Federalism,distributive politics and representative democracy

We analyze federal systems of government in which local public policies are financed by general taxation. In a decentralized political system there is, in each region, a vote to elect a local representative while in a centralized political system a single representative is elected by a federal vote. It is shown that under decentralization, voters strategically elect liberal representatives so as to nullify any element of cooperation between representatives in the decision-making stage. Thus, there is a trade-off between the budgetary externality and a "policy closer to the people", but the democratic choice is biased towards decentralization.     

Pareto improving interventions in a general equilibrium model with private provision of public goods

Most of the literature on government intervention in models of voluntary public goods supply focuses on interventions that increase the total level of a public good, which is considered to be typically underprovided. However, an intervention that is successful in increasing the public good level need not benefit everyone. In this paper we take a direct approach to welfare properties of voluntary provision equilibria in a full blown general equilibrium model with public goods and study interventions that have the goal of Pareto improving on the voluntary provision outcome. Towards this end, we study a model with many private goods and non-linear production technology for the public good, and hence allow for relative price effects to serve as a powerful channel of intervention. In this setup we show that Pareto improving interventions generally do exist. In particular, direct government provision financed by “small” , or “local” , lump-sum taxes can be used generically to Pareto improve upon the voluntary provision outcome.     

The Role of Symmetry between the Revenue and the Expenditure Side of the Government Budget in the Debate about the Potential Negative Effects of Tax Competition

The effects of capital tax competition are reconsidered in this paper incorporating the argument that the expenditure structure of public budget should reflect its revenue structure. The paper offers a small open economy model where capital and labour tax revenues are used exclusively on the provision of public inputs. It is shown that if the revenue side of the government budget exactly matches the expenditure side that is if industrial public goods are financed by both private production factors with the weights reflecting the contributions of public inputs to the private factor productivity then public inputs are provided optimally even in the presence of tax competition.     

How economic integration affects the vertical structure of the public sector

This paper investigates the impact of economic integration on the vertical structure of the public sector within a country. To tackle this issue we set up a model of fiscal federalism, where economic integration is assumed to affect central government tax revenues. The main findings are that when an increase of the impact of economic integration brings about a reduction in central government tax revenues, under certain conditions: (a) it reduces central government expenditure; (b) it reduces general government expenditure; (c) it increases local taxation; (d) it increases the degree of public sector decentralization. Quite interestingly, these results are consistent with different patterns of local public spending and grants to local government.     

Capital structure,investment unanimity,and public goods: the case for social responsibility

This paper examines the concepts of optimal capital structure and investment in an economy where government’s role is the provision of a public good. That public good is financed through current tax revenues and the sale of government securities. Absent such complications, traditional finance theory has established the equivalence among (competitive) value maximization, unanimity, and Pareto optimality. In the setting of this paper, however, the market value of government securities is not determined by the value of public good production, and the correspondence between value maximization, Parto optimality, and unanimity will not generally hold without significant restrictions on the tax structure. Otherwise, value maximization is neither an optimal nor unanimously supported objective for the firm.     

Exploring tax evasion in the context of political uncertainty

We present a model of agents facing the uncertainty of two future forms of government who are able to insure against this uncertainty by hiding funds from taxation. In order to choose whether or not to hide funds from taxation, agents need to know policy choices that each government would make should it come to power. But each government, before it could make its decision, would need to know the choices of the agents who would, for example, produce tax revenues. This informational tension is resolved endogenously. We derive the resulting level of tax evasion in society and the optimal choices made by the potential governments. We examine how changes in governmental structure would affect the level of tax evasion, and how that, in turn, would affect a particular form of capital flight.     

Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US

Concurrent taxation is a feature of many federal systems. As a result, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. A way to check the empirical relevance of this hypothesis is to test for the existence of interdependencies in the tax setting behaviour of various layers of government. Following this approach, this paper estimates the reaction of US state personal income and general sales taxes to federal tax rates, taking into account the special features of the US tax system. We find that when the federal government increases taxes, there is a significant positive response of state taxes.     

Vertical externalities in cigarette taxation: Do tax revenues go up in smoke?

In federal systems, where tax bases are joint property, the tax policy of one level of government affects the tax base of the other. This paper examines the interdependence of US federal and state cigarette tax rates. Our results suggest that states may reduce their cigarette tax rate by as much as 48 cents per dollar increase in the federal tax rate. Thus, a federal tax hike may reduce the amount of generated state tax revenues both directly (the overall tax rate rises and the state tax base declines), and indirectly (the state tax rate declines).     

