An analysis of Key Issues arising from Professor A. J. Briloff’s Paper entitled, “Garbage In/Garbage Out: A Critique of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987–1997 (The COSO Report, 1999) The SEC Accounting Regulatory Process (AAERs)"

This paper examines the COSO Report (1999) in light of concerns raised by Professor Briloff in his critique (Briloff, 2001). I identify a number of limitations of using AAERs in research including the possibility that these releases reflect prevailing SEC agendas and therefore may not be representative of the population of financial statement frauds. I also question the sampling process used in the COSO Report which does not appear to capture many of the “high-profile" frauds of recent years. I evaluate three possible explanations for why Big 5 CPA firms are under-represented in the fraud sample used in that report: differences in audit quality; self-selection by the large audit firms away from risky firms; and the considerable financial resources of Big 5 firms discouraging the SEC from prosecuting them in all but the most blatant audit abuses for inadequacies. Following on from Professor Briloff’s remarks and earlier research, I also explore the broader issue of auditor independence.     

Corporate fraud and the audit expectations gap: A study among business managers

This paper presents the findings of an empirical study on the audit expectations gap concerning the role of the auditor in corporate fraud cases. The purpose of the study is to assess the significance of a reasonableness gap, a deficient performance gap and a deficient standards gap in the specific context of corporate fraud. In order to distinguish all three elements of the expectations gap, respondents need a certain level of expertise on fraud. Therefore, in this research the audit expectations gap is studied primarily from the perspective of three groups of business managers, based on the fact that they typically have a special responsibility in fraud cases. Bankers are used as a control group to assess the potential differences between the views of business managers and ‘society in general’. This study provides clear evidence of a substantial audit expectations gap in the context of fraud, both with respect to the auditor's performance as well as the auditor's formal obligations as laid down in existing standards. However, compared to bankers, business managers are less inclined to judge auditors’ performance of existing duties as inadequate, and see fewer points where auditing standards should be amended.     

制度变迁、集团客户重要性与非标准审计意见

客户重要性是否影响审计师独立性,是审计理论界和实务界都非常关注的话题。本文以企业集团作为一个整体来研究集团客户重要性对审计师独立性的影响,发现集团客户经济依赖性会损害审计师的独立性,这种现象对于小规模事务所而言尤为严重。此外,本文还进一步考察了2007年新会计准则、审计准则及事务所民事诉讼风险加强等制度环境变化对审计师行为的影响。研究发现,在制度环境改善之后,审计师执业总体上变得更加谨慎,大规模事务所尤其如此。     

Great Expectations: Public Perceptions Of The Auditor's Role

The professional accounting bodies in Australia have undertaken a study of the "expectation gap" in perceptions of the auditing role and concluded that the public's image of the auditing profession will be enhanced if the differences in attitudes can be minimised. This paper analyses the views of auditors and financial report users about what the role of the auditor and the nature of an audit should be. The most significant differences between the auditors and the user groups relate to whether the auditor should be responsible for preventing and detecting fraud, detecting illegal acts, reporting whether the company is a reliable debtor or loan prospect and reporting the degree of confidence he or she has that the correct audit opinion has been issued. Where the differences represent "deficient standards" or "unreasonable expectations", the professional bodies should consider changing auditor responsibilities or attempting to change users' attitudes.     

How individual auditor characteristics impact the likelihood of audit failure: Evidence from China

Audit failure imposes a severe loss on investors and damages market participants' confidence in financial reporting quality. This study investigates the impacts of individual auditor characteristics on the likelihood of audit failure. Chinese regulators mandate listed firms to disclose the engagement auditors' identity. Furthermore, the information regarding individual auditor characteristics in China is also publicly available. Utilizing this unique setting, we examine the relationship between individual auditor characteristics and the likelihood of audit failure in China during the period from 2000 to 2009. We document that individual auditors with more auditing experience are less likely associated with audit failure. We also find a weaker negative relationship between auditor education level and audit failure. Our study has important implications for both auditors and regulators by shedding lights on the determinants of audit failure and by providing guidance to the human resource management in audit firms.     

