Civic participation of secular groups in Canada

Using two recent nationally representative Canadian surveys, this paper investigates how secularization affects civic participation, inclusive of political engagement and philanthropy. Three mutually exclusive categories of secularized individuals are considered. The analysis suggests that Canadian secular groups are relatively less engaged with politics and volunteer fewer hours, compared with the actively religious. They are, however, found to contribute significantly more money to secular causes, controlling for a wide range of individual attributes. Various explanations are explored.     

The impacts of religion,political ideology,and social capital on religious and secular giving: evidence from the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey

Using a double hurdle model and data from the 2006 Social Capital Community Survey (SCCS2006) we examine religious and secular giving, focusing on the impacts of religion, political ideology and social capital. Our main results indicate that greater participation in religious activities positively impacts religious and secular giving, the intensity of religious belief increases religious giving at the expense of secular giving, religious giving by very conservative individuals is higher than for other ideological groups, and measures of social capital are very important in raising the level and likelihood of philanthropic giving.     

Can religion insure against aggregate shocks to happiness? The case of transition countries

This paper examines the effects of reforms and religion on happiness in transition economies. Earlier literature suggests that religiosity insures happiness against various individual stressful life events. This phenomenon is well-explored in developed countries but rarely studied in post-communist countries, where religion was officially suppressed for a long period. These countries have undergone considerable economic transformations over the past two decades. Using cross-sectional Life in Transition Survey data and historical data on religions, I examine if religion insures against economic reforms. The endogeneity of religion is taken into account. The findings suggest that economic reforms may have both positive and negative effects on happiness. Religiosity indeed insures happiness and perceptions of economic and political situations against economic reforms.     

中国农村"文明的冲突"

基于中国宗教发展特点,本文对宗教俱乐部模型进行了简单的扩展,用来研究宗教与传统文化、世俗文化之间的关系。使用河南农村实地调查数据,本文检验了扩展的宗教俱乐部模型所揭示的宗教替代效应。研究结果表明,宗教归信者对传统文化和世俗文化活动的参与明显小于无宗教信仰者,并且宗教的替代效应与文化活动的世俗性具有正相关关系。这些结果说明了宗教对传统文化、世俗文化替代效应的存在,宗教已经在一定程度上导致了农村分化。     

State and religion over time

State and religion, two of the oldest institutions known to mankind, have historically had a close relationship with each other, but the disestablishment of state religions has been one of the most drastic institutional transformations that has taken place in the modern era. We offer a systematic analysis of the development of secular states based on a political economy approach that is centered on the notion of legitimacy. Viewing religion as a legitimizing force for political leaders, we consider the factors affecting the cost and benefits of alternative sources of legitimacy, such as the differential abilities of religious and secular sources to legitimize political rulers and historical inertia that shaped the cost of monitoring legitimizing agents. To examine this argument empirically, we built a cross-national time-series dataset for the relationship between state and religion since the year 1000. We first use the data to examine the evolution of secularism over time and its variation across religious traditions. We then use regression analysis and an instrumental variables approach to identify the influences on the adoption of secular state, such as concentration in the religion market, religious differences between rulers and the general population, historical inertia of a state, and the prevailing political regime. We address endogeneity concerns regarding the relationship between religious concentration and state secularism by exploiting variation among territories in their geographic distance to religious “capitals” of the world as an instrument.     

Afterlife incentives in charitable giving

There is an expanding literature that examines the influence of religion on economic behaviour. Researchers typically do not distinguish among religions, masking important variation across doctrines. Our article adopts a typology of religions based on the construct of salvific merit. Major religious doctrines are ordered based on their linkage between charitable behaviour in this life and condition in the afterlife. Using the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS), we exploit variation in household marginal tax rates (a subsidy to charitable giving) to test the influence of major religious doctrines on charitable giving. We find that charitable giving by adherents to high-salvific-merit religions are less sensitive to changes in charitable subsidies. Adherents to low-salvific-merit religions behave more like nonreligious households. Our results suggest that religious households optimize according to specific doctrines rather than a broad notion of religion.     

