中央银行货币政策工具变化评析

近年来,在全球经济一体化进程快速发展的背景下,以美国为代表的发达国家受次级抵押贷款危机影响,金融机构面临短期流动性不足的问题;以中国、韩国和印度为代表的新兴市场国家则出现流动性过剩的状况。为应对经济金融领域不断出现的新情况、新问题,保持中央银行货币政策的主动性和有效性,发达国家在充分运用传统货币政策工具的同时,适时引入了新的投放流动性的工具;新兴市场国家则不断拓展收回流动性的工具组合。本文简要分析了近来各国央行调整货币政策工具的背景情况,全面总结了发达国家及新兴市场国家货币政策工具变化的基本特点,并提出了央行货币政策工具调整中值得关注的问题。     

Taper Tantrum and Emerging Equity Market Slumps

In the post-global financial crisis period, the central banks of the advanced economies pursued unconventional monetary policies, such as the United States (U.S.) Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing (QE). Those policies and their unwinding may significantly affect cross-border capital flows and thus destabilize the financial systems of emerging markets. For example, emerging markets experienced substantial financial instability during the taper tantrum triggered by U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s May 2013 announcement of the potential unwinding of QE. In this article, we examine the spillovers from the taper tantrum on emerging markets more rigorously by using econometric analysis to empirically assess the effect on equity markets in emerging markets. Our central finding that virtually all emerging-market equity markets were affected by the taper tantrum highlights the need for emerging-market authorities to remain vigilant about the effects of advanced-economy monetary policies on their financial stability.     

Capital and credit market integration and real economic contagion during the global financial crisis

This study investigates the role of financial integration in the spread of global financial crisis. In particular, this study shows how the effect of the crisis on real business cycle co-movement varied for capital and credit market integration, using a sample of 58 countries in 2001–2013. During the global financial crisis, the United States – the epicenter of the crisis – experienced a severe downturn in the real economy, and other countries followed suit. We find that during the global financial crisis, the business cycle co-movements between the United States and the rest of the world were stronger when the level of capital market integration between them was higher. However, the co-movements were weaker when the level of credit market integration was higher. These findings are robust even when including investment channels, local fundamental factors, endogenous policy responses across countries, and alternative measures for financial integration and business cycle co-movements.     

大国模型下的货币政簟博弈

“次贷”危机爆发以来,以美联储为首的各大国央行为遏制危机蔓延,拯救金融市场和实体经济,纷纷实施了高度宽松的货币政策。本文运用蒙代尔——弗莱明模型（M—F模型）,分析美国和日本货币政策的实质,揭示其对我国货币政策实施效果的影响,并针对这些影响提出后续研究的方向。     

量化宽松货币政策的理论、实践与影响

全球金融危机已使全球经济陷入衰退,为应对危机各国央行不断降息。随着短期利率接近于零,美、日、英等主要国家的央行转而求助于"量化宽松货币政策",即通过购买长期国债等方式向经济注入巨量的流动性。全球大规模采取量化宽松政策在历史上尚属首次,对世界经济和中国经济都将产生难以估量的影响,对此有必要进行深入的分析。为此,本文在对量化宽松货币政策的理论基础进行分析的基础上,进一步研究了日本量化宽松政策实践的经验与教训及其影响,并提出相应的政策建议。     

Intra- and inter-regional portfolio diversification strategies under regional market integration: Evidence from U.S. global banks

This study empirically assesses whether being a part of any specific region affects global banks' decisions on capital allocation across 20 developed and 44 emerging markets by using data on U.S. banks in the period from 2006 to 2015. We find that both the intra-bank lending of a parent bank to its affiliates abroad and the local lending of foreign affiliates decrease as internal lending to neighboring countries within a region increases. This finding provides evidence of the negative spillover or contagion effects from regional allocations on the capital allocation of global banks to individual economies. Our findings reflect that financial markets are integrated within the region, which suggests no intra-regional diversification benefits to the United States or to other global investors. Moreover, parent banks' intra-bank lending translates into foreign affiliates' local lending in the host country. A policy implication is that countries in the same region should strengthen coordinated efforts to ensure free intra-regional capital mobility and diversify country-specific risk. The findings of this study can help enhance our understanding of the relationships between financial markets interconnectedness and global banks' portfolio management strategies.     

