Maturity Intermediation and Intertemporal Lending Policies of Financial Intermediaries

This paper considers the maturity intermediation and intertemporal lending decisions of risk-averse financial intermediaries. In particular, the maturity mismatch problem and the fixed-versus-variable-rate lending decision are modeled when the major source of risk involves uncertain future interest rates. The results imply that the strategy of matching the maturity of assets and liabilities is not generally optimal or even minimum risk. This is due primarily to the “built-in” hedge that the intermediary has as a result of rolling over short-term loans while continuing to finance long-term loans. Intertemporal dependencies between loan demand and costs (or both) also have an effect on the optimal degree of maturity mismatching and provide one rationale for making loans at rates below current marginal cost.     

Economic policy uncertainty and the credit channel: Aggregate and bank level U.S. evidence over several decades

Economic policy uncertainty affects decisions of households, businesses, policy makers and financial intermediaries. We first examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on aggregate bank credit growth. Then we analyze commercial bank entity level data to gauge the effects of policy uncertainty on financial intermediaries’ lending. We exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity to back out indirect evidence of its effects on businesses and households. We ask (i) whether, conditional on standard macroeconomic controls, economic policy uncertainty affected bank level credit growth, and (ii) whether there is variation in the impact related to banks’ balance sheet conditions; that is, whether the effects are attributable to loan demand or, if impact varies with bank level financial constraints, loan supply. We find that policy uncertainty has a significant negative effect on bank credit growth. Since this impact varies meaningfully with some bank characteristics – particularly the overall capital-to-assets ratio and bank asset liquidity-loan supply factors at least partially (and significantly) help determine the influence of policy uncertainty. Because other studies have found important macroeconomic effects of bank lending growth on the macroeconomy, our findings are consistent with the possibility that high economic policy uncertainty may have slowed the U.S. economic recovery from the Great Recession by restraining overall credit growth through the bank lending channel.     

Credit evaluation,information production,and financial intermediation

Financial intermediaries such as banks, saving and loan institutions, and insurance companies play a large and important role in highly developed economies. The economic significance of financial intermediaries results from their making arrangements between borrowers and lenders more efficiently than if these agents had to trade directly. The intent of this article is to provide a better understanding of the advantage that a financial institution has over an individual lender. This research treats intermediaries as producers of information in the credit evaluation process. The lender produces borrower information that revises the expected profit of the credit decision. Though the production of credit itself holds no economic advantage for institutions over individuals. The opportunity to produce information will provide economies of scale in lending and will help to explain the existence of financial intermediaries.     

THE NEW LEVERAGED LOAN SYNDICATION MARKET

Over the past ten years, commercial lending has been transformed from a one-off, bilateral "market" in which issuers maintained one or more separate banking relationships into a capital market in which one or more underwriters structure and price loans for syndication to groups of investors. This market-driven evolution has been most dramatic in the leveraged lending segment (defined as loans priced at LIBOR plus 150 basis points or more), where wide margins have attracted a large and growing field of underwriters, intermediaries, and investors.
Liquidity is the overriding theme in today's syndicated loan market, making the market a more user-friendly one for corporate borrowers and deal sponsors. As a result, a record number of corporate issuers are taking advantage of the syndicated loan market to finance strategic transactions or simply to reduce their borrowing costs. Deal sponsors, too, are tapping the market to finance leveraged buyouts, recapitalizations, and acquisitions at a pace not seen since the late 1980s. But, although acquisition pricing has reached cash flow multiples that recall those of the late '80s, equity contributions by sponsors are larger and credit structures are more conservative.
For banks and other investors, reduced loan pricing and more flexible credit structures have been balanced by much greater access to a large volume of diversified assets, as well as the ability to manage asset-specific and portfolio risk more effectively. As a result of more effective portfolio management strategies, lenders today are less vulnerable to credit problems with individual issuers or a given industry segment, and the bank market as a whole should be much less subject to disruption than it proved to be in the early 1990s.     

