Are twin currency and debt crises special?

In the literature on currency and banking crises it has become the standard procedure to distinguish pure currency crises, pure banking crises and combined (“twin”) currency and banking crises. We show theoretically and empirically that a similar differentiation should be chosen with regard to currency and debt crises. Twin currency and debt crises differ from both pure currency and pure debt crises in their determinants, course of events, and economic consequences. We find that each type of crises has a unique set of macroeconomic causes. We also identify internal contagion and selection bias effects, which may lead to biased empirical estimates if twin crises are not treated as a specific type of crises. Such a separation allows in significantly improving the efficiency of early warning systems especially for debt and twin crises.     

The Twin Crises: Determinants of Banking and Currency Crises in the Turkish Economy

Several twin crises occurred in the Turkish economy in the last three decades. In this article, we aim to analyze the link between banking and currency crises and to illustrate the essential determinants of these twin crises by developing a multivariate logit model for the period 1990–2013. The empirical findings show that Turkish currency crises are mainly due to excessive fiscal deficits, rises in short-term external debt, overvaluation of Turkish lira, and external adverse shocks; banking crises are primarily caused by excessive money supplies and bank short positions. The empirical findings also indicate that banking crises lead to currency crises, and vice versa.     

Financial crises and emerging stock markets volatility: do internal factors matter?

This paper has two central aims. The first one is to deal empirically with the effects of financial crises on emerging stock markets volatility. The second objective consists in testing if the level of stock market development affects this relationship. For this purpose, we estimate a static panel data model for a sample of nine emerging economies from January 1990 to December 2006. We consider three types of financial crises, i.e. banking, currency and twin crises. Our empirical results suggest that the onset of financial crises strongly increased stock market volatility. In addition, we find that the biggest impact is exerted by twin crises. When dealing with the second objective, our results show that the market size and the liquidity level can attenuate the effects of banking and currency crises, but not the one associated to twin crises. Nevertheless, the degree of stock market integration seems to reduce the effects of banking, currency and twin crises on stock market volatility.     

金融危机发生条件及其对中国金哨开放的警示——以新兴市场国家为例

金融危机成因固然复杂,但是循着新兴市场金融危机特征、金融危机模型以及大量相关实证分析的路径,可以追溯到金融危机的主要生成条件。在固定汇率制条件下开放金融业,如果出现宏观基本面恶化、金融体系扭曲、公众对政府政策预期不乐观等现象,金融危机就有可能在各种层面孪生、爆发并传染。金融危机爆发的充要条件是值得中国政府开放金融市场进程中予以关注的。     

Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Crises

This article develops an index of money market pressure to identify banking crises. We define banking crises as periods in which there is excessive demand for liquidity in the money market. We begin with the theoretical foundation of this new method. With the newly defined crisis episodes, we examine the determinants of banking crises using data complied from 47 countries. We find that slowdown of real GDP, lower real interest rates, extremely high inflation, large fiscal deficits, and over-valued exchange rates tend to precede banking crises. The effects of monetary base growth on the probability of banking crises are negligible.     

Some Parallels Between Currency and Banking Crises

There is a sizeable literature on the causes of speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates and a large literature on the determinants of bank runs. Surprisingly, these two literatures rarely overlap, even though both types of crises involve attacks on asset price-fixing schemes. This paper draws a number of parallels between the work on currency crises and the work on banking crises and examines some of the new insights that are coming out of a more integrated approach in the aftermath of the Asian financial crises.     

Financial crises and political crises

The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country's stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbating distortions and possibly leading to political crisis; but if lenders are optimistic, the cost of the debt falls and political crises disappear. In such a case, international liquidity packages can select the best equilibrium and rule out political crises at negligible cost.     

Default, Currency Crises, and Sovereign Credit Ratings

Sovereign credit ratings play an important part in determiningcountries' access to international capital markets and the termsof that access. In principle, there is no reason to expect thatsovereign credit ratings should systematically predict currencycrises. In practice, in emerging market economies there is astrong link between currency crises and default. Hence if creditratings are forward-looking and currency crises in emergingmarket economies are linked to defaults, it follows that downgradesin credit ratings should systematically precede currency crises.This article presents results suggesting that sovereign creditratings systematically fail to predict currency crises but doconsiderably better in predicting defaults. Downgrades in creditratings usually follow currency crises, possibly suggestingthat currency instability increases the risk of default.     

Banking,debt, and currency crises in developed countries: Stylized facts and early warning indicators

We construct and explore a new quarterly dataset covering crisis episodes in 40 developed countries over 1970–2010. First, we present stylized facts on banking, debt, and currency crises. Using panel vector autoregression we find that banking and debt crises are interrelated and both typically precede currency crises, but not vice versa. Banking crises are the most costly in terms of the overall output loss, and output takes about six years to recover. Second, on a reduced sample we try to identify early warning indicators of crises specific to developed economies, accounting for model uncertainty by means of Bayesian model averaging. The most consistent result across the various specifications and time horizons is that significant growth of domestic private credit precedes banking crises, while rising money market rates and global corporate spreads are also leading indicators worth monitoring. For currency crises, we also corroborate the role of rising domestic private credit and money market rates and detect the relevance of domestic currency overvaluation. The role of other indicators differs according to the type of crisis and the warning horizon selected, but it mostly seems easier to find reliable predictors at a horizon shorter than two years. Early warning indicators of debt crises are difficult to uncover due to the low occurrence of such episodes in our dataset. We also employ a signaling approach to derive the threshold value for the best single indicator (domestic private credit), and finally we provide a composite early warning index that further increases the usefulness of the model.     

