Liberalising Trade in the Agriculture Sector of a Small Island State: The Case of Fiji

This paper uses Fiji as a case study to investigate the impacts of three trade liberalisation policies – removal of sugar price subsidies, unilateral trade liberalisation and multilateral trade liberalisation, implied by the successful completion of the Doha Round. Removal of the sugar price subsidies has an adverse effect on real output, real national welfare and employment, but promotes growth of non‐agricultural exports in the long run. Unilateral trade liberalisation, in the form of tariff cuts in the agricultural sector, increases real output, real national welfare and non‐agricultural exports in the medium term. However, this growth is not sustained in the long term. The best outcome for Fiji is multilateral trade liberalisation which increases real output, real national welfare, non‐agricultural exports and employment. It is argued that reform of trade policies in less developed countries could come at a cost, therefore highlighting the need for compensating mechanisms to deal with the adverse impacts. Other measures to assist farmers to expand output in response to a rise in prices could include measures to reduce transport, storage and packaging costs, as well as institutional measures to enhance the functioning of input and factor markets.     

反倾销税与反倾销补贴的经济学思考

文章从经济学角度分析一国采取反倾销税时对该国经济福利的影响,同时使用反倾销补贴的新概念并与之比较。文章对两国厂商在几种不同的成本情况下分别采取反倾销税和反倾销补贴时对本国经济福利会产生怎样的影响进行对比分析。采取反倾销补贴与反倾销税相比较能带来更大福利,反倾销补贴可以更大程度地防止反倾销的滥用,而且可以更有效地阻止掠夺性倾销。     

Export subsidies and foreign capital inflows

The welfare effect of a foreign capital inflow in an economy which practises an export-oriented trade policy is examined. The latter takes the form of optimally designed export subsidies, minimizing the welfare costs of existing import tariffs. Under the practice of this policy, an inflow of foreign capital is shown to have anambiguous welfare effect. An empirically relevant condition for welfare improvement is derived and discussed.     

Preferences,Welfare and Desirable Subsidies under Monopolistic Competition

A simple model of monopolistic competition with consumer preferences for diversity reconciles an empirical‐theoretical disconnect of the welfare properties of industrial subsidies. The optimal policy rules indicate that subsidies can be Pareto improving, but subject to society's preference for diversity. More counter‐intuitively, the welfare‐maximizing subsidy is always found to be strictly non‐negative, and the general qualitative nature of the results seem to contradict the optimum taxation literature. The subsidy incidence is also examined and we find that there exists a potential for an over‐shifting of the subsidy.     

Subsidies for FDI: Implications from a model with heterogeneous firms

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are heterogeneous in their productivity levels. I show that the use of a small subsidy raises welfare in the FDI host country, with the consumption gains from attracting more multinationals exceeding the direct cost of funding the subsidy program through a tax on labor income. This welfare gain stems from a selection effect, whereby the subsidy induces only the most productive exporters to switch to servicing the host's market via FDI. I further show that for the same total subsidy bill, a subsidy to variable costs delivers a larger welfare gain than a subsidy to the fixed cost of conducting FDI, since a variable cost subsidy also raises the inefficiently low output levels stemming from each firm's markup pricing power.     

R&D policies, trade and process innovation

We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.     

Entrepreneurship: skills and financing

This article analyzes an occupational choice model with risk-averse agents who are heterogeneous in terms of skills and wealth in a setting with financial frictions. We show that high- and middle-wealth individuals endowed with a balanced portfolio of skills upgrade their skills so that the resulting portfolio of skills is more balanced and choose entrepreneurship. In contrast, middle-wealth individuals endowed with an unbalanced portfolio of skills and low-wealth individuals specialize in the skill in which they have an absolute advantage and choose paid employment. Deeper financial development, a more balanced portfolio of skills, lower entrepreneurial risk, and a higher liquidation value for projects result in more entrepreneurship and higher welfare, while wealth redistributions and financial subsidies to entrepreneurs have an ambiguous effect on welfare.     

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the current world trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.     