THE LOGIC OF AUTHORITARIAN BARGAINS

Dictatorships do not survive by repression alone. Rather, dictatorial rule is often explained as an "authoritarian bargain" by which citizens relinquish political rights for economic security. The applicability of the authoritarian bargain to decision-making in non-democratic states, however, has not been thoroughly examined. We conceptualize this bargain as a simple game between a representative citizen and an autocrat who faces the threat of insurrection, and where economic transfers and political influence are simultaneously determined. Our model yields implications for empirical patterns that are expected to exist. Tests of a system of equations with panel data comprising 80 non-democratic states between 1975 and 1999 generally confirm the predictions of the authoritarian-bargain thesis, with some variation across different categories of dictatorship.     

Coups,revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies

The purpose of this paper is to explore the interaction of two mechanisms that might constrain the power of dictators: the threat of a coup by the selectorate and a revolution by citizens. Our results help explain a stylized fact, namely that autocracies are far more likely to be either the best or the worst performers in terms of growth and public goods policies. To this end, we focus on accountability within dictatorships using a model where both the selectorate and the citizens are the principals and the autocrat is the agent. Our results highlight that both excessively strong and excessively weak dictators lead to poor economic performances, and that a balanced distribution of de facto political power is required to incentivize the dictator to choose efficient economic policies.     

International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator

Wintrobe's (1990, 1998) dictatorship model is adapted to examine the impacts of economic sanctions on an autocrat. It is shown that the dictator's choice of the level of power, and the quantities of loyalty and repression used as inputs in the production of power, are affected by the type and magnitude of sanctions and by the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups. Sanctions have direct and indirect effects on the prices of loyalty and repression as well as potentially generating rents that might be captured either by the dictator or by the opposition.     

Autocratic family policy

Families produce people. This presents a problem for autocratic regimes. On the one hand, familial production benefits the autocrat by augmenting the future productivity of the labor force. On the other hand, familial production threatens the autocrat by drawing current resources and loyalty away from the collective. This paper presents a theory of autocratic family policy in which the deciding factor is how much present control over resources an autocrat is willing to forego for future control. I apply this theory to the Soviet Union, arguing that the somersault of Soviet family policies (1917–1944) was a response to this tradeoff under different conditions.

     

Religion and Economic Development in History: Institutions and the Role of Religious Networks

I argue that the role of religion on economic performance is mainly through the networks of small religious groups. These groups form social networks that enable individuals to conduct non-formal contract enforcement mechanisms. I analyze the effects of religions on societies, focusing mainly on the institutional aspects that affect the capabilities of creating social capital via networks which enhance cooperation and decrease transaction costs. Since the interaction between institutions and organizations is expected to shape the institutional evolution and economic performance of an economy, religions that have a communal form of organization rather than a vertical (hierarchical) structure, thus allowing many different denominational sub-communities within a society, can be more beneficiary for development and growth. Such institutions may not only provide allocative and production efficiency, but also adaptive efficiency that is a key to long-run growth. However, these effects may turn negative depending on these institutions’ role in causing group hostility and exclusion.     

An experimental study of democracy breakdown,income and inequality

Many empirical studies investigate the relationships between economic development, inequality, and democracy survival; however, establishing causal links with naturally occurring cross-country data is problematic. We address this question in a laboratory experiment, where in democracy citizens can invest in profitable projects and vote on income taxation. In the alternative regime—autocracy—efficient investment levels and equitable redistribution are implemented exogenously, but there is a risk of resources being partially expropriated. Citizens can voluntarily switch from democracy to autocracy by a majority vote, which mimics recent historical examples, where voters voluntarily delegate political powers to an autocrat in exchange for a promise of high taxation and redistribution. We find that the likelihood of democracy breakdown increases with the degree of inequality but does not vary with productivity. The link between productivity and democracy survival depends critically on the degree of sophistication of the median voter.     

风险、社会保障与农村宗教信仰

遵循理性选择研究范式,本文研究了农村社会保障与农村信教行为之间的关系.实证分析结果表明,风险是宗教选择和宗教参与的一个重要决定因素;目前农村社会保障水平对信仰量变有显著影响,但对信仰质变尚不够构成显著影响;"新农合"的开展能够有效地降低农村宗教信仰的增长速度.这些结果可以对农村"宗教热"现象进行解释:世俗社会对于农村居民所面临风险的不作为或者弱作为,是宗教在农村颇具吸引力的一个重要原因.     

