Informality,enforcement and growth

This paper develops a two-sector growth model with formal and informal sectors for an economy that cares about redistribution and illustrates its relationship with the enforcement level. The technology gap and labour rigidity explicate the duality. The state can tax the formal sector to subsidise informal income and finance public infrastructure. Alternatively, enforcement, which is costly and corresponds to a variety of discrete components from the security of property rights and integrity of contracts to control of corruptions, can be chosen to favour the formal sector and discourage the informal sector. It is observed that weaker enforcement required to accommodate some degree of informality, which releases tax burden from the formal sector needed for redistribution, can accelerate growth rate. However, sufficiently weaker enforcement dampens the formal sector expansion and growth rate. The growth rate registers an inverted-U shaped relationship against the enforcement level. The optimum enforcement can, however, be higher without formal labour union and subsidisation. This must be higher for welfare maximisation than that of growth rate, especially when the consumer cares about the quality of enforcement.     

Government policy in the formal and informal sectors

The paper quantitatively investigates, in general equilibrium, the interaction between the firms' choice to operate in the formal or the informal sector and government policy on taxation and enforcement, given a level of regulation. A static version of Ghironi and Melitz's (2005) industry model is used to show that firms with lower productivity endogenously choose to operate in the informal sector. I use cross-country data on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of regulation (entry and compliance costs, red tape, etc.) to back out how high the enforcement levels must be country by country to make the theory match the data. The welfare gains from policy reforms are on average 1.2% (measured in terms of consumption) for OECD countries. I also find that the welfare gains from reducing regulation are on average 2.1%. Finally, performing a similar decomposition to that of Hall and Jones (1999), I find that distortions associated with informality account for a factor of 1.5 of the output per capita difference between the richest and the poorest countries.     

Regulation of entry, labor market institutions and the informal sector

This paper develops a two-sector matching model that incorporates the main features of Latin American labor markets. It has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries. The model is numerically solved using Brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed. Reducing formal sector's entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance. Increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare. Thus, the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal, as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal.     

Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy

This paper describes a model where the size of the informal sector decreases as the degree to which financing contracts can be enforced in the formal sector rises. Agents who choose to operate in the informal sector can evade taxes, but they have no access to official means of contract enforcement. Numerical simulations of the model suggest that lax tax enforcement alone does not suffice to generate a large informal sector. Contractual imperfections, on the other hand, can generate a large informal sector and account for several distinguishing features of the organization of production in developing economies. I would like to thank Tim Kehoe, Ed Prescott and Manuel Santos for their guidance, and seminar participants at ITAM, the Universidad Torcuato di Tella and the University of Montréal for their valuable comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.     

Inequality, corruption and the informal sector

The marginal impact of corruption on income inequality is shown to be a linear function of the size of the informal sector. This implies that anti-corruption policies alone are unlikely to reduce inequality in countries with a large informal sector.     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

Fiscal policy and the structure of production in a two-sector developing economy

This paper develops a two-sector model of a developing economy and examines the role of the informal sector in limiting the government's ability to increase tax revenues. A key feature is the introduction of auditing of the informal sector and degree of tax enforcement in that sector. We emphasize the interdependence between tax policy and enforcement in achieving a developing economy's fiscal objectives and show that by judicious policy choices the presence of the informal sector need not hinder its ability to raise tax revenues. We supplement the formal analysis with numerical simulations highlighting the contrasting intertemporal tradeoffs implied by higher tax rates and tax-enforcement levels.     

Urbanization,informal sector,and development

Urbanization is a universal phenomenon in the postwar world, but its qualitative nature is varied across countries. Some nations have experienced urbanization that accompanied skill upgrading, industrialization, and the expansion of the urban formal (modern) sector, but others urbanized without such modernization and underwent the expansion of the urban informal (traditional) sector simultaneously. The question that naturally arises is what are the underlying causes for the differences. The purpose of the paper is to tackle this question analytically based on a dynamic model of urbanization and development.     

Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

Financial Innovation,Deposit Deregulation,and the US M1-GNP Link

This paper considers the effect of financial liberalization on aggregate consumption, with a special focus on Taiwan, which has sustained a high savings rate and a rapid rate of economic growth under financial dualism, but has undertaken financial liberalization since the 1980s, leading to an expansion of the formal financial sector. The paper finds that, because of an active informal financial sector, consumers in Taiwan are less credit constrained than in other developing countries. However, the expansion of the formal financial sector has contributed to some relaxation of consumer credit constraints and thereby changes in the income and interest elasticities of consumption. It also has brought about a higher consumption growth rate, offsetting at least partially the positive growth effect of financial liberalization, which helps improve the efficiency in finanacial intermediation.     