Federal grants and the flight to the suburbs

Migration to the suburbs is a long-standing problem for cities in the United States. A central question in the literature is whether the improvement in public goods and services in the central cities will stop the flight to the suburbs. We would expect that if cities offer better services, it would persuade affluent residents to stay in the city. We find, paradoxically, that even if these reforms are exclusively financed by the federal or state government, and even if the grant money indeed goes towards improving the quality of public goods and not towards redistribution, the city may end up with more flight to the suburbs.     

Cohesion Policy Funds and local government autonomy: Evidence from Italian municipalities

In this article we investigate the effect of the European Union (EU) Cohesion Policy funds dedicated to administrative capacity building on the local government autonomy for the Italian case focusing on municipalities taking part to the programming cycle 2007–13. From an empirical perspective, the causal impact is estimated using a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) design with continuous treatment combined with a Propensity Score Matching approach. We exploit a unique database developed by the open government initiative on cohesion policies in Italy (OpenCoesione), which collects detailed information at municipality level on financed EU projects. Our results show that the specific Cohesion Policy funds have a positive and significant effect on the local government autonomy measured in terms of taxation autonomy.     

Mineral Taxation, Mineral Revenues and Mine Investment in Zambia, 1964–83

A bstract . The relationship between mineral taxation, mineral revenues , and investment in existing and new mine capacity in Zambia during 1964–83 is examined. By the mid-1970s the Zambian copper industry was incapable of producing investible surpluses which could be appropriated by government partly because of unfavorable movements in real market prices for mining inputs and mineral output, partly because the mineral taxation systems applied since 1964 had deterred mine investment. This situation can only be remedied by changing the cost structure of Zambia's copper production, requiring major investments in modernization of existing, and development of new, mines. A tax system is suggested which offers a workable compromise between the need to obtain revenues for development and to ensure continued investment in mining.     

Reprint to: Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.     

VOLUNTARY ROADS AND STREETS

This article examines the question of whether roads and streets could be financed by voluntary charges rather than by compulsory taxation as they are now. The question of private arrangements for long-distance roads is examined first, then local streets. Both questions are complicated, but there is more evidence available to look at the first question than the second. It is concluded that a move to greater use of private mechanisms for providing roads and streets would have considerable advantages and expansion of this mode of provision should be encouraged.     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Managing the Public Debt: The Optimal Taxation Approach

This paper examines research on public debt management, focusing on debt structure by denomination, indexation features, and maturity. The optimal taxation approach is reviewed and its policy implications are related to the trade-off between minimization of the expected cost of debt servicing and minimization of budgetary risk. Strong arguments are provided for debt instruments which yield low returns when output and hence revenues are lower and public spending higher than expected. This debt design minimizes tax distortions and provides flexibility in conducting fiscal policy. The exact characterization of the debt composition which supports efficient taxation depends on the stochastic structure of the economy. Long-term nominal debt is a hedge against supply shocks affecting revenues and inflation and makes the government budget insensitive to interest-rate risk. However, at high levels of debt, the extent of insurance or flexibility that governments can obtain by issuing long-term nominal debt is limited by the need to maintain the credibility of the anti-inflation stance.     

Looking across borders: A test of spatial policy interdependence using local government efficiency ratings

Spatial patterns in (local) government taxation and spending decisions have received a lot of attention. Still, the focus on taxation or expenditure levels in previous studies may be incomplete. Indeed, (rational) individuals are likely to consider the level of spending on (or taxation for) public goods provision simultaneously with how much public goods they actually receive—thus assessing the ‘price/quantity’ of government policies. Therefore, the present paper argues that incumbents may want their ‘price/quantity’ ratio to be close to that in neighbouring regions. Analysing Flemish local governments' efficiency ratings for the year 2000 (which relate total spending to the quantity of locally provided public goods), we confirm the existence of neighbourhood effects in local government policies.     

'Public Goods' from the Market

In the mounting criticism of 'government failure', a role for government is stubbornly argued by statist-minded economists on the ground that only government can supply public goods - from defence to (some) research (p. 34). Frank van Dun of the University of Ghent argues that public goods have the same disadvantages of monopoly, restriction of choice, confiscation by taxation, pressure group distortion, as non-public goods unnecessarily supplied by government. Moreover, technical progress will make it possible to supply more public goods in the market by creating separable benefits that can be financed by pricing.     

Federal deductibility and local property tax rates

Recent econometric work has suggested that federal deductibility of state and local taxes has raised the proportion of these taxes—especially property taxes—in local budgets. This paper lends additional support to these earlier findings by showing that one channel through which deductibility leads to higher local property tax revenues is by increasing the rate of local property taxation. Specifically, we find that if deductibility were eliminated, the mean property tax rate in our sample would fall by 0.00715 ($7.15 per $1000 of assessed property), or 21.1% of the mean tax rate.     

Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.