董事高管责任保险对公司负债能力影响研究

本文运用沪深A股上市公司财务数据,实证检验董事高管责任保险的购买与上市公司负债能力之间的关系。研究结果显示,公司的负债水平与上市公司的董事高管责任保险的购买之间呈现显著正相关关系,同时上市公司负债的期限,不管是期限结构还是期限水平也都与董事高管责任保险购买正相关。随后本文对比国有上市公司和非国有上市公司购买董事高管责任保险的效用,结果显示董事高管责任保险的购买对国有上市公司负债能力的作用显著大于非国有上市公司。最后总结并提出包括完善我国董事高管责任保险制度、加强公司的内部监督、完善购买董事高管责任保险的信息披露等建议。     

英美公司法中董事及高管人员责任保险制度探讨

在现代市场经济条件下,公司或企业董事及高管人员的风险、义务、责任等日益加重,为了激励公司经营者大胆创新工商业活动,为股东谋取最大利益,西方国家公司法往往规定董事责任保险制度,对董事、经理经营中的某些过失责任运用保险机制分散其风险。本文介绍英美公司法中董事责任保险制度的基本框架,以期对促进我国责任保险业务的开展有所启示。     

董事高管责任保险、制度环境与公司治理——基于中国上市公司盈余管理的视角

以盈余管理行为作为研究视角,采用2002年～2011年我国A股上市公司的数据,研究了董事高管责任保险、制度环境与公司治理水平之间的关系。研究发现,相对于没有购买保险的公司,购买了董事高管责任保险的公司具有更高的盈余管理程度。进一步将样本分为国内和香港交叉上市(同时发行AH股)和仅国内上市(仅发行A股)两个子样本,发现对于AH股公司,购买保险的公司具有更低的盈余管理程度,而对于仅发行A股的公司,购买保险的公司却具有更高的盈余管理程度。研究结果表明,董事高管责任保险目前尚未发挥对国内上市公司应有的治理作用。此外,董事高管责任保险的治理作用受到外部制度环境的影响。具体地,在法律和监管制度相对完善的环境下,董事高管责任保险才能发挥正向激励作用。     

中美董事责任保险需求差异的制度因素分析

董事责任保险在我国已发展十余年,但仍属起步阶段,当前我国董事责任保险市场的有效需求严重不足。将美国已发展成熟的董事责任保险制度内容与我国进行对比,揭示当前我国董事责任保险需求不足背后多方面的制度层面因素,并提出相关的完善建议,以期合理构建我国的董事责任保险制度。     

开拓我国董事责任保险市场初探

一、董事责任保险概念及其必要性 董事责任保险,是指以董事向公司或包括股东、债权人在内的第三者承担民事赔偿责任为保险标的的一种保险。董事责任保险中,投保人是董事所任职的公司,被保险人则是向公司或第三者承担民事赔偿责任的董事。 我国传统企业立法从来没有规定过经营者的善管义务。     

从“乐山电力审计事件”谈独立董事的独立性问题

独立董事制度在我国上市公司治理中发挥着十分重要的作用,本文通过对“乐山电力审计事件”的分析,从法律法规、选聘机制、激励约束机制、责任保险机制、与监事会关系等方面对独立董事的独立性问题进行了分析,并提出了相应的完善措施。     

论独立董事责任保险

独立董事责任保险是指当独立董事在行使职权时因工作疏忽或行为不当，导致第三者遭受经济损失而应承担赔偿责任时，由保险人按保险合同的约定支付保险金的一种责任保险。我国目前尚无此种保险。本文分析了独立董事责任保险的法律内涵及我国独立董事所面临的职业风险，阐述了我国现有的董事及公司高级职员责任保险不能满足独立董事转移职业风险需要的几点理由，论述了建立独立董事责任保险的必要性，提出了建立独立董事责任保险的初步构想。     

