Who needs budgets?

Budgeting, as most corporations practice it, should be abolished. That may sound radical, but doing so would further companies' long-running efforts to transform themselves into developed networks that can nimbly adjust to market conditions. Most other building blocks are in place, but companies continue to restrict themselves by relying on inflexible budget processes and the command-and-control culture that budgeting entails. A number of companies have rejected the foregone conclusions embedded in budgets, and they've given up the self-interested wrangling over what the data indicate. In the absence of budgets, alternative goals and measures--some financial, such as cost-to-income ratios, and some nonfinancial, such as time to market-move to the foreground. Companies that have rejected budgets require employees to measure themselves against the performance of competitors and against internal peer groups. Because employees don't know whether they've succeeded until they can look back on the results of a given period, they must use every ounce of energy to ensure that they beat the competition. A key feature of many companies that have rejected budgets is the use of rolling forecasts, which are created every few months and typically cover five to eight quarters. Because the forecasts are regularly revised, they allow companies to continuously adapt to market conditions. The forecasting practices of two such companies, both based in Sweden, are examined in detail: the bank Svenska Handelsbanken and the wholesaler Ahlsell. Though the first companies to reject budgets were located in Northern Europe, organizations that have gone beyond budgeting can be found in a range of countries and industries. Their practices allow them to unleash the power of today's management tools and realize the potential of a fully decentralized organization.     

Who goes, who stays?

The merger announcement between DeWaal Pharmaceuticals and BioHealth Labs was front-page news. Pictures of CEO Steve Lindell and chairman Kaspar van de Velde had appeared in newspapers around the world. Two months later, the press had moved on to a new story, and the hard labor of integration loomed. Steve had worked tirelessly to clear regulatory hurdles, and all signs pointed toward approval in the near future. Now Steve was feeling pressure to attack the real challenge of the merger: bringing together two very different cultures as quickly and efficiently as possible. DeWaal was an established drug-maker based in the Netherlands, and BioHealth, headquartered just north of New York City, had in recent years become competitive at the highest tier of the market. The first step in integrating the two companies was to select the top layers of management for the new company. At the moment, there were some 120 people on two continents for about 65 senior-level jobs. Steve's urgency was not without cause: talented people from both sides were jumping ship, and BioHealth's stock price had dipped 20% after the initial euphoria over the deal had worn off. Complicating matters was confusion over who was really in charge: Steve wanted to take leadership and move ahead rapidly, but he was often disarmed by Kaspar's charming persuasiveness. As the two men attempt to work through the important personnel issues during a lunch meeting, they quickly hit a roadblock. How can they come to agreement about who goes and who stays? Four commentators offer advice in response to this fictional case.     

Who makes on-the-run Treasuries special?

The most recently issued, on-the-run, Treasuries are extremely liquid and frequently trade at a premium in both the cash and repo, or financing, markets. Previous research suggests that both the cash and repo premiums reflect demand from buy-and-hold investors who value the superior liquidity of these securities and are reluctant to lend them in the repo market. We find evidence that premiums in the repo market are also closely related to market participants’ demand to hedge interest rate risk associated with their holdings of fixed income securities.     

Who hedges more when leverage is endogenous? A testable theory of corporate risk management under general distributional conditions

This paper develops a theory of a firm’s hedging decision with endogenous leverage. In contrast to previous models in the literature, our framework is based on less restrictive distributional assumptions and allows a closed-form analytical solution to the joint optimization problem. Using anecdotal evidence of greater benefits of risk management for firms selling “credence goods” or products that involve long-term relationships, we prove that those optimally leveraged firms, which face more convex indirect bankruptcy cost functions, will choose higher hedge ratios. Moreover, we suggest a new approach to test this relationship empirically.

Who Gambles in the Stock Market?

This study shows that the propensity to gamble and investment decisions are correlated. At the aggregate level, individual investors prefer stocks with lottery features, and like lottery demand, the demand for lottery-type stocks increases during economic downturns. In the cross-section, socioeconomic factors that induce greater expenditure in lotteries are associated with greater investment in lottery-type stocks. Further, lottery investment levels are higher in regions with favorable lottery environments. Because lottery-type stocks underperform, gambling-related underperformance is greater among low-income investors who excessively overweight lottery-type stocks. These results indicate that state lotteries and lottery-type stocks attract very similar socioeconomic clienteles.     

Who＇s Who

《会计学报》是1920年国立暨南大学（上海真如）的“商学院会计学会”所编，当时．未见有“会计系”编制．商学院学生依研究兴趣结社．如银行学会、会计学会等。     

Who should set CEO pay? The press? Congress? Shareholders?

Populist fervor in an election year has transformed executive compensation from a business issue into a political one. Critics, led by Graef Crystal, author of In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives, charge that CEOs are ripping off shareholders with their outrageous salaries while running U.S. corporations into the ground. Politicians claim overpaid CEOs are the root cause of the U.S. competitiveness problem. Add a recessionary business climate to the fact that some CEOs earn 130 times more than their lowest paid employees, and you have the makings of a populist rebellion. In a bid to appease voters, Congress is considering several bills that would limit the deductibility of "excessive executive salaries," the SEC has opened the issue to shareholder comment, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board is looking at new accounting standards for granting stock options to executives as part of company compensation schemes. Andrew R. Brownstein and Morris J. Panner say it's time to put the debate back where it belongs--in a business context. The real question is not are executives paid too much, but are shareholders getting their money's worth. Most U.S. corporations use stock compensation to link company long-term performance to executive salaries. And because of the staggering market performance of U.S. corporations in the 1980s, an overwhelming majority of CEOs are actually paid in line with their performance. Rather than cut executive pay, Brownstein and Panner suggest that corporations extend incentive-based compensation plans to all employees, thus narrowing the salary gap and establishing pay for performance at every level of the organization.     

