The Influence of Foreclosure Delays on Borrowers' Default Behavior

This paper conducts loan‐level analysis to investigate the influence of expected foreclosure delay on a borrower's default propensity. We include the actual foreclosure times in the analysis to capture the dynamic nature of foreclosure duration. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we find a statistically and economically significant impact of foreclosure delay on borrower default behavior. In the current market condition where many borrowers have negative equity, the increase in delay may make default an optimal choice for more borrowers. The negative effect of increased foreclosure delay may need to be considered when devising policies to aid troubled borrowers.     

Optimal Bank Transparency

Increasing transparency is recurrently offered as a centerpiece of bank regulation. We study a competitive banking sector whose illiquid assets are funded by short‐term debt that must be refinanced. We show that welfare is a nonmonotonic function of the level of transparency: Increasing transparency fosters efficient liquidation but has an adverse effect on rollover risk given the level of risk. Banks may compensate this adverse effect by taking more risk. These offsetting effects render an intermediate level of transparency optimal. Moreover, the existence of negative social externalities of bank failures calls for making banks more opaque rather than more transparent.     

Regulatory Capital Charges for Too‐Connected‐to‐Fail Institutions: A Practical Proposal

The recent financial crisis has highlighted once more that interconnectedness in the financial system is a major source of systemic risk. I suggest a practical way to levy regulatory capital charges based on the degree of interconnectedness among financial institutions. Namely, the charges are based on the institution's incremental contribution to systemic risk based on a risk budgeting approach. The imposition of such capital charges could go a long way towards internalizing the negative externalities associated with too‐connected‐to‐fail institutions and providing managerial incentives to strengthen an institution's solvency position, and avoid too much homogeneity and excessive reliance on the same counterparties in the financial industry.     

Strategic loan modification: An options-based response to strategic default

This paper presents a parsimonious barrier model for the optimal principal reset in a loan modification, thereby maximizing the loan value to the lender bank and minimizing the likelihood of strategic foreclosure by the homeowner. Writing down the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio will reduce the present value of future payments on the loan, but will also reduce the probability of default, thereby saving foreclosure losses. The optimal trade-off of these two countervailing effects will pinpoint the optimal LTV at which the loan must be reset. We present a simple barrier option decomposition of the loan value that makes the optimization of LTV easy to implement. An extension of the model is shown to account for varying growth rate assumptions about house prices. The model in this paper specifically accounts for the homeowner’s willingness to pay, and uses the framework to model shared-appreciation mortgages (SAMs).     

Margining in derivatives markets and the stability of the banking sector

We investigate the effects of margining, a widely-used mechanism for attaching collateral to derivatives contracts, on derivatives trading volume, default risk, and on the welfare in the banking sector. First, we develop a stylized banking sector equilibrium model to develop some basic intuition of the effects of margining. We find that a margin requirement can be privately and socially sub-optimal. Subsequently, we extend this model into a dynamic simulation model that captures some of the essential characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets. Contrarily to the common belief that margining always reduces default risk, we find that there exist situations in which margining increases default risk, reduces aggregate derivatives’ trading volume, and has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the banking sector. The negative effects of margining are exacerbated during periods of market stress when margin rates are high and collateral is scarce. We also find that central counterparties only lift some of the inefficiencies caused by margining.     

The Co‐movement of Credit Default Swap,Bond and Stock Markets: an Empirical Analysis

We analyse the relationship between credit default swap (CDS), bond and stock markets during 2000–2002. Focusing on the intertemporal co‐movement, we examine monthly, weekly and daily lead‐lag relationships in a vector autoregressive model and the adjustment between markets caused by cointegration. First, we find that stock returns lead CDS and bond spread changes. Second, CDS spread changes Granger cause bond spread changes for a higher number of firms than vice versa. Third, the CDS market is more sensitive to the stock market than the bond market and the strength of the co‐movement increases the lower the credit quality and the larger the bond issues. Finally, the CDS market contributes more to price discovery than the bond market and this effect is stronger for US than for European firms.     

