The First‐ and Second‐Hand Effect of Analysts' Stock Recommendations: Evidence from the Swiss Stock Market

This paper empirically investigates the impact of both the first release of analysts' stock recommendations to a limited clientele and the subsequent dissemination of the same information in a major newspaper to a broader audience. For a sample of 1460 stock recommendations published in FuW, Switzerland's major financial newspaper, significant positive abnormal returns on the day of the original release of buy recommendations and on the day of publication in FuW are documented. Tests of the price pressure and information hypotheses reveal that analysts' recommendations contain new information, which is quickly incorporated in the stock prices on the first release of this information. In contrast, the statistically significant announcement effects associated with the subsequent publication can be primarily ascribed to price pressure in the underlying securities.     

Tests of Analysts' Overreaction/Underreaction to Earnings Information as an Explanation for Anomalous Stock Price Behavior

This study examines whether security analysts underreact or overreact to prior earnings information, and whether any such behavior could explain previously documented anomalous stock price movements. We present evidence that analysts' forecasts underreact to recent earnings. This feature of the forecasts is consistent with certain properties of the naive seasonal random walk forecast that Bernard and Thomas (1990) hypothesize underlie the well-known anomalous post-earnings-announcement drift. However, the underreactions in analysts' forecasts are at most only about half as large as necessary to explain the magnitude of the drift. We also document that the “extreme” analysts' forecasts studied by DeBondt and Thaler (1990) cannot be viewed as overreactions to earnings, and are not clearly linked to the stock price overreactions discussed in DeBondt and Thaler ( 1985 , 1987 ) and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (Forthcoming). We conclude that security analysts' behavior is at best only a partial explanation for stock price underreaction to earnings, and may be unrelated to stock price overreactions.     

Do accurate earnings forecasts facilitate superior investment recommendations?

We find that analysts who issue more accurate earnings forecasts also issue more profitable stock recommendations. The average factor-adjusted return associated with the recommendations of analysts in the highest accuracy quintile exceeds the corresponding return for analysts in the lowest accuracy quintile by 1.27% per month. Our findings provide indirect empirical support for valuation models in the accounting and finance literatures (e.g., Ohlson, 1995) that emphasize the role of future earnings in predicting stock price movements. Our results also suggest that imperfectly efficient markets reward information gatherers, such as security analysts, for their costly activities in generating superior earnings forecasts.     

ABNORMAL RETURNS AND ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECAST REVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUBLICATION OF “STOCK HIGHLIGHTS” BY VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY

We examine the reaction of stocks and the response of financial analysts' earnings forecasts to securities recommended as “Stock Highlights” by Value Line Investment Survey. Significant abnormal returns appear around the publication of stock highlights. Stock price responses are relatively efficient and permanent. Using earnings expectation data provided by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, we find analysts raise their forecasts significantly following Value Line recommendations. Near-term forecast revisions are significantly related to stock returns at the time of the recommendations. Thus, an explanation for Value Line's security recommendation success is its ability to generate firm-specific earnings information.     

Discrete Expectational Data and Portfolio Performance

In this article we examine the information content in analysts' recommendations which are made on a five-point buy, hold, or sell scale. Our data set includes data on 10,000 forecasts per month. Unlike most prior studies, our data set does not suffer from selection or survivorship bias. We find information in analysts' changes in recommendations. Approximately 4.5% extra return can be earned by purchasing new buys rather than new sells.     

Short selling and the independence of business-related analysts: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper investigates whether short-sale deregulation improves analysts' independence in an emerging market where conventional mechanisms mitigating conflicts of interest are either ineffective or absent. Short selling reduces the effectiveness of analysts' favourable opinions in creating or sustaining overvalued stock prices, thus decreasing the incentives of institutional clients of brokerages to exert pressure on related analysts to initiate coverage and issue biased opinions. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find strong evidence that stocks that are eligible for short sales experience a greater reduction in coverage by related analysts than stocks that are ineligible for short sales. When covered firms become eligible for short sales, the quality of forecasts and recommendations issued by related analysts improves considerably. Further analyses show that shortable firms with a significant reduction in related analysts' coverage are more likely to underperform and to experience stock price crashes in the future. Altogether, our results are consistent with short selling effectively restoring related analysts' independence in emerging markets.     