Crisis risk and risk management

We assess the state of knowledge about crisis risk and its implications for risk management. Data that became available after the global financial crisis show that some types of crises are predictable when accounting for interactions between risks. However, other types of crises do not seem predictable. There is no evidence that the frequency of economic and financial crises is increasing. While data show that an economic crisis is more likely following a political crisis, there is no comparable evidence for climate events. Strategies that increase firm operational and financial flexibility reduce the adverse impact of crises on firms.     

Corporate financial structure and financial stability

Drawing on a unique dataset of flow-of funds and balance sheet data, this paper analyzes the impact of financial crises on aggregate corporate financing and expenditure in a range of countries. Investment and inventory contractions are the main contributors to lower GDP growth after crises, with a much greater effect in emerging market countries. The debt–equity ratio is correlated with investment and inventory declines following crises. Econometric analysis suggests that financial crises have a greater impact on expenditure and the financing of corporate sectors in emerging markets than in industrial countries. Industrial countries appear to benefit from a pick-up in bond issuance in the wake of banking crises. Although companies in emerging market countries hold more precautionary liquidity, this is evidently not sufficient to prevent a greater amplitude of response of expenditure to shocks.     

国际资本流动“突然停止”、银行危机及其产出效应

国际资本流动突然停止是新兴市场国家金融全球化和金融开放早期面临的重要障碍。本文运用20个新兴市场国家1976~2006年间的面板数据,考察突然停止和银行危机对宏观经济产出的影响。研究发现:突然停止或银行危机都不必然导致产出的大幅下降;如果银行部门不发生系统性的危机,突然停止对产出没有显著影响;给定国际资本流动不出现大幅的逆转,银行危机对产出的影响也不显著;突然停止和银行危机的叠加则对产出造成严重的负面冲击,经济增长率显著下滑。研究结论有重要的政策含义,表明构建一个稳固的银行体系对于一国金融开放和金融自由化过程中的经济安全至关重要。     

Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

Assessing systemic risks and predicting systemic events

The paper develops a framework for assessing systemic risks and for predicting systemic events, i.e. periods of extreme financial instability with potential real costs. It contributes to the literature on the prediction of financial crises mainly in two ways: first, it uses a Financial Stress Index for identifying the starting date of systemic financial crises. Second, it uses discrete choice models that combine both domestic and global indicators of macro-financial vulnerabilities to predict systemic financial crises. The performance of the models is evaluated in a framework that takes into account policy maker’s preferences between missing crises and issuing false alarms. Our analysis shows that combining indicators of domestic and global macro-financial vulnerabilities substantially improves the models’ ability to forecast systemic financial crises. Our framework also displays a good out-of-sample performance in predicting the ongoing Global Financial Crisis.     

Bank liquidity creation,monetary policy,and financial crises

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.     

Costs of financial instability, household-sector balance sheets and consumption

Extant work on costs of financial instability focuses on fiscal costs and declines in aggregate GDP following banking crises. We estimate effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 19 OECD countries, showing consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis, and effects are not captured solely by the impact of crises on standard consumption determinants, income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising leverage, despite financial liberalisation easing liquidity constraints. High leverage implies that banking crises taking place now could have greater incidence than in the past.     

Banking regulation and the output cost of banking crises

Using a cross-section time-series of 47 banking crisis episodes in 35 industrial and emerging market economies between the 1970s and 2003, this study analyses the relationship between banking regulation and supervision, and the severity of banking crises measured in terms of the magnitude of output loss. The empirical results show that countries that provide comprehensive deposit insurance coverage and enforce strict bank capital adequacy requirements experience a smaller output cost of crises. Restrictions on bank activities also influence the severity of crises. The results, however, do not suggest that there is a significant impact of bank supervision. In addition, there is no robust evidence that the magnitude of the output cost of crises depends on the extent of banks’ financial intermediation.     

Financial crisis,structure and reform

In this study, we examine the relationship between the structure of financial systems and financial crises. Using cross-country data on financial structures and crises, we find that there is a significant short-term reversal in development of the banking sector and the stock market during both bank crises and market crashes, with the corporate bond market moving in the same direction as bank credit. However, the results are significant for countries with market-based financial systems but not for countries with bank-based financial systems. Emerging markets have mainly bank-based financial systems, which may explain why these markets require more time to recover from economic downturns after a financial crisis. Therefore, we argue that governments should emphasize a balanced financial system structure as it helps countries to recover from financial crises more quickly compared with countries that lack such balanced structures.     

Banking industry volatility and banking crises

While studies using balance sheet information of banks and macroeconomic indicators to forecast banking crises are prolific, empirical research using market information of banks is relatively sparse. We investigate whether banking industry volatility, constructed with the disaggregated approach from Campbell et al. [Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B.G., Xu, Y., 2001. Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk? The Journal of Finance 56, 1–43] using exclusively publicly available market information of banks, is a good predictor of systemic banking crises in the analyses including data from 18 developed and 18 emerging markets. We find that banking industry volatility performs well in predicting systemic banking crises for developed markets but very poor for emerging markets, which suggest that the impact of market forces on the soundness of the banking system might be different for developed and emerging markets. We also find that those macroeconomic and banking risk management indicators have different impact on the probability of banking crises. Therefore, the traditional cross-country results of the studies on banking crises need to be interpreted cautiously.     

Political crises and the stock market integration of emerging markets

This paper investigates the role of political crises in explaining the degree of stock market integration in emerging markets over the period 1991-2006. Using the International Crisis Behavior database, which contains detailed information on political crises around the world, and employing data on more than 15,500 firms, we assess whether political crises affect stock market integration in 19 emerging markets in South and East Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe. We conclude that crises with certain characteristics generally reduce the level of stock market integration in these regions. In particular, the beginning of a political crisis, its severity, the involvement of the US in the conflict, and the number of parties involved in a crisis all have impacts on the level of stock market integration in these markets.