Product Quality,Informality, and Child Labor

This paper studies how the interactions between the structure of product demand and relative wages affect the incidence of child labor. One sector (the agrarian) produces a homogeneous good, and the other (the modern) produces a vertically differentiated product. The modern sector is segmented according to quality: high‐quality varieties are produced by formal firms which employ only adult labor, whereas low‐quality varieties are produced by informal firms which employ child labor as well. Differences in tastes and incomes across households generate demand for both high‐quality and low‐quality varieties. Stricter enforcement of child‐labor regulations and increases in minimum wages can have beneficial effects regarding the incidence of child labor and the size of the formal sector. However, since these policies have undesirable welfare effects among segments of wage‐earning households, they may not garner the necessary political support.     

Illegal Immigration and Second-best Import Tariffs

A version of the small‐union Meade model is presented to analyze the illegal immigration problem in the context of import tariffs. Two possible host nation objectives are considered: (i) to control the level of illegal immigration to a given target; or (ii) to choose an illegal immigration level that maximizes national welfare. Available policy instruments are import tariffs/subsidies, border, and internal enforcement levels. The second‐best tariff on imports from the source nation (for illegal immigration) can be of either sign. It depends on the effect of the tariff on the wage rate and the pattern of substitutability in consumption. In scenario (ii), greater enforcement may be justified if it reduces labor inflow and thereby contracts the protected sector. If enforcement is too costly, tariff policy may substitute for it to exploit monopsony power in the labor market and to counter the distortionary effects of labor flows.     

Do good workers hurt bad workers—or is it the other way around?*

I study the effect of worker heterogeneities on wages and unemployment in a directed search model. A worker's productivity in a given firm depends both on his type and on a worker–firm specific component. Firms advertise unconditional wage offers only. The resulting equilibrium is inefficient, with a too high wage premium for high‐type workers, and too few high‐type jobs. This reduces the welfare of high‐type workers. My findings contrast with the findings in the literature on labor market segmentation, where it is argued that the existence of high‐type workers forces down wages and reduces welfare for low‐type workers.     

Poverty changes in Manaus: Legacy of a Brazilian free trade zone?

This study contributes to the literature on the social impacts of Special Economic Zones by analyzing poverty changes in the Brazilian state of Amazonas, where the Free Trade Zone of Manaus (FTZM) is located. Using census data, statistical micro‐decompositions and counterfactual simulations, we show that labor income was the major driver of poverty declines during the 2000 to 2010 decade in the municipality of Manaus (and all the more so for households with members working in the FTZM, who were less poor to start with). Comparison with ex‐ante “similar” municipalities, in regard to socioeconomic and demographic criteria, corroborates the relative success of Manaus in terms of poverty reduction as well as the essential role played by labor income. Wage regressions also show a significant FTZM premium effect for workers, though diminishing over time. In the rest of the state of Amazonas, nonlabor income remains the main factor for poverty reduction and the FTZM appears to have limited spillover effects, even at short distances. Our contrasting results illustrate both the benefits and limitations that trade and industrial policies face in underprivileged areas and suggest that a better targeting of social policies is needed to improve distributional outcomes and spillovers for the whole state.     

International R&D Networks

This paper considers the Goyal and Moraga‐Gonzalez (2001 ) model of strategic R&D collaboration networks in the open economy framework. The R&D is the d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988 ) process innovation and collaboration takes the form of research joint ventures (RJV) in which firms cooperate in R&D but compete in product markets. Countries decide whether to establish free‐trade links while firms decide whether and with whom to form RJVs. A double‐layer pairwise stability concept is introduced to characterize equilibrium network structures. In contrast with conventional wisdom, it is shown that global free trade generally reduces collaborative R&D levels. We give conditions for which pairwise stable R&D networks are welfare maximizing. Stability and efficiency are congruent when R&D cost is either too high or too low. A large public spillover effect is detrimental to an R&D network when trade networks are regional.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Entry,reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement

We examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a developing country under weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Equilibrium IPR violations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns. Holding constant a multinational's incentive to innovate, better IPR enforcement encourages entry but reduces social welfare. The multinational's incentive to innovate may be inversely U‐shaped in the strength of IPR enforcement. If timed properly, however, stronger IPR enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social welfare. Testable implications concerning observable IPR violations are derived.     