The impact of institutional analyst forecast divergence on crude oil market: Evidence from the mixed frequency models

As important information intermediaries, analysts play a non-negligible role in the crude oil market. Existing research often focuses on analysts' collection and interpretation of firm-specific information, but neglects the impact of analysts' forecasts on specific markets such as the crude oil market, which is crucial to the safe and stable development of the crude oil market. Therefore, this study uses historical data from January 2011 to December 2020 as a sample to construct analysts' forecast divergence indicators from 15 institutional analysts' forecast data on international crude oil futures prices. It then explores the impact of institutional analysts' forecast divergence on oil price return volatility, crude oil market jumps and crude oil futures trading volume, based on various mixed-frequency models. The results are as follows: First, volatility in oil price returns increases with a growing divergence in analysts' forecasts. Second, analysts' forecasts do not trigger jump in the crude oil market on the first six days after the information is released, but trigger a significant positive jump in the market on the seventh day. Third, the impact of analysts' forecast divergence on trading volume is weak; however, the reverse effect is significant, while the static and dynamic spillover results are consistent.     

The use of management forecasts to dampen analysts' expectations by Chinese listed firms

This paper studies the use of management earnings forecasts (MEF) to dampen analysts' expectations, i.e. expectation management, by Chinese listed companies. We reveal several important findings: Firstly, information asymmetry is positively associated with the use of MEF to dampen analysts' expectations. State control has been found to moderate this relationship. Secondly, dampening analysts' expectations using MEF leads to negative stock return reactions and downward analysts' forecast revisions. Thirdly, the effectiveness of “pre-empting bad news through MEF” appears mixed and dependent on the information content of MEF and measures of actual earnings surprises. Finally, firms that disclose MEF are found to engage in more earnings management to meet the forecasts than firms that do not.     

GLAMOUR VERSUS VALUE: TRADING BEHAVIOR OF INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS

We design a new metric to measure the net buying and selling by institutions and individual investors and find that from 1980 to 2004 institutional investors were net buyers of growth stocks and net sellers of value stocks, implying that individual investors were net buyers of value stocks and net sellers of glamour stocks. The institutional preference for glamour and value stocks seems to be related to sell‐side analysts' recommendations and recent favorable stock price performances, especially during the post‐1994 period. Finally, the institutional buying of growth stocks and sale of value stocks was not based on superior information.     

Analyst target price revisions and institutional herding

We document that institutional herding behavior is associated with analyst target price revisions even after controlling for the effects of analyst recommendations and earnings forecasts, and provide insights into the price impact of institutional herding. Institutional investors tend to buy the same stocks following an upward target price revision and sell the same stocks following a downward price revision. Moreover, institutional investors tend to overreact to analysts' target price revisions, which exacerbates the mispricing in the stock market. Such price destabilizing effect is particularly pronounced for herding among investment firms.     

The incremental impact of analyst initiation of coverage

I compare the return surrounding a sell-side analyst's initiation of coverage to the return surrounding a recommendation by an analyst who already covers the stock. The market responds more positively to analysts' initiations than to other recommendations. The incremental price impact of an initiation is 1.02% greater than the reaction to a recommendation by an analyst who already covers the stock. I examine whether the hypothesis that analyst coverage increases liquidity explains this incremental return. I find that liquidity improves after initiations, but that one must extend the liquidity hypothesis in order to fully explain the incremental price impact. Liquidity gains subsequent to analyst initiation depend on the analyst's recommendation. The more positive the initial recommendation, the greater the subsequent liquidity improvement. I also find that the initiation abnormal return correlates with the subsequent improvements in liquidity. Corporations should encourage analyst coverage to capture this liquidity benefit.     

Analysts’ estimates of the cost of equity capital

We explore a large sample of analysts' estimates of the cost of equity capital (CoE) to evaluate their usefulness as expected return proxies (ERP). We find that the CoE estimates are significantly related to a firm's beta, size, book-to-market ratio, leverage, and idiosyncratic volatility but not other risk proxies. Even after controlling for the popular return predictors, the CoE estimates incrementally predict future stock returns. This predictive ability is better explained as the CoE estimates containing ERP information rather than reflecting stock mispricing. When evaluated against traditional ERPs, including the implied costs of capital, the CoE estimates are found to be the least noisy. Finally, we document CoE responses around earnings announcements, demonstrating their usefulness to study discount-rate reactions of market participants. We conclude that analysts' CoE estimates are meaningful ERPs that can be fruitfully employed in a variety of asset pricing contexts.     

Analyst rounding of EPS forecasts and stock recommendations

We examine the association between analysts' stock recommendations and their tendency to round annual EPS forecasts to nickel intervals (i.e. placing a zero or five in the penny location of the forecast). We find that prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), analysts were more likely to provide rounded EPS forecasts in association with unfavorable (underperform and sell) recommendations. However, after Reg FD, we find no significant association between rounded forecasts and unfavorable stock recommendations. Further, other regulations (NASD 2711, NYSE 472, and Global Research Analyst Settlement) have no impact on analyst rounding behavior. The findings in this study suggest that analyst rounding behavior is a particular form of forecasting optimism motivated, at least in part, by management relations incentives. Further, Reg FD appears partially successful at curbing the influence of management relations incentives on analysts' research.     