Performance and Merton-type default risk of listed banks in the EU: A panel VAR approach

This paper provides empirical evidence that sheds new light into the dynamic interactions between risk and efficiency, a highly debated issue. First, we estimate three alternative measures of bank performance, by employing a directional distance function framework, along with a cost frontier and a profit function. As a second step, we calculate a Merton-type bank default risk. Then, we employ a panel VAR analysis, which allows the examination of the underlying relationships between efficiency and risk without applying any a priori restrictions. Most evidence shows that the effect of a one standard deviation shock of the distance to default on inefficiency is negative and substantial. There is some evidence of a reverse causation. As part of a sensitivity analysis, we extent our study to investigate the relationship between efficiency and default risk for banks with different types of ownership structures and across financial systems with different levels of development.     

Determinants of the incidence of U.S. Mortgage Loan Modifications

This paper combines data on the performance of mortgage loans with detailed borrower, neighborhood, and property characteristics to examine the factors that determine the outcomes of seriously delinquent loans. We employ multinomial logit models in a hazard framework to explain how loan, borrower, property, servicer and neighborhood characteristics affect which of the following four outcomes results from a seriously delinquent loan: (1) the borrower cures the delinquency; (2) the borrower and lender agree to modify the loan; (3) the borrower suffers a liquidation (short sale, deed in lieu, foreclosure auction sale or REO); or (4) the loan remains delinquent. In particular, we focus on mortgage modification. We find that the outcomes of delinquent loans are significantly related to: current LTV, FICO scores, especially risky loan characteristics, the servicer of the loan, neighborhood housing price appreciation, and whether the borrower received foreclosure counseling.     

House‐Price Expectations,Alternative Mortgage Products,and Default

The goal of this paper is to better understand the forces that spurred use of alternative mortgages during the housing boom. A theoretical model shows that, when future house‐price expectations become more favorable, reducing default concerns, mortgage choices shift toward alternative products, which are characterized by backloading of payments. The empirical work confirms this prediction by showing that an increase in past house‐price appreciation, which captures more favorable expectations for the future, raises the market share of alternative mortgages. In addition, the paper tests the fundamental presumption that backloaded mortgages are more likely to default, finding support for this view.     

Beyond the Transaction: Banks and Mortgage Default of Low‐Income Homebuyers

We evaluate the effects of the lending institution and soft information on mortgage loan performance for low‐income homebuyers. We find that even after controlling for the propensity of a borrower to get a loan from a local bank based on observable characteristics, those who receive a loan from a local bank branch are significantly less likely to become delinquent or default than other bank or nonbank borrowers, consistent with an unobserved information effect. These effects are most pronounced for loans originated to borrowers with marginal credit, where soft information may have a stronger effect. These findings support previous research on information‐driven lending, and provide additional explanation for observed differences in mortgage loan performance between bank and nonbank lenders.     

SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET PURCHASE COMMITMENT YIELDS

We provide empirical evidence that quoted secondary market mortgage yields conform to the predictions of option theory. We compare Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac origination yields offered in the secondary market from 1985 to 2003 with the predictions of a two‐state binomial mortgage option valuation model. Our two‐state approach considers a mean‐reverting interest rate process as well as a stochastic housing price. Using predictions from option simulations, we find strong links between market practice and mortgage option prepayment and default factors over time. We also find cross‐sectional differences that are consistent with the institutional structure of the markets.     

Optimal loan-to-value ratio and the efficiency gains of default

We study the optimal loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in a monetary general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, collateral default, production and a banking sector. We find that the welfare of the debtor is not monotonically increasing in the LTV ratio, i.e. tighter financing constraints can be welfare-improving for the debtor. Moreover, the optimal LTV ratio for both the debtor and the creditor allows for the possibility of ex post default. Collateral default enhances efficiency by allowing for better consumption smoothing and risk hedging. Our result improves the argument in Dubey et al. (Econometrica 73(1):1–37, 2005) and Zame (Am Econ Rev 83(5):1142–1164, 1993), which use default penalties instead of collateral to induce repayment and show the efficiency gains of default.     

Non‐compliance in Executive Compensation Disclosure: the Brazilian Experience

We examine the determinants and consequences of firms’ choice not to comply with a new executive compensation disclosure regulation. We exploit a unique feature of Brazilian markets, where a change in the regulation of executive compensation disclosure could arguably lead to personal security‐related costs for executives. This major reform in executive compensation disclosure in Brazil became effective in December 2009. While some firms complied with the change in regulation, other firms explicitly refused to comply fully with the regulation by using a court injunction. After controlling for firm‐specific characteristics and both social and economic inequality measures, we find that the degree of criminality in the state in which the firm is headquartered (a proxy for security‐related costs) and the level of CEO compensation are important determinants of a firm's decision not to fully disclose executive compensation information. We also show that firms which do not fully comply with the regulation face costs in the form of higher bid‐ask spreads, suggesting investors are leery of the decision not to comply with the regulation. We discuss the potential implications of our results in the context of executive compensation disclosure reform.     