审计失败中的审计责任认定与监管倾向:经验分析

监管者对审计责任的认定倾向是审计执业环境的重要构成。本文选取1999—2006年间中国证券市场发生的72例财务报表审计失败进行观测,发现:(1)在监管实践较早期间(1999—2002年间)的审计失败样本观测中,88.2%的审计师遭到处罚;而2003—2006年间的审计失败观测中仅有23.6%的审计师遭到处罚;(2)在控制了审计失败观测的公司受处罚严厉度、舞弊期跨度、舞弊期间审计意见类型以及审计师规模后,仍能检测到近年来审计责任认定的显著缓和趋势;(3)即使对于审计师受到处罚的审计失败观测,在1999—2002年间平均82.7%的虚假陈述事项需要由审计师承担审计责任,而在2003—2006年间仅有平均41.2%的虚假陈述事项须由审计师承担责任。综上,监管机构在近年来对会计师事务所或签字注册会计师的审计责任认定显著趋于缓和与稳健;审计执业环境的这种变化趋势亦可为未来监管和司法实践中的审计责任界定提供有益的借鉴。     

Audit committee diligence around initial audit engagement

Studies focusing on governance mechanisms argue that auditor monitoring is one of several governance mechanisms that exist in the firm, and these mechanisms supplement each other. Extending this argument, I examine whether firms support auditor monitoring with audit committee monitoring when auditor oversight is deemed to be weak. Prior auditing literature argues that audit quality is affected by auditors' lack of familiarity with their clients' activities. Since lack of auditor–client familiarity exists in the first year of auditor–client tenure, I examine whether firms increase their audit committee monitoring during the year of auditor change. For a sample of firms that changed auditors between 2006 and 2012, the findings show that audit committees meet more frequently in the first year of audit engagement. Further tests show that firms' past reporting behavior play a significant role in the demand for more audit committee meetings and the increase in the audit committee meetings in the initial year of auditor engagement positively affects reporting quality.     

The influence of the CEO's value perception towards auditing on audit demand in private firms

Audit demand is generally considered to be a direct reflection of the level of agency conflicts. This study examines the CEO's value perception towards auditing as additional driver for both auditor reputation demand (appointing a Big 4 auditor or not) and audit effort demand in private firms. Examining the CEO's value perception in a multidimensional way, the regression results indicate that the CEO's functional value perception towards auditing positively affects the demand for audit effort, while the CEO's social value perception towards auditing negatively affects the demand for audit effort but positively affects the demand for auditor reputation.     

Consulting revenue sharing,auditor effort and independence,and the regulation of auditor compensation

The joint provision of audit and non-audit services by audit firms to their audit clients has posed a threat to auditor independence. To mitigate the independence problem, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a regulation (SEC, 2003) that prohibits audit partners from receiving compensation for the sale of non-audit services to their audit clients. This study examines the effects of this regulatory change on the effort and reporting decisions of audit partners. We show that partners in an audit firm strategically change the firm’s liability-sharing rule. As a consequence, the regulation restores truthful reporting but has an undesirable negative effect on audit effort. The effect of the regulation on the welfare of the economy (defined as the total payoff to both audit firms and their clients) hinges on the tradeoff between the benefit of the regulation, which is derived from the inducement of truthful reporting, and the cost of the regulation, which results from less diligent audit work. We show that the regulation is more likely to increase the welfare in a strong legal regime (where the legal liability cost of auditor litigation is high) than in a weak legal regime.     

Evidence of Fraud,Audit Risk and Audit Liability Regimes

We investigate the effectiveness of proportionate liability in reducing the probability of fraud and audit risk relative to joint and several liability in two strategic audit settings: one that provides conclusive evidence of fraud and one that provides inconclusive evidence of fraud. In both settings the auditor makes an audit effort choice, but in the second setting the auditor also evaluates the audit evidence. Our results show that when the auditor chooses only effort, a proportionate liability rule with large marginal liability relief decreases audit risk. However, when the auditor also evaluates the audit evidence this result no longer holds.     

