Local Bank Financial Constraints and Firm Access to External Finance

I exploit the exogenous component of a formula‐based allocation of government funds across banks in Argentina to test for financial constraints and underinvestment by local banks. Banks are found to expand lending by $0.66 in response to an additional dollar of external financing. Using novel data to measure risk and return on marginal lending, I show that the profitability of lending does not decline and total borrower debt increases during lending expansions, holding investment opportunities constant. Overall, financial shocks to constrained banks are found to have a quick, persistent, and amplified effect on the aggregate supply of credit.     

The global rise of corporate saving

The sectoral composition of global saving changed dramatically during the last three decades. Whereas in the early 1980s most of global investment was funded by household saving, nowadays nearly two-thirds of global investment is funded by corporate saving. This shift in the sectoral composition of saving was not accompanied by changes in the sectoral composition of investment, implying an improvement in the corporate net lending position. We characterize the behavior of corporate saving using both national income accounts and firm-level data and clarify its relationship with the global decline in labor share, the accumulation of corporate cash stocks, and the greater propensity for equity buybacks. We develop a general equilibrium model with product and capital market imperfections to explore quantitatively the determination of the flow of funds across sectors. Changes including declines in the real interest rate, the price of investment, and corporate income taxes generate increases in corporate profits and shifts in the supply of sectoral saving that are of similar magnitude to those observed in the data.     

Do Lending Relationships Affect Corporate Financial Policies?

This paper provides new evidence on how lending relationships impact firms’ financing and investment decisions. I find that lending relationships have a significant impact on leverage ratios, issuance choices, and the investment structures of relationship borrowers. The influence of relationships is heightened for financially constrained firms. I find a significant decrease in leverage, net debt issuing, and investment activity in the aftermath of lender‐specific shocks to lending relationships, including announcements of bank write‐downs and downgrades in banks’ credit ratings. My findings are robust to controlling for confounding effects that might arise due to unobserved demand and relationship changes.     

Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.     

Monetary policy,bank lending and corporate investment

The purpose of this study is to shed light on the chain of causality from macroeconomic financial policy to the microeconomic investment function. Concretely, we aim to provide an in-depth analysis of the relationships between the monetary policy of central banks, the loan policy of commercial banks, and the investment behavior of firms. We focus on countries that conduct their monetary policy under the inflation-targeting framework. Our empirical analysis with data from Germany, Switzerland and Thailand provides several new insights. First, after controlling for the US monetary policy, the monetary policy in Germany and Thailand appears to influence the banks' lending rate in the short run (i.e. within two months), whereas the monetary policy in Switzerland seems to be ineffective at influencing the banks' lending rate in the short run. Second, our results show that the banks' lending rate has a negative effect on their loans and that this negative effect is weakened by their growth opportunities. Third, we find that the supply of bank loans plays a more pivotal role in determining firms' investment than the lending rate. Last but not least, we document that neither the lending rate nor the loan-to-assets ratio moderates the sensitivity of the firms' investment to growth opportunities.     

Do capital flows change domestic credit allocation?

Since the 1990s, domestic bank credit has been reallocated away from lending to non-financial business and toward households. An expanding literature discusses negative effects on growth and stability of this change in credit allocation. We research its drivers. We hypothesize that if foreign capital flows into economies with few investment opportunities, it may substitute for domestic bank lending to non-financial business, so that bank balance sheets become more dominated by household lending. In GMM estimations on data for 36 economies over 1990–2011, we find evidence consistent with this mechanism. Foreign capital inflows into the non-bank sector (but not into the bank sector) are associated with lower shares of business lending in domestic bank portfolios. The association is weaker in economies with more investment opportunities, whether proxied by investment shares, current account surpluses, or EMU membership. Our results highlight the importance of sectoral destination in determining the effects of capital flows.     

Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility?

We use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition is shown to reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Hence, there need not be a tradeoff between lending market competition and financial fragility. Such a tradeoff may not emerge either when banks compete by conditioning interest rates on investment volumes irrespectively of whether credit rationing takes place or not.     