Welfare Effects of Immigration Policies in the Presence of Skilled,Unskilled Labor and Capital Mobility

This paper investigates the welfare consequences of immigration policies in a model with two types of labor, skilled and unskilled, and international capital mobility. The paper examines the effect of government policies, which change the immigration cost and cause immigration of one type of labor, on the welfare of natives, when the other types of labor and/or capital are also mobile. It is shown, for example, in the absence of capital mobility, if skilled and unskilled labor are highly complementary in production, then a decrease in the immigration cost of the net fiscal contributor skilled labor that causes its immigration, decreases the welfare of natives.     

Counterfeiting, enforcement and social welfare

This paper uses a vertical product differentiation model to discuss the influences caused by counterfeiting on prices and outputs of original products, consumer surplus and social welfare. We also explore the impact of the government??s enforcement on counterfeiting and social welfare. We find that as counterfeiting may occur, sales of the original product could either increase or decrease. The welfare effects of government enforcement are shown as follows. First, a strict enforcement on counterfeiting by government may either increase or decrease welfare. Second, when counterfeiting emerges, welfare under a stricter enforcement is not necessarily larger than that without enforcement. Last, a strict enough enforcement can still improve welfare even if there is a relatively high enforcement cost.     

Welfare states and unemployment

Summary This paper studies equilibrium unemployment in a search model where the government both provides liberal unemployment insurance and taxes labor at high progressive tax rates. It is shown how progressive income taxation can counteract a high unemployment rate under generous unemployment insurance. In particular, high marginal taxes reduce workers' incentives to switch jobs in response to changing economic opportunities. This lower labor mobility reduces unemployment but at the cost of a less efficient labor allocation.We are grateful to William Dupor, Krishna Kumar, and Ashok Rai for excellent computer programming.     

Regulation of entry, labor market institutions and the informal sector

This paper develops a two-sector matching model that incorporates the main features of Latin American labor markets. It has an innovation in its matching structure that makes it more consistent with some key stylized facts of the informal sector in these countries. The model is numerically solved using Brazilian data and several policy simulations are performed. Reducing formal sector's entry cost significantly reduces the size of the informal sector and improves overall labor market performance. Increasing enforcement significantly reduces informality but has strong adverse effects on unemployment and welfare. Thus, the results indicate that the tradeoff between lower informal employment and higher unemployment rates is not present when one looks at policies that aim at reducing the costs of being formal, as opposed to policies that simply increase the costs of being informal.     

人口流动性、公共收入与支出--户籍制度变迁动因分析

本文分析了人口流动性的内生决定 ,以此解释中国户籍管理政策变迁的动因。文章表明 ,分权框架下的区际竞争将推动政府降低人口流动成本。一般而言 ,集权 ①框架下的最优流动性水平普遍低于分权框架下的流动性水平。与我国近 2 0年来户籍政策变化相一致的是 ,跨区劳动力配置需求的上升增加了户籍管制的效率损失成本 ,将推动人口流动成本下降。我们认为 ,除了协调地方公共品供给外部性、限制地区间税收竞争以最大化税收收入这两个基本原因之外 ,我国户籍管制的另一个特殊原因是便于执行地区差别政策。而设置流动成本的效率性取决于政府目标与社会福利最大化的一致性程度。     

Controlling Illegal Immigration: Border Control vs. Domestic Enforcement

This paper presents a two-country general equilibrium model where international mobility of labor is prohibited. Illegal immigration nevertheless occurs. The probability of success at illegal immigration depends on resources allocated to border control and domestic enforcements. We examine the effects of switching resources form border control to domestic enforcement on illegal immigration and on welfare levels. We characterize the allocation of resources between the two methods of immigration control, that minimizes illegal immigration, and find that, starting from this allocation, moving resources from border control to domestic enforcement is unambiguously welfare improving for the destination country.

     

MFN vs Tariff Discrimination in the Presence of Cross Ownership

We develop a three‐country two‐firm model to examine the superiority of most favored nation (MFN) vs tariff discrimination in global welfare by taking into account the cross ownership between exporters. We obtain several interesting results as follows. First, given cross ownership of financial interests and linear demand, the government of the importing country will impose a lower (higher) tariff on the low‐cost (high‐cost) firm and the global welfare under tariff discrimination will be higher than that under MFN, regardless of whether the mode of competition is Cournot or Bertrand competition, when the magnitude of cross ownership is relatively large compared with the cost difference. Second, given the cross ownership of corporate control and linear demand, the global welfare under tariff discrimination will be identical to that under MFN.     

