The mediated effect of SAS No. 99 and Sarbanes–Oxley officer certification on jurors’ evaluation of auditor liability

This study experimentally examines the impact of implementing Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit and the financial statement and internal control certification requirement by key corporate officers under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). The study investigates the prediction that the new regulations affect jurors’ assessment of guilt for failing to discover fraud, and also whether the regulations affect jurors’ perceptions of the appropriateness of auditors’ actions regarding fraud detection and of auditors’ and officers’ responsibility for the fraudulent financial statements. The study tests whether these perceptions mediate the association between the regulations and mock jurors’ guilt assessments. Results show that jurors assess auditors as less guilty under SAS No. 99 and in the presence of the officer certification requirement. SAS No. 99 decreases guilt assessments indirectly through jurors’ perception that auditors acted more appropriately under the new standard. Although jurors did view auditors as more responsible under SAS No. 99, their responsibility perceptions had no effect on guilt assessments. An additional finding is that the officer certification requirement has an indirect effect on guilt assessments via jurors’ perceptions of the officers’ responsibility for the fraudulent financial statements.     

The Market's Valuation of Fraudulently Reported Earnings

This study examines the market valuation of accounting earnings during the period before it is publicly revealed that the earnings are fraudulent. Using both cross‐sectional and time‐series valuation models, we first find that the market accords less weight to earnings when the accounting numbers are fraudulent. We also show that the market better anticipates the presence of fraud when there is information in the public domain indicating a high ex‐ante risk of fraud. Our findings suggest that investors are able to accurately assess the probability of fraud and that such assessments affect the market's valuation of earnings even before it is publicly announced that fraud has occurred.     

基于GONE理论的上市公司财务报告舞弊识别研究

本文基于GONE理论,剖析了财务报告舞弊诱因的影响机理和舞弊行为的决策权衡机理,并选取2006～2009年因财务舞弊受处罚的上市公司为样本,实证分析了贪婪、机会、需要和暴露四因素与财务报告舞弊的关系,结果发现:在控制了一系列因素以后,管理层的风险偏好和剩余索取权引发的个体贪婪程度越高,治理结构不完善制造的舞弊机会越多,增发配股引发的组织需要程度越高,舞弊的可能性越大;审计意见类型和会计师事务所变更代表的发现机制越完善,暴露的可能性越大,舞弊的可能性越小。     

The Dempster‐Shafer Theory: An Introduction and Fraud Risk Assessment Illustration

This article introduces the Dempster‐Shafer theory (DS theory) of belief functions for managing uncertainties, specifically in the auditing and information systems domains. The use of DS theory is illustrated by deriving a fraud risk assessment formula for a simplified version of a model developed by Srivastava et al. (2007). In this formulation, fraud risk is the normalised product of four risks: risk that management has incentives to commit fraud; risk that management has opportunities to commit fraud; risk that management has an attitude to rationalise committing fraud; and risk that an auditor's special procedures will fail to detect fraud. The article demonstrates how to use such a model to plan for a financial audit where management fraud risk is assessed to be high. In addition, it discusses whether audit planning is better served by an integrated audit/fraud risk assessment as now suggested in SAS 107 (AICPA 2006a, see also ASA 200 in AUASB 2007) or by the approach illustrated here where a parallel, but separate, assessment is made of audit risk and fraud risk.     

上市公司舞弊性财务报告及其防范与监管——基于中国证券监督委员会处罚公告的分析

舞弊性财务报告是全世界经济社会和会计职业界关注的重大问题。我国目前也面临其挑战。本文以中国证券监督委员会2002—2006年处罚公告中涉及的上市公司舞弊性财务报告为依据,对我国上市公司舞弊性财务报告的主要类型、手段等进行了统计分析。分析发现,舞弊公司表外舞弊严重,所占比重大;同时存在多种舞弊类型,典型的是虚假利润表和虚假披露;虚构销售业务、虚增资产、隐瞒对外担保分别成为虚假利润表、虚假资产负债表和虚假披露的最主要舞弊手段;舞弊公司同时采用多种舞弊方法,且舞弊行为持续年限在两年以上,最长的达9年。本文最后提出了相应的防范与监管建议。     

Batten Down The Hatches! U. S. Accounting Scandals and Lessons for Australia

This paper warns the Australian accounting profession about the threat of fallout similar to that experienced in the US following major accounting scandals. This US fallout has included a significant loss of public faith in the accounting profession, reduced autonomy for auditors with the formation of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board, and the stringent Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Australian accounting profession must maintain high-quality auditing and corporate financial reporting or risk greater regulatory intrusions and additional threats to its relatively high levels of autonomy.     

