The Thrift IPO as the First Stage of its Subsequent Sale

Although the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) has been well documented, the underpricing of foreign IPOs have received relatively little attention. In a comparative analysis of foreign and domestic IPOs in the U.S. market for the 1990-1993 period, we find that for a matched sample, foreign IPOs are significantly more underpriced. Our results are consistent with the models developed by Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), and Carter and Manaster (1990). Examination of the characteristics of foreign IPOs reveals that they are more likely to be larger in size, employ more prestigious underwriters and are much more likely to list on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).     

Underwriter learning about unfamiliar firms: Evidence from the history of biotech IPOS

This study examines the ability of underwriters to properly value unfamiliar firms prior to issuance. I use a sample of IPOs in biotechnology, a relatively new but thriving industry. The first American biotech IPO was in 1980. Through the end of 2004, almost 500 biotech IPOs have appeared in the public market. I find that biotechnology differs from other industries in the attributes of individual firms valued by the market. In particular, R&D and the quality of human capital (e.g., star scientists on the staff) are much more important for biotech valuations. I find also that underwriters appeared not to appreciate this distinction for early biotech IPOs; in those cases, first-day market returns were predictable by firm attributes not used by underwriters to establish IPO issue prices. I also find that underwriters have learned over time, albeit slowly. Over the 20+ years of biotech history, IPO issue prices have become more dependent on firm attributes unique to biotechs while first-day market returns have become less predictable.     

Underpricing and long-run performance of Chinese IPOs: the role of underwriter reputation

This study examines the impact of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and long-run performance in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2006. This sample period is notable for the implementation of a verification and approval system that occurred during it, which provided underwriters more freedom to price IPOs. We develop two alternative proxies to measure underwriter reputation based on either the ratio of the total gross proceeds raised or the number of IPOs managed by each underwriter. We find that underwriter reputation does not affect the level of underpricing, but that the level of long-run underperformance is significantly mitigated when IPOs are managed by more prestigious underwriters.     

The Pricing of Initial Public Offers of Corporate Straight Debt

This study examines the initial-day and aftermarket price performance of corporate straight debt IPOs. We find that IPOs of speculative grade debt are underpriced like equity IPOs, while those rated investment grade are overpriced. IPOs of investment grade debt are typically issued by firms listed on the major exchanges and underwritten by prestigious underwriters. In contrast, junk bond IPOs are more likely to be handled by less prestigious underwriters and are typically issued by OTC firms. Our analysis also reveals that bond rating, market listing of the firm, and investment banker quality are significant determinants of bond IPO returns.     

Stabilization and the aftermarket prices of initial public offerings

The paper examines the determinants of stabilization and its impact on the aftermarket prices. We use a unique dataset to relax several assumptions in the stabilization literature. We find that underwriters support IPO prices shortly after listing, particularly in cold markets and when demand is weak. We also show that stabilized IPOs are more common amongst reputable underwriters. This finding suggests that stabilization may be used as a mechanism to protect the underwriter’s reputation. It also implies that reputable underwriters may possess private information and price IPOs closer to their true values (i.e., higher than those indicated by the weak premarket demand). Consistent with the latter view, we show that stabilized IPOs are offered at higher prices and suffer less underpricing than those indicated by the premarket demand, firm characteristics and market-wide conditions. The post-IPO performance results indicate that stabilized IPOs are unlikely to be mispriced as their prices do not exhibit any significant reversal after the initial stabilization period. We conclude that stabilization may be superior to underpricing as it protects investors from purchasing overpriced IPOs, benefits issuers by reducing the total money “left on the table” and enhances the overall profitability of underwriters.     

Penny Stock IPOs

We examine underpricing, long-run returns, lockup periods, and gross spreads for penny stock IPOs over the 1990–1998 period. We find that penny stock IPOs have higher initial returns than ordinary IPOs, but significantly worse long-run underperformance. We also find that penny stock IPOs have longer lockup periods and larger gross spreads. To explore the effect of potential market manipulation, we examine IPOs led by a group of underwriters that were the subject of SEC enforcement actions and/or other penalties. Penny stock issues led by these banks are particularly underpriced and underperform ordinary IPOs led by other underwriters.     

