of farm‐retail price transmission of private label and branded products

Given the leading role of private label brands in the fluid milk market, it is of special interest to focus on possible differences in farm‐retail price transmission between private label and branded milk as well as the causes of heterogeneity. This article examines the heterogeneous effects of private label and branded products on price transmission in the fluid milk market using a panel threshold asymmetric error correction model. Results indicate that upward retail‐price adjustment is faster than the downward price adjustment for both private label and branded milk. The speed of adjustment of private label products is significantly faster than branded products in three different price regimes. We further investigate the reasons of heterogeneity in farm‐retail price transmission of private label milk. We find that both retailer market power and state pricing regulations contribute to the heterogeneity in asymmetric price transmission. Higher retailer market power causes retail prices of private label milk to rise faster and to fall slower. The existence of a state pricing regulation slows down the adjustment speed of retail prices of private labels back to the long‐run equilibrium, regardless of whether the retail price is low or high.     

中国住房市场与土地市场协调性分析——基于协调度模型

房地产是房产与地产的综合体,住房市场与土地市场相互影响相互作用共同推进房地产市场的发展。住房与土地市场化以来,住房价格与土地价格的快速上涨使得人们普遍认为住房市场与土地市场发展不相协调,从而阻碍了房地产市场的健康发展。从采用协调度模型对全国及主要城市住房市场与土地市场的协调状况的评析来看,我国房地产市场与土地市场协调发展中尚存在着房地产市场调控不力,招拍挂制度导致地王频繁出现,地方政府对土地财政过度依赖等问题,亟待促进宏观调控政策的持续性,进一步完善土地出让制度,制定房地产税的区域推广规划。     

房价与地价的动态调整关系

研究目的:探讨地价与房价间的动态调整关系,为政府决策提供支持。研究方法:门限协整理论,EGARCH模型和实证分析法。研究结果:(1)房价和地价呈正相关;(2)地价变化是房价变化的Granger原因,地价和房价之间存在协整关系;(3)地价与房价在偏离均衡时其调整回归系数是非对称的。研究结论:购房者、开发商对利空利好消息的反应差异和中央与地方的利益博弈及各相关利益机构对房地产政策"选择性执行"是非对称性调整现象产生的原因,提出改进土地拍卖制度、平衡中央地方财力、优化政绩考核标准、强化对地方执行各项房地产政策的监管等建议。     

土地供应规则的变化对北京市住宅用地市场的影响

研究目的:以2004年8月31日和2005年5月1日为界,将北京市住宅用地市场分为三个阶段,从土地供应量、地价、竞租曲线、土地—资本替代弹性等方面分析土地供应规则的变化对住宅用地招拍挂出让市场的影响。研究方法:定性分析,土地竞租曲线和土地—资本替代弹性分析。研究结论:(1)经营性项目用地招拍挂供应的政策对住宅用地市场的影响胜于“熟地”供应政策;(2)土地竞租曲线的变化反映土地市场在经过较大波动之后正在适应新的土地供应规则;(3)土地—资本替代弹性分析显示北京市住宅用地的市场效率仍然偏低。     

Water markets in Australia: an experimental analysis of alternative market mechanisms

Formal water markets in Australia began as uniform price open call markets. As water markets in Australia continue to expand and mature, water managers are introducing double auction water markets, believing that such markets will produce more efficient outcomes. It is therefore timely and policy relevant to explore the relative merits of the two auction mechanisms in context. To date, experimental comparisons of these auction mechanisms have been based on balanced, single unit designs with defined buyers and sellers. However, many resource markets involve trade in multiple unit, often thin, double auction markets. This paper questions whether a multiple unit double auction performs as well as the more traditional open multiple unit call auction in a series of thin water market experiments.     

Willingness to Pay for Multiple Quantities of Animal Welfare Dairy Products: Results from Random Nth‐, Second‐Price,and Incremental Second‐Price Auctions

Nonhypothetical experimental auctions are used to elicit willingness to pay for humane animal care‐certified dairy products: cheese and ice cream. We use second‐price, random Nth‐price, and incremental second‐price auctions in multiproduct, multiquantity, and multiround contexts. The results contrast participants’ bids across different auction mechanisms and different products. Differences in bidding patterns are detected across auction mechanisms as well as products. Our results suggest that subjects on average are only willing to pay a premium price for one unit of humane animal case‐certified ice cream but not for multiple quantities.     