The role of hedge funds as primary lenders

We examine the role of hedge funds as primary lenders to corporate firms. We investigate both the reasons and the implications of hedge funds’ activities in the primary loan market. We examine the characteristics of firms that borrow from hedge funds and find that borrowers are primarily firms with lower profitability, lesser credit quality, and higher asymmetric information. Our results suggest that hedge funds serve as lenders of last resort to firms that may find it difficult to borrow from banks or issue public debt. We also examine the effect of hedge fund lending on the borrowing firms and find that borrowers’ profitability and creditworthiness improve subsequent to the loan. This beneficial effect of hedge fund lending is corroborated by our finding of positive abnormal returns for borrowers’ stocks around the loan announcement date. Overall, our findings are consistent with hedge funds adding value through their lending relationships and financial markets perceiving these activities as good news for the firms.     

汇率敏感性会影响企业贷款利率吗？——基于中国上市公司的分析

本文基于中国A股上市公司2009-2018年的数据,测算了企业价值对人民币汇率变动的敏感性。在此基础上,实证检验了汇率敏感性(企业价值对汇率变动的敏感程度)对企业贷款利率的影响和作用机制。研究发现:汇率敏感性与企业贷款利率之间显著正相关,且这种关系在拥有境外收入、境外投资和使用外汇衍生品的公司中更加显著。进一步分析发现,对于存在密切银企关系、较大的股东债权人利益冲突以及抵押品价值较低的企业,汇率敏感性与贷款利率之间的正相关关系更加显著。本文研究结果表明,随着我国市场化改革的进一步深化,贷款利率将会更加显著地反映企业的汇率敏感性特征。这种效应对于存在海外业务、银行更了解借款公司信息,以及违约可能性更高的公司更加明显。本文研究对于增强我国企业应对汇率风险能力,完善金融机构风险定价能力,引导金融机构服务实体企业具有一定参考意义。     

Lending Booms and Lending Standards

We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.     

Bank Forward Lending in Alternative Funding Environments

This paper examines the effects of loan commitments on bank lending behavior in both deposit-funding and liability management environments. Assuming that the bank lends exclusively under commitments and that the number of commitments exercised is uncertain, the bank must choose its supply of commitments. Given this choice, the bank becomes a passive lender to commitment holders. Our focus on forward credit markets sheds new light on the private bankers' assertion that they do not directly determine their level of lending, but merely “accommodate” the credit needs of their customers. Similarly, the central banker's claimed inability to control monetary aggregates in the short-run becomes understandable in a new context. It is shown that the advent of liability management will reduce the volume of loan commitments and the expected size of the bank and of the banking system. It is also shown that increased uncertainty regarding borrower takedown behavior diminishes the volume of commitments, expected bank and banking system size.     

Loan collateral,corporate investment,and business cycle

Collateral and loan rates are observed to be highly cyclical in their use for bank lending. The effects of such cyclicality on corporate investment are analyzed in this paper using a dynamic model. We find that more collateral causes firms to select riskier (/safer) projects if the loan rate rises above (/falls below) the expected investment return. We show that the incentive effect of loan rates becomes stronger with greater collateral, with the two credit terms having larger incentive effects on lower-quality firms. These results offer a new explanation for why lenient collateral policies are associated with rising loan rates in economic upturns but stricter collateral requirements come with falling loan rates during downturns.     

Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads

This paper estimates the cost arising from information asymmetry between the lead bank and members of the lending syndicate. In a lending syndicate, the lead bank retains only a fraction of the loan but acts as the intermediary between the borrower and the syndicate participants. Theory predicts that asymmetric information will cause participants to demand a higher interest rate and that a large loan ownership by the lead bank should reduce this effect. In equilibrium, however, the asymmetric information premium demanded by participants is offset by the diversification premium demanded by the lead. Using shifts in the idiosyncratic credit risk of the lead bank's loan portfolio as an instrument, I measure the asymmetric information effect of the lead's share on the loan spread and find that it accounts for approximately 4% of the total cost of credit.     