Lending Policies of Financial Intermediaries Facing Credit and Funding Risk

This paper compares the optimal lending decisions of financial intermediaries that differ in their risk exposure. All intermediaries are assumed to face a loan demand described by a random applicant arrival process with each applicant offering a unique risk-adjusted rate of return; loan demand is therefore uncertain in both quantity and quality. The intermediaries differ in terms of their risk exposure because of disparate funding practices. Intermediaries functioning as brokers minimize their exposure by borrowing funds only as demand is realized, whereas those behaving as asset-transformers borrow in advance of realizing loan demand, thereby maintaining a loanable funds inventory and sustaining the related exposure. The optimal sequential lending policy is shown to involve setting a credit standard that becomes stricter with the length of the intermediary's planning horizon and the volume of loans outstanding. Most importantly, it is shown that brokers adopt stricter credit standards than asset-transformers and therby reduce their volume of lending.     

民间资本进入金融领域的影响因素分析

民间资本进入金融领域的行为是投资条件、投资意愿和投资行动三者的加总,经济发展、政府政策、资金需求的存在昭示着投资条件的是否具备,信用状况、投资收益率和投资风险则决定投资意愿,这些因素都在直接或间接、或大或小的影响着投资忠诚度和投资额度,其中信用环境、资金需求、政府政策支持力度以及投资期限是民间资本通过人人贷进行正规借贷的主要影响因素。因此民间借贷的正规化有赖于风险防范体系和中小企业直接融资平台的完善,以及政府的扶持。     

汇率敏感性会影响企业贷款利率吗？——基于中国上市公司的分析

本文基于中国A股上市公司2009-2018年的数据,测算了企业价值对人民币汇率变动的敏感性。在此基础上,实证检验了汇率敏感性(企业价值对汇率变动的敏感程度)对企业贷款利率的影响和作用机制。研究发现:汇率敏感性与企业贷款利率之间显著正相关,且这种关系在拥有境外收入、境外投资和使用外汇衍生品的公司中更加显著。进一步分析发现,对于存在密切银企关系、较大的股东债权人利益冲突以及抵押品价值较低的企业,汇率敏感性与贷款利率之间的正相关关系更加显著。本文研究结果表明,随着我国市场化改革的进一步深化,贷款利率将会更加显著地反映企业的汇率敏感性特征。这种效应对于存在海外业务、银行更了解借款公司信息,以及违约可能性更高的公司更加明显。本文研究对于增强我国企业应对汇率风险能力,完善金融机构风险定价能力,引导金融机构服务实体企业具有一定参考意义。     

External Constraints on Monetary Policy and the Financial Accelerator

We develop a small open economy macroeconomic model where financial conditions influence aggregate behavior. Our goal is to explore the connection between the exchange rate regime and financial distress. We first show that a calibrated version of the model captures well the behavior of the Korean economy during its financial crisis period of 1997–98. In particular, the model accounts for the sharp increase in lending rates and the large drop in output, employment, investment, and measured productivity. The financial market frictions play an important role, further, explaining roughly half the decline in overall economic activity. We then perform some counterfactual exercises to illustrate how the fixed exchange rate regime likely exacerbated the crisis by tying the hands of monetary policy.     

Bank lending incentives and firm investment decisions in China

This study investigates whether and how banks’ lending incentives influence firms’ investment behaviors in China. First, empirical results show that loans granted to politically connected firms are less influenced by those firms’ profitability and tangibility. Second, political connection is a violation factor in debt markets, and our study finds that firms with political ties invest less efficiently than firms without political ties when they can access abnormal debt. Finally, we find that regional development with regard to market development and government quality improvement reduces the negative impact of politically connected lending on firms’ investment efficiency.     

Predatory mortgage lending

Regulators express growing concern over predatory loans, which we take to mean loans that borrowers should decline. Using a model of consumer credit in which such lending is possible, we identify the circumstances in which it arises both with and without competition. We find that predatory lending is associated with highly collateralized loans, inefficient refinancing of subprime loans, lending without due regard to ability to pay, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and poorly informed borrowers. Under most circumstances competition among lenders attenuates predatory lending. We use our model to analyze the effects of legislative interventions.     

