ST公司并购现金支付方式决定因素研究——基于并购方与目标方双视角

采用 Logistic 模型,基于 ST 公司分别作为并购方和目标方双视角,考量中国资本市场并购活动中决定支付方式的市场因素、公司因素和交易因素。结果表明,市场因素中商业周期指标越积极,并购双方越愿意选择非现金支付;市场利率越高,越倾向于以现金支付。ST 公司为并购方时支付方式选择受到管理者控制权、分析师数量和交易态度等因素的决定;ST 公司为目标方时支付方式选择受到公司财务杠杆、公司成长机会、分析师数量和交易态度等因素支配。不同的并购支付方式会对并购后企业产生不同的效应。     

融资约束、支付方式与并购绩效的关系研究

本文利用中国A股上市公司2008～2010年在国内并购的数据,实证检验融资约束是否影响并购支付方式以及公司并购绩效。研究结果发现,融资约束程度的提高增加了公司采用现金支付对价的可能性;收购公司规模和交易规模对支付方式选择也具有显著影响;融资约束公司并购绩效好于无融资约束公司并购绩效;现金支付引起公司并购绩效降低,但是,这种作用在不同融资约束程度公司中存在差异。本文研究意味着融资约束公司遵循融资优序理论;自由现金流假说对于融资约束公司可能不成立。     

股权控制、债务容量与支付方式——来自我国企业并购的证据

本文以2008至2011年发生并购的企业为样本,研究了股权控制和债务容量对支付方式的影响。结论表明,高管持股比例越大,企业使用现金支付的比例越高;在大股东持股的中等区间内,股权比例越大,并购企业较多的使用股票支付,在股权分置改革的背景下,借助并购重组的机会,出资人有明显的稀释股权的动机,在很低和很高的区间内,股权比例对支付方式影响不显著;债务容量越大的企业,由于具有更大的举债能力,现金支付的比例更高。本文结论对完善并购支付理论、指导我国企业并购实践和提高并购支付决策的科学化水平都具有重要理论和现实意义。     

外资并购模式对我国上市公司治理结构影响的差异性分析

以我国沪、深两市在1999～2005年内发生外资并购的48家上市公司为样本,选取股权结构、董事会、监事会、股东大会、高管层以及信息披露六个维度共13个指标,通过因子分析法定量研究外资并购对我国上市公司治理结构的影响,发现不同并购模式下公司治理结构得到优化的比例呈现较大差异:拍卖收购模式为100%,协议收购非流通股为40.91%,二级市场收购流通股为60%,增资扩股为50%,成立合资公司为22.22%,收购母公司为40%。     

商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势研究

公司治理机制是现代公司制度的基本架构。从公司制度诞生至今,良好的公司治理机制始终和公司的健康运行密切相关。由于商业银行区别于一般公司的特殊性,构建良好的公司治理机制一直是国际银行业所关注的焦点。本文从公司治理机制的理论和制度两个层面分析商业银行公司治理机制的发展趋势,并探讨这种变化趋势对中国商业银行公司治理改革的借鉴意义。作者认为商业银行应当按照国际会计准则提高信息披露的质量,利用市场竞争的力量来改善公司治理机制,注重外部审计和内部审计力量的结合,注重法律在公司治理机制中的作用,实现商业银行激励与约束机制的创新。     

Corporate Governance: Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure by Publicly Traded Canadian Firms*

We report on the comprehensiveness of voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports and management information circulars of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) firms. We focus on disclosure of the corporate governance practices implemented by our sample of TSE 300 firms vis‐à‐vis the 14 guidelines set out in the TSE's report on corporate governance Where Were the Directors? Our analysis indicates that only a very few firms disclose that they have fully implemented the TSE guidelines, and that the extent of disclosure of corporate governance practices implemented varies widely among the firms. We then test factors associated with the comprehensiveness of such disclosures and the choice of disclosure medium using simultaneous equations multivariate analysis. We also assess the influence of publicized corporate governance failures on disclosure. Overall, our results suggest that the choices of disclosure medium and the extent of disclosure are made concurrently, and are influenced by the strategic considerations of management.     

