Heterogeneity,leveling the playing field,and affirmative action in contests

The heterogeneous abilities of players in various competitive contexts often lead to undesirable outcomes such as low effort provision, a lack of diversity, and inequality. A range of policies is implemented to mitigate such issues by enforcing competitive balance, that is, by leveling the playing field. Some of those policies, known as affirmative action (AA) policies, are practiced in ethical response to historical discrimination against particular social groups, and are also aimed at increasing competition. This survey summarizes the rapidly growing literature on contest theory regarding AA and other policies that level the playing field. Using a general theoretical structure, we outline the theoretical, experimental, and empirical research findings on contest outcomes under a multitude of policy mechanisms, and in doing so, we touch upon some of the common debates in the AA literature.     

The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction

We investigate a group all‐pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group‐specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi‐pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups.     

A note on the effect of elections subject to judicial review

The most recent U.S. presidential election raised the questions of whether or not agents who believe that losing candidates will contest the results of close elections perceive their vote as more important and whether or not they will be more or less likely to vote. The analysis involves a two-player voting game with one of the players initially in a weaker position because he loses all ties. The key variable is the probability of the weaker player winning the post-election judicial review process. The relationship between this probability and the level of voting for the weaker player is non-monotonic. Also, if this probability is sufficiently close to one-half, contesting close elections leads to increased voting, lowering social welfare.     

竞赛机制设计研究回顾与展望

竞赛是社会、政治和经济中的典型现象,在激励和资源配置方面发挥了非常重要的作用,竞赛机制设计已成为竞赛研究的理论热点问题.本文介绍了竞赛理论基础知识,主要从竞赛奖励、竞赛结构及竞赛成功函数三个方面,综述了有关竞赛机制设计研究.在回顾以往研究的基础上,探讨了竞赛机制设计研究未来的可能发展方向.     

基于旅游认知的滨海旅游地居民类型研究——以三亚市为例

借鉴国内外相关研究成果,设计问卷,对三亚滨海旅游地居民对旅游发展的认知进行了调查研究。应用SPSS15.0,对居民认知数据进行聚类分析,把三亚滨海旅游地居民分成四种类型。分析每种类型居民对旅游发展的认知数据,把四种类型的居民分别命名为强烈支技者、矛盾支持者、理性支持者和反对者,并提出相应的管理对策。     

Happiness before and after an election: An analysis based on a daily survey around Japan’s 2009 election

This paper investigates whether the Japanese voters became happy and/or unhappy due to the results of the General Election in 2009. We conducted a daily web survey for seven days before and after the election, obtaining 1068 responses. Estimating a fixed effects model, we found that among those whose expectation differed from the reality, supporters of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the winner, became significantly happier, and supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) and New Komeito, the losers, became significantly unhappier on the day following the election. However, happiness returned to the previous level in one or two days, implying people adapted to the news very quickly. On the other hand, the happiness level of those whose expectation of the election results were realized did not change. In a word, only unexpected results matter. Dividing those who support the policies of DPJ into two groups, those who expect material benefits from the victory of DPJ and those who do not, the obtained results suggested that the reason why the supporters of the winner (DPJ) felt happy was not because they obtained material benefits from the change of government.     

Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods

The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High‐powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.     

Sex,Race, and Job Satisfaction Among Highly Educated Workers

There has been a considerable amount of work focusing on job satisfaction and sex, generally finding that women are more satisfied than men despite having objectively worse job conditions. But there is little evidence on whether job satisfaction differs by race or ethnicity. We use data from the 2010 National Survey of College Graduates to examine the relation between job satisfaction and race and ethnicity among Asian, black, Hispanic/Latino, and white workers. Overall job satisfaction does not differ by sex among college graduates. Relative to white workers of the same sex, Asian and black workers are far less satisfied. The lower satisfaction of Asian and black workers relative to white workers is not explained by immigrant status, job match, or other individual or job characteristics.     