Illegal immigration: a supply side analysis

"This paper analyzes the supply-side determinants of illegal immigration using a three-sector general equilibrium model of the source country. Agricultural liberalization raises illegal immigration while liberalization of the high tech sector reduces it. In contrast, capital mobility in the source country renders trade policy ineffective for controlling illegal immigration. Paradoxically, increased enforcement (by the host country) may raise source country unskilled wages, although illegal immigration falls. Finally, under capital mobility, a rise in the source country restrictions on capital inflow raises the level of illegal immigration and reduces the effectiveness of border enforcement efforts by the host country."     

Financial infrastructure and house prices

We argue that banks operating in a local market possess better information about the local housing market than do nonlocal banks. Possessing this information may influence their willingness to grant loans to house buyers and the specifics of the loan terms, which in turn may affect house prices because credit facilitation makes the housing market more efficient. Using a panel data set covering a period from 1993 to 2007 and involving 274 municipalities in Sweden, we establish a positive causal influence of local bank presence on local house prices. There are significant spatial and spillover effects, that is, banks in a municipality affect the housing markets in neighbouring municipalities, although to a lesser extent than in their own municipality. Similar results are obtained through a gravity model. The results are robust over time and municipality size.     

Labor Mobility, Trade, and Social Capital

Labor market integration raises welfare in the absence of distortions. This paper examines labor and goods market integration in a general‐equilibrium model with social capital. The findings are: (i) labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare, and raises it if the goods and labor skills are sufficiently different; (ii) compared to Pareto optimum, labor mobility (social capital) is excessively large (depleted); (iii) trade is superior to labor market integration if trading costs are no higher than private migration costs, otherwise the outcome is ambiguous; and (iv) the creation of new institutions in response to labor market integration has an ambiguous impact on welfare.     

Skills,Tasks and the Scarcity of Talent in a Global Economy

The scarcity of talent is a tremendous challenge for firms in the globalized world. This paper investigates the role of labor market imperfection in open economies for the usage of talent in the production process of firms. For this purpose, I set up a heterogeneous firms model, where production consists of a continuum of tasks that differ in complexity. Firms hire low‐skilled and high‐skilled workers to perform these tasks. How firms assign workers to tasks depends on factor prices for the two skill types and the productivity advantage of high‐skilled workers in the performance of complex tasks. I study the firms’ assignment problem under two labor market regimes, which capture the polar cases of fully flexible wages and a binding minimum wage for low‐skilled workers. Since the minimum wage lowers the skill premium, it increases the range of tasks performed by high‐skilled workers, which enhances the stock of knowledge within firms to solve complex tasks and reduces the mass of active firms. In a setting with fully flexible wages trade does not affect the firm‐internal assignment of workers to tasks. On the contrary, if low‐skilled wages are fixed by a minimum wage, trade renders high‐skilled workers a scarce resource and reduces the range of tasks performed by this skill type with negative consequences for the human capital stock within firms. In this case, trade leads to higher per‐capita income for both skill types and thus to higher welfare in the open than in the closed economy, whereas – somewhat counter‐intuitive – inequality between the two skill types decreases, as more low‐skilled workers find employment in the production process.     

EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN COMMONWEALTH GRANTS TO THE STATES: A CGE ANALYSIS*

This paper describes CSF, a general equilibrium model encompassing factors of relevance to economic efficiency in Federal/State funding including: interstate differences in tax bases and unit costs of State‐provided goods; factor mobility; congestion; State‐government behaviour incorporating the possibility that governments in subsidised States embark on expenditures with low benefit/cost ratios (flypaper effects); fiscal externalities; and non‐discretionary expenditures in each State associated with special national responsibilities. The model is applied to Australia where Federal/State funding is a major political and economic issue. Welfare effects of moving from the present Australian funding system based on fiscal equalisation to a system of equal‐per‐capita grants are calculated. CSF implies that the welfare gain from this move would be small. The most important source of potential welfare gain is a reduction in flypaper effects. The recognition of congestion externalities can eliminate the small welfare gain, but only under seemingly extreme assumptions. The results are not very sensitive to variations in assumptions concerning population mobility and fiscal externalities.     

Subsidy competition and imperfect labor markets

This study presents a two‐country model of subsidy competition for manufacturing firms under labor market imperfections. Because subsidies affect the distribution of firms, subsidies influence unemployment rates and welfare in both countries. We show that when labor market frictions are high, subsidy competition is beneficial, although subsidies under subsidy competition are inefficiently high. In the coordinated equilibrium, the supranational authority provides a subsidy to firms that equal the expected total search costs, which increases the number of firms relative to laissez‐faire and improves welfare relative to laissez‐faire and subsidy competition. Finally, we find that a rise in a country's labor market frictions raises the equilibrium subsidy rate, affects unemployment rates, and lowers welfare.