代理人市场—声誉模型在内部经理人市场中的拓展应用

我国外部经理人市场尚不完善,外部经理人市场上的声誉作为经理人显性激励契约的替代作用有限.文章在假设不存在外部经理人市场的前提下,研究了内部经理人市场对经理人产生激励的方式和影响因素,认为内部经理人市场的考核晋升机制和不同职位的隐性收益对经理人的行为有重要影响,提出了优化企业考核晋升机制、降低隐性职位收益、进一步完善外部经理人市场的建议.     

论企业经营者隐形激励与显性激励的有机结合

从表现形式上,经营者激励可以划分为显性激励与隐性激励两方面,将二者有机结合起来,是我国探寻内外治理结构共同完善的企业改革实践的内在要求。本文在廓清隐性激励与显性激励的概念的基础上,分析了两种激励机制在实践中各自的局限性以及二者相结合的必要性,进而在考虑企业经营者的职业生涯阶段和企业的生命周期的基础上探讨如何实现对经营者隐性激励和显性激励的动态组合。     

基于经理人市场的隐性激励分析

经理人市场研究的一个重要问题是经理人的激励问题。激励分为显性激励和隐性激励两个方面，所谓显性激励是指基于经理业绩的报酬体系的设计，如固定报酬与业绩报酬、股票与股票期权等；而隐性激励则是指经理基于自己的职业生涯考虑的自我驱动性激励。隐性激励也是经理人市场解决代理问题的一个主要功能。本文重点针对隐性激励加以分析。     

薪酬管制降低了经理人的激励效率吗？——基于迎合效应的薪酬结构模型分析

薪酬管制是我国市场低效率和政府作为国有企业经营者的特殊身份下的现实选择,而市场低效率集中体现在投资者非理性,薪酬管制给经理人通过迎合投资者情绪获取私人收益创造了客观条件。本文基于迎合效应的薪酬结构模型分析,将在职消费纳入薪酬契约中,探讨薪酬管制前后怎样的薪酬结构会致使国有企业经理人为了自身利益最大化而做出迎合投资者情绪的投资决策。研究表明,薪酬管制并没有如现有文献所诟病的那样降低了经理人的激励效率,在制度创新尚未成熟前,在职消费与限制性股票的契约组合反而成为经理人自我激励的方法。这说明在低效率市场中薪酬管制有其合理性。     

中国职业经理人激励机制探讨

职业经理人在社会经济发展中起着至关重要的作用.本文对当前我国职业经理人激励机制所存在的问题从四个方面进行了分析,最后从物质激励、价值理念激励和约束机制方面对激励机制进行了探讨.     

我国国有企业经营者激励现状分析

如何调动国有企业经营者的积极性成为搞好国有企业改革的关键点之一，对国有企业经营者的激励机制的探讨和如何提高激励水平是我国当前的一个重要课题。本文拟对我国国企经营者激励现状进行分析，为国企经营者激励机制的构建奠定基础。     

基于信息经济学理论的国有企业激励机制和人力资源管理改革研究

文章以逆向选择模型和道德风险模型为理论基础,分析了国有企业在激励机制上存在的问题。研究发现,在信息不对称的情况下,国有企业绩效考核体系不完善,薪酬、晋升激励不公平会导致员工的"逆向选择";激励失控与激励不足共存,任免非市场化会导致经理人的"道德风险"。并分别提出了相应的改革对策,即通过健全绩效考核体系,建立公平的薪酬、晋升激励制度来规避员工的"逆向选择";通过建立相容的经理人激励机制,发展职业经理人市场来防范经理人"道德风险"。     

职业经理人激励与能力发挥的关系研究综述

文章在前人研究的基础上,从企业业绩、经理行为等间接衡量因素来探讨职业经理人的激励与其能力发挥的相关性,并认为经理人的激励与能力发挥之间存在正相关性,但是需要企业在设计激励机制时,合理组合物质激励和非物质激励,并选择合适有能力的经理人。同时,文章还认为,研究如何通过激励机制来调动经理人的积极性,提升其努力程度和能力发挥度,是具有理论和实践意义的。     

浅论构建国企经营者激励机制的几个问题

<正> 随着我国社会主义市场经济体制的逐步建立,特别是我国加入WTO的日益临近,在市场经济活动中企业经营者的作用日益显现,迫切需要构建符合社会主义市场经济要求,激发经营者积极性的激励机制,推动国有企业深化改革,使之成为充满活力的市场主体。激励机制的构建是一个系统工程,它是由激励主体、激励客体、激励方式、激励控制等各种要素相互作用、相互支撑而成。由于我国处在计划经济向市场经济的转轨期间,还存在许多环境障碍和体制障碍,必须按照十五届四中全会的《决定》精神,加快构建国有企业经营者的激励机制。一、影响国有企业建立健全经营激励机制的主要因素     

我国企业股权激励机制应用研究

企业股权激励机制是现代企业制度的核心内容之一,随着中国经济改革的深入,作为企业经营者激励机制发展趋势的股权激励已经越来越多地被我国企业所采用。本文对股权激励在我国的发展障碍进行了分析,提出了我国企业在实行股权激励过程的对策。     

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Intra-industry trade as an indicator of labor market adjustment

Intra-Industry Trade as an Indicator of Labor Market Adjustment. — A growing body of recent empirical research uses measures of change in intra-industry trade as indicators of labor market adjustment. In this paper, we argue that the theoretical foundations for this work are problematic. To make this argument we develop a simple model with both inter- and intra-industry trade and adjustment. We find that changes in domestic absorption, which influence trade flows but which are distinct from production changes, make changes in IIT an unreliable guide to labor market pressure.     

