Taxation of a Polluting Non-renewable Resource in the Heterogeneous World

This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources by taking international heterogeneities and national tax-setting into account. We propose a two-country Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with the stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as affecting global welfare. First, we characterize the optimal environmental taxation policies. Second, we examine the impacts of national taxes. Their time profile determines the extraction path, the dynamics of pollution accumulation and that of world output. Their respective levels entail inter-country interactions by altering the efficiency of the world resource allocation, the tax revenues and the resource rents. We study isolatedly the distortional and distributional effects of local taxes. Then, we completely assess the overall impact of a unilateral tax increase. Finally, we find that, even if heterogeneous countries coordinate their taxation policies to correct the global environmental problem, their divergent strategic interests cause another global, non-environmental distortion in the allocation of the resource.     

Socially responsible investment in an environmental overlapping generations model

One of the problems associated with the conservation of the environment is that short-lived individuals fail to account for the long-term effects of pollution, which implies that future generations bear the costs imposed by the current generation. Such inter-generational externalities are usually tackled by (Pigovian) taxes, fiscal policy or environmental regulation. Alternatively, we propose that socially responsible investment funds create a role for the stock market to deal with intergenerational environmental externalities. We analyze the role of the stock market in an environmental overlapping generations model of the Diamond-type, in which agents choose between investing in “clean” government bonds or “polluting” firm equity. We show that although socially responsible investors are short-lived, the forward-looking nature of stock prices can help to resolve the conflict between current and future generations.     

Trade,Transboundary Pollution,and Foreign Lobbying

In this paper, we explore the use of trade policy in addressing transboundary stock pollution problems such as acid rain and water pollution. We show that a tariff determined by the current level of accumulated pollution can induce the time path of emissions optimal for the downstream (polluted) country. But if the upstream (polluting) country can lobby the downstream government to impose lower tariffs, distortions brought by corruption and foreign lobbying lead to a rise in the upstream country’s social welfare, and to a decrease in social welfare in the downstream country. Thus, the usefulness of trade policy as a tool for encouraging cooperation and internalizing transboundary externalities depends critically on the degree of governments’ susceptibility to foreign political influence.     

Optimal Extraction of a Polluting Nonrenewable Resource with R&D toward a Clean Backstop Technology

We study the optimal extraction of a polluting nonrenewable resource within the following framework: environmental regulation is imposed in the form of a ceiling on the stock of pollution and a clean unlimited backstop technology can be developed by research and development. More specifically, the time taken to develop a new technology depends on the amount spent on R&D. A surprising result is that the stringency of the ceiling and the size of the initial stock of the polluting nonrenewable resource have a bearing on whether environmental regulation speeds up the optimal arrival date of this new technology. Compared to a scenario with no environmental externalities, stringent environmental regulation drives up the optimal R&D investment and brings forward the optimal backstop arrival date only in the case of a large initial resource stock. Otherwise, if the initial resource stock is small, regulation reduces optimal R&D and postpones the optimal backstop arrival date. These results are explained by the two roles played by the backstop technology. First, the backstop serves to replace oil once it has been exhausted. As extraction is slowed down by regulation, the exhaustion of the nonrenewable resource is postponed and the long‐run gains of innovation are lowered. Second, environmental regulation raises the short‐run gains of innovation by increasing the cost of consuming just oil.     

The stock market effect of air pollution: evidence from China

In financial studies, environmental stimuli such as sunshine, temperature, and daylight are often used as proxies for people’s collective mood swings to test their effects on the stock market. China has experienced serious air pollution problems in recent years, and Chinese public awareness of air pollution has soared. In this paper, we use China as a natural experiment to investigate the effect on stock returns of depressed moods induced by air pollution. Daily air-pollution data from 2005 to 2014 are analysed and the results obtained from the empirical research show that a contemporaneous negative and a two-day lagged positive relationship exists between air pollution levels and stock returns over this time period. The relationship is mediated by the influence of air pollution on investment decisions. The results also indicate that the effect is weakened for companies that protect air quality, but no stronger effect is detected for polluting companies. The findings imply that air pollution is a behavioural factor with some connection to stock returns in China.     