How using derivatives affects bank stability in emerging countries? Evidence from the recent financial crisis

Based on banks exclusively from emerging countries over the whole period 2003–2011, this paper aims to investigate whether the use of derivative instruments are responsible in the amplification of the recent and global financial crisis. To do that, we measure the effect of derivatives use on stability of banks from emerging countries during normal period “the pre-crisis period”, 2003–2006, and turbulent period “the crisis and post-crisis period”, 2007–2011. We use the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator technique developed by Blundell and Bond to estimate our regressions.The main findings show that contrarily to forwards and swaps – which are not disruptive factors – futures and especially options, weaken the stability of banks from emerging countries. The major conclusion is that only options and futures can be considered as risky derivatives and partly responsible in the intensification of the last financial crisis.     

What drives portfolio investments of German banks in emerging capital markets?

After decades of steady liberalization and financial market development, emerging capital markets experienced unparalleled capital inflows in the aftermath of the emerging markets crisis of the 1990s. This paper studies portfolio investment decisions of German banks in emerging capital markets from 2002 to 2007. The use of a dynamic time-series cross-section framework and the micro database External Position Report provided by Deutsche Bundesbank permit insights into the various determinants of portfolio investments in ECMs. For example, there is evidence that German banks take into account the various dimensions of financial market development in their portfolio investment decisions and anticipate the special risks inherent in emerging markets. Proxies for the overall development and efficiency of capital markets have the highest economic significance of all variables. The introduction of depositary receipts programs has a positive impact on stock market investment. Moreover, there is evidence that global risk aversion exerts a significant influence in times of financial turmoil.     

The role of foreign currency debt in financial crises: 1880–1913 versus 1972–1997

We show that exposure to foreign currency debt does not necessarily increase the risk of having a financial crisis. Some countries do not suffer from financial fragility despite original sin. Before 1913 British offshoots and Scandinavia afflicted with it avoided financial meltdowns. Today many advanced countries have original sin, but few have had crises. In both periods, aggregate balance sheet mismatches are associated with a greater likelihood of a crisis. The evidence suggests that foreign currency debt is dangerous when mis-managed. This is part of the difference between developed countries and emerging markets both of which borrow in foreign currency.     

Market Risk of Developed and Emerging Countries During the Global Financial Crisis

This study compares the performance of the widely used risk measure, value at risk (VaR), across a large sample of developed and emerging countries. The performance of VaR is assessed using both the unconditional and conditional tests of Kupiec and Christoffersen, respectively, as well as the quadratic loss function. The results indicate that VaR performs much more poorly when measuring the risk of developed countries than of emerging ones. One possible reason might be the deeper initial impact of the global financial crisis on developed countries. The results also provide evidence of the decoupling of the market risk of emerging and developed countries during the global financial crisis.     

Why European Banks Are Undercapitalized and What Should Be Done About It

Major European banks are significantly undercapitalized as compared to large American banks, and, more importantly, as compared to the capital levels they would need to survive another severe financial crisis. Bank capital shortfalls in Italy, Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, in particular, are largely the consequence of European bank regulations that: (1) apply static risk weights to assets like mortgages and sovereign debt; (2) fail to require an overall market‐based capital ratio that is high enough to enable banks to survive a severe financial crisis; (3) fail to get banks to promptly write down their impaired assets to market value; (4) subject banks to weak stress tests that can create a false impression of capital adequacy; and (5) fail to compel banks to retain sufficient earnings and to raise sufficient capital externally to eliminate capital shortfalls promptly, all apparently out of fear that being tougher might cause investors and customers to lose confidence in the banks. This article summarizes important recent independent bank stress testing that has quantified the capital shortfalls in European banks. The recent highly publicized regulatory interventions to resolve failing European banks were inevitable due to these shortfalls. The authors recommend steps European bank regulators should take to address the problem and to eliminate the risk of serious capital shortfalls. In the absence of such steps, bank depositors, customers, and security holders should be prepared to expect further unwelcome surprises as the risks inherent in allowing undercapitalized banks to operate will continue to materialize in more bank failures.     