城市再生水项目的特许经营权拍卖机制设计及水价研究

通过对城市再生水特许经营项目的考察,探讨了特许经营项目中再生水如何定价的问题,设计了一种具有可分性的再生水特许经营权拍卖机制,并分别研究了在这种拍卖机制下项目公司向政府指定机构售水的价格的影响因素以及政府指定机构向用户售水的价格的确定方法。最后考察了这种拍卖机制所具有的激励相容特点。     

南水北调中线水市场机制的实验研究

南水北调工程的复杂性要求其水资源配置应适度利用价格杠杆等利益调节机制,遵循政府宏观调控与市场机制相结合的原则。以中线工程为例,采用实验经济学方法,对基于国情和水情的、改进的水市场双向竞价机制进行实验研究,并根据实验案例及结果分析提出几点建议,供南水北调水资源管理制度设计参考。     

Comparing Open-Ended Choice Experiments and Experimental Auctions: An Application to Golden Rice

We use two experimental valuation methods to estimate consumer demand for genetically modified golden rice. The first is an open-ended choice experiment (OECE) where participants name the quantities of golden rice and conventional rice demanded at each of several price combinations, one of which will be randomly chosen as binding. This allows us to estimate market demand by aggregating demand across participants. This estimate of market demand also allows us to estimate own-price elasticity and consumer surplus for golden rice. Comparing willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates from the OECE with those from a uniform-price auction, we find that OECE WTP estimates exhibit less affiliation across rounds, and the effects of positive and negative information under the OECE are more consistent with prior expectations and existing studies. We also find that, while auction WTP estimates more than double across five rounds, OECE WTP estimates are stable across rounds and are always roughly equal to those from the final auction round.     

Experimental Auction Procedure: Impact on Valuation of Quality Differentiated Goods

Despite increased use of experimental auctions, a myriad of different procedures are being employed without formal consideration of how the procedures might affect results. This study investigates the effect of several procedural issues on valuation estimates from experimental auctions. Results indicate the second price auction generates higher valuations than English, Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) , and random n th price auctions, especially in latter bidding rounds, and that random n th price auction yields lower valuations than English and BDM auctions. We find that endowing subjects with a good prior to eliciting bids can have an impact on valuations, but the effect varies across auction mechanism.     

Are French consumers ready to pay a premium for eco‐labeled seafood products? A contingent valuation estimation with heterogeneous anchoring

Could the future French eco‐label for fresh seafood products find its place in the French market? This study employs a contingent valuation method to estimate French consumers’ willingness‐to‐pay (WTP) for eco‐labeled fresh seafood products. We exploit original data from a survey carried out in 2010, where 626 participants responded to a double‐bounded dichotomous choice model, through an ascending or descending bid system. Controlling for shift and anchoring effects in random effect probit models, we significantly improve estimation of WTP and its determinants for the three species studied (monkfish, lobster, sole), in particular when using heterogeneous anchoring. We show that WTP is positively correlated to respondents’ income, and also to their environmental concern, to living alone, to living far from the coast, and to trusting NGOs or public institutions more than producer organizations to implement an eco‐label. We also show that the mean price premiums do not differ between species. Finally, on average, the maximum premium consumers accepted to pay is approximately 10% of the product price.     

Valuation on the Frontier: Calibrating Actual and Hypothetical Statements of Value

The lack of robust evidence showing that hypothetical behavior directly maps into real actions remains a major concern for proponents of stated preference nonmarket valuation techniques. This article explores a new statistical approach to link actual and hypothetical statements. Using willingness-to-pay field data on individual bids from sealed-bid auctions for a $350 baseball card, our results are quite promising. Estimating a stochastic frontier regression model that makes use of data that any contingent valuation survey would obtain, we derive a bid function that is not statistically different from the bid function obtained from subjects in an actual auction. If other data can be calibrated similarly, this method holds significant promise since an appropriate calibration scheme, ex ante or ex post , can be invaluable to the policy maker that desires more accurate estimates of use and nonuse values for nonmarket goods and services.     

The Collusion-deterring Effect of Pre-attributed Supplies and the Hog Auction in Quebec

The hog/pork industry in Quebec has been going through major institutional changes since 1989, the year an electronic auction was put in place to market all of the hogs in the province. Because the auction's ability to generate high prices did not meet the expectations of hog producers, the pure auction system was replaced by a hybrid one in 1994. In this system, most of the hog supply was pre-attributed to processors at a negotiated price based on the US. price while the remainder of the provincial supply of hogs was sold through the auction. In this paper, we investigate how a seemingly inefficient marketing mechanism like pre-attributions can increase the efficiency of a usually efficient mechanism like an auction. We present theoretical arguments regarding the sustainability of collusion under the pure auction and hybrid systems in addition to analyzing auction prices with modern time series tools.