董事责任保险的附加承保范围——公司实体责任保险研究

目前,我国保险公司销售的董事责任保险并不包括公司实体责任保险这一附加承保范围,因此,当公司因遭遇证券民事赔偿诉讼而与董事和高级职员承担连带责任时,赔偿责任以及抗辩、和解费用的分摊就成为一个非常棘手的问题。为了及时解决分摊难题并增强公司的赔偿能力,应当借鉴美国保险公司的实践经验,在董事责任保险中附加公司实体责任保险。     

董事责任保险的附加承保范围——公司实体责任保险研究

目前,我国保险公司销售的董事责任保险并不包括公司实体责任保险这一附加承保范围,因此,当公司因遭遇证券民事赔偿诉讼而与董事和高级职员承担连带责任时,赔偿责任以及抗辩、和解费用的分摊就成为一个非常棘手的问题。为了及时解决分摊难题并增强公司的赔偿能力,应当借鉴美国保险公司的实践经验,在董事责任保险中附加公司实体责任保险。     

我国上市公司独立董事制度:缺陷与改进——一个基于制度分析的研究框架

本文认为,为改革董事会、完善公司治理而出现的独立董事制度须有相应的制度与之相配套,这些制度由包括外部公司治理制度、内部公司治理制度以及独立董事制度本身在内的公司治理制度,以证券法律制度为代表的非公司治理制度和以文化为主要内涵的非正式制度等所组成。我国目前的制度环境尚未能为独立董事制度提供强有力的支持,从而造成我国上市公司独立董事制度的先天缺陷,而对这些局限认识不足所导致的独立董事制度设计偏差则形成独立董事制度的后天不足。为完善目前我国上市公司独立董事制度,应该从制度分析入手,标本兼治,长期治本,短期治标,以治标为手段达到治本之目的。     

The impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage

The governance effects of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance), an important tool for risk diversification, are of strong concern in the capital market. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2018, we examine the impact of D&O insurance on excess corporate leverage. We find that D&O insurance is negatively associated with excess corporate leverage and that this result is consistent with a series of robustness tests. Further analyses show that D&O insurance impedes excess corporate leverage mainly because of its effect on external monitoring. The effect is more pronounced for firms that are state-owned, have political connections and are located in provinces with low marketization than for other firms.     

公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理

董事高管责任保险在董事和高管遭受民事诉讼时具有“兜底”效应,降低了董事高管的执业风险.选取2002-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验董事高管责任保险对公司盈余管理的影响,进一步分析在不同公司治理水平下,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的关系是否存在差异.研究结果表明:董事高管责任保险的引入会加剧公司盈余管理行为;随着公司治理水平提高,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的正相关关系减弱.     

董事责任保险与公司治理机制的互动影响研究——来自中国A股上市公司的证据

关于董事责任保险通过鼓励董事高管积极进取从而改善公司治理效力,还是通过增强董事高管的道德风险从而削弱公司治理效力存在争论。在已有研究发现上市公司在公司章程中设立董事责任险条款有助于减少公司代理成本的基础上,进一步基于中国A股上市公司的数据实证考察了董事责任保险实际购买需求影响因素和董事责任险实际购买对企业代理成本的影响。实证结果发现,良好的公司治理机制将增加公司对董事责任保险的需求,同时董事责任保险购买又将进一步改善公司治理机制、降低公司代理成本。     

Liability Risk for Outside Directors: a Cross‐Border Analysis

Much has been said recently about the risky legal environment in which outside directors of public companies operate, especially in the USA, but increasingly elsewhere as well. Our research on outside director liability suggests, however, that directors’ fears are largely unjustified. We examine the law and lawsuit outcomes in four common law countries (Australia, Canada, Britain, and the USA) and three civil law countries (France, Germany, and Japan). The legal terrain and the risk of ‘nominal liability’(a court finds liability or the defendants agree to a settlement) differ greatly depending on the jurisdiction. But nominal liability rarely turns into ‘out‐of‐pocket liability,’ in which the directors pay personally damages or legal fees. Instead, damages and legal fees are paid by the company, directors’ and officers’(D&O) insurance, or both. The bottom line: outside directors of public companies face a very low risk of out‐of‐pocket liability. We sketch the political and market forces that produce functional convergence in outcomes across countries, despite large differences in law, and suggest reasons to think that this outcome might reflect sensible policy.     