Banking crises,financial dependence,and growth

This paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the mechanisms linking financial shocks and real activity. In particular, we investigate the growth impact of banking crises on industries with different levels of dependence on external finance. If banks are the key institutions allowing credit constraints to be relaxed, then a sudden loss of these intermediaries in a system in which such intermediaries are important should have a disproportionately contractionary impact on the sectors that flourished due to their reliance on banks. Using data from 38 developed and developing countries that experienced financial crises during the last quarter century, we find that those sectors that are highly dependent on external finance tend to experience a substantially greater contraction of value added during a banking crisis in countries with deeper financial systems than in countries with shallower financial systems. Our results do not suggest, however, that on net the externally dependent firms fare worse in deep financial systems.     

What explains global exchange rate movements during the financial crisis?

A striking and unexpected feature of the financial crisis has been the sharp appreciation of the US dollar against virtually all currencies globally. The paper finds that negative US-specific macroeconomic shocks during the crisis have triggered a significant strengthening of the US dollar, rather than a weakening. Macroeconomic fundamentals and financial exposure of individual countries are found to have played a key role in the transmission process of US shocks: in particular countries with low FX reserves, weak current account positions and high direct financial exposure vis-à-vis the United States have experienced substantially larger currency depreciations during the crisis overall, and to US shocks in particular.     

The effects of the structure of banking market and funding strategy on risk and return

This paper analyses the implications of bank market power and funding structure for risk and return. It employs a sample of 978 banks in 55 countries leading up to the 2008 financial crisis to test for two related hypotheses. First, competition reduces internal capital as the level of market power increases when banks use internal funding to diversify into non-interest income generating activities. Building on these results and employing various specifications of Lerner index and funding strategy, the second test suggests that the relatively low insolvency risk among banks in emerging and developing countries during 2000–2007 is attributed to the high degree of market power and the use of internally generated funds.     

Dissecting Foreign Bank Lending Behavior During the 2008–2009 Crisis

This paper analyzes the lending behavior of foreign‐owned banks during the recent global crisis. Using bank‐level panel data for 51 countries, the paper explores the role of affiliate and parent financial characteristics, host location, as well as the impact of parent geographic origin and reach on foreign banks’ credit growth. Overall, the analysis finds robust evidence that foreign banks curtailed the growth of credit relative to other banks, independent of the host region in which they operate. Banks from the United States reduced loan growth less than other parent banks. Neither the global nor regional reach of parent banks influenced the lending growth of foreign affiliates. Parent capitalization and not parent funding explained the behavior of foreign bank credit growth during the global crisis. However, funding did affect the lending behavior of domestic and foreign banks in host countries, with those relying more heavily on deposits suffering a smaller decline in bank lending. Although not the focus of the paper, we also find that government‐owned banks played a countercyclical role in all regions.     

Auditor choice and bank risk taking

We investigate the importance of auditor choice on bank risk-taking in a cross-country setting for 5498 banks from 116 emerging and developed countries. Using the Z-score as our main proxy for bank risk, we report evidence that hiring a Big Four auditing firm reduces bank-risk even after controlling for bank and country variables. The reported evidence is valid for banks outside the United States and is robust to concerns relating to endogeneity and alternative banking risk measures. The results are economically meaningful. All else constant, the Z-score of a bank audited by a Big Four firm is 10.4% higher than a similar bank with a non-BIG Four auditor. Moreover, consistent with the view that Big Four auditors serve a corporate governance mechanism in emerging markets, we find that Big Four auditors maintain the ability to curb bank risk in countries characterized by weak institutions. Finally, our results suggest that while audit quality is associated with bank safety, its impact is reduced in countries that require audit-oversight.     