从反倾销税到反倾销补贴

本文首先就相关的若干核心概念进行整理和定义,并阐述了文章研究的必要性和整体的研究思路。其次,考察了世界贸易组织(WTO)框架下现行反倾销制度的各种缺陷,认为通过导入反倾销补贴的新做法至少有利于弥补现行反倾销制度的不足。再次,本文就两国间三种不同的成本情况下的反倾销税与反倾销补贴的经济福利效应进行了比较分析。最后结论是反倾销补贴不仅对现行反倾销制度的滥用能起到积极的作用,能够避免掠夺性倾销的威胁,而且与反倾销税相比消费者的利益不会受到损害。     

WTO背景下改革补贴政策研究

近年来,国际社会对我国政府补贴的质疑甚嚣尘上,政府补贴特别是对国有企业的补贴,在世界贸易组织(WTO)规则下面临变革。党的十九大明确提出,要清理废除妨碍统一市场和公平竞争的各种规定及做法。推进经济高质量发展对政府补贴提出了进一步规范的要求。本文通过梳理分析世界主要经济体的补贴情况,从理论和实践角度讨论补贴在国际范围内所具有的客观性和普遍性,得出补贴是政府支持产业发展,激发市场活力的重要政策工具。对我国政府补贴和对国有企业补贴的情况进行梳理研究,结合国际实践经验,探索符合WTO规则的,促进我国市场经济健康快速发展的补贴政策体系,并针对补贴中存在的问题提出深化改革的对策建议。     

Privatisation and the unusual case of Belarusian accession to the WTO

The accession negotiations of Belarus to the WTO are unusual since, due to its obligations in the Eurasian Economic Union, WTO accession is not expected to impact its tariffs or formerly substantial trade‐distorting agricultural subsidies. Nonetheless, we estimate that WTO accession will increase welfare by 9.9% of consumption in Belarus. We show that inclusion of: (i) foreign direct investment; (ii) reduction in non‐discriminatory barriers against services providers; and (iii) our model with imperfect competition and endogenous productivity effects together produce estimated gains eleven times larger than a model of perfect competition with only cross‐border trade in services. Our analysis is enabled by our production of a data set on both discriminatory and non‐discriminatory barriers in services and their ad valorem equivalents. Based on a new data set on labour productivity by sector and type of ownership, in our central model, we estimate that privatisation will increase welfare by 35.8% of consumption. We find substantial variance in the estimated gains from privatisation depending on model assumptions, but all the estimates of the impacts of privatisation indicate substantial welfare gains.     

US–Brazilian cotton policies

Brazil filed a lawsuit with the WTO against the United States for providing cotton production and export subsidies, and the WTO ruled in favour of Brazil. Brazil threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs if the United States does not comply with the WTO rulings. After a prolonged litigation stretching from 2002 to 2010, both countries agreed to a negotiated settlement wherein the United States paid Brazilian cotton producers to compensate for any adverse effects. This study develops a political economic model to theoretically analyse US cotton policies, Brazil's threat of retaliatory tariffs and the negotiated settlement between the two countries. The theoretical results show that the volume of cotton output, supply price response, politicians' apathy for the public welfare, elasticities of excess supply/demand and the magnitude of US transfers play a crucial role in determining US policies. This study contributes to the literature by being the first to model political economic aspects of the complex system of trade and domestic policies in the cotton industry using a three-country framework, tariff retaliation and transfers between the countries.     

State tax competition for foreign direct investment: a winnable war?

When a multinational firm invests in a country, potential host states compete for the firm by offering firm-specific tax reductions. Critics blast such incentives for transferring rents to the firm without affecting the investment decision. In fact, these incentives are tied to the firm's use of domestic inputs and therefore affect output decisions. With positive interstate spillovers, a federal subsidy is necessary to reach the national optimum without tax competition. Competition reduces state taxes and the need for federal subsidies. Also, under competition, the firm locates efficiently. Therefore, tax competition does not always reduce national welfare.     

Commercial policy and dynamic adjustment under monopolistic competition

We explore liberalization of trade in differentiated commodities using a model featuring monopolistic competition and capital accumulation. We identify a mechanism of ‘cumulative causation’ in investment and an associated externality leading to under-accumulation. We provide long-run analytical results for a stylized core model and offer a quantitative treatment of transitional and sectoral issues using a disaggregate computational model. The aggregate welfare gains from unilateral liberalization are about three times larger than in the competitive case with constant returns, and they exhibit a characteristic pattern of generational incidence. Small export subsidies may be self-financing.     