Optimal consumption and the environment Choosing between ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ goods

In this paper, a model with heterogeneous consumption goods is presented. Consumers are assumed to choose between two different consumption goods, characterized by a different impact on the environment. This implies that, in a decentralized economy, government can sustain the social optimum by setting two Pigouvian taxes: one on production as a whole and the other on dirty consumption acting as an incentive in favour of clean consumption. In accordance with the previous literature, a trade-off between a clean environment and economic activity evolves. However, this trade-off is now mitigated by the additional taxation on polluting consumption which allows the control of pollution stock evolution through the substitution between clean and dirty commodities.     

技术冲击、二氧化碳排放与中国经济波动——基于DSGE模型的数值模拟

文章通过构建包含环境约束的动态随机一般均衡模型,分析了生产技术和环保技术冲击对一国主要宏观变量的影响。研究发现:(1)生产技术冲击对经济发展的促进作用是直接的、主要的,而对污染排放量的增长效应则是间接的、次要的,最优污染排放变动具有顺周期性;(2)环保技术冲击对经济的推动作用是间接的、次要的,而对污染排放量的限制作用则是直接的、主要的,最优污染排放变动具有逆周期性;(3)在两类冲击共同作用下,环保技术冲击的减排效应短期显著,而生产技术冲击的增长效应则长期占优,但两类冲击对全球污染存量变动的影响都十分微弱,经济波动周期维持在十年左右。     

Tradable pollution permits in dynamic general equilibrium: Can optimality and acceptability be reconciled?

In this paper we study the dynamic general equilibrium path of an economy and the associated optimal growth path in a two-sector overlapping generation model with a stock pollutant. A sector (power generation) is polluting, and the other (final good) is not. Pollution is regulated by tradable emission permits. The issue is to see whether the optimal growth path can be replicated in equilibrium with pollution permits, given that some permits must be issued free of charge for the sake of political acceptability. We first analyze the many adverse impacts of free allowances, and then we propose a policy rule that allows optimality and acceptability to be reconciled.     

The environmental Kuznets curve in a world of irreversibility

This paper develops an overlapping generations model where consumption is the source of polluting emissions. Pollution stock accumulates with emissions but is partially assimilated by nature at each period. The assimilation capacity of nature is limited and vanishes beyond a critical level of pollution. We first show that multiple equilibria exist. More importantly, some exhibit irreversible pollution levels although an abatement activity is operative. Thus, the simple engagement of maintenance does not necessarily suffice to protect an economy against convergence toward a steady state having the properties of an ecological and economic poverty trap. In contrast with earlier related studies, the emergence of the environmental Kuznets curve is no longer the rule. Instead, we detect a sort of degenerated environmental Kuznets curve that corresponds to the equilibrium trajectory leading to the irreversible solution. I would like to thank Alain Venditti, Mabel Tidball, Alain Jean-Marie and Thierry Bréchet for their helpfull comments and suggestions. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee whose comments have greatly improved the paper.     

Environment,Directed Technical Change and Economic Policy

We study the effects of an economic policy in an endogenous growth general equilibrium framework where production of consumption goods requires two resource inputs: a polluting non-renewable resource and a non-polluting labour resource. The use of the former contributes to the accumulation of pollution in the atmosphere, which affects welfare. There is a specific research sector associated with each of those resources. We provide a full welfare analysis, and we describe the equilibrium paths in a decentralized economy. We go on to study the effects of three associated economic policy tools: a tax on the polluting resource, and two research subsidies. We show that the optimal environmental policy has two main effects; it delays the extraction of the resource and with it the level of polluting emissions and it reallocates research efforts, decreasing the amount put into “grey” research to the benefit of “green” research. We also show that the environmental policy is grey-biased in the short-term, and green-biased in the long-term. Finally, we compute the optimal values for these tools.      

Stock Externality vs. Symbiosis in a Forest-Air System

Stock externalities and ecological interaction have similar equilibrium effects. The influence on the dynamics of an ecosystem, however, is quite different. The different effects are laid out theoretically in the context of a forest-air model. We compare a centralized, welfare-maximizing policy and decentralized policies. Finally, we numerically simulate the dynamic differences between stock externalities and ecological interaction.     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control I: Competition

I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock extermality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies.     

Trade,Growth, and Environmental Quality*

This paper examines linkages between international trade, environmental degradation, and economic growth in a dynamic North–South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function subject to an endogenously improving technology, North produces manufactured goods by employing labor, capital, and a natural resource that it imports from South. South extracts the resource using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. We study optimal regional policies in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers from North to South under both non‐cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non‐cooperative trade is inefficient due to stock externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit North. Both regions gain from improved productivity in North and faster knowledge diffusion to South regardless of the trading regime.     

