构建中小法人金融机构宏观审慎监管定量指标体系——基于区域性金融风险的监管视角

本文从区域金融风险监管的视角,选择对区域金融风险有极其重要影响的中小法人金融机构作为宏观审慎监管对象,构建宏观审慎监管定量指标体系.在指标体系设计过程中,本文以宏观审慎监管的理论和实践共识为基础,从金融机构脆弱性假设切入,选择七大模块,重点突出,针对特定部门和跨部门的宏观审慎监管设计指标.考虑到指标体系的操作性、易得性和科学性等因素,所有指标均为定量指标.当然,宏观审慎监管指标体系的构建仅仅是宏观审慎监管的开始,本文实际价值还体现在以此为蓝本,开发和设计宏观审慎监管应用系统,实现对辖区金融风险快速、便捷反应.     

基于主成分分析的我国宏观审慎监管指标体系构建

构建适宜的宏观审慎指标体系,是有效实施宏观审慎监管的关键。本文选取宏观经济指标和微观审慎指标共18个,运用主成分分析法进行分析计算,论证评估构建我国宏观审慎监管指标体系的可行性,揭示指标体系的缺陷,并指出提高我国宏观审慎监管效率的改进方向。     

宏观审慎监管:定义、工具与实践

2008年的全球会融危机引发了人们对金融监管的反思,宏观审慎监管已成为当前金融研究的热点.本文在总结理论与实践两方面研究成果的基础上,阐述了宏观审慎监管的定义、特点和原则,并从资本、风险、杠杆和机制四个方丽总结了宏观审慎监管的主要工具,指出中国构建宏观审慎监管体系的原则,并提出了中国下一步应采取的宏观审慎监管措施.     

宏观审慎监管框架下有关金融会计问题研究

本文从以下几个方面探讨宏观审慎监管框架下有关金融会计问题:一是宏观审慎监管概述,阐述了宏观审慎监管的起源、内涵与特点;二是宏观审慎监管框架下存在的金融会计问题,包括会计确认基础与动态储备制度存在冲突、资本结构失衡现象严重等问题;三是宏观审慎监管框架下金融会计问题的解决对策,根据现阶段宏观审慎监管框架下存在的金融会计问题,采取积极有效的应对策略,对金融市场实施更为有效的监管。     

加强中央银行宏观审慎管理职能的思考

全球金融危机后,欧美英等国家和地区在金融监管改革中均赋予了中央银行宏观审慎监管职能。从理论上分析,加强中央银行宏观审慎监管职能是防范系统性金融风险、维护金融稳定和有效实施货币政策的需要。构建我国逆周期的金融宏观审慎管理框架,应明确中央银行履行宏观审慎管理职能的法律地位,赋予其开发宏观审慎政策工具和监管系统重要性金融机构的权力,并建立宏观审慎与微观审慎的协调机制。     

逆周期宏观审慎监管的理论、框架及其局限性研究

最近一次金融危机暴露出微观审慎监管存在顺周期性,在一定程度上加剧了经济周期性波动。通过深刻反思金融危机的教训,宏观审慎监管无论是在理论方面还是在政策框架方面,都着眼于通过逆周期监管校正微观审慎监管的顺周期性,从而提高整个金融系统的韧性。当前理论和实证分析也证明了宏观审慎监管的价值,但也存在诸多局限性。只有宏观审慎监管与货币政策等协调配合,才能更好地发挥稳定金融的作用。     

宏观审慎监管政策工具研究——基于贷款成数的分析

本文以韩国、中国香港和中国大陆为代表,梳理了新兴市场国家和地区运用贷款成数实施宏观审慎监管的实践,并从理论层面探讨了贷款成数作为逆周期维度宏观审慎监管政策工具的可行性与优缺点。本文认为,贷款成数一是可以降低居民不审慎借贷的风险;二是可以抑制银行不审慎放贷的动机;三是可以衡量金融系统性风险;四是可以抑制金融体系信贷过度扩张。但简单静态使用该指标也有一系列不足,因此必须设计反映跨产品多维度变动标准的监管指标体系,并将贷款成数与其他措施一并使用以提高宏观审慎监管有效性。     

宏观审慎监管与金融稳定北大核心CSSCISSCI

本次危机之后,政策制定者和学术界最早达成的一个共识就是:必须加强宏观审慎监管,以防范系统性金融风险,维护金融稳定。本文主要探讨宏观审慎监管与金融稳定相关问题:近年来系统性风险的新特征进一步凸显了加强宏观审慎监管的必要性;建立有效的宏观审慎监管框架中,中央银行的地位以及中央银行与其他相关部门的关系;我国应如何建立宏观审慎监管框架。     