Two‐Sided Matching: How Corporate Issuers and Their Underwriters Choose Each Other

In this article, the authors update and confirm the findings of a 2005 article that was the first to view corporate underwriter choices as the outcome of a two‐sided matching process in which issuers look to the abilities of the underwriters offering their services and underwriters focus on the quality of the issuers that wish to use their services. This view offers a contrast with both the conventional representation of issuer‐underwriter associations as one‐sided decisions (by either issuers or underwriters) and the classical economist's representation of a competitive market in which prices serve as the primary market‐clearing mechanism. In their examination of both initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) during the period 1980–2010, the authors continue to find strong evidence that higher‐quality issuers associate with more reputable underwriters and lower‐quality issuers match with lower reputation underwriters. Moreover, when examining cases of underwriter switching between an IPO and SEOs by the same issuer, they find that cases involving the largest divergence in the relative rankings of issuer and underwriter were the most likely to produce a change of underwriter—and that issuers that experienced larger post‐ IPO increases in quality were more likely to find more reputable underwriters for their SEOs (than for their IPOs). The authors also find that the larger the number of offerings brought to market in a given year, the smaller the market share of the top‐tier underwriters, likely reflecting the willingness of the most reputable underwriters to turn down business to maintain quality and reputation. Finally, the most reputable underwriters appear to benefit from the fact that the issuers whose IPOs they underwrite end up raising larger amounts of capital, both at the time of the IPO and in the larger and more frequent seasoned offerings by such issuers that come after the IPO. This evidence in support of two‐sided matching suggests that, especially for high‐quality issuers, the reputation of the underwriters they contract with for security offerings is likely to be more important than the underwriting fees they incur. What's more, the authors' finding that the most reputable underwriters are less likely to lose high‐quality clients and have more stable market share—and that the higher‐quality issuers they attract end up raising larger amounts of capital over their lives as public companies—suggests that underwriters' investments in building and preserving their reputations have a large expected payoff.     

Heterogeneous Beliefs,IPO Valuation,and the Economic Role of the Underwriter in IPOs

We empirically analyze the economic role of the underwriter in initial public offerings (IPOs), distinguishing between the “certification” and “market power” hypotheses. We find that equity in high‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs is priced higher and further away from intrinsic value than that in low‐reputation underwriter backed IPOs. Our results are robust to controlling for the endogenous selection of firms to take public by underwriters. Overall, our results support the market power hypothesis and reject the certification hypothesis, indicating that the role of underwriters is to obtain the highest possible valuation for the IPOs that they back rather than to price the equity close to intrinsic value.     

Underwriter reputation,earnings management and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings

This study contributes to the extant literature on the nature of earnings management surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating the role of underwriter reputation. We argue that prestigious underwriters will protect their reputation by carefully monitoring and certifying financial information on IPO firms, thereby limiting any potential earnings manipulation. As a result, those IPO firms that are associated with more prestigious underwriters are likely to exhibit substantially less‐aggressive earnings management. Conversely, we find the existence of a negative relationship between earnings management and the post‐offer performance of an IPO firm’s stocks only for those firms associated with less‐prestigious underwriters.     

Underwriter Quality and Long‐Run IPO Performance

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

IPO Placement Risk and the Number of Co‐Managers

Previous studies show that co‐managers mainly affect initial public offering (IPO) aftermarket activities. We investigate the role of co‐managers in IPO pre‐market activities. We argue that co‐managers help reduce IPO placement risk and hypothesize that IPO issuers hire more co‐managers when placement risk is higher. We find the number of co‐managers is positively associated with three proxies for placement risk. IPOs with more price uncertainty and high‐tech IPOs hire more co‐managers, while IPOs in regulated industries hire fewer co‐managers. We also find larger IPOs, recent IPOs, and IPOs with more reputable lead underwriters hire more co‐managers.     

Do you really want to ask an underwriter how much money you should leave on the table?

