“偿二代”监管体系下寿险公司风险管理研究

随着经济发展进入新常态,已有的监管体系"偿一代"已无法适应当前以及未来寿险业风险管理的要求.2016年,以全面风险管理为导向的"偿二代"正式实施,给我国寿险公司的风险管理带来了深刻影响.为此,本文从负债端、资产端和公司风险管理三个方面分析"偿二代"对寿险公司风险管理的作用路径及影响.研究发现:在"偿二代"下寿险公司在负债端的风险管理重点应在于着力优化并调整产品结构,使得长期期缴业务成为核心;在资产端的风险管理重点应在于提升权益投资和另类投资比例;在公司的风险管理上应逐步加强完善风险管理框架,不断提高全面风险管理能力.     

If private equity sized up your business

As the dust settles on the recent frenzy of private equity deals (including transactions topping $20 billion), what lessons can companies glean? Directors and executives of public companies may now be slightly less fearful of imminent takeover, yet the pressure remains: They face shareholders who wonder why they aren't getting private-equity-level returns. Rather than dismiss the value private equity has created as manipulated or aberrant, public company leaders should recognize the disciplined management that often underlies it. Pozen, a longtime leader in the financial services industry, finds that in the aftermath of buyouts, companies undergo five major thrusts of reform. These translate into five key questions that directors should pose to senior management: Have we left too much cash on our balance sheet instead of raising our cash dividends or buying back shares? Do we have the optimal capital structure, with the lowest weighted after-tax cost of total capital, including debt and equity? Do we have an operating plan that will significantly increase shareholder value, with specific metrics to monitor performance? Are the compensation rewards for our top executives tied closely enough to increases in shareholder value, with real penalties for nonperformance? Finally, does our board have enough industry experts who have made the time commitments and been given the financial incentives necessary to maximize shareholder value? The era of private equity is far from over - the top funds have become very large and are likely to play an influential role in future market cycles. Boards that ask these questions, and act on them, won't just beat the takeover artists to the punch. They will build stronger businesses.     

Creating new market space.

Most companies focus on matching and beating their rivals. As a result, their strategies tend to take on similar dimensions. What ensues is head-to-head competition based largely on incremental improvements in cost, quality, or both. The authors have studied how innovative companies break free from the competitive pack by staking out fundamentally new market space--that is, by creating products or services for which there are no direct competitors. This path to value innovation requires a different competitive mind-set and a systematic way of looking for opportunities. Instead of looking within the conventional boundaries that define how an industry competes, managers can look methodically across them. By so doing, they can find unoccupied territory that represents real value innovation. Rather than looking at competitors within their own industry, for example, managers can ask why customers make the trade-off between substitute products or services. Home Depot, for example, looked across the substitutes serving home improvement needs. Intuit looked across the substitutes available to individuals managing their personal finances. In both cases, powerful insights were derived from looking at familiar data from a new perspective. Similar insights can be gleaned by looking across strategic groups within an industry; across buyer groups; across complementary product and service offerings; across the functional-emotional orientation of an industry; and even across time. To help readers explore new market space systematically, the authors developed a tool, the value curve, that can be used to represent visually a range of value propositions.     

Strategy and the Internet

Many of the pioneers of Internet business, both dot-coms and established companies, have competed in ways that violate nearly every precept of good strategy. Rather than focus on profits, they have chased customers indiscriminately through discounting, channel incentives, and advertising. Rather than concentrate on delivering value that earns an attractive price from customers, they have pursued indirect revenues such as advertising and click-through fees. Rather than make trade-offs, they have rushed to offer every conceivable product or service. It did not have to be this way--and it does not have to be in the future. When it comes to reinforcing a distinctive strategy, Michael Porter argues, the Internet provides a better technological platform than previous generations of IT. Gaining competitive advantage does not require a radically new approach to business; it requires building on the proven principles of effective strategy. Porter argues that, contrary to recent thought, the Internet is not disruptive to most existing industries and established companies. It rarely nullifies important sources of competitive advantage in an industry; it often makes them even more valuable. And as all companies embrace Internet technology, the Internet itself will be neutralized as a source of advantage. Robust competitive advantages will arise instead from traditional strengths such as unique products, proprietary content, and distinctive physical activities. Internet technology may be able to fortify those advantages, but it is unlikely to supplant them. Porter debunks such Internet myths as first-mover advantage, the power of virtual companies, and the multiplying rewards of network effects. He disentangles the distorted signals from the marketplace, explains why the Internet complements rather than cannibalizes existing ways of doing business, and outlines strategic imperatives for dot-coms and traditional companies.     