关于构建宏观审慎监管体系的探讨

全球金融危机后,在强化微观审慎监管的同时,全面加强宏观审慎监管已成为国际共识。宏观审慎监管将整个金融体系看作一个完整的系统,重点关注那些对金融稳定具有系统重要性影响的金融机构和金融市场,采取针对性的逆周期监管措施进行调节,维护金融体系的健康运行。宏观审慎监管体系包括宏观审慎监测分析、宏观审慎政策工具和宏观审慎政策安排三大要素。美英等国为了加强宏观审慎监管,成立了相应的宏观审慎监管机构,其经验值得借鉴。我国应构建宏观审慎监管实体,启动宏观审慎监测分析系统,并注重研究开发宏观审慎监管政策工具。     

银行业宏观审慎监管研究的新思路

本文根据从下向上的方法以及金融外部性的分析框架,提出了一个银行业宏观审慎监管研究的新理论思路。该思路说明,宏观审慎监管和微观审慎监管的区别不在于监管工具,而在于对监管标准的把握。该思路不仅有助于解释目前已推出的主要的银行宏观审慎监管措施,而且也能用来开发新的宏观审慎监管工具。     

Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies in Developing Asia: An Empirical Analysis

Before the 2008 global financial crisis, bank monitoring focused primarily on risks to individual institutions, or what are generally referred to as prudential risks. Regulators thus failed to consider that a buildup of macroeconomic risks and vulnerabilities could pose systemic risk to the financial sector. The global credit crisis showed the inadequacy of purely prudential surveillance systems and the need for bank supervisors to better detect the buildup of macroeconomic risks before they can threaten the financial system. This article presents an empirical framework for analyzing how effectively macroprudential policies control credit growth, leverage growth, and housing price appreciation. Two significant findings emerge. Broadly, macroprudential policies can indeed promote financial stability in Asia. More specifically, different types of macroprudential policies are proved effective for different types of macroeconomic risks.     

宏观审慎政策的国际协调问题研究--基于我国的DSGE模拟分析

本文在两国模型的DSGE框架下引入宏观审慎政策监管机制,把金融摩擦、国际资本流动和宏观审慎政策纳入同一个一般均衡分析框架。通过国际贸易和国际资本流动机制,考察宏观审慎政策的国际影响机制。基于我国的模拟分析结果表明,第一,对于我国来说,宏观审慎政策的国际合作不仅能够有效地应对国内经济冲击,也有助于抵御外部经济冲击。第二,我国推动构建国际宏观审慎政策长效合作机制,有助于积极应对国际资本流动,促进我国资本市场进一步开放。第三,我国宏观审慎政策存在国际溢出效应,但是对其他国家的影响并不明显。     

Mapping heat in the U.S. financial system

We provide a framework for assessing the build-up of vulnerabilities to the U.S. financial system. We collect forty-six indicators of financial and balance-sheet conditions, cutting across measures of valuation pressures, nonfinancial borrowing, and financial-sector health. We place the data in economic categories, track their evolution, and develop an algorithmic approach to monitoring vulnerabilities that can complement the more judgmental approach of most official-sector organizations. Our approach picks up rising imbalances in the U.S. financial system through the mid-2000s, presaging the financial crisis. We also highlight several statistical properties of our approach: most importantly, our summary measures of system-wide vulnerabilities lead the credit-to-GDP gap (a key gauge in Basel III and related research) by a year or more. Thus, our framework may provide useful information for setting macroprudential policy tools such as the countercyclical capital buffer.     

Predicting macro-financial instability – How relevant is sentiment? Evidence from long short-term memory networks

This paper examines the relevance of sentiment in predicting overall financial system instability using long-run short-term memory networks. Weekly data on the US financial system, consumer sentiment, producer sentiment, and investor sentiment is collected from 21 January 1994 to 27 December 2019, and different models are developed to predict the one-week-ahead levels of financial stress in the US financial system. We find that models using sentiment indices outperform those relying solely on historical financial stress and risk data. This result is robust to comparisons with an alternative deep learning method and out-of-sample predictions. It constitutes an argument in favor of behavioral finance and Minsky’s (Knell, 2015) financial instability hypothesis against the Efficient Market Hypothesis. As it concretely identifies the main indicators for predicting US financial stress one week in advance, the study provides relevant recommendations for policymakers and investors in terms of macroprudential policies and portfolio management.     