浅谈大学生创新竞赛与创新型人才的培养

通过对目前高等学校竞赛的现状与特征进行归纳，对学科竞赛存在的问题进行分析，并结合工作实际，就如何构建完善的大学生竞赛体系，充分发挥大学生竞赛在创新型人才培养的载体作用进行探讨。     

Good Girl,Bad Boy? Evidence Consistent with Collusion in Professional Tennis

We identify professional tennis matches where one player competes for extraordinarily high payoffs while their opposition does not. Players “on the bubble” of direct qualification to upcoming Grand Slam events face substantially higher stakes than opponents, which presents an opportunity for collusion. Our findings produce evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis of unethical behavior taking place on the men's tour, as bubble players are 5.1 percentage points more likely to beat better ranked opponents than in comparable nonbubble matches. However, no such evidence emerges when analyzing women's tennis. We find additional support for the hypothesis of match‐fixing activities on the men's tour from analyzing the occurrence of tie‐breaks and the fact that our results become stronger once monetary incentives were increased after the 2013 season. Finally, the betting market does not predict this phenomenon, further confirming our suspicion of irregular activities.     

Temperature and outdoor productivity: Evidence from professional soccer players

We estimate the causal effects of ambient temperature on outdoor productivity, using the performance data of professional soccer players in the Chinese Super League (CSL) from 2014 to 2018. We exploit exogenous variation in the players’ exposure to temperature by matching it with hourly stadium temperature at the time of kick-off. We find that temperature has an inverted-U shaped relationship with players’ physical performance, and high temperature has a sizeable adverse impact on the cognitive performance. Our results are robust while considering alternative measures of productivity, potential avoidable behaviors, various playing styles, and possible climate adaptations. Furthermore, we focus on the economic consequences of reducing players’ productivity by investigating the adverse impacts of high-temperature exposure on social media attention and players’ human capital accumulation. Our findings suggest that the temperature profoundly impacts on the careers of outdoor workers both in the short- and long-term.     

Noncooperative foundations for the kalai-smorodinsky and equal sacrifice solutions via prominence structures

In bargaining, players may adopt different prominence structures when making demands: (i) each player might use (1/N)th of his maximum monetary payoff as the prominence level or (ii) players might use a common prominence level. This paper considers a scheme in which players alternate making demands. It turns out that if the prominence levels described by (i) are used and if players have utilities linear in money, the outcome of this scheme converges to that of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution as players' prominence levels get smaller. If the common prominence level of (ii) is used and if players have identical constant marginal utilities of money, the outcome of this scheme converges to that of the equal sacrifice solution as that prominence level gets smaller.     

Division of a contest with identical prizes

This paper studies an economic contest with identical prizes. We consider the effects of division of the contest. When the contest designer divides the contest symmetrically, each participant competes in each assigned division. The main result is that division is sometimes profitable for the contest designer, in the sense that division brings about increases in lower ability agents' (and occasionally higher ability agents') efforts in exchange for decreases in other agents' efforts. We also study an application to educational attainment. The result helps to explain why it is difficult to find class size effects in empirical data. J. Japanese Int. Economies 18 (2) (2004) 282–297.     

Sexual Identity,Same‐Sex Relationships,and Labour Market Dynamics: New Evidence from Longitudinal Data in Australia

Using newly collected data on sexual identity from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey, this study examines the relationship between sexual identity and labour market outcomes. Our findings show that gay males are: (i) less likely to be continuously employed than their heterosexual counterparts, and (ii) face an annual earnings penalty of 16–21%. There are also important differences in earnings dynamics for men who transition into (or out of) same‐sex versus opposite‐sex live‐in relationships. Individual fixed effects estimates show that opposite‐sex partnerships are associated with increased earnings for men, while same‐sex partnerships are associated with small declines in earnings that are statistically indistinguishable from zero. For women, we find evidence of an earnings premium for lesbians, driven largely by increased labour supply on the intensive margin.     