Who Are the Value and Growth Investors?

This paper investigates value and growth investing in a large administrative panel of Swedish residents. We show that, over the life cycle, households progressively shift from growth to value as they become older and their balance sheets improve. Furthermore, investors with high human capital and high exposure to macroeconomic risk tilt their portfolios away from value. While several behavioral biases seem evident in the data, the patterns we uncover are overall remarkably consistent with the portfolio implications of risk‐based theories of the value premium.     

Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?

To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud, we study all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on standard corporate governance actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but rather takes a village, including several nontraditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Differences in access to information, as well as monetary and reputational incentives, help to explain this pattern. In‐depth analyses suggest that reputational incentives in general are weak, except for journalists in large cases. By contrast, monetary incentives help explain employee whistleblowing.     

Are zombie firms more incentivized to financialize?

This paper investigates whether zombie firms demonstrate a tendency to invest in the financial sector, a practice we term financialization strategy. Unlike those in the United States, Japan, and Europe, we find that zombie firms in China are not necessarily small and that they rely heavily on government subsidies in addition to bank loans for survival. In addition, we document that zombie firms in China experience limited investment opportunities in their core businesses. This combination of readily available funding and limited investment opportunities jointly motivate the financialization of firms with zombie status. We further find that financialization is preferred by non-state-owned firms and by those located in regions with less developed markets. Finally, we suggest that a contagion effect can occur in terms of financialization in provinces that have a high percentage of zombie firms. This research sheds light on the effects of a triangular relationship among firms, government agencies, and financial institutions on both the operations of individual firms and overall market efficiency.     

Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?

This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.     

Why are US firms using more short-term debt?

We show that corporate use of long-term debt has decreased in the US over the past three decades and that this trend is heterogeneous across firms. The median percentage of debt maturing in more than 3 years decreased from 53% in 1976 to 6% in 2008 for the smallest firms but did not decrease for the largest firms. The decrease in debt maturity was generated by firms with higher information asymmetry and new firms issuing public equity in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, we show that demand-side factors do not fully explain this trend and that public debt markets' supply-side factors play an important role. Our findings suggest that the shortening of debt maturity has increased the exposure of firms to credit and liquidity shocks.     

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.     

Housing Finance GSEs: Who Gets the Subsidy?

Taxpayer subsidies that flow toward housing-finance GSEs are implicit in nature. This makes the size and distribution of subsidy values hard to measure directly. An array of indirect analyses indicates that incentive-conflicted GSE managers can and do extract substantial annual subsidies for GSE stockholders. Currently, stockholders are allowed to encourage managers to exploit taxpayers by tying incentive compensation implicitly to increases in the discounted present value of expected future subsidies. To counteract this inappropriate incentive, managers should be made accountable to taxpayers for returning all compensation that can be fairly attributed to increases in subsidies captured by GSE stockholders.     

Should more local governments purchase a bond rating?

We investigate whether issuers that choose to forgo a bond rating suffer an interest cost penalty greater than the cost of the rating. We use estimated ratings provided by Moody’s Investor Service to proxy for what the rating would have been if it had been purchased. We find that the primary factors associated with an issuer’s decision to purchase a rating are the rating expected by the issuer and the extent to which an issue is marketed locally. After controlling for self-selection bias, we find that the issuers that forgo a rating do not suffer an interest cost penalty.

Who''''s Who

《会计学报》是1920年国立暨南大学(上海真如)的"商学院会计学会"所编,当时,未见有"会计系"编制,商学院学生依研究兴趣结社,如银行学会、会计学会等。     

Corporate restructuring in Japan: Who monitors the monitor?

Peek and Rosengren [Peek, J., Rosengren, E., 2005. Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan. American Economic Review 95, 1144–1166] showed that, when the bubble economy era ended, regulatory forbearance and perverse incentives allowed Japanese banks to engage extensively in evergreening. This is the first comprehensive study to empirically analyze the economics of private debt restructurings of financially distressed companies in Japan, where the corporate monitoring mechanism is not market based but large-stakeholder based – typically, banks and affiliated companies. These stakeholders are expected to efficiently resolve potential bankruptcy or collapse with better information resulting from long-term relationships with the distressed firms. Our study, however, finds that private restructurings led by them failed because of delays in implementing fundamental solutions. Forbearance in addressing the needs of distressed firms demonstrates the weakness of such stakeholders in instituting discipline, hence the need for a system to “monitor the monitor”.     

Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction

Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. The effects are strongest if they have access to internal financing. We test these predictions using two proxies for overconfidence: CEOs’ personal over-investment in their company and their press portrayal. We find that the odds of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as overconfident. The effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. The market reaction at merger announcement (-90$-90$ basis points) is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs (-12$-12$ basis points). We consider alternative interpretations including inside information, signaling, and risk tolerance.