Regulation of accountancy and the power of capital: some observations

In response to Briloff’s study of the regulation of fraudulent financial reporting in the USA, this paper examines the regulation of financial reporting and auditing in the UK. In common with Briloff, it reports that little effective regulatory action is taken against auditing firms implicated in audit failures and/or the publication of “defective" financial statements. Seemingly, as major fraction of international capital, auditing firms have colonised and captured the state to shield themselves from regulatory action.     

基于财务报表审计的会计舞弊揭示机制研究

目前企业会计信息失真主要因会计舞弊引起,CPA能否有效揭示重大会计舞弊已经直接影响到CPA行业的生存价值。中注协因此发布了大量的新准则,试图借鉴国外先进的审计技术,将风险导向审计理念引入到我国的审计实践中来,以提高CPA揭示会计舞弊的能力。但CPA不能有效揭示重大会计舞弊主要的不是技术问题,本文在借鉴国外经验的基础上,分析我国CPA不能有效揭示会计舞弊的原因,提出应将CPA审计和政府审计相结合,共同揭示企业会计舞弊。     

Conservatism,SEC investigation,and fraud

We present evidence on the relationship between firms that have engaged in fraudulent financial reporting and accounting conservatism. We empirically investigate the extent to which US firms identified by the SEC in their Enforcement Releases demonstrate higher levels of conditional conservatism in order to mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems. Specifically, by assessing the timing of changes in the litigation risk environment for fraud firms, we document how differences in heightened legal liability guide changes in conservative accounting behavior. Compared to a matched non-fraud control sample, we document that fraud firms have significantly lower levels of accounting conservatism in the pre-fraud period. Consistent with changes in potential legal liability, we find an increase in accounting conservatism for fraud firms during the SEC investigation period. Subsequently, during the public discovery of fraud, any increases in accounting conservatism are marginal and appear to converge back to lower levels compared to the SEC investigation period. Overall, our findings suggest more temporary changes in conservative reporting in the short-term for fraud firms. We also document that increased levels of accounting conservatism for fraud firms are not due solely to the passage of the SOX Act. Our findings aid in explaining fraud firms’ incentives and opportunities for accounting conservatism and lend support for why standard setters, regulators and auditors should continue to monitor and re-evaluate conservatism’s short-term effects that are conditioned on changes in a firm’s risk environment.     

The impact of SEC investigations and accounting and auditing enforcement releases on firms’ cost of equity capital

I study the impact of an SEC investigation (as captured by accounting and auditing enforcement releases) on a firm’s cost of equity capital. AAERs are often used in accounting literature as a proxy for fraudulent financial reporting. Fraudulent financial reporting should lead to an increase in cost of equity capital as a firm’s future cash flows become less certain. Overall, this study provides evidence of changes in cost of equity capital for firms targeted by an SEC AAER on the date the investigation is first made public.     

The influence of auditor narcissism and moral disengagement on risk assessments of a narcissistic client CFO

Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.     

基于案例推理的财务报告舞弊识别研究

上市公司财务报告舞弊对资本市场建设和投资者利益保护掣肘已久。以2003~2012年我国沪深 A 股财务报告舞弊公司及其配对公司为样本,依据“舞弊钻石”理论和现有文献提取舞弊识别指标,基于案例推理思想构建财务报告舞弊识别模型。研究发现,较之于非舞弊公司,舞弊公司通常面临更大的盈利压力和偿债压力,成长能力更弱,事务所变更现象更为普遍,被出具非标准审计意见的概率更高。基于仿兰氏距离的案例推理模型对测试集样本的识别总正确率为66.7%。     

后安然时代的会计与审计——评美国《2002年萨班斯—奥克斯利法案》及其对会计、审计发展的影响

针对安然等公司会计造假案件所暴露的会计、审计、公司治理、证券监管等问题 ,美国国会作出了迅速反应 ,制定了《2 0 0 2年萨班斯—奥克斯利法案》。法案对会计行业的监管、审计独立性、财务信息披露、公司责任、证券分析师行为、证券交易委员会的权利和职责、违法违规行为的法律责任等方面进行了重大改革和重新规范。本文重点阐述了该法案所规定的会计、审计框架及其对后安然时代会计、审计发展的影响。     

Detection of Management Fraud: A Neural Network Approach

The detection of management fraud is an important issue facing the auditing profession. A major contributor to this issue is the Loebbecke and Willingham (1988) conceptual model for the detection of management fraud. A cascaded Logit approach using the Loebbecke and Willingham model was developed in Bell et al. (1993). The present study offers an alternative approach using Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs). This paper develops a successful discriminator of management fraud using both the generalized adaptive neural network architectures (GANNA) and the Adaptive Logic Network (ALN) approaches to designing neural networks. The discriminant functions can distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies with superior accuracy to the cascaded Logit results of Bell et al. (1993). Finally, the discriminant function provides a parsimonious set of questions useful for detecting management fraud.     