Up the average cost curve: Inefficient entry and the new protectionism

A two-country model is developed in which each country produces one good with increasing returns, the goods being perfect or imperfect substitutes. With Cournot-Nash behavior and free entry, certain restrictive trade policies have effects opposite to their favorable effect under noentry assumptions. Import tariffs and export subsidies lead to inefficient entry that raises rather than decreases the average production cost of and price charge by the domestic industry with negative welfare consequences. We argue that these predictions of our model are closely consistent with extensive Canadian data on entry, exit, and firms' responses to trade liberalization.     

When and how should infant industries be protected?

This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection. The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant industry using domestic production subsidies, tariffs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (although the domestic industry experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry should depend on the industry's learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the flexibility over time of the policy instruments, the paper subsequently compares the effectiveness of the different instruments. Given such restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariffs. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (including the case of a voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.     

Distorted Agricultural Incentives and Economic Development: Asia's Experience

Earnings from farming in many low‐income countries have been depressed by a pro‐urban bias in own‐country policies, as well as by governments of richer countries favouring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of policies reduce national and global economic welfare. The rapid development of many Asian emerging economies has been accompanied by a gradual reduction in their anti‐agricultural policies, but many distortions remain and some countries have moved from negative to positive assistance for farmers, following the earlier examples of first Japan and then Korea and Taiwan. Drawing on results from a new multi‐country research project, this paper examines the extent of these changes relative to those of other developing countries over the past five decades. It concludes by pointing to prospects for further policy reform in Asia.     

政府就业补贴、劳动保护政策的就业促进效应——基于沪深A股上市企业数据的分析

就业是民生之本,关乎人民生活福祉和社会稳定。为了让企业吸纳更多就业,政府对企业进行了大量补贴。基于沪深A股上市企业数据,本文聚焦政府就业补贴、劳动保护政策与就业这个主题进行探讨。研究表明,政府补贴有助于推动企业吸纳更多就业,劳动保护能够协同政府补贴促进就业,政府补贴通过“政治许诺效应”和“融资效应”影响就业,地方人力资本积累强化了政府补贴对就业的正向影响;与资本密集型企业相比,劳动密集型企业的政府补贴强化就业的效应更明显;政府补贴增加了企业产生冗余雇员的可能性,冗余雇员在政府补贴对企业生产率的负向影响中发挥了部分中介作用。     

应对气候变化补贴与SCM协定

补贴是各国目前所普遍采用的应对气候变化措施之一。但是,依据现有补贴与反补贴(SCM)规则,很多以应对气候变化为真实目的的补贴都可能被判定为禁止性补贴或可诉性补贴,从而在很大程度上限制了WTO成员采取应对气候变化补贴措施的自由。因此,要为各国推行正当的应对气候变化补贴铺平道路,就必须对SCM协定的相关规则进行修改和完善。目前比较可行的办法是借鉴GATT第20条模式,增加环保例外条款。     

WTO subsidy rules and tariff liberalization: evidence from accession of China

Countries increasingly rely on subsidies to assist their producers leading to concerns about their potential misuse. The WTO regulates its members’ subsidies by defining subsidies that are permissible, as well as by providing means to retaliate against subsidies of partner countries if these subsidies hurt one's interest. However, these subsidy rules might have an unintended effect. As both subsidies and tariffs are substitute instruments of protection, tighter subsidy rules might lead to a decrease in the pace of tariff liberalization. In this paper, we present first empirical evidence in support of this prediction. Using China's accession to the WTO in 2001 as a case study, we show that China's accession to the WTO was associated with a relative increase in its tariffs for products that faced a higher threat of retaliation against subsidies. More importantly, we also show that increases in tariff were larger in products with higher potential costs imposed by retaliation. Finally, we include several robustness tests as well as conduct two counterfactual exercises to verify that the results we obtain are indeed due to perceived threat of retaliation against subsidies.