Measuring Integrated Market and Credit Risk in Bank Portfolios: An Application to a Set of Hypothetical Banks Operating in South Africa

The banking crises of the ‘90s emphasize the need to model the connections between financial environment volatility and the potential losses faced by financial institutions resulting from correlated market and credit risks. Due to the number of variables that must be modeled and the complexity of the relationships an analytical solution is not feasible. We present here a numerical solution based on a simulation model that explicitly links changes in the relevant variables that characterize the financial environment and the distribution of possible future bank capital ratios. This forward looking quantitative risk assessment methodology allows banks and regulators to identify potential risks before they materialize and make appropriate adjustments to bank portfolio credit qualities, sector and region concentrations, and capital ratios on a bank by bank basis. It also has the potential to be extended so as to assess the risks of correlated failures among a group of financial institutions (i.e., systemic risk analyses). This model was applied by the authors to the study of the risk profile of the largest South African Banks in the context of the Financial System Stability Assessment program undertaken by the IMF in 1999. In the current study, we apply the model to various hypothetical banks operating in the South African financial environment and assess the correlated market and credit risks associated with business lending, mortgage lending, asset and liability maturity matches, foreign lending and borrowing, and direct equity, real estate, and gold investments. It is shown to produce simulated financial environments (interest rates, exchange rates, equity indices, real estate price indices, commodity prices, and economic indicators) that match closely the assumed parameters, and generate reasonable credit transition probabilities and security prices. As expected, the credit quality and diversification characteristics of the loan portfolio, asset and liability maturity mismatches, and financial environment volatility, are shown to interact to determine bank risk levels. We find that the credit quality of a bank's loan portfolio is the most important risk factor. We also show the risk reduction benefits of diversifying the loan portfolio across various sectors and regions of the economy and the importance of accounting for volatility shocks that occur periodically in emerging economies. Banks with high credit risk and concentrated portfolios are shown to have a high risk of failure during periods of financial stress. Alternatively, banks with lower credit risk and broadly diversified loan portfolios across business and mortgage lending are unlikely to fail even during very volatile periods. Asset and liability maturity mismatches generally increase bank risk levels. However, because credit losses are positively correlated with interest rate increases, banks with high credit risk may reduce overall risk levels by holding liabilities with longer maturities than their assets. Risk assessment methodologies which measure market and credit risk separately do not capture these various interactions and thus misestimate overall risk levels.     

商业银行打包放款业务的运作及其法律风险防范

打包放款是与信用证有关的贸易融资形式之一.国内商业银行在打包贷款的操作上虽然存在一些分歧,但在定性上是基本一致.从法律关系来看,打包放款是一种融资法律关系,实质上是一种信用贷款,它与信用证有密切的关联性.银行在办理打包放款业务中通常都要求申请人提供信用证正本作抵押.打包放款存在诸多风险,尤其是客户的资信能力风险;信用证的真实性、合法性和有效性风险;开证行的偿付能力和开证行所在国家的信用风险以及汇率风险等.商业银行必须高度重视这些风险,并采取严格审查贸易真实性、合法性,留存信用证正本,监督借款用途以及要求第三方担保等措施来加以防范.     

Deposit insurance and credit union lending

We exploit an exogenous change in the coverage of insured deposits following the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008) to investigate the impact of deposit insurance on the volume, composition and quality of credit union lending. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find changes in the volume, composition and riskiness of credit union lending. Specifically, we find that affected credit unions increase total and unsecured lending, leading to a decline in loan quality. Overall, our results suggest that an increase in the maximum coverage of insured deposits induces credit unions to lend more at the expense of loan quality.     

An Analysis of Bank Loan Rate Indexation

This paper examines the economic rationale for the use of bank loan commitments and the effect on the allocation of bank credit of indexing the loan rate offered through the commitment to the prime. A simple model of the loan market is constructed and used to examine the effect changes in loan demand and the cost of bank funds have on the allocation of bank credit under indexation. It is shown that indexing implies changes in the relative cost of borrowing for certain groups of bank customers. For nonprime customers, an increase in the cost of bank funds results in a decline in the relative cost of borrowing under commitments. The pattern of commitment use is found to be consistent with the predictions of the model.     