Labor Unions and Income Smoothing

We study labor unions, an important stakeholder group that has not been a focus of the earnings smoothing literature. We posit that managers strike a balance between sheltering resources from employees’ profit sharing demands and catering to employees’ aversion to downside risk by smoothing earnings. We then hypothesize that a strong labor union would intensify managerial incentives to smooth earnings. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that union strength is positively associated with earnings smoothing activities through management of both accruals and R&D expenditures.     

When Do Firms Adjust Bonus Targets Intrayear? Evidence from Sales Executives' Targets*

This study investigates when and why intrayear bonus target revisions occur. This is important as intrayear target revisions occur regularly in practice but are not well understood. Specifically, we analyze two potential drivers of intrayear bonus target revisions: reduced managerial incentives owing to managers dropping out of the incentive zone of their piecewise defined bonus function and potential spillovers from planning target revisions that reflect changes in performance expectations during the year. We also investigate the effects of organizational characteristics on intrayear bonus target revisions. Using data collected from sales executives via multiple waves of surveys, we find evidence for both predicted drivers. In addition, consistent with our predictions, we find that the levels of delegated decision authority, intrafirm interdependencies, and information asymmetry negatively moderate the positive association between reduced managerial incentives and revision likelihood. Our paper contributes to the target setting literature by being the first study to investigate intrayear bonus target revisions and shed light on when firms commit to not revising such targets intrayear.     

出版企业管理层激励效应与保障机制研究

有效的管理层激励机制能够鼓励企业管理者努力工作,促使管理者与股东的利益趋于一致,是企业解决委托代理问题、吸引和留住优秀管理型人才的关键。以2008—2017年24家出版业上市公司为研究样本,分析出版企业管理层薪酬契约激励现状,针对管理层薪酬与业绩关联较弱、薪酬激励水平不足及管理层持股比例低等问题,从业绩考核评价体系的完善、薪酬激励力度的确定与股权激励机制的构建等角度,提出改善出版企业管理层薪酬契约的保障机制,以期对企业公司治理机制的完善有所裨益。     

Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting‐Based Debt Covenants*

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.     

经营者激励与业绩评价

现代企业所有权与经营权的分离产生了委托代理关系。委托代理理论认为,只要存在委托代理关系,就要有激励机制。文章分析了激励机制的内涵和作用、激励机制与业绩评价的历史演进,指出激励机制的建立需要业绩评价系统的要素为前提,激励机制的实施和报酬契约的执行需要以业绩评价系统的输出结果为依据。针对我国企业业绩评价与经营者激励存在的种种问题,强调坚持公平公正原则是解决问题的关键。     

High benefits and low wages: Employees as monitor of management in SOEs

Employees do play a role in corporate governance as important stakeholders of modern enterprises. In the absence of financial and managerial labor markets in centrally planned economies (CPE), the owner of state enterprises (SOEs) has no effective mechanisms to discipline management. Therefore, the role of employees in corporate governance becomes much more important in SOEs than in the typical capitalist private firm. We posit that low wages and generous benefits in SOEs provide incentives for employees to monitor management. Other employment arrangements, especially lifetime job security and centralized wage scale, are also conducive to the monitoring of management by employees. A formal model shows that benefits tied to firm performance, designed properly, induce employees to monitor management. It also suggests that the existence of a market for managers tends to undermine this mechanism.     

The moonlighting decision of unmarried men and women: Family and labor market influences

This paper investigates the moonlighting behavior of unmarried adults. Moonlighting theory hypothesizes that individuals who face labor supply constraints may possess an enhanced incentive to work for more than one employer at a time, but previous research in moonlighting literature has not investigated the influence of labor market constraints empirically. Unmarried men and women, an increasingly prevalent demographic group, face somewhat unique familial and economic circumstances. Unlike married individuals, they do not have access to intra-household income sources and, yet, they may have children present in their household. Empirical results suggest a relationship between labor market constraints and moonlighting likelihood that is consistent with theory and suggest that a larger immediate and extended family may be associated with a lesser probability of moonlighting.This research was assisted by a grant provided by the Research Institute, University of Alabama in Huntsville. Helpful comments were provided by David Blau, Bruce Dixon, Al Wilhite, and participants in the Young Faculty Research Symposium, University of Alabama in Huntsville. A special debt of gratitude is owed to Howard Hayghe, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, for providing access to several unpublished labor force statistics. The author assumes responsibility for any errors.     

The Influence of Ownership and Compensation Practices on Charitable Activities

Recent accounting research provides evidence that similar profit‐based compensation incentives are used in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. Because charity care reduces profits, such incentives should lead for‐profit hospital managers to reduce charity care levels. Nonprofit hospital managers, however, may respond differently to the same incentives because they face a different set of institutional pressures and constraints. We compare the association between pay‐for‐performance incentives and charity care in for‐profit and nonprofit hospitals. We find a negative and significant association between charity care and our proxy for profit‐based incentives in for‐profit hospitals, and no significant association in nonprofit hospitals. These results suggest that linking manager pay to profitability does not appear to discourage charity care in nonprofit hospitals. Apparently, the nonprofit mission, institutional pressures, and ownership constraints moderate the potentially negative effects of profit‐based incentives. Because this evidence partially alleviates concerns over nonprofit compensation arrangements that mirror those used in for‐profit hospitals, it should be of interest to regulators and policymakers. In addition, this study provides insights into accounting researchers about institutional and organizational influences that affect managerial responses to financial incentives in compensation contracts.