基于全球价值链视角的企业对外投资模式分析——以北京为例

基于全球价值链视角对北京的100强企业处于全球价值链阶段和运用全球价值链动力机制对外投资进行分析,结果表明:北京对外投资发展缓慢,呈现出以绿地投资为主、香港为主要投资地区、投资行业多元化且对外合作发展迅速的特征,大部分的北京企业对外投资处于全球价值链的低端,且以生产者驱动型的全球价值链为主,由此,提出全球价值链下北京企业对外投资可选择的5种模式。     

Moving upward in a downturn.

As the recent bursting of the new economy bubble has shown, business cycles are still wih us. The question, then, is, what executives should do to help their companies weather these downturns. As in so many instances, there are conventional approaches that appear to make sense in the short term. But while these approaches seem reasonable in the heat of the moment, they can eventually damage competitive positions and financial performance. Drawing on extensive research of Fortune 500 companies that have lived through industry downturns and economic recessions over the past two decades, Darrell Rigby, a director of Bain & Company, reveals how companies need to go against the grain of convention and exploit industry downturns to harness their unique opportunities for upward mobility. The author explains that every downturn goes through three phases. He examines each phase and shows how successful players navigate the huge waves of a downturn. Smart executives, he says, don't panic: they look bad news in the eye and institutionalize an approach to detecting storms. Rather than hedge their bets through diversification, they focus on their core businesses and spend to gain market share. They manage costs relentlessly during good times and bad. They keep a long-term view and strive to maintain the loyalty of employees, suppliers, and customers. And coming out of the downturn, they maintain momentum in their businesses to stay ahead of the competition they've already surpassed. Every industry will face periodic downturns of varying severity, says Rigby. But executives with the vision and ingenuity to take unconventional approaches can buoy their companies to new heights.     

Disability insurance overview

In summary, I think the industry is doing the right things to return to profitability. Rates are increasing, underwriting and products are tightening, claim administration is becoming more proactive, and reserves are being strengthened. I think this will lead to future profitability, and future profitability will attract some new companies into the marketplace. The real long-term question is, once profitability has returned, will the industry shoot itself in the foot again in its efforts to do competitive battle?     

You have more capital than you think

Senior executives typically delegate the responsibility for managing a firm's derivatives portfolio to in-house financial experts and the company's financial advisers. That's a strategic blunder, argues this Nobel laureate, because the inventiveness of modern financial markets makes it possible for companies to double or even triple their capacity to invest in their strategic assets and competencies. Risks fall into two categories: either a company adds value by assuming them on behalf of its shareholders or it does not. By hedging or insuring against non-value-adding risks with derivative securities and contracts, thereby removing them from what the author calls the risk balance sheet, managers can release equity capital for assuming more value-adding risk. This is not just a theoretical possibility. One innovation-the interest rate swap, introduced about 20 years ago-has already enabled the banking industry to dramatically increase its capacity for adding value to each dollar of invested equity capital. With the range of derivative instruments growing, there is no reason why other companies could not similarly remove strategic risks, potentially creating billions of dollars in shareholder value. The possibilities are especially important for private companies that have no access to public equity markets and therefore cannot easily increase their equity capital by issuing more shares. The author describes how derivative contracts of various kinds are already being employed strategically to mitigate or eliminate various risks. He also shows how companies can use the risk balance sheet to identify risks they should not bear directly and to determine how much equity capacity they can release for assuming more value-adding risk.     