D&O insurance and IPO performance: What can we learn from insurers?

We investigate whether a firm’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contract at the time of the IPO is related to insured firms’ first year post-IPO performance. We find that insurers charge a higher premium per dollar of coverage to protect the directors and officers of firms that will subsequently have poor first year post-IPO stock performance. A higher price of coverage is also associated with a higher post-IPO volatility and lower Sharpe ratio. Our results are robust to various econometric specifications and suggest that even when the high level of information asymmetry inherent to the IPO context prevails, insurers have information about the firms’ prospects that should be valuable to outside investors.     

Inherent Virtue or Inevitable Evil: The Effects of Directors' and Officers' Insurance on Firm Value

Whether directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance improves firm value is a controversial issue. We perform a literature review about the effect of D&O insurance and find mixed results. The proponents of D&O insurance believe it enhances corporate monitoring and improves firm value, while the opponents of D&O insurance argue that it creates a moral hazard problem and diminishes firm value. Against this backdrop, we argue that the trade‐off between the monitoring and moral hazard effects depends on the information acquired by the outside directors. Using a sample of listed Canadian firms, we find that (1) a change in D&O insurance coverage has no net effect on a firm's subsequent value when we ignore the information acquired by outside directors, (2) an increase in D&O insurance coverage improves a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are well informed, and (3) an increase in D&O insurance coverage reduces a firm's subsequent value when the outside directors are poorly informed. Our findings are robust to endogeneity checks and have important implications for the regulation of D&O insurance.     

Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance and Aggressive Tax‐Reporting Activities: Evidence from Canada

This paper examines the relationship between directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) and firms’ aggressive tax reporting. Using large Canadian public companies listed on the TSX300 and relying on several measures to capture aggressive tax‐reporting activities, including GAAP effective tax rates, cash effective tax rates, and the total and residual book‐tax differences, I find that D&O insurance exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rates and a strong positive relationship with both the total and residual book‐tax differences. However, there is generally no evidence showing that D&O insurance is associated with the cash effective tax rates. I interpret these results as indicating that D&O insurance reduces the tax expenses reported in the financial statements but not the actual tax paid. In other words, D&O insurance contributes to financial tax management but not to cash tax savings. Further tests in this study reveal that firms with fluctuating D&O coverage limits engage in more aggressive tax reporting than other firms, suggesting that managers may consider the level of D&O insurance that they purchase when they make aggressive tax‐reporting decisions.     

Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from China

This paper examines the demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) by Chinese listed companies where controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts are acute due to the concentrated and split ownership structure. We hypothesize and find evidence that the incidence of seeking D&O insurance is positively related to the extent of controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts – a finding not previously documented in the literature. Using an event study, we find that the announcements of D&O insurance decisions in firms that engage in earnings management, and/or are controlled by a local government (such firms tend to have stronger incentives to tunnel), seem to have a negative wealth effect. In addition, the incidence of the D&O insurance decision is positively related to the proportion of independent directors and several litigation risk proxies. Therefore, the breakthrough in corporate governance and judicial reforms has created non-negligible perceived securities litigation risks in China.     

Voluntary versus mandatory disclosure of liability insurance coverage limit

This article analyzes the disclosure of the liability insurance coverage limit and the impact of mandating disclosure of the coverage limit in a setting where voluntary disclosure of a firm’s cash flow information is subject to litigation risk and the firm has directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance. Disclosure of cash flow information is costly, but disclosure of the insurance coverage limit features no direct disclosure friction. We find that, when the litigation environment is weak, the usual unraveling argument applies, and the manager always voluntarily discloses the coverage limit in equilibrium. However, when the litigation environment is strong, either no coverage limit is disclosed or only sufficiently high coverage limits are disclosed in equilibrium. Further analysis shows that mandatory disclosure of the coverage limit increases the voluntary disclosure of cash flow information.     

Directors' and officers' liability insurance and acquisition outcomes

We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation.