Specific vs Ad Valorem Strategic Export Subsidies with Taxation Distortion

This paper employs a model to compare the welfare between optimal specific and ad valorem export subsidies if the subsidy payment is financed by distortional taxation. It is found that the welfare under the specific subsidy regime is higher (lower) than that under the ad valorem subsidy regime if the social cost of taxation distortion is low (high). Moreover, the signs of the two optimal subsidies are also crucially dependent on this social cost. They are positive (negative) if the social cost is low (high).     

Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms

We examine an oligopoly model where some consumers engage in costly non-sequential search to discover prices. There are three distinct price-dispersed equilibria characterized by low, moderate and high search intensity. The effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour, expected prices, price dispersion and welfare are sensitive (i) to the equilibrium consumers' search intensity, and (ii) to the status quo number of firms. For instance, when consumers search with low intensity, an increase in the number of firms reduces search, does not affect expected price, leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare. In contrast, when consumers search with high intensity, increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with, but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large. Duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms.     

To outsource or not to outsource in an integrated world

This paper investigates outsourcing decision under certainty and uncertainty. When the production activity can be fragmented into two or more processes, an integrated firm must be competitive in each of the fragmented processes. There are gains from outsourcing when factor prices differ between countries. When factor prices are not equalized internationally, a firm may outsource the process which uses its scarce source intensively. If the cost of outsourcing is lower in the foreign country, full outsourcing occurs under certainty. However, even if the outside supplier has a cost advantage, uncertainty in outsourcing cost ensures that partial outsourcing is optimal for risk-averse firms.     

Price‐level versus inflation targeting with financial market imperfections

Abstract Price‐level targeting (PT) is compared with inflation targeting (IT) in a DSGE model augmented with imperfections in both debt and equity markets. The PT regime outperforms the IT regime, and the gain depends on the degree of financial market frictions. This is because inflation is better anchored under PT, owing to the expectation channel, and therefore the monetary authority has more leverage to deal with the financial market distortions. We also find that the gain is higher if the optimal rule reacts to asset prices instead of the output gap, and the rule requires a positive response to asset prices.     

Fear of floating

This paper uses unique household survey data to investigate the expected effects of a switch from a fixed exchange rate regime to a floating exchange rate regime in Bulgaria during the global financial crisis. The data show that the public associated such a switch with a contraction of output, higher prices, a decline in exports, and an overall deterioration of economic welfare. These expectations fuelled a strong opposition to removing the fixed exchange rate. Thus, the survey data allow us to investigate why a switch from a fixed exchange rate to a floating exchange rate did not take place.     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH THE STICKY INFORMATION MODEL OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT: INFLATION OR PRICE‐LEVEL TARGETING?

I investigate the optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian macroeconomic framework with the sticky information model of price adjustment. The model is solved for optimal policy, and welfare implications of three alternative monetary policy regimes under this optimal policy are compared when there is a cost‐push shock to the economy. These monetary policy regimes are the unconstrained policy, price‐level targeting and inflation targeting regimes. The results illustrate that optimal policy depends on the degree of price stickiness and the persistence of the shock. Inflation targeting emerges as the optimal policy if prices are flexible enough or the shock is persistent enough. However, the unconstrained policy or price‐level targeting might be preferable to inflation targeting if prices are not very flexible and the shock is not very persistent. The results also show that as prices become more flexible, the welfare loss usually gets bigger.     

How Long is a Piece of Cable? Equilibrium Determination of Local Telephone Areas

This paper studies the endogenous determination of telephone local calling areas. In many telephone systems, calls between users in the same calling area are local; calls to outside the calling area are long distance and priced differently. We allow the extension of this area to be treated as a strategic variable. We show the extension of the calling areas which maximizes the carrier's profit to be the same which a welfare maximizing regulator would choose. Under a price cap regime in which prices are required to meet an average price constraint, the firm manipulates strategically the extension of the local calling areas. We end the paper by considering the case of a competitive market. In this case, again, the owner of the local loop extends the local calling areas in response to decreased efficiency or increased competition of its competitors. Received April 25, 2002; revised version received September 9, 2002 Published online: April 30, 2003     

