浅议经理股票期权激励制度

在美国和欧洲各国企业中经理股票期权激励制度被广泛采用,我国企业也纷纷试行.但在股票期权的实践中出现了一些问题,美国财务造假丑闻使其受到许多批评.从经理股票期权激励的实践和效应分析,经理股票期权激励制度完全可以加以完善并发挥其应有的作用.     

非高管员工股权激励与公司债券信用利差——基于A股上市公司2010-2020年债券数据的经验证据

非高管员工是企业人力资本的重要组成部分,非高管员工的积极性与创造性可以影响公司的经营业绩,进而影响公司债券的信用利差。本文检验了非高管员工股权激励的实施与公司债券信用利差之间的关系,研究发现非高管员工股权激励的实施可以有效降低公司债券信用利差。在非高管员工股权激励中,限制性股票和股票期权两种股权激励形式对公司债券信用利差的影响存在一定差异性,限制性股票股权激励更能有效地降低公司债券信用利差,而股票期权股权激励对公司债券信用利差没有显著影响。同时,非高管员工股权激励对公司债券信用利差的负向作用存在一定的滞后性,并且实行多次非高管员工股权激励,更能有效地降低公司债券信用利差。进一步分析表明,较高的融资约束程度、较强的管理层权力和较高的产品市场竞争水平更有助于发挥非高管员工股权激励,尤其是限制性股票股权激励降低公司债券信用利差的作用。最后,基于上述结论,本文提出了建立并完善非高管员工股权激励及其相关配套制度的政策建议。     

股票期权激励机制分析

股票期权制产生于美国,其期权分享的思想来源于员工持股计划(Employee Stock Ownership Plan,简称ESOP),最早是1952年美国一家叫菲泽尔的公司推出的.经理股票期权(Executive Stock Option,ESO)是在20世纪中后期发展起来的.国际上通过Black-Scholes期权定价模型来测定受益人获得的收入V=(P-PO)×Q,其中,P为行权时的股票市价,PO为行权价格,Q为股票数量.如果在行权期内,股票市价超过了行权价,经理人能获得二者的差额收入.如果股票的市价低于行权价,经理人可以不行权.因此经理人有的是权力而非义务.在美国,90%以上的上市公司实行员工持股计划.Garen、M.Jensen、K.Murphy、Reily等长期跟踪研究各种激励手段对经营者的激励效果,认为股票期权的激励作用最大.     

股票期权理论及在公司激励中的应用研究

股票期权无论在投资中还是在公司激励中都有着重要的作用。本文首先从期权的内涵出发 ,对股票期权进行规范与分类 ;重点对公司激励中的股票期权进行界定与分类 ;对股票期权合约中的财务与会计问题进行研究 ;最后提出完善股票期权激励机制的政策建议。     

商业银行实施激励股票期权若干问题研究

近年来,激励股票期权在我国商业银行中逐渐被重视,并即将成为重要的激励方式.本文在阐述商业银行实施激励股票期权重要意义的基础上,指出应合理定位法律在实施激励股票期权过程中充当的角色,法律不宜过多介入商业银行激励股票期权方案的实施,但对激励股票期权实施过程是否公正、实施结果是否合理等情况则应保留相当程度的审查权与裁判权.同时,指出以股价、财务会计手段作为业绩测量标准来界定银行业绩的含义均存在一定缺陷,授予业绩或指数期权而非固定溢价期权应为更佳选择;本文还对激励股票期权的授予数量、持有时间和期权重新定价等问题进行了剖析.     

股票期权费用化与我国期权激励问题

股票期权是公司采取的长期激励手段,但是它的出现却引发了一系列的会计丑闻。于是准则制定者推出了股票期权费用化。本文通过期权计划的正面效应和负面效应来解释股票期权计划的激励功效及其不足,得出期权费用化是针对股票期权激励的约束机制,其存在具有重要的意义。我国只有股权激励的试点,但没有正式的期权制度。本文从我国股权激励以及06年颁布的新的会计准则来分析我国在期权计划执行上与外国存在的差距,以及我国会计准则与外国准则不断趋同。     

关于股票期权会计处理及相关问题的研究

薪酬性的股票期权(compensatory stock option,简称股票期权)制度,是20世纪中期兴起,80年代以后在西方国家的大公司中流行起来的一种长期激励方式.它是利用股票价格涨落对经理人绩效的度量作用来对他们进行长期激励.本文拟从股票期权与公司治理的关系即股票期权作为公司治理机制的一个激励环节这一角度就国内外学者的研究文献进行简要概述.主要介绍股票期权作为一种激励机制的会计处理及其相关的问题.     

限制性股票、激励性股票对薪酬制度选择的影响分析

限制性股票期权与激励性股票期权在授权价格和行权价格、受赠股份的数量、收益大小、风险大小、员工投资程度以及税收待遇等上存在差别。不同的企业在薪酬制度中都会选择适合本企业的股票期权。选择适合企业目标的薪酬制度不仅有利于激励员工,更能帮助企业留住人才。因此,选择适合的股权激励方案就成为企业薪酬制定的重中之重。但是不同层次的员工,需求也不相同。这就要求企业应该对不同层次的员工,提出不同的股权激励方案。     

税收对经理人股票期权激励效应的影响

股票期权的实施某种程度上是追求税收利益最大化的结果.税收因素因为决定实施股票期权的企业和经理人的现金收入,而影响企业授予经理人股票期权的行为,以及经理人持有行权所得股票的时间、股利政策和盈余管理等.税收的行为调节既可能促进股票期权的激励效应,也可能抵消其激励作用.因此,如何协调宏观层面的税收政策制定与微观层面委托代理问题的缓解是未来应该关注的问题.     