Dynamic Prudential Regulation: Is Prompt Corrective Action Optimal?

The current U.S. bank capital regulation features prompt corrective action, which mandates regulators to intervene in and liquidate banks based on their book‐value capital ratios. To see if prompt corrective action is optimal, I build a dynamic model of repeated interactions between a banker and a regulator. Under hidden choice of risk, private information on returns and limited commitment by the banker, and costly liquidation, I first characterize the optimal incentive‐feasible allocation. I then demonstrate that the optimal allocation is implementable through the combination of a risk‐based deposit insurance premium and a book‐value capital regulation with stochastic liquidation.     

What Determines Collection Rates of Debt Collection Agencies?

We contribute to the literature on debt collection agencies in two ways: First, we present an estimation of the collection rates. The distribution of collection rates exhibits a mean of about 65% and a strong bimodality with peaks at the very ends of the distribution. Second, we investigate potential determinants of the collection success. We find that collection rates are positively related to the exposure at default and to prior debtor‐specific collection rates. In contrast, the age of the account and—if applicable—prior experience with the debtor have a negative impact on collection rates.     

Trade Credit Risk Management: The Role of Executive Risk‐Taking Incentives

In this study we investigate how executive equity incentives affect companies’ risk‐taking behavior in relationships with their customers. We hypothesize and find that executive risk‐taking incentives provided by options are positively related to the degree of trade credit riskiness measured both as the amount of total trade credit a firm extends to all its customers and as the amount of trade credit a firm extends to customers with a high probability of default. We also find that the measures of trade credit riskiness are positively related to the firm's future stock return volatility, suggesting that the customer default risk inherent in customer‐supplier trade credit relationships represents an important economic source of the overall supplier‐firm riskiness. The findings of the study provide insights into why firms facing financial difficulties are not denied trade credit.     

An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities

We analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity‐dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. We show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys. Also, the seller's allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient. As an illustration, we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non‐anchor stores. We show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough.     

The Determinants of Financial Structure: New Insights from Business Start‐ups

Business start‐ups lack prior history and reputation, face high failure risk, and have highly concentrated ownership. The resulting information and incentive problems, combined with entrepreneurial private benefits of control, affect initial financing decisions. This paper examines simultaneously the impact of these issues on leverage, debt mix and maturity. We find that start‐ups with high adverse selection and risk shifting problems contract less bank debt but compensate with other debt sources. Start‐ups in growing industries have lower leverage, but raise more bank debt. Entrepreneurs with large private control benefits contract less but longer term bank loans to lower the default probability.     

“Too‐Small‐To‐Survive” versus “Too‐Big‐To‐Fail” banks: The two sides of the same coin

In the recent crisis, the U.S. authorities bailed out numerous banks through TARP, whilst let many others to fail as going concern entities. Even though both interventions fully protect depositors, a bail out represents an implied subsidy to shareholders, which is not yet the case with closures where creditors are not subsidised. We investigate this non‐uniform policy, demonstrating that size and not performance is the decision variable that endogenously determines one threshold below which banks are treated as TSTS by regulators and another one above which are considered to be TBTF. We, hence, provide a pair of economic rather than regulatory cut‐offs for TBTF and TSTS banks. The shareholders and the other uninsured creditors of a distressed bank are not bailed out if the bank is considered to be TSTS. We further document that the less complex a bank is, the less likely is to be bailed out and, hence, to have all of its creditors protected.     

Distance to default,subordinated debt,and distress indicators in the banking industry*

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the inadequacy of present supervisory arrangements to identify reliable ex‐ante indicators of banking distress. For a sample of US bank holding companies, we analyse the extent to which distance to default based on market data can be explained using accounting‐based indicators of risk. We show that a larger number of bank fundamentals help predict default for institutions that issue subordinated debt. For banks that issue sub‐debt, we find that higher charter values and low bank capitalizations further increase the power of bank fundamentals to predict default risk.