Sequential formation of alliances in survival contests

We consider a sequential formation of alliances à la Bloch (1996) and Okada (1996), followed by a two‐stage contest in which alliances first compete with each other, and then the members in the winning alliance compete again for an indivisible prize. In contrast to Konishi and Pan (2019a), which adopted an open‐membership game as the alliance formation process, alliances are allowed to limit their memberships (excludable alliances). We show that if members’ efforts are strongly complementary to each other, there will be exactly two asymmetric alliances: the larger alliance is formed first and then the remaining players form the smaller one. This result contrasts with the one under open membership, where moderate complementarity is necessary to support a two‐alliance structure. It is also in stark contrast with Bloch, Sánchez‐Pagés, and Soubeyran (2006), which shows that a grand coalition is formed in the same game if the prize is divisible and a binding contract can be used to avoid further conflicts after an alliance wins the prize.     

Sibling Rivalry and Strategic Parental Transfers

This paper develops a noncooperative Nash model in which two siblings compete for their parents' financial transfers. Treating sibling rivalry as a “rent-seeking contest” and using a Tullock-Skaperdas contest success function, we derive the conditions under which more financial resources are transferred to the sibling with lower earnings. We find that parental transfers are compensatory and that the family as an institution serves as an “income equalizer.” Within a sequential game framework, we characterize the endogeneity of parental transfers and link it to parents' income, altruism, and children's supply of merit goods (e.g., parent-child companionship or child services). We show that merit goods are subject to a “moral hazard” problem from the parents' perspective.     

The Effect of the Tipped Minimum Wage on Employees in the U.S. Restaurant Industry

According to federal law in 2013, employers can take a credit of up to $5.12 for tips received by workers in satisfying the minimum‐wage requirement of $7.25. This article uses interstate variation in laws regarding tip credits and minimum wages to identify the effects of reducing or eliminating the tip credit on employment, hours, and earnings in the U.S. restaurant industry. Using data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages and the Current Population Survey, we find that a reduction in the tip credit increases weekly earnings but reduces employment in the full‐service restaurant industry and for tipped workers. The results are robust to controls for spatial heterogeneity in employment trends and are supported by a series of falsification tests.     

Sport and Measurement of Competition

Summary  Sport is becoming an activity of increasing importance: over time more people participate in sport (active sport consumption), more time is spent watching sport (passive sport consumption). An important part of sport consumption is passive sport consumption where production and consumption are separate: (professional) athletes engage in a contest, and fans pay to watch the contest. An important characteristic of sport that generates this demand is relative competition: the competitiveness of a particular match or league. In this paper, we set out to measure competitive balance in three sports (soccer, tennis, and skating), and assess its development over time. As we separate variation in quality of teams or athletes from randomness of outcome, we can compare relative competition in these three sports. Part of this paper was written when I enjoyed the hospitality of the University of Salford. I thank David Forrest, Ian McHale, and Bertus Talsma for fruitful discussions. Bertus Talsma helped to get the skating data. All calculations and graphs were done using R (R Development Core Team 2008). An Appendix with additional tables and graphs is available on .     

Prostitutes,Pimps, and Brothels: Intermediaries,Information, and Market Structure in Prostitution Markets

Prostitution is a multi‐billion dollar, globally distributed, low‐concentration service industry that is receiving increasing attention in the economics literature. This article focuses on a widespread, but little studied, feature of this environment—the role of intermediaries (pimps or brothel owners) on market outcomes. Prostitution laws and markets are perhaps unique in that transactions between principals (prostitutes and johns) are legal in many countries, while intermediary activity (pimping) is illegal. After surveying the varying cross‐country legality of agents we develop a simple theoretical model to analyze how the presence or absence of intermediaries shifts the distribution of market surplus. We show that eliminating pimps and brothels may shift surplus in non‐obvious ways, depending on the precise function they perform and on whether equilibrium is pooling or separating across “high quality” and “low quality” market segments. The implications of alternative policy regimes (intermediaries legal or illegal) are considered.     

The Effect of Immigration on Unskilled Native Workers: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

This study exploits the natural experiment, provided by the start of the second intifada, to measure the effect of immigration on the wage and employment of unskilled native workers. It finds that immigration has no effect on the wage or employment of unskilled Jewish workers. The wage and employment of the least‐skilled Israeli Arab workers (with zero to five years of schooling) are adversely affected by immigration. The slightly more skilled Arab workers (with six to 11 years of schooling), in contrast, are positively affected by immigration, suggesting a complementarity effect with this group. Different explanations are proposed.