股票期权激励计划介绍及对公司业绩影响

近年来,大多数的上市的企业都进行了股权分置改革,上市的企业实行股票期权激励计划的数量上升.因为实施股票期权激励计划可以解决经营权和代理权利益不完全一致的问题,笔者先假设实施此激励计划可以对公司业绩产生正面的影响,进而用实证分析法来验证股票期权激励计划对公司业绩的影响.本文以高层管理层的持股比例为解释变量,公司业绩为被解释变量,采用Eviews软件的回归分析对2012年的40家样本公司的数据进行处理和运算,验证股票期权激励计划对公司业绩的正面影响.     

Pension Portfolio Choice and Peer Envy

I examine the effect of envy on the portfolio allocation of workers in a defined contribution (DC) pension plan. If a worker’s DC plan performs better than his co‐worker’s, he may gloat; on the other hand, if his DC plan performs worse, he may feel envy. I model anticipated envy when workers make portfolio allocations, and find that in equilibrium, workers will mimic their co‐worker’s allocation to eliminate the disutility from envy. This portfolio allocation is riskier than that of a worker who does not exhibit envy.     

On the supply of landlord labor in small real estate rental firms

Small real estate rental firms in the United States tend to be employee-owner firms in which the landlord does maintenance and repairs as a part-time job rather than principal-agent firms in which the landlord hires part-time workers. Applying work incentives theory to explain this observation, we find that the difference in incentive compatibility conditions for the two forms of organization provides a bias toward the employee-owner form of organization for sufficiently small-scale operations. By supplying labor to the firm, the landlord avoids transferring economic rents to contract labor, rents that function as incentives for assuring profit-maximizing maintenance effort even when worker productivity is at its lowest.     

Dynamic credit relationships in general equilibrium

We construct a general equilibrium model with private information in which borrowers and lenders enter into long-term dynamic credit relationships. Each new generation of ex ante identical individuals is divided in equilibrium into workers and entrepreneurs. Workers save through financial intermediaries in the form of interest-bearing deposits and supply labor to entrepreneurs in a competitive labor market. Entrepreneurs borrow from financial intermediaries to finance projects which produce privately observed sequences of random returns. Each financial intermediary holds deposits from a large number of workers and operates a portfolio of dynamic contracts with different credit positions. We calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and find that dynamic contracting is very effective at mitigating the effects of private information. Moreover, restricting borrowers and lenders to use static (one-period) contracts with a costly monitoring technology has adverse effects both on the level of aggregate economic activity and on individual welfare unless monitoring costs are very small. Finally, the optimal provision of intertemporal incentives leads to increasing consumption inequality over time within generational cohorts as in U.S. data.     

Technology and Firm Size-Wage Differentials in Colombia, Mexico, and Taiwan (China)

In many economies, studies have found large wage differentialsnot accounted for by work force characteristics, collectivebargaining, or market power. Researchers attribute these differentialsto either unobserved worker quality or pay incentives designedto elicit worker effort. This article finds empirical supportfor an alternative explanation: These wage differentials resultfrom firms' technology-generating activities. Using firm-leveldata from Colombia, Mexico, and Taiwan (China), the articlecompares the effects of research and development, worker training,and exports by employers on the wages of skilled and unskilledworkers. The results suggest that technology investments leadto large wage premiums for skilled workers but not for unskilledworkers. These wage premiums are primarily the result of investmentsin research and development and in training, while exportingis relatively less important except in Colombia.     

Competition,cooperation, and corporate culture

Cooperation between workers can be of substantial value to a firm, yet its level often varies substantially between firms. We show that these differences can unfold in a competitive labor market if workers have heterogeneous social preferences and preferences are private information. In our model, workers differ in their willingness to cooperate voluntarily. We show that there always exists a separating equilibrium in which workers self‐select into firms that differ in their monetary incentives as well as their level of worker cooperation. Our model highlights the role of sorting and worker heterogeneity in the emergence of heterogeneous corporate cultures. It also provides a new explanation for the coexistence of nonprofit and for‐profit firms.

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Portfolio size and information disclosure: An analysis of startup accelerators

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Taking the Long Way Home: U.S. Tax Evasion and Offshore Investments in U.S. Equity and Debt Markets

We empirically investigate one form of illegal investor‐level tax evasion and its effect on foreign portfolio investment. In particular, we examine a form of round‐tripping tax evasion in which U.S. individuals hide funds in entities located in offshore tax havens and then invest those funds in U.S. securities markets. Employing Becker's ( 1968 ) economic theory of crime, we identify the tax evasion component by examining how foreign portfolio investment varies with changes in the incentives to evade and the risks of detection. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence of investor‐level tax evasion affecting cross‐border equity and debt investment.     

Offsetting the implicit incentives: Benefits of benchmarking in money management

Money managers are rewarded for increasing the value of assets under management. This gives a manager an implicit incentive to exploit the well-documented positive fund-flows to relative-performance relationship by manipulating her risk exposure. The misaligned incentives create potentially significant deviations of the manager’s policy from that desired by fund investors. In the context of a familiar continuous-time portfolio choice model, we demonstrate how a simple risk management practice that accounts for benchmarking can ameliorate the adverse effects of managerial incentives. Our results contrast with the conventional view that benchmarking a fund manager is not in the best interest of investors.     

Internal promotion competitions in firms

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