上市公司并购重组支付方式体系存在的问题及对策

上市公司并购重组在促进产业结构调整、优化社会资源配置方面发挥了日益重要的作用,而丰富、灵活的并购重组支付方式是提高并购市场效率的关键之一。本文简要介绍了国内上市公司并购重组支付体系概况,重点分析存在的问题,并结合国内外并购市场案例及实证数据,对并购创新支付工具作了评述,提出完善上市公司并购重组支付体系的政策建议,包括在并购交易中先行推出定向可转债、引入储架发行制度、论证认股权证试点的可行性、支持券商提供并购支付融资工具等。     

放松卖空管制能够抑制并购商誉泡沫吗？

本文以我国放松卖空管制作为切入点,系统检验了其对并购商誉泡沫的影响。研究发现,放松卖空管制之后,超额商誉显著下降,同时商誉资产也显著下降,且该效应在民营控股公司中更显著;机制检验发现,卖空通过吸引更多分析师跟踪、增加对管理者的激励来抑制商誉泡沫;进一步研究发现,在市场化水平较高、行业竞争度较低的情形下,卖空机制对商誉泡沫的抑制作用更强。本文的研究结论丰富了卖空和并购商誉领域的文献,并为以市场导向原则化解并购商誉泡沫提供了新思路和新范式。     

Renegotiation of cash flow rights in the sale of VC-backed firms

Incomplete contracting theory suggests that venture capitalist (VC) cash flow rights, including liquidation preferences, could be subject to renegotiation. Using a hand-collected data set of sales of Silicon Valley firms, we find common shareholders do sometimes receive payment before VCs’ liquidation preferences are satisfied. However, such deviations from VCs' cash flow rights tend to be small. We also find that renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the firm's choice of corporate law, give common shareholders more power to impede the sale. Our study provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits, and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private firms.     

The impact of corporate governance on auditor choice: Evidence from China

As the largest and fastest growing emerging market, China is becoming more and more important to investors throughout the world. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of firms’ auditor choice in China in respect of their corporate governance mechanism. Normally firms have to take a trade-off in their auditor choice decisions, i.e., to hire high-quality auditors to signal effective audit monitoring and good corporate governance to lower their capital raising costs, or to select low-quality auditors with less effective audit monitoring in order to reap private benefits derived from weak corporate governance and less-transparent disclosure (the opaqueness gains). We develop a logit regression model to test the impact of firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism on auditor choice decisions made by IPO firms getting listed during a bear market period of 2001–2004 in China. Three variables are used to proxy for firms’ internal corporate governance mechanism, i.e., the ownership concentration, the size of the supervisory board (SB), and the duality of CEO and chairman of board of directors (BoDs). We classify all auditors in China into large auditors (Top 10) and others (non-Top 10), assuming the large auditors can provide higher quality audit services. The empirical results show that firms with larger controlling shareholders, with smaller size of SB, or in which CEO and BoDs chairman are the same person, are less likely to hire a Top 10 (high-quality) auditor. This suggests that when benefits from lowering capital raising costs are trivial, firms with weaker internal corporate governance mechanism are inclined to choose a low-quality auditor so as to capture and sustain their opaqueness gains. On the other hand, with improvement of corporate governance, firms should be more likely to appoint high-quality auditors.     

The market reaction to corporate governance regulation

This paper investigates the market reaction to recent legislative and regulatory actions pertaining to corporate governance. The managerial power view of governance suggests that executive pay, the existing process of proxy access, and various governance provisions [e.g., staggered boards and Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-chairman duality] are associated with managerial rent extraction. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that reduce executive pay, increase proxy access, and ban such governance provisions are value-enhancing. In contrast, another view of governance suggests that observed governance choices are the result of value-maximizing contracts between shareholders and management. This perspective predicts that broad government actions that regulate such governance choices are value destroying. Consistent with the latter view, we find that the abnormal returns to recent events relating to corporate governance regulations are, on average, decreasing in CEO pay, decreasing in the number of large blockholders, decreasing in the ease by which small institutional investors can access the proxy process, and decreasing in the presence of a staggered board.     

Race to the top or bottom? Corporate governance,freedom of reincorporation and competition in law

Summary This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms’ technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context of a model of the firm in which there are agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. We show that the allocation of control over firms’ reincorporation decisions determines the corporate governance choice ex ante and the outcome of the competition between legal regimes ex post. When managers have control over reincorporation then competitive deregulation and “runs to the bottom” ensue. When shareholders have partial or full control then there is diversity in governance structures. Runs to the bottom are not necessarily socially undesirable but they have a feedback effect on firms’ choices of technologies that may make the party in control worse off ex ante. We show that it is impossible for any country to achieve social welfare maximization of its existing and new enterprises. With competition between legal regimes, start-up and mature companies incorporate in different jurisdictions even when reincorporation is correctly anticipated.     

Does corporate governance influence convertible bond issuance?

We examine the influence of corporate governance quality on firms' choice between convertible debt, straight debt, and equity using a Western European sample of security offerings made between 2000 and 2010. We find that weaker firm-specific and country-specific corporate governance quality increases firms' likelihood of issuing convertible debt instead of straight debt and common equity. We also find that stockholder reactions to convertible debt announcements are more favorable for firms with weaker corporate governance. Our results suggest that corporate governance quality is a significant security choice determinant, with firms using convertible debt as a substitute for high quality governance mechanisms.     

Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations

The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agencyproblems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100%small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combinedwith small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empiricalvalidity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listedfirms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market valueof firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms witha single large owner and from widely held firms. Moreover, therelationship between corporate valuations and the distributionof cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistentwith the predictions of recent theoretical models.     

The determinants of auditor switching from the perspective of corporate governance in China

This paper reports the association between firms' internal corporate governance mechanisms and their auditor switch decisions in the Chinese context. We identify two types of auditor switch, namely switching to a larger auditor and switching to a smaller auditor. Three variables are used to proxy for firms' internal corporate governance mechanism, including the ownership concentration (shareholding by the largest owner), the effectiveness of supervisory board (SB), and the duality of chairman of board of directors (CBoD) and CEO. We regressed the internal corporate governance variables over firms' audit switching types during a specific period of 2001-2004 when a bear market continued in China. The empirical results demonstrate that firms with larger controlling owners or in which CBoD and CEO are held by the same person are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor rather than to a larger one. However, the effect of the SB variable does not have a significant impact on auditor switching decisions. In general, the study findings suggest that firms with weak internal corporate governance mechanism tend to switch to smaller or more pliable auditors in order to sustain the opaqueness gains derived from weak corporate governance. On the other hand, with the improvement of corporate government, firms should be more likely to choose large (high-quality) auditors in making auditor switching decisions.     

What Are Boards For? Evidence from Closely Held Firms in Colombia

Using a large survey database on the corporate governance practices of privately held Colombian firms, we investigate why firms have boards, and how that choice and the balance of power among the board, controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders affect the trade‐offs between control, liquidity, and growth and, ultimately, firm performance. We find that the probability of having a board increases with the number of shareholders and in family firms. When the preferences of controlling and minority shareholders diverge, as with respect to capital structure and dividend policy, boards support controlling shareholders’ decisions, thereby exacerbating the agency conflict between the two groups of shareholders.     

What determines the financing decision in corporate takeovers: Cost of capital,agency problems,or the means of payment?

How is a takeover bid financed and what is its impact on the expected value creation of the takeover? An analysis of the sources of transaction financing has been largely ignored in the takeover literature. Using a unique dataset, we show that external sources of financing (debt and equity) are frequently employed in takeovers involving cash payments. Acquisitions with the same means of payment but different sources of transaction funding are in fact quite distinct. Acquisitions financed with internally generated funds significantly underperform those financed with debt. The takeover financing decision is influenced by the bidder's pecking order preferences, its growth potential, and its corporate governance environment, all of which are related to the cost of external capital. The choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing also depends on the bidder's strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment.     

我国银行业改革与引进外资的开放竞争策略

针对我国银行业面临的问题和外资银行进入后的竞争压力,本文通过分析几种不同改革思路后认为,我国银行业改革的核心问题是产权和公司治理,两者紧密相连,产权改革是为了获得良好的公司治理,私有化和引入外资都是可供选择的产权改革方式之一,理论上不存在何者更优.国有商业银行改革的关键在于改变国有独资所有权结构为多元投资结构,可供选择的方案有不改变所有权性质的多个国有投资主体的单一所有制和引进包括国有、民营、外资参股的多元所有制.鉴于我国银行业目前的特点,外资参股并不是一种最优的选择,引进外资银行的正确策略是:独资优于合作,合作优于合资.     

制度环境、银企关系与企业并购支付方式

以2007~2012年上市公司的并购事件为样本,考察银企关系的不同形态对企业并购支付方式选择的影响。研究发现,具有良好银企关系的企业更倾向于采取现金并购支付方式,但是银企关系的不同形态对企业并购支付方式的选择具有不同的影响。与企业持股银行(股权式银企关系)相比,企业高管的银行背景(信任式银企关系)更倾向于采取现金支付方式。加入制度环境(货币政策以及地区金融发展水平)进一步检验后发现,在货币紧缩时期和金融发展水平低的地区,以上结论依然成立。     

公司并购税制的理论与实践

公司并购市场的蓬勃发展,促使对这一领域法制规范的研究成为当前的理论热点。作为调整并购市场法律体系的重要组成部分,税收政策在并购激励和并购能力、并购融资和支付、并购资源整合与绩效等方面都具有深刻影响。本文以法经济学的交易费用及产权分析为理论工具,在借鉴世界公司并购税制,尤其是美、欧公司并购税制成功经验的基础上,审视我国公司并购税制的有效性,并对其完善和改进提出政策建议。