Industry upheaval and valuation: Empirical evidence from the international oil and gas industry

Accounting literature suggests that contemporaneous earnings are more useful than current operating cash flow in predicting future cash flows and, therefore, also more relevant for company valuation. However, recent research indicates that elevated levels of merger and acquisition activity or a changing economic environment may reduce the value relevance of earnings. Using the oil and gas industry as a case, this paper examines how the oil industry upheaval in the late 1990s influenced the value relevance of financial statement information. We extend the literature by testing for a structural shift in the equity market valuation process. Our results provide evidence of a structural break in the value relevance of accounting information. In contrast to prior research, we find that the value relevance of cash flows actually decreased in the recent oil industry upheaval. On the other hand, the value relevance of book equity increased. Furthermore, we find that accounting-method choice (full cost versus successful efforts) affects the value relevance of accounting information.     

Leading through rough times. An interview with Novell's Eric Schmidt. Interview by Bronwyn Fryer

Few large companies have soared as high, sunk as low, and struggled as long as the 18-year-old networking software maker Novell. For years, the company dominated the market for local area networks, but by 1997, it had faltered due to misguided acquisitions, product missteps, and large unsold inventories. That's when Eric Schmidt arrived from Sun Microsystems to take over as Novell's third CEO. He turned the company around with a deft combination of cost reductions, divestitures, and new product rollouts, and by 1998, it was back in the black. Unfortunately, the good times didn't last, and like most technology companies, Novell is once again struggling with a slowdown in demand. But Schmidt is optimistic about returning Novell to good health, and his strategies suggest ways for other organizations to handle themselves during downturns. He counsels against being overly cautious during such times. It may be necessary to eliminate excess inventory, cut costs, and reduce the size of the staff and the management team in order to stabilize a company. Working to retain those employees whom he calls the "smart people" and keeping them motivated will have long-term payoffs. Further, Schmidt says it is necessary to acknowledge and overcome a "culture of fear," the deadening environment of cynicism in which employees suppress thoughts and feelings because they're worried about layoffs. His additional advice: keep new products coming out to sustain the interest of customers and the press, pay attention to your cash position, stay focused on your desired outcomes, and take heart from other industry leaders.     

长期资产减值:公允价值的体现还是盈余管理行为

长期资产与流动资产相比,由于其使用期限长,公允价值更难寻觅,因此其减值政策的应用不仅对公司业绩的影响深远,而且主观性更强。那么《企业会计制度》出台后长期资产减值政策的执行状况如何,其追溯调整政策给公司减值行为会产生什么样的影响,公司长期资产减值是真实反映了长期资产未来收益能力的变化,还是盈余管理的行为,本文对此进行了研究。研究结果发现,我国上市公司在长期资产减值政策实施当年,普遍进行了长期资产的减值,并且证实不仅减值总额真实反映了长期资产未来收益能力的下降,而且追溯调整后计入当年损益的减值数额也真实反映了长期资产未来收益能力的下降。这一研究结果说明追溯调整政策为公司夯实长期资产,如实反映长期资产的公允价值提供了政策途径,并未演化成公司盈余管理的工具。     

关于构建我国药品不良反应保险救济机制问题的研究

2006年上海试点的“严重药品不良反应综合保险”初探市场,未能实现药企蜂拥而至的期望局面,而是十分落寂地收场。药品不良反应保险救济机制一直未能实现,已成为我国医药业一大难题。本文通过对药品不良反应定义的分析,探析了我国建立药品不良反应保险救济机制的可行性,再结合近期的“严重药品不良反应综合保险”的失败经验,提出了完善救济制度、累积相关数据、建立鉴定委员会、政府补贴并强制购买等相关的政策与建议。     

徐曙光 董事长专业户的成功法则

他曾连续成功创业,并跨越不同的国家、涉足不同的领域。他正是董事长专业户徐曙光。     

Is a share buyback right for your company?