Standard-setting in auditing: Insights from PCAOB inspections

We explore whether the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) consistently follows its own standard-setting policies. We do this using a methodology that combines the reports of audit partners, the timing of enacted auditing standards, and the issuance of PCAOB inspection findings. Rules governing standard-setting are critical to ensure that auditing standards are appropriate, efficient, and are therefore likely to be generally accepted. Our results suggest that in some instances auditors were penalized for omitting evidence from their working papers which is not specified in the standards, in effect, changing or removing auditor judgment in the amount and nature of audit evidence to be gathered in corroboration of management’s assertions and creating new auditing standards outside of the formal standard-setting process. Beyond the societal benefits of standard-setters adhering to their own policy-making rules, changes in auditing procedures impact the behavior of both auditors’ and managers and is costly. Although subject to limitations, we believe our results are informative to policy makers and other participants in PCAOB standard-setting.     

头脑风暴法在舞弊审计中的运用研究:回顾与启示

头脑风暴法有助于解决舞弊审计这一类非结构化问题,在舞弊审计中运用头脑风暴法成为美国注册会计师审计中的一项必要程序,头脑风暴技术也成为审计理论界和实务界关注的一个重点问题。本文对相关研究文献进行了梳理和回顾,总结文献研究发现:舞弊审计适合使用开放式头脑风暴法、循环头脑风暴法和电子头脑风暴法;头脑风暴法不仅有助于审计人员识别更多的舞弊风险因素和提高识别因素的质量,而且能够使审计人员表现得更加谨慎,调高了客户舞弊风险的预期水平;此外,头脑风暴讨论会还能够使审计人员更愿意修改拟实施的实质性测试程序,采取更为有效的舞弊风险应对程序。这些实践经验和研究成果对我国审计实践和审计理论研究都具有重要的借鉴作用。     

The influence of auditor narcissism and moral disengagement on risk assessments of a narcissistic client CFO

Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.     

The Unintended Consequences of the Frequency of PCAOB Inspection

After more than 50 years of self‐regulation of the US auditing profession, the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a quasi‐governmental entity with statutory authority to inspect accounting firms that audit public clients. The frequency of this inspection is annual or triennial, based upon the number of public clients the firm audits. We examine the effects of these two levels of inspection frequency on financial reporting quality and audit fees for clients of small and midsize public accounting firms. Our findings provide evidence of significantly higher audit quality and audit fees for clients of annually inspected firms relative to clients of triennially inspected firms. These findings are robust to auditor‐client alignment analyses, propensity score matching, time‐series analyses, examination of firms that have changed from triennial to annual inspection, and particular examination of firms with inspection deficiencies. Overall, our study suggests that the two‐tier frequency system of PCAOB inspection may have also resulted in two‐tier audit quality and audit fee systems for small and midsize public accounting firms, with more frequent inspection leading to more rigorous and informed auditor decisions. We discuss the implications of our results for the Board and the profession at large.     

Mandatory audit firm rotation: Fresh look versus poor knowledge

Our aim in this paper is to investigate the effects of mandatory audit firm rotation (MAR) on companies’ investment decision and auditor choice in a capital market setting. We compare a MAR regime with a non-MAR regime in a setting in which auditors’ independence and companies’ opinion shopping are real concerns. To capture auditor independence and opinion shopping, we model auditor biases (a conservative bias or an aggressive bias) and client firms’ incentives to engage auditors with desired biases. We find that when firms engage in opinion shopping, MAR improves investment efficiency for some firms but impairs investment efficiency for other firms. More generally, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating the real effects of auditing on corporate resource allocation decisions.     

An experimental study of users’ responses to qualified audit reports in China

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on users’ responses to the qualification of audit reports in China. By employing the type of audit report (e.g., unqualified vs. qualified auditor opinion) as a manipulated variable in the experiment, we found mixed responses from the participants towards the perceived impact of a qualified audit report on users’ understanding and use of the financial statements. In general, Chinese users, credit and loan officers in particular, perceived a qualified auditor opinion as having a somewhat negative impact on the credibility of financial statements. However, no significant difference was found in users’ investment or credit decisions with respect to their exposure to the financial statements accompanied by an unqualified or a qualified auditor opinion. The study findings suggest that the U.S.-style qualified audit reports have fairly limited “information content” to users in the present Chinese auditing environment and that there is a need to further improve Chinese auditing standards and practices. In addition, the study provides some insights into recent auditing developments in China.     