Welfare change and the elimination of the shortage economy in Russia: some representative-household results1

The welfare consequences of eliminating the shortage economy for the representative Russian household are quantitatively assessed. Before price liberalization, households either bought goods and services at state prices and paid searching and queuing costs, or they bought on parallel markets at higher monetary prices. An equation is derived that permits empirical evaluation of the extent to which welfare gains from eliminating searching and queuing costs offset welfare losses from falling real consumption. Available data suggest that when regime change was initiated in Russia in 1992, welfare gains from eliminating shortage were substantial and may have completely offset welfare losses from falling real consumption.     

An experimental study of price dispersion

We report an experiment examining a simple clearinghouse model that generates price dispersion. According to this model, price dispersion arises because of consumer heterogeneity—some consumers are “informed” and simply buy from the firm offering the lowest price, while the remaining consumers are “captive” and shop based on considerations other than price. In our experiment we observe substantial and persistent price dispersion. We find that, as predicted, an increase in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers. We also find, as predicted, that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers become more competitive while prices to captive customers become less competitive. Thus, our experiment provides strong support for the model's comparative static predictions about how changes in market structure affect pricing.     

Monopoly Price Dispersion Under Demand Uncertainty

When a monopolist sets its price before its demand is known, then it may set more than one price and limit the availability of its output at lower prices. This article adds demand uncertainty and price rigidities to the standard model of monopoly pricing. When there are two states of demand and the ex post monopoly price is greater when demand is high then the monopolist's optimal ex ante pricing strategy is to set two prices and limit purchases at the lower price.     

SOME NEW EVIDENCE ON COMPETITION IN PAYDAY LENDING MARKETS

A critical question in the policy debate about payday lending is whether other financial institutions can plausibly provide attractive and lower‐priced substitutes for standard payday loans. I present several new pieces of evidence addressing the question, focusing on whether credit unions, which are often held as the strongest potential competitors to payday lenders, do (or might) viably compete in the payday loan market. National payday loan offerings by credit unions show that very few credit unions currently offer payday loans. Credit union industry reports suggest that those credit unions offering such loans seem unwilling or unable to undercut substantially the prevailing prices set by payday lenders. Those industry reports also reveal that lower‐priced credit union loans generally ration riskier borrowers out of the market by imposing greater restrictions on approval and repayment; risk‐adjusted prices for credit union payday loans may not be lower at all. Survey evidence suggests that most current payday borrowers prefer higher‐priced but less restrictive standard payday loans to lower‐priced but more restrictive alternatives offered by credit unions. The combined demand‐ and supply‐side evidence suggests that one should not expect credit unions (or by extension banks) to offer lower‐priced, higher‐quality alternatives for consumers who currently use payday loans. (JEL G2, L0, L5)     

Imports and the structure of retail markets

Abstract We construct a model of trade with heterogeneous retailers to examine the effects of trade liberalization on retail market structure, imports and social welfare. We are especially interested in investigating the transmission of lower import prices into consumer prices and the effects of retail market regulation. The paper shows that changes in import prices may have large effects on consumer prices and import volumes when changes in retail market structure are taken into account, and that restrictions on retailing, as they occur in several countries, may significantly alter this transmission mechanism by reducing imports and raising consumer prices.     

Dynamic adverse selection and the supply size

In this paper we examine the problem of dynamic adverse selection in a stylized market where the quality of goods is a seller׳s private information while the realized distribution of qualities is public information. We obtain that full trade occurs in every dynamic competitive equilibrium. Moreover, we show that if prices can be conditioned on the supply size then a dynamic competitive equilibrium always exists, while it fails to exist if prices cannot be conditioned on the supply size and the frequency of exchanges is high enough. We conclude that the possibility to condition prices on the supply size allows us to reach efficiency in the limit for exchanges becoming more and more frequent, while otherwise the welfare loss due to delays of exchanges remains bounded away from zero.     

Carbon Abatement and International Spillovers

Carbon abatement policies in large open economies affect both the allocation of domestic resources and international market prices. A change in international prices implies an indirect secondary burden or benefit for all trading countries. Based on simulations with a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use, we show that international spillovers have important welfare implications for carbon abatement policies designed to meet exogenous emission reduction targets. We present a decomposition of the total welfare effect of carbon abatement policies into a primary domestic market effect (at constant international prices) and a secondary international spillover impact as a result of changes in international prices. This decomposition reveals the extent to which domestic abatement costs are increased or decreased as a result of the impact of carbon abatement on international prices.     

Railroad Deregulation and Consumer Welfare

Railroad deregulation under the Staggers Act of 1980 generated rate reductions, service enhancements, and other improvements in economic welfare. These benefits appear to be widely shared. There is a low likelihood that some captive shippers pay rates that exceed the rates they would have paid under regulation, some evidence that some captive shippers have paid rates that regulators would judge unreasonable, and strong evidence that captive shippers pay higher rates than non-captive shippers. The source of deregulations benefits is as noteworthy as their size and distribution. The principal benefits of railroad deregulation stem from cost reduction, not just a closer alignment of prices with pre-deregulation cost levels.     

THE IMPACT OF MERGERS IN U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ON WHOLESALE GASOLINE PRICES

Starting in the mid‐1990s, the U.S. petroleum industry experienced a wave of mergers, several of them between large petroleum companies that were previously competitors. Using an econometric analysis of terminal city‐specific data, this study finds that the majority of the mergers led to higher wholesale gasoline prices in the United States in the mid‐1990s through 2000. (JEL L7, L13, L40)     

Re-evaluation of Welfare Changes during the Transition in Poland

The costs of shortages/rationing are not captured by standard consumer price indices. Thus the change in real GDP per capita is an over-estimate of welfare losses in transition economies. In this study virtual prices are used to calculate new cost of living indices, making it possible to construct more accurate pre-reform and post-reform welfare comparisons. The results for Poland using virtual prices show 62-84% decline in welfare over the transition 1987-92. This welfare loss is approximately one-third of the value obtained using actual prices.     

Can a decline in search cost increase prices?

This paper provides a new explanation of why a decline in consumers’ price search cost may not lead to lower prices. In a duopoly with price competition, I show that when some consumers are captive to one firm, there may be a non‐monotonic relationship between search cost and market power; firms may charge high prices with higher probability and the average price charged may be higher when consumers’ price search cost falls below a critical level. Furthermore, when firms have asymmetric captive segments, expected prices charged by each firm may move in opposite directions as search cost declines.     

ON THE PROFITABILITY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE WHEN DEMAND IS UNCERTAIN

A previous study finds that in a market where a manufacturer faces uncertain demand and sells to consumers through competitive retailers, the manufacture wishes to support adequate retail inventories by imposing resale price maintenance (RPM). I show that if retail inventories are allocated to consumers through first‐come‐first‐served rule rather than efficient rationing rule in the game with unconstrained retail competition, imposing RPM may not be profitable. It may not encourage more retail inventories either. RPM may also lower consumer surpluses and social welfare. This study casts some doubt on the demand uncertainty theory that supports RPM.     

WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE MEASUREMENT OF NNP*

Some relationships between NNP and economic welfare are explored in the confines of a simple, static welfare maximization model. Various assumptions concerning both the measurement of NNP and the economic system underlying this model are dropped seriatem and the implications for the correspondence between NNP and economic welfare are examined. The following conclusions emerge. There are several classes of resource reorganization in which NNP and welfare move in the same direction, so that NNP can serve as an ordinal proxy for welfare. These include changes in taxes or competitive imperfections which result in product substitution and movements along the transformation function. With a general qualification, NNP-welfare correspondence is preserved for allocative changes which affect the real costs and prices of goods included in NNP or of non-included goods in inelastic demand; changes in involuntary unemployment; and changes in technological externalities affecting producers. There are other cases where changes in NNP and welfare are not positively correlated. Included here are changes in real costs of non-included goods for which demand is elastic and changes in technological externalities imposed on consumers.