The use of knowledge about society

Selection of efficient institutions or policies in politics requires constituents to estimate the net benefits of political reforms. Political competition fails to inform constituents of the costs of forgone political alternatives. Ignorance of ‘political opportunity costs’ prevents the adoption of welfare enhancing reforms of public institutions and policies. The empirical record supports this contention.     

校企合作工学交替背景下高职思想政治理论课教学方式的创新

大力推行校企合作工学结合,是我国职业教育发展的重要举措。高职思想政治理论课教学要适应这一新的人才培养模式,重构课程教学体系、构建富有校企合作工学结合特色的教学方法和考评体系。这些教学方式的创新对提高新时期高职思想政治理论课教学具有重要的实用价值。     

What determines the likelihood of structural reforms?

We use data for a panel of 60 countries over the period 1980–2005 to investigate the main drivers of the likelihood of structural reforms. We find that: (i) external debt crises are the main trigger of financial and banking reforms; (ii) inflation and banking crises are the key drivers of external capital account reforms; (iii) banking crises also hasten financial reforms; and (iv) economic recessions play an important role in promoting the necessary consensus for financial, capital, banking and trade reforms, especially in the group of OECD-countries. Additionally, we also observe that the degree of globalisation is relevant for financial reforms, in particular in the group of non-OECD countries. Moreover, an increase in the income gap accelerates the implementation of structural reforms, but increased political fragmentation does not seem to have a significant impact.     

论政府供给偏好的短期决定:政治均衡与经济效率

本文以财政支出为主体,研究了我国政府供给偏好(规模与结构)短期决定问题。政治均衡而非经济市场均衡是理解这一问题的关键。在“有管理的竞争性政治市场”和政府追求政治支持最大化等假定下,我们考察了政治均衡决定政府供给偏好的过程及其效率属性,以及“政治价格”在两级“政治市场”上的形成机制。结论表明:政治均衡决定资源配置固有的低效率属性,因政府供给范围的“越位”和“缺位”而加剧。当前改革的重点应是推动经济市场化转轨的完成和公共财政的转型,而非完全的民主化。权威因素对“政治价格”的管理在利益分化严重的当前形势下具有建设性作用。推动渐进民主化,完善权力对等的“二级政治市场”则是长远之策。     

Was Mancur a Maoist? An Essay on Kleptocracy and Political Stability

Much of Mancur Olson's work explored the link between government structure and economic development. This paper provides a framework for thinking about this link that exposes both the powerful insights and the deep tensions in Olson's work. In The Rise and Decline of Nations Olson argued that instability was good for democratic accountability because it upset entrenched interests. In contrast, after the fall of the socialist regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union, Olson argued that the stability of a single autocrat or "stationary bandit" was superior to the competitive rent seeking of competing "roving bandits." I argue that there is a real inconsistency in Olson's thinking on the role of stability and change in political life; I do this by developing the connections between Olson's classic Logic of Collective Action and his subsequent writing. The paper concludes by building on Olson's insights to point the way to a more complete analysis of democracy and transition.     

The year of commissions.

Despite mutterings that today's political climate is unreceptive to health care reforms, would-be reformers are inching forward under several high-powered commissions and task forces.     

Unveiling the effects of a headscarf ban: Evidence from municipal jobs in Turkey

Religious conservatism is often associated with patriarchal attitudes and deterioration of women’s rights. This conventional wisdom has motivated ubiquitous policies that limit public expressions of religion and emphasize secular values. This paper demonstrates that a policy change which undermines secularity ends up empowering women. The current article takes advantage of a unique divergence in political institutions that occurred in Turkey’s recent history to explore how revoking a headscarf ban affected employment outcomes of women in the public sector. In a difference-in-discontinuities setting, I exploit the before/after discontinuous policy variation and compare female employment within municipalities that have Islamist and secular mayors. I find that eliminating legal obstacles against observant Muslim women in the labor market improves female employment in Islamist municipalities. Yet, when women are not allowed to wear headscarves to work, Islamist mayors employ less women vis-à-vis secular mayors. Overall, findings point to unintended consequences of headscarf bans on pious women.