我国P2P网络借贷信用风险影响因素研究——基于排序选择模型的实证分析

P2P(peer-to-peer)网络借贷是一种借助网络平台,由个人与个人间互为借贷双方的小额借贷交易。它作为互联网与民间借贷相结合的新兴金融模式,具有较高的信用风险。采用排序选择模型,基于 ex-celVBA 数据挖掘技术截取多个 P2P 网站数据,对平台信用风险的影响因素进行实证分析,结果表明：个人特征、信用变量、历史表现、借款信息分别对网络借贷信用风险存在正向影响,由此发现网站提供的信息对投资者避免信用风险没有起到实质作用。     

Deposits and relationship lending

We empirically examine whether access to deposits with inelasticrates (core deposits) permits a bank to make contractual agreementswith borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay marketrates for funds. Such access insulates a bank's costs of fundsfrom exogenous shocks, allowing it to insulate its borrowersagainst exogenous credit shocks. We find that, controlling forloan market competition, banks funded more heavily with coredeposits provide more loan rate smoothing in response to exogenouschanges in aggregate credit risk. Thus we provide evidence fora novel channel linking bank liabilities to relationship lending.     

Liquidity creation and funding ability during the interbank lending crunch

This study examines the portfolio response of US banks to the interbank lending collapse during the global financial crisis. The paper documents that a bank's response to the collapse of interbank markets is related to whether or not the bank was a net borrower or lender of funds. In particular, we find that typical borrowers had lower loan growth than typical lenders, but that the crisis did not differentially affect borrowers and lenders with respect to loan growth. However, borrowing and lending banks were differentially affected by the crisis in terms of their liquid asset growth. The typical borrowers reduced their liquid asset growth relative to lending banks during the crisis. We interpret this finding as saying that borrowing banks had to reduce their risky asset holdings because access to interbank funds had been reduced. The paper presents analogous analyses of the possible differential response of borrowers and lenders to changes in counterparty risk and lending through the Fed's TAF facility.     

Bank lending opportunities and credit standards

This article empirically tests the hypothesis that credit-screening standards can be first increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the bank's pool of potential borrowers, which in turn may vary through the business cycle or across different segments of the lending markets. A key implication is that banks with lending opportunities toward the middle of the quality spectrum can have loan portfolios that perform better than do the portfolios of banks with loan-origination opportunities that are either too weak or too strong. Using banks’ volume of secondary-market loan sales as a proxy for the richness of lending opportunities, I find an inverse U-shaped relation between the performance of banks’ loan portfolios and their activity in the loan sales market. The pattern deserves scrutiny for its policy implications, as many regulators hold the view that countercyclical variation in credit standards may have a destabilizing effect on business cycles.     

Changes in bank lending standards and the macroeconomy

Identifying macroeconomic effects of credit shocks is difficult because many of the same factors that influence the supply of loans also affect the demand for credit. Using bank-level responses to the Federal Reserve's Loan Officer Opinion Survey, we construct a new credit supply indicator: changes in lending standards, adjusted for the macroeconomic and bank-specific factors that also affect loan demand. Tightening shocks to this credit supply indicator lead to a substantial decline in output and the capacity of businesses and households to borrow from banks, as well as to a widening of credit spreads and an easing of monetary policy.     

The Economics of Low-Income Mortgage Lending

The presumption that mortgage markets for low-income borrowers and neighborhoods are underserved by lenders has led to a variety of increased government interventions on the supply side of the housing market. Although many studies of low-income lending at the neighborhood level have been published, none is from the firm's perspective. We adopt such a framework to test the twin propositions that the low-income mortgage market is no different from the non-low-income mortgage market and that the low-income mortgage market is underserved.We examine empirically whether the operating costs including credit losses, revenues, and profits of savings and loan institutions engaged in more low-income lending differ systematically from those that do less low-income lending. We find that firms engaged in more low-income mortgage lending have higher costs than those engaged in less low-income lending, which is consistent with higher credit risk for low-income loans. Nevertheless, these firms are no more profitable than those that do less low-income lending, which is inconsistent with a market for low-income mortgage lending that is currently underserved.