Public goods, merit goods, and the relation between private and government consumption

In this paper, we investigate the relation between public and private consumption, by constructing a general government spending data set, by function, for 12 European countries. In particular, we split government consumption into two categories. The first category—“public goods”—includes defence, public order, and justice. The second category—“merit goods”—includes health, education, and other services that could have been provided privately. Equations from a relatively general permanent income model are estimated by GMM. The estimates are fairly robust in showing that public goods substitute while merit goods complement private consumption. However, the relation between merit goods and private goods turns out to be stronger than that between public goods and private goods. Thus, in the aggregate government and private consumption are complements.     

Public goods,voting, and growth

We study a parametric politico‐economic model of economic growth with productive public goods and public consumption goods. The provision of public goods is funded by a proportional tax. Agents are heterogeneous in their initial capital endowments, discount factors, and the relative weights of public consumption in overall private utility. They vote on the shares of public goods in gross domestic products (GDP). We propose a definition of voting equilibrium, prove the existence and provide a characterization of voting equilibria, and obtain a closed‐form solution for the voting outcomes. Also we introduce a “fictitious” representative agent and interpret the outcome of voting as a choice made by a central planner for his benefit. Finally, we undertake comparative static analysis of the shares of public goods in GDP and of the rate of balanced growth with respect to the discount factors and the preferences for public consumption. The results of this analysis suggest that the representative‐agent version of our model is capable of capturing the interaction between many voting heterogeneous agents only if the heterogeneity is one‐dimensional.     

Dynamic effects of externalities,optimal saving and economic growth

Conclusion Recognizing the fact that provision of mixed public goods can result in both consumption externalities of the Samuelsonian variety as well as production externalities we set out to extend the earlier results of Rao and Kalpagam (1977) on the effect of public goods on economic growth. In so doing, we considered three standard specifications of production externalities and enlarged the concept of consumption displacement. Our basic conclusion is that the results of our earlier paper remain valid under the more general conditions set out in this paper.     

Keynesian Multipliers, Direct Crowding Out, and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

This paper studies Keynesian multipliers in a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition. We allow public and private consumption goods to be perfect substitutes in private utility. This enables us to study the effect of direct crowding out on the size of national income, profit and employment multipliers for a given rise in real public spending. A positive real national income multiplier is obtained if consumers value public consumption less than private consumption. In addition, we determine the effective marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods, both in the short run and in the long run.     

The provision and pricing of excludable public goods: Ramsey–Boiteux pricing versus bundling

This paper studies the relation between Bayesian mechanism design and the Ramsey–Boiteux approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. For a large economy with private information about individual preferences, the two approaches are shown to be equivalent if and only if, in addition to incentive compatibility and participation constraints, the final allocation of private-good consumption and admission tickets to public goods satisfies a condition of renegotiation proofness. Without this condition, a mechanism involving mixed bundling, i.e. combination tickets at a discount, is superior.     

PRIVATE GOOD,EXTERNALITY, PUBLIC GOOD*

In two recent investigations into the economic problems of externality the authors have noted in passing that the welfare or optimality conditions in the case of a consumption externality seemed identical with the welfare conditions in the case of public goods as originally stated by Samuelson.¹ The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the welfare conditions for a public good are a special case of the welfare conditions for a consumption externality where a public good is defined as a good ‘which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good’ (Samuelson [4]). Since the welfare conditions for a private good are also a special case of the welfare conditions for a consumption externality, it follows that we have a range of externality with the pure private good and the pure public good as polar cases.     

Does Government Expenditure Crowd Out Private Consumption in Italy? Evidence from a Microeconomic Model

An abnormal expansion of the public sector may create serious problems to the market economy, as the literature suggests. This issue is quite important in countries such as Italy where the size of the public sector and of its debt are quite relevant. In this paper a model, in the microeconomic tradition, is developed and applied to the italian economy using a quite general utility function to represent consumer's behaviour. The aim of the article is to set up a methological framework in which to test for the hypothesis that the provision of public and impure public goods crowds out private consumption. The main result of the analysis is that, in Italy, traditional public goods play a neutral role in expenditure decisions while impure public goods crowd out private consumption. This crowding out is created by over-production of these services; merit goods are direct complements to a wide range of private goods, but this beneficial effect is more than offset by the negative income effect related to their financing.     

Welfare Effects of Different Public Expenditures and Taxes in the Netherlands

This paper explores the welfare effects of public consumption, income transfers and public investment financed through different types of taxes. One surprising result is that, contrary to public consumption goods, public capital goods do not necessarily become less attractive if distortionary taxes, rather than lump-sum taxes, are necessary to finance them. The numerical simulations reveal that the net welfare effects of public investments in the Netherlands are typically positive if financed through lump-sum taxes or distortionary taxes on labor. However, if a source-based capital tax is adopted to finance public investments, the overall welfare effect may be negative.     

Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

Consumption and fiscal policy

This paper uses the life-cycle approach to derive an equilibrium intratemporal efficiency condition which relates the marginal utility of consumption of nondurable goods and services to the marginal utility of consumption of services from durable goods. Given this condition and the assumption that marginal utilities are affected by the level of public spending, a long-run relationship between components of private consumption and public expenditure is then postulated. The application of cointegration analysis to UK data supports the existence and uniqueness of such a long-run relationship, and estimates based on the error correction approach produce results which suggest that (i) a change in public spending has different effects on components of private consumption in the short-run, and (ii) the entire burden of long-run substitution falls on nondurable consumption.     

Relative price shifts,economies of scale and poverty during economic transition1

Economic transition is associated with significant shifts in relative prices between private and public goods. If, as a result, public goods claim a larger share of total expenditures, economies of scale in consumption increase. We show how relative price changes might alter the welfare of different‐sized households in the short run and over time. We illustrate, for a selection of transition economies, that conventional poverty profiles are quite sensitive to assumptions made about economies of scale in consumption. In particular, the common view that large households with many children are poor relative to small households (such as those comprising the elderly) is shown to be highly non‐robust.     

Technology and public goods

This paper presents a theory of public goods based on production theory where public goods are viewed as inputs to the production process. We examine the pure case of public inputs (no private inputs) as well as the mixed case (private and public inputs). We show how the case of public inputs is related to certain forms of nonjoint production, and we characterize it in terms of variable profit and joint cost functions. Comparative statics results are derived graphically in the two-by-two case.     

Variety of products,public capital,and endogenous growth

This paper develops an extension of the endogenous growth model with variety expansion presented in Romer [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technical change, Journal of Political Economy 98, part 2, S71–S102] by considering public capital accumulation. Characterizing the transitional dynamics, the growth rate of consumption traces (and available number of intermediate goods also might trace) an S-shaped converging path to the equilibrium growth rate, similar to a logistic growth curve, if the intensity of public capital is sufficiently high. We also show that public investment enhances economic growth because it stimulates demand for intermediate goods and raises the market interest rate.     

A generalized impure public good and linear characteristics model of green consumption

This paper provides a general framework for understanding consumer behavior related to goods and services that may be considered environmentally friendly, ethically produced, fairly traded, or some combination thereof. We generalize the impure public good model and derive its comparative static properties. The model accounts for any number of impure public (green) goods and joint production of any number of both private and public characteristics. The generalization provides a bridge between the impure public good model and the well-known linear characteristics model, both of which are special cases of the model developed here. The results show how demand for green goods and characteristics such as environmental quality depends on wealth, exogenously given levels of public goods, and the technologies of joint production. The effects of changes in technology depend critically on whether jointly produced characteristics are complements or substitutes in consumption. Several of the results are rather counterintuitive and differ in meaningful ways from existing models of impure public goods and linear characteristics. The results also illuminate several reasons for greater caution about whether it is reasonable to assume that green goods and services are necessarily beneficial for the provision of public goods.     

所得、快乐与赋税:基于黄有光快乐经济学的审视

根据黄有光的快乐经济学,人们追求的最终目的是提高福利,因而经济学探讨的中心问题是福利或快乐.由于快乐是一种主观感受,因而GDP并不是衡量福利的一个有效指标.在现代社会中,生活品质不仅与私人品的消费有关,更与公共品的质量和数量有关.因此,在未来社会中,公共开支确实会且应该不断增长.为了应对不断增加的公共支出,政府就需要提高累进税,尤其是提高钻石商品的税收.     

交通基础设施的公共产品属性探析

交通基础设施是为满足全社会经济生活中人与物的位移需求而生产出的产品,该产品具有显著的公共需求性与公益性。以公共产品理论为基础,从非排他性和非竞争性的角度可以判定交通基础设施具有公共产品属性,通过分析交通基础设施的消费机理深入探讨交通基础设施使用过程中产生拥挤现象的原因,可以否定交通基础设施为拥挤性公共产品的观点。此外,投资主体的变化不会变更交通基础设施的公共产品性质。     

EVALUATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE*

This article evaluates the distribution of public expenditure on subsidized goods and services over income categories. It is argued that undifferentiated application of usual measures of dispersion must be rejected when judging the distribution of these expenditures, because there are hardly any subsidized goods and services for which the government aims at equal consumption. Such an application requires a normative distribution of expenditure. The normative distribution of expenditure is derived from a normative distribution of consumption and the distribution of normative charges. Central elements are needs of consumers and their financial capacity. The normative distribution of consumption is based on government intentions with respect to the goods and services under consideration.     

Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the “mixed” region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods. As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.     

Public capital, endogenous growth, and endogenous fluctuations

Cazzavillan [Cazzavillan, G., 1996. Public spending, endogenous growth, and endogenous fluctuations. Journal of Economic Theory 71, 394–415] studies a discrete-time, one-sector endogenous growth model with a flow of publicly enjoyable goods and productive services financed through income taxation. He demonstrates how equilibrium paths are indeterminate, for a large range of the consumption externality of public spending. This study extends [Cazzavillan, 1996] by considering an otherwise identical production function, except with public capital stock as an input. The results support the robustness of multiple growth paths even in a one-sector growth model with public capital stock, and modify the set of the consumption externality of public spending, in determining growth dynamics in a similar model with non-accumulated public spending.