关于日本银行界在融资过程中环境风险控制的研究

随着我国经济的飞速发展,环境污染程度日趋严重,一些新的投资项目面临着愈来愈高的环境保护要求,目前这些项目的建设资金主要来自于银行的贷款,这就要求银行的信贷决策必须更多地考虑环境风险的因素。但是,我国金融界普遍还未将环境风险评估机制引入项目审查体系,而与我国比邻的日本银行界,关于环境风险的控制水平已走在了世界的前列。本文从理论、实践两个层面对日本银行界的环境风险控制进行了研究,研究结果对我国银行界有非常重大的参考价值。     

Do Predatory Lending Laws Influence Mortgage Lending? An Analysis of the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law

In this paper, we examine the effect of the 1999 North Carolina predatory lending law on mortgage activity in that state as compared to other states in the Southeastern United States. Using 1998–2000 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, we find that the North Carolina law reduced the overall level of subprime mortgage lending activity. Furthermore, we find that the North Carolina decline was caused by a decline in loan application volume and not by a change in loan denial rates, suggesting less aggressive marketing in that state after the imposition of the law. Finally, the impact of the legislation was different by both the type of financial service provider and borrower. Specifically, non-bank subprime lending contracted faster in North Carolina when compared to the control group, while both minority and low-income applicants were also less likely to get loans following the legislation. These results have wide ranging policy implications given that several predatory lending proposals are currently before Congress, as well as proposed in almost forty other states.     

Cross-border banking,bank market structures and market power: Theory and cross-country evidence

Patterns in cross-border banking have changed since the global financial crisis. This may affect domestic bank market structures and macroeconomic stability in the longer term. In this study, I theoretically and empirically analyze how different modes of cross-border banking impact bank concentration and market power. I use a two-country general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks developed by DeBlas and Russ (2010a) to grasp the effect of cross-border lending and foreign direct investment in the banking sector on bank market structures. The model suggests that both cross-border lending and bank FDI mitigate concentration. Empirical evidence from a panel dataset of 18 OECD countries supports the theoretical predictions: higher volumes of bank FDI and of cross-border lending coincide with lower Herfindahl-indexes in bank credit markets.     

On the direct and indirect real effects of credit supply shocks

We explore the real effects of bank-lending shocks and how they permeate the economy through buyer-supplier linkages. We combine administrative data on all Spanish firms with a matched bank-firm-loan dataset of all corporate loans from 2003 to 2013 to estimate firm-specific credit supply shocks for each year. We compute firm-specific measures of exposure to bank lending shocks of customers (upstream propagation) and suppliers (downstream propagation). Our findings suggest that credit supply shocks have sizable direct and downstream propagation effects on employment, investment, and output, especially during the 2008–2009 crisis, but no significant impact on employment during the expansion. We provide evidence that both trade credit extended by suppliers and price adjustments in general equilibrium explain downstream propagation of credit shocks.     

Financial Turmoil, Failed Bank Acquisitions, and Bank Business Lending Behavior

This paper utilizes bank Call Report and FDIC receivership data from 1987 to 1991 to examine the impact of a failed bank acquisition on the growth rate of commercial and industrial (C&I) lending at the acquiring institutions. Using a two-stage least squares model with fixed effects, we find that banks acquiring a failed bank's assets experience a significant decline in both the growth rate of C&I lending and their capital asset ratios in the period of the acquisition. The results support anecdotal evidence that failed-bank borrowers may experience difficulties in accessing credit once their bank fails and underscores the importance of bank-borrower relationships in C&I lending. Finally, the paper provides an alternative explanation for banks' stagnant or declining business lending activity during this period of financial turmoil.     

A Theory of Corporate Capital Structure and Investment

This article uses a general equilibrium framework to explorethe origins and limitations of financial intermediaries. Inthe model, investors have a generic lending technology thatthey can improve at a cost. Those who upgrade become intermediariesto exploit their advantage. However, conflicts with depositorswill limit the banks' market presence, and they will only lendto moderately endowed firms while bondholders will finance cash-richcorporations. The article also analyzes the extent to whichinvestors adopt the superior lending technique, the nature ofbank competition, and how corporate and bank conditions affectinterest rates and investment.     

Economic policy uncertainty and cross-border lending

Banks increase cross-border syndicated lending when domestic economic policy uncertainty is high, after controlling for credit demand at the borrower country or country-industry levels. The credit migration effects are strongest for banks with diverse income and when banks face fiercer competition. Using elections as a source of plausibly exogenous variation which positively affects political uncertainty, we provide causal evidence on the effects of political uncertainty on cross-border lending. In countries with exogenous election timings, banks increase cross-border lending during the election period, especially when elections are closely fought. Compared to the extant literature, which extensively documents the negative effect of uncertainty on real investment, our findings show that uncertainty affects investments in financial assets differently.