This paper analyses whether the owners of companies seeking to list will leave less money on the table if underwriters are employed to price and market the issue. Our findings indicate that limited liability and Industrial company initial public offerings (IPOs) that have used underwriters have left more money on the table than those not employing underwriters. Not only is there a direct cost in employing an underwriter but this study suggests there might also be an indirect cost. We also find that a positive forecast earnings per share yield may be useful in reducing the amount of money left on the table.     

Multiple lead underwriting syndicate and IPO pricing

This paper examines the role of multiple lead underwriters (MLUs) in pricing initial public offerings (IPOs) by considering certification and market power hypotheses. Consistent with the notion that MLUs provide certification to the issue, we find that IPOs backed by MLUs price the offer closer to the intrinsic value of the firm than firms backed by single lead underwriters. Our results also indicate that IPOs led by MLUs experience lower initial return, lower variability of initial returns and better long-run performance. The results are robust to self-selection and omitted variable biases. MLU led offerings also exhibit a lower risk of withdrawal and are more likely to conduct a larger secondary equity offering.     

The Underpricing of Venture and Nonventure Capital IPOs: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper, we examine the premarket underpricing phenomenon within a group of venture-backed and a group of non-venture-backed initial public offerings (IPOs), using a stochastic frontier approach. Consistent with previous research, we find that venture-backed IPOs are managed by more reputable underwriters and generally are associated with less underwriter compensation. However, unlike other papers in the literature, we find that the initial-day returns of venture-backed IPOs on average, are, higher than the non-venture-backed group. We observe a significantly higher degree of premarket pricing inefficiency in the initial offer price of venture-backed IPOs. Further, our results show that a significant portion of the initial day returns is due to deliberate underpricing in the premarket.     

Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds

Combining data on brokerage commissions that mutual fund families paid for trade execution between 1996 and 1999 with data on mutual fund holdings of initial public offerings (IPOs), I document a robust, positive correlation between commissions paid to lead underwriters and reported holdings of the IPOs they underwrite. Moreover, I find that the correlation is limited to IPOs with nonnegative first‐day returns and strongest for IPOs that occur shortly before mutual funds report their holdings, when the noise introduced by flipping is smallest. Overall, the evidence suggests that business relationships with lead underwriters increase investor access to underpriced IPOs.     

Underwriter Compensation Structure: Can It Really Bond Underwriters?

Underwriter compensation can be structured as all cash or a combination of cash and warrants. Using a sample of small initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that underwriter compensation contracts that include warrants in exchange for cash can serve as certification for IPO firms by substituting for reputation capital. When underwriters accept warrants when they could have received more cash compensation, the IPOs avoid the well documented long‐run underperformance. However, when underwriters receive warrants after maximizing cash compensation, the IPO experiences higher underpricing and poorer long‐run performance. The findings are consistent with a motivation by the underwriters to circumvent regulatory constraints.     

The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition

We examine syndicates for 1,638 IPOs from January 1997 through June 2002. We find strong evidence of information production by syndicate members. Offer prices are more likely to be revised in response to information when the syndicate has more underwriters and especially more co‐managers. More co‐managers also result in more analyst coverage and additional market makers following the IPO. Relationships between underwriters are critical in determining the composition of syndicates, perhaps because they mitigate free‐riding and moral hazard problems. While there appear to be benefits to larger syndicates, we discuss several factors that may limit syndicate size.     

AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNDERWRITER SELECTION PROCESS FOR INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

This study extends previous research that shows prestigious underwriters avoided underwriting smaller, more speculative initial public offerings (IPOs) during a post-SEC period, 1966–77. Estimating a logit model with a sample of 1,192 IPOs from 1977 to 1988, we evaluate the effect of offering characteristics and prevailing market conditions on the probability a prestigious investment banker will underwrite an IPO. Similar to previous studies, we find that prestigious underwriters avoid smaller, riskier issues. However, we also find stock market volatility, interest rate volatility, and the strength and profitability of the recent market for seasoned new issues to be important determinants of a prestigious underwriter's decision to underwrite an IPO.