欧洲主权债务危机演进及对中资银行的启示

受全球金融危机的持续影响和欧元区制度问题的激化,欧洲主权债务危机呈愈演愈烈之势,逐步从边缘国家扩散至核心国家,并从主权债务危机向银行业危机演化。目前,欧元区重债国采取的财务整顿政策难以在短期发挥缩减赤字的作用,反而加大复苏风险;对重债国援助资金总量有限,其发放门槛徒增短期违约风险;欧洲央行购买国债虽有利于缓解危机恶化,但量化宽松的政策与其控制通胀的设立宗旨存在矛盾。在此背景下,中资银行应调整涉欧资产配置,进一步加强国别风险研究和管理,积极稳健地推进国际化经营,打造资产、业务和经营地域多元化的国际化银行。     

Productivity and efficiency at large and community banks in the US: A Bayesian true random effects stochastic distance frontier analysis

This paper compares the productivity and efficiency of large banks and community banks in the United States over the period 1997–2006. This comparison is performed by estimating a true random effects stochastic distance frontier model—a model that is capable of disentangling unobserved heterogeneity from inefficiency—within a Bayesian framework. We find that failure to consider unobserved heterogeneity results in a misleading ranking of banks and mismeasured technical efficiency, productivity growth, and returns to scale. Our results show that, compared with community banks, large banks have experienced much higher productivity growth and higher levels of returns to scale. Our estimates of total factor productivity growth show a clear downward trend for both large and community banks, and our decomposition of the output-distance-function-based Divisia productivity index indicates that technical change is the driving force behind this trend.     

How did a domestic housing slump turn into a global financial crisis?

The global financial crisis clearly started with problems in the U.S. sub-prime sector and spread across the world from there. But was the direct exposure of foreigners to the U.S. financial system a key driver of the crisis, or did other factors account for its rapid contagion across the world? To answer this question, we assessed whether countries that held large amounts of U.S. mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and were highly dependent on dollar funding experienced a greater degree of financial distress during the crisis. We found little evidence of such direct spillovers from the United States to abroad. Although CDS spreads generally rose higher and bank stocks generally fell lower in countries with more exposure to U.S. MBS and greater dollar funding needs, these correlations were not robust, and they fail to explain the lion’s share of the deterioration in asset prices that took place during the crisis. Accordingly, less tangible channels of contagion may have played a more important role in the global spread of the crisis: a generalized run on global financial institutions, given the opacity of their balance sheets; excessive dependence on short-term funding; vicious cycles of mark-to-market losses driving fire sales of MBS; the realization that financial firms around the world were pursuing similar (flawed) business models; and global swings in risk aversion. The U.S. sub-prime crisis, rather than being a fundamental driver of the global crisis, may have been merely a trigger for a global bank run and for disillusionment with a risky business model that already had spread around the world.     

An analysis of nontraditional activities at U.S. commercial banks

In recent years, commercial banking in the United States has experienced a decline in its traditional business of financing loans by issuing deposits. Simultaneously, banks have become more involved in nontraditional activities that provide financial services and generate fee income. As a result, real aggregate noninterest income has risen relative to income from traditional activities. This paper examines features common to banks that are heavily engaged in nontraditional areas. The empirical analysis suggests that these banks tend to be larger, have smaller net interest margins, have relatively fewer core deposits, and exhibit less risk. These findings have intuitive appeal and conform to conventional wisdom; while larger banks have fewer core deposits and face more competitive interest rate conditions, resulting in narrow spreads from traditional intermediation, they have more diverse sources of revenue and greater access to financial markets, which reduces risk.