The effect of external audits of internal control over financial reporting on financial reporting for clients of Big 4, Second-tier,and small audit firms

The external audit of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) is a very expensive and contentious aspect of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Larger public firms were first required to file a management report on and have an external audit of ICFR in 2004. Smaller public firms were first required to file a management report on ICFR in 2007 but are exempt from the audit requirement. Whereas most related prior research investigates the combined effect of management and auditor reports on financial reporting, this study examines the distinct effect of auditor reports on reporting quality. For companies audited by small auditors, we find evidence that financial reporting quality improves with an auditor report on ICFR. We find no evidence that auditor ICFR reports improve reporting quality for clients of Big 4 or Second-tier audit firms. Our study adds to the debate on the applicability of SOX Section 404 to smaller firms.     

Audit Standards and Auditor Liability: A Theoretical Model

The business of auditing is heavily regulated. Auditor regulation exists through licensing, professional standards and liability. The auditor's liability for losses to financial statement users from audit failure is subject to a test of negligence. What constitutes due audit care is, however, not generally well-specified. Furthermore, reviews of litigation against auditors conclude that compliance with professional audit standards does not always act as a complete defence to allegations of negligence. The current situation can be described as one where (ex ante)—from the point of view of the auditor—uncertainty exists about the ‘legal’ standard of due audit quality (as seen by the courts in the event of litigation). This uncertainty about legal standards fundamentally affects audit behaviour in ways that are not immediately intuitive. This paper draws on insights from the economics and law literature (e.g., Kolstad et al., 1990; Shavell, 1984a, 1984b and 1987; Calfee and Craswell, 1984 and 1986) and provides an analysis of the effects of uncertainty about auditor negligence on the produced level of audit quality and on audit fees. The auditor subject to a negligence rule will produce too low or too high an audit quality level, as compared to the socially optimal level. It is shown that uncertainty about the legal standard of ‘due audit quality’ is fundamental to understanding audit quality supplied. This uncertainty is the explicator of an insurance component in audit fees. A surprising insight is that a large uncertainty about the legal standard of care can reduce rather than increase the quality of audit work supplied and increase the insurance component. Relying on insurance premiums can be more effective than direct expenditure in reducing risk. The effect of the imposition of ex ante precise audit quality standards, in combination with an uncertain negligence rule, is discussed. Since the influence of ex ante standards is indirect through its effect on ex post liability, auditing standards cannot be analysed independently of ‘legal’ standards. If the legal standard of care were clear, there would be no role for audit standards. Audit standards only affect audit behaviour if legal standards of care are unclear, and they help to clarify the legal standard. An effective combination is for ex ante standards to be set below the ex post standards of care so that they provide a lower bound on acceptable work. Under a lowest common denominator approach set too far below legal standards, audit standards would be irrelevant as far as operational decisions were concerned. As the level of standards are raised, so costs are first imposed on the lowest quality providers.     

Effects of auditor-provided tax services on book-tax differences and on investors' mispricing of book-tax differences

Over the last decade, the joint provision of audit and non-audit services has been criticized for compromising auditor independence and affecting audit quality. Since 2005, the SEC has enacted rules restricting the types of non-audit services audit firms can provide clients. While most non-audit services are prohibited, a range of tax services are still allowed. Therefore, if compromises can emerge from allowing non-audit services, permitting tax services could be problematic. This study investigates the effect of auditor-provided tax services (ATS) on firms' levels of book-tax differences and on investors' mispricing of book-tax differences. Using a propensity-score matched sample from 2000 to 2013, I find strong evidence that firms acquiring ATS exhibit a low level of temporary book-tax differences, which in turn mitigate investors' levels of firms' mispricing. These results do not support regulators' claim that the provision of ATS compromises auditor independence. Instead, it suggests that purchasing ATS can improve overall accounting quality through knowledge spillover and thus help investors better price the value of firms.