Contracting with externalities and outside options

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. We show that when outside options are independent of the actions of other players all Markov perfect equilibrium without coordination failures are efficient, regardless of externalities created by interim actions. Otherwise, in the presence of externalities on outside options, all Markov perfect equilibrium may be inefficient. This formulation encompasses many economic models, and we analyze the distribution of coalitional gains and the dynamics of coalition formation in four illustrative applications.     

Conditions for indeterminacy and thresholds in neoclassical growth models

This paper considers externalities and investigates which general properties and respectively their magnitudes induce complex behavior like thresholds and indeterminacy (and cycles). The objective is to obtain general mechanisms within a general setting in order to complement the much advanced but model specific literature. It turns out that these arithmetic and simultaneously economic conditions for thresholds or indeterminacy require complementarity and non-moderate dynamic social influence. In other words, complexities can be related (necessary and sufficient) to a familiar static property that social interactions turn the (stationary) demand for the private stock into a Giffen good. Indeterminacy requires in addition ‘low’ subjective discounting and proper interactions between control, stock and externality. These conditions provide an easy way to construct models that allow for the targeted outcome, stability, thresholds or indeterminacy.     

Environmental capital flight and pollution tax

This paper analyzes the impacts of a production pollution tax on environmental capital flight and national product in a two-country static general equilibrium model with two-way foreign investment. It is assumed that the capital input in both countries is a composite good of domestic and imported capital. And pollution is assumed to originate in the production process. The productivity of capital in each country is negatively (or positively) related to the worldwide aggregate emissions.The analysis shows that when a domestic pollution tax is levied, domestic capital outflows increase and foreign capital inflows decrease for sufficiently high elasticities of substitution between labor (immobile input) and capital (mobile input) in both countries. Moreover, with negative transnational externalities, increases of a domestic pollution tax reduce domestic production and increase foreign production. The difficulty of substitution between immobile and mobile inputs hinders the optimal allocation of worldwide capital and national product. In this paper, the optimal pollution tax is based on global welfare maximization, not on global income maximization, taking into consideration the impact of income change on individual welfare. Therefore, an optimal pollution tax in the developing country should be lower for a given rate of pollution.     

土壤重金属污染治理多方演化博弈研究

土壤重金属污染严重制约了中国经济的高效优质发展,第三方治理模式的引入在促进污染治理专业化的同时,引发相关利益主体关系扭曲,因而厘清各主体关系有助于解决土壤污染整治的现实困境。基于演化博弈理论,构建政府、污染企业、第三方治理企业演化博弈模型,探讨其博弈均衡和演化趋势,并进行仿真分析。研究表明,罚款数额和监管成本、寻租成本和治理费用、政府奖励和寻租收益是分别影响政府、土壤污染企业、第三方治理企业演化稳定策略的关键因素;在各主体博弈中,政府能够以行政管制遏制污染企业违法行为,第三方治理企业严格治理会改变污染企业理性预期,以期共同打造“政府尽责、企业担责和第三方治理主体负责”的理想演化均衡策略。     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies.     

Corrective Taxes under Oligopoly with Inter-Firm Externalities

Pollution externalities between polluters should be taken into account in the design of corrective taxes. When the externalities are substantial and/or the number of polluters is large, the effluent levies on these firms do not necessarily result in a deadweight loss. Consequently, the second-best tax exceeds the marginal social cost of pollution. A more general rule is that the tax rate should be greater than the marginal social cost of pollution if and only if a marginal increase in the tax rate results in opposite effects on the changes of equilibrium emission level and output.     

Climate Policy with Tied Hands: Optimal Resource Taxation Under Implementation Lags

In this paper we present a Stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a polluting firm and a regulator who sets pollution limits overtime. At each time, the firm settles emissions taking into account the fine for non-compliance with the pollution limit, and balances current costs of investments in a capital stock which allows for future emission reductions. We derive two main results. First, we show that the optimal pollution limit decreases as the capital stock increases, while both emissions and the level of non-compliance decrease. Second, we find that offering fine discounts in exchange for firm’s capital investment is socially desirable. We numerically obtain the optimal value of such discount, which crucially depends on the severity of the fine. In the limiting scenario with a very large severity of the fine, the optimal discount implies that no penalties are levied, since the firm shows adequate adaptation progress through capital investment.