Public external debt,informality and production efficiency in developing countries

This paper proposes an alternative approach to investigate the non-linear effect of external debt on growth. In the theoretical part, we develop an endogenous growth model with formal and informal sectors to analyse the effect of the public external debt on the production efficiency. We show that an increase of the public external debt share increases the production efficiency through a positive externality effect. However, it generates an opposite effect via the reduction of the formal sector’s size in favour of a less efficient informal sector. The resultant effect becomes negative beyond an optimal level. Besides, we show that a large stock of public external debt reduces the production efficiency when it leads to a tight fiscal policy which reduces the formal sector size. Empirically, using a stochastic frontier technique with unobserved heterogeneity, for a panel of 27 developing countries for the period of 1970–2005, we confirm that the turning point associated to the effect of the share external public debt is apparent at 84%.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

收入不平等与家庭借贷行为*——家庭为追求社会地位而借贷的动机真的存在吗

本文利用中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)2011年度的调查数据,考察了收入不平等对家庭借贷行为的影响,并验证了家庭是否存在为追求社会地位而借贷的动机。研究表明：（1）收入不平等并不是影响家庭是否借贷的主要因素,但是对家庭的负债规模存在十分显著的抑制作用;（2）收入不平等的扩大并不会促使中低收入家庭寻求借贷或提升家庭负债规模,我国家庭并不存在为了追求更高的社会地位而进行借贷的动机;（3）收入不平等的扩大有利于高收入家庭获得更多的正规金融借贷,中低收入家庭则会较多地依赖于非正规金融借贷;（4）户主的人口统计学特征、家庭经济特征以及家庭所处地区特征均是影响家庭借贷行为的重要因素,在正规金融和非正规金融市场上,影响家庭借贷行为的因素存在较明显的差异。     

Tanzanian formal sector workers' participation in informal production

A theoretical model is developed explaining formal sector workers participation in the informal sector. A reduced-form informal sector participation function is derived from a specific utility function, a specific informal sector production function, and a specific informal sector earnings function. The participation function can be estimated consistently, and provides a solution to the problem that informal sector ‘wages’ in developing countries are hard to observe. A sample of Tanzanian formal sector workers is used to estimate the participation function. A majority of Tanzanian formal sector workers participate in informal production. Participation in informal production is inversely related to household income, to living in Dar es Salaam, and to being a mother with small children. Participation is positively related to age, and multiple-job-holding seems to play a very different role in the transition from work to retirement in Tanzania compared to industrialized countries.     

The Political Economy of Policy Reform in the Philippines: 1992–1998

Accurately measuring Turkey's informal sector is important for policymaking. We utilize household income‐expenditure surveys to examine this sector's income underreporting. The Pissarides‐Weber approach hypothesizes that data would reflect such underreporting as “excess food consumption”. Our results suggest informal sector members spend more than their formal sector counterparts with comparable reported income levels. Using this information, we estimate the average size of the true informal sector to be about 1.25 times the official estimate. The informal sector accounts for around 83% of officially reported disposable income. Therefore, true Turkish disposable income is (25%)?(83%), roughly 21% larger than the officially estimated magnitude.     

Informal work networks

Abstract We present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labour supply, where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers. In addition to formal income taxation and enforcement, individuals’ labour supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties. Workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good. More connected social networks (e.g., wheel, complete) feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks (e.g., star, empty). Average income may be non‐monotonic in tax enforcement.     

Job search and mobility in developing countries. Theory and policy implications

A labor market model is developed in which the formal sector is characterized by search frictions whereas the informal sector is competitive. We show that there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium in this dual economy. We then consider different policies financed by a tax on firms' profits. We find that reducing the unemployment benefit or the firms' entry cost in the formal sector induces higher job creation and formal employment, reduces the size of the informal sector but has an ambiguous effect on wages. We also find that an employment/wage subsidy policy and a hiring subsidy policy have different implications. In particular, the former increases the size of the informal sector while the latter decreases it.     

Product Quality,Informality, and Child Labor

This paper studies how the interactions between the structure of product demand and relative wages affect the incidence of child labor. One sector (the agrarian) produces a homogeneous good, and the other (the modern) produces a vertically differentiated product. The modern sector is segmented according to quality: high‐quality varieties are produced by formal firms which employ only adult labor, whereas low‐quality varieties are produced by informal firms which employ child labor as well. Differences in tastes and incomes across households generate demand for both high‐quality and low‐quality varieties. Stricter enforcement of child‐labor regulations and increases in minimum wages can have beneficial effects regarding the incidence of child labor and the size of the formal sector. However, since these policies have undesirable welfare effects among segments of wage‐earning households, they may not garner the necessary political support.     

Quality dualism

We suggest a theory of quality dualism, defined in terms of the gap between the highest quality good produced in the informal sector and the lowest quality produced in the formal sector. We develop a model of vertically differentiated products, in which firms producing in the formal and informal sectors face different factor prices, and have a relative advantage in the manufacture of different qualities. We then use the model to examine the cyclical behavior of the respective sizes of the two sectors. Finally, we point out that factor price changes, which reduce or increase the size of the informal sector, may have the same or opposite effect on the degree of dualism in the economy.