Contrary to popular wisdom, buybacks don't create value by raising earnings per share. But they do indeed create value, and in two very different ways. First, a buyback sends signals about the company's prospects to the market--hopefully, that prospects are so good that the best investment managers can make right now is in their own company. But investors won't see it that way if other, negative, signals are coming from the company, and it's rarely a good idea for companies in high-growth industries, where investors expect that money to be spent pursuing new opportunities. Second, when financed as a debt issue, a buyback is essentially an exchange of equity for debt, conferring the traditional benefits of leverage--a tax shield and a discipline for managers. For such a buyback to make sense, a company would need to have taxable profits in need of shielding, of course, and be able to predict its future cash flows fairly accurately. Justin Pettit has found that managers routinely underestimate how many shares they need to buy to send a credible signal to the markets, and he offers a way to calculate that number. He also goes through the iterative steps involved in working out how many shares must be purchased to reach a target level of debt. Then he takes a look at the advantages and disadvantages of the three most common ways that companies make the actual purchases--open-market purchases, fixed-price tender offers, and auction-based tender offers. When a company's performance is lagging, a share buyback can look attractive. Unfortunately, a buyback can backfire--unless executives understand why, when, and how to use this powerful and risky tool.     

Regulation And The Rise In Asset-Based Mutual Fund Management Fees

In this article I explain why asset‐based fees are common for mutual fund management companies and why the average fee has increased recently. I argue that Securities and Exchange Commission fee regulations make alternative fee types illegal or unattractive. Management companies can maintain higher fees because regulations and brand‐name capital partly insulate them from competition and because investors cannot easily distinguish between performance‐oriented and marketing‐oriented fund companies. Index funds and unit investment trusts may offer competition to mutual funds in the future because they are designed to minimize management fees.     

中国上市公司营运资金管理调查:2007—2008

本项调查分行业考察了2007—2008年中国上市公司营运资金管理的状况和变化趋势,并用"经营活动营运资金周转期(按要素)"和"经营活动营运资金周转期(按渠道)"指标对上市公司营运资金管理绩效进行了排行。通过对比分析发现:在金融危机背景下,2/3行业的中国上市公司营运资金管理绩效在2008年度显著降低;2/3行业在至少两个渠道上的营运资金管理绩效同时降低;但也有三个行业(农林牧渔行业、金属非金属行业、交通运输及仓储业)的营运资金管理绩效不降反升,且三个渠道营运资金管理绩效同时提升。通过对典型企业的经营管理活动分析发现,渠道管理、供应链管理与营运资金管理相结合成为一种新的趋势,供应链融资、出口信用保险成为金融危机背景下企业改善营运资金管理的业务创新模式。     

The trouble I've seen

David James is a professional crisis manager. For almost 30 years, his job has been to rescue companies on the brink of bankruptcy. By the time he's called in, it's usually too late to save much for the shareholders. In almost every case, however, there is still a lot to salvage: Nearly all the companies James has managed continue to operate in some form. More than 2 billion Pounds have been repaid to banks and unsecured trade creditors. And more than 30,000 jobs have been saved. The key to preserving value, James has found, is to resist the urge to try to generate cash from operating the business. In most cases, these companies have taken on far too much debt to ever sell their way out. Indeed, trying to expand operations beyond what the market would bear was what got them into trouble in the first place. James argues against waiting until the company is dead to break it up. A more effective course is to sell off valuable assets while the company is still a going concern. In vivid and sometimes hair-raising detail, James recounts how he has discovered valuable assets in unexpected places, salvaging everything from airlines to soft-drink makers to Britain's Millennium Dome. He has a routine for accomplishing this, which involves locking up the checkbook on day one and, more often than not, firing the senior management. His is a cautionary tale for top executives who, it is clear, should be concentrating their efforts on never needing to call on him in the first place.     

The CEO's role in business model reinvention

Fending off new competitors is a perennial struggle for established companies. Govindarajan and Trimble, of Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business, explain why: Many corporations become too comfortable with their existing business models and neglect the necessary work of radically reinventing them. The authors map out an alternative in their "three boxes" framework. They argue that while a CEO manages the present (box 1), he or she must also selectively forget the past (box 2) in order to create the future (box 3). Infosys chairman N.R. Narayana Murthy mastered the three boxes to reinvigorate his company and greatly increased its changes of enduring for generations.