Underwriting relationships,analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations

We examine the effect of underwriting relationships on analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations. Lead and co-underwriter analysts' growth forecasts and recommendations are significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts, although their earnings forecasts are not generally greater. Investors respond similarly to lead underwriter and unaffiliated `Strong buy' and `Buy' recommendations, but three-day returns to lead underwriter `Hold' recommendations are significantly more negative than those to unaffiliated `Hold' recommendations. The findings suggest investors expect lead analysts are more likely to recommend `Hold' when `Sell' is warranted. The post-announcement returns following affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' recommendations are not significantly different.     

The role of financial analysts in stock market efficiency with respect to annual earnings and its cash and accrual components

This study examines biases in stock prices and financial analysts' earnings forecasts. These biases take the form of systematic overweighting or underweighting of the persistence characteristics of cash versus accrual earnings components. Our evidence suggests that stock prices tend to overweight and financial analysts tend to underweight these persistence characteristics. Furthermore, we find that analysts' underweighting attenuates stock price overweighting. However, we find little evidence that the overweighting in stock prices attenuates analyst underweighting. This study brings a new perspective to the literature regarding the disciplining role of financial analysts in capital markets.     

Sell-side analyst heterogeneity and insider trading

This study explores insider trading patterns under different earnings surprises. After controlling for stock market liquidity and earnings announcements returns, we show that insiders sell more aggressively depending on the heterogeneity of analysts whose EPS forecasts are met or beaten to camouflage their trades. Specifically, insiders sell more shares of their company sooner after the publication of earnings when top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten. Consistent with the informed trading literature, insiders strategically select these moments because the stock price impact is low and the legal scrutiny of their trades is minimal. To support this result, we employ an exogenous drop in firms' analyst coverage due to the closure or merger of brokerage houses. Furthermore, in line with the camouflage incentives, by selling after top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten, stock prices adjust slowly to insider trades. Finally, we show that the incentives of insiders to hide their trades are concentrated in opportunistic insiders and members of the top management team, who are more likely to bear the costs of selling shares after positive news.     

Difference of opinion and the cross-section of equity returns: Australian evidence

This paper examines the relationship between difference of opinion among investors and the return on Australian equities. The paper is the first to employ dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts, abnormal turnover and idiosyncratic volatility as proxies for difference of opinion. We document a negative relationship between difference of opinion and stock returns when dispersion in analysts' forecasts and idiosyncratic volatility are employed as proxies. This result provides support for Miller's (1977) model and is consistent with the findings of Diether et al. (2002). In contrast, we find mixed results when using abnormal turnover to proxy difference of opinion.     

Model-based earnings forecasts vs. financial analysts' earnings forecasts

Existing accounting-based forecasting models of earnings either do not fully consider information that is contained in stock prices or use an ad hoc specification that is not based on rigorous valuation theory. In this paper, we develop an earnings forecasting model built on the theoretical linkages between future earnings and stock prices as well as a number of accounting fundamental variables. We find that our model-based forecasts of earnings are in general less biased and more accurate than both existing model-based forecasts and analysts' consensus forecasts, at both shorter and longer horizons. We also show that the accuracy of both model-based forecasts and financial analysts' forecasts depend on firm-specific characteristics such as firm size and industry membership.     

Analyst responses to stock‐index adjustments: Evidence from MSCI Taiwan Index additions

Using data from MSCI Taiwan Index adjustments, we study analyst responses to stock additions from 1999 to 2007. The empirical results show that the magnitudes of changes in analysts' earnings-per-share forecasts are similar to those of their two benchmarks for new additions to the index. Therefore, in our sample we find no significant information effect from the additions. We also find that the absolute forecast errors made by analysts are smaller for new additions and those foreign analysts are more accurate than local analysts. This finding demonstrates that new additions to the index exhibit significant performance improvements.     

Common Stock Offerings and Earnings Expectations: A Test of the Release of Unfavorable Information

This paper examines the revisions of analysts' forecasts of future earnings around announcements of common stock offerings. The forecasts of the current year earnings are, on average, decreased when firms announce plans to issue additional common stock. The size of the decrease is significantly related to announcement period abnormal stock returns. In contrast, forecasts of the five-year growth rate of earnings are, on average, unchanged. We interpret these results as being consistent with the claim that equity offering announcements convey unfavorable information regarding the firm's short-term but not its long-term earnings prospects.