Perceived importance of red flags across fraud types

The purpose of this study is to examine whether internal auditors, external auditors and economic crime investigators perceive the importance of red flags as significantly different across two fraud types: fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets, as well as across within-subject categories. A total of 471 useable responses were collected using a web-based survey. The findings indicate that significant differences exist on both single and aggregate mean levels among the participant groups. Internal auditors report a higher perceived importance of the red flags related to detecting misappropriation of assets than of those related to fraudulent financial reporting, whereas the opposite is true for economic crime investigators. For external auditors, only small differences in aggregate means between misappropriation of assets and fraudulent financial reporting were found. As the sensitivity to fraud type may affect professional planning, procedures and techniques with regard to fraud prevention, detection and investigation, the results may have both practical and theoretical implications. Further, the focus on both fraud types adds to prior literature on fraud.     

Bank Runs and the Accounting for Illiquid Assets in Financial Institutions

Abstract

Financial services are an increasingly important sector in modern economies, yet many accounting and auditing texts focus on manufacturing and retailing. This teaching note describes the role of financial institutions in transforming long-term, difficult-to-sell assets into short-term bank accounts. This is referred to as liquidity transformation. The social benefits and risks of liquidity transformation are described. The social benefit occurs due to the increased liquidity provided by the bank to depositors. The risk comes in the form of a bank run, wherein difficult-to-sell assets cannot be redeemed in time to cover the rapid and unexpected withdrawals of depositors. The financial statements of a financial institution are presented and the issue of valuation is discussed. Finally, practical relevance for accounting students is enhanced by including discussions of historical precedents and of implications for financial reporting and auditing.     

Financial scandals: a historical overview

I examine the incidence of fraud from c.1720 to 2009 and relate it to the occurrence of significant financial scandals. Focusing on the UK, and US prior to Enron, and using a detailed dataset of significant events and news content, underpinned by examination of specific watershed scandals, the paper highlights the regulatory response to scandals and the implications for accounting and financial reporting. The evidence reveals the incidence of fraud and financial scandal to be historically contingent and skewed towards certain sectors, particularly banking and finance, facilitated by complex group structures and international capital mobility, and mediated by managerial incentives and ownership concentration. Financial reporting and auditing can mitigate fraud opportunities in all sectors and businesses without complex group structures, and the accounting profession achieved some success in this respect up to the mid-1970s. Since then, the profession has been increasingly challenged by, and to some degree implicated in, the development of interconnected and international business networks, which, combined with wider financial deregulation, has led to a resurgence of fraud and financial scandal not previously experienced since the mid-nineteenth century.     

Financial statement comparability and accounting fraud

We examine the association between financial statement comparability and the likelihood of accounting fraud. Prior research documents a negative association between the quality of a firm's reporting environment and accounting fraud. We build on this literature and show that poor financial statement comparability is associated with a greater likelihood of accounting fraud. We also find that accounting comparability declines over time as the year of fraud detection approaches and that the association between comparability and fraud becomes more negative over this time. In addition, we find that financial statement comparability improves after fraud detection, consistent with the notion that managers improve their financial reporting quality after fraud.     

Fraudulent financial reporting in China: Evidence from corporate renaming

Using a sample of listed Chinese companies during 2010–2019, we examine whether corporate renaming is associated with fraudulent financial reporting. We find that companies that change their corporate names without making underlying changes to business fundamentals are more likely to commit financial reporting fraud. The positive association between corporate renaming and financial reporting fraud is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises and companies with a lower ownership concentration. There is further evidence that corporate renaming is more likely to be associated with disclosure-related fraud (e.g., failure to disclose or delayed disclosure) and that the likelihood of fraudulent behavior increases with the frequency of corporate renaming. Overall, the findings of this study provide evidence of a new red flag for regulators and investors investigating financial fraud. This study is timely and has policy implications for market regulators hoping to establish and improve emerging capital markets in which the information environment is generally considered weak and opaque.     

SEC communications to the independent auditors: An analysis of enforcement actions

All 415 SEC releases issued between the end of 1972 and the end of 1989 were analyzed to clarify the SEC's philosophy of independent auditing and to document the violations of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) reported in the releases. Among the findings are 1) the SEC consistently concluded that the primary purpose of an independent audit is to enhance the efficiency of the capital markets and help protect the investing public by providing reasonable assurance concerning the integrity of the financial statements and related disclosures; 2) the SEC attributed many independent audit failures to questionable independent auditor judgement in adhering to professional standards, most often because of insufficient gathering of audit evidence due to over-reliance on management representations; 3) the large majority of cases in which the SEC associated the auditor with fraudulent financial reporting (usually constructive fraud) involved smaller audit firms; 4) the large majority of cases of management fraud in which the auditors were deceived by clients involved large audit firms. In the final section of this paper, we discuss the influence of enforcement releases on independent audit standard setting and possible implications for the audit profession in the future.