中国金融周期与横向关联:时空双维度相结合视角

宏观审慎政策关注各金融子市场在时间维度上的金融周期和空间维度上的横向关联。本文结合时间维度与空间维度视角,使用股票市场、货币市场、房地产市场以及信贷市场的数据,测算2001—2019年中国金融周期和横向关联的波动特征、作用关系与频域叠加机理。研究结果表明:时间维度金融周期与空间维度横向关联的波动趋势具有一致性。我国金融周期长度约为10.33年,横向关联波动周期的长度约为10.58年。从作用关系上看,首先,我国房地产周期达到波峰后,会对股票市场和信贷市场产生较强的溢出效应。随后,股市周期达到波峰后,会向房地产市场和信贷市场产生较强的溢出效应。最后,我国信贷市场接受股票市场和房地产市场溢出后,信贷周期会逐渐达到波峰。从频域叠加机理的角度看,我国金融子市场间横向关联的波动主要由中低频波段驱动,中低频波段横向关联的持续期在2个月以上。     

Heterogeneous effects of macroprudential policies on firm leverage and value

We empirically investigate the effect of financial institution-targeted macroprudential policies on firms using a comprehensive macroprudential policy dataset and corporate panel data across 35 countries. We find that tightening of macroprudential measures persistently curbs the leverage of firms, while loosening is related to the increase in leverage. We also find that this effect on leverage is heterogeneous across firms, as net macroprudential policy actions reduce the procyclicality of leverage more significantly for small firms and firms with high leverage. Also, we estimate the effect of macroprudential policies on firm value to evaluate potential policy trade-offs as the policies restrict the firms' access to credit during economic booms while protecting them from future financial crises. The effect of macroprudential policies on firm value is generally positive despite the policies' restrictive nature. Further, the effect on firm value is heterogeneous depending on firm characteristics: the positive effect becomes stronger as firms are less leveraged, but this positive effect is weaker for firms that grow faster, suggesting potential costs of macroprudential policies for these firms.     

Macroprudential policy in the EU: A political economy perspective

In response to the lessons of the global financial crisis, macroprudential policy is now firmly established as a financial policy area to prevent excessive risk taking in the financial sector and mitigate its effects on the real economy. However, macroprudential policy is facing several challenges relating to its political sensitivity and institutional context. These include political and interest group resistance, weaknesses in the governance framework, and limited institutional memory among policy makers. This article seeks to contribute to the contextual understanding of macroprudential policy by exploring how factors relating to these challenges influence policy in the EU. More specifically, it develops and empirically tests a number of hypotheses on how wider institutional and structural factors influence the actual use of macroprudential measures across Europe. The findings yield considerable support for theoretical predictions that institutions and contexts matter - Political pressure and interest group resistance tend to influence the intensity of macroprudential policy stances. Weaker policy stances characterise countries where banking systems depend on domestic banks, whereas the opposite holds for financial systems with significant market shares of other financial intermediaries. Results on institutional arrangements show that governance arrangements on relating to transparency influence policy stances. The results also indicate that policy makers' inertia is best counteracted by appointing a single macroprudential authority. The results differ somewhat depending on whether countries are based in the Euro zone or not. This suggests that policy frameworks that are multi-layered and complex pose tricky conundrums on how to ensure sufficient institutional autonomy, policy capacity and discretion among macroprudential authorities. This also has implications on other policy areas macroprudential policy, such as microprudential policy, crisis management and fiscal policy.     

对货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架内在逻辑的思考

本轮国际金融危机以来,金融稳定在中央银行政策目标中的重要性再次得到强化。随着具有顺周期波动特征的金融市场和金融资产规模显著增大,金融管理政策需要更加关注金融稳定和系统性风险问题,货币稳定和金融稳定“双目标”的重要性凸显出来。政策目标的变化相应要求优化和完善政策工具箱,需要健全宏观审慎政策框架作为应对系统性风险的工具,并与货币政策相互配合,形成由货币政策和宏观审慎政策“双支柱”支撑起“双目标”的基本框架,共同维护好货币稳定和金融稳定。在此框架中,货币政策和宏观审慎政策都不可或缺,须相互补充,形成合力,产生“一加一大于二”的政策效应增进效果。健全货币政策和宏观审慎政策双支柱调控框架,有利于把经济周期和金融周期更好地结合起来,把维护经济稳定与促进金融稳定更好地结合起来。下一阶段应进一步健全宏观审慎政策框架,并完善货币政策和宏观审慎政策协调配合的体制机制。     

宏观审慎政策的角色

本文基于宏观审慎目标、理论动因和风险传播渠道,探讨了是否应该追加全局性资本金以平抑经济周期。全局性资本金追加要求可以一刀切或者区别对待,区别对待的方法有利于更好地掌控风险,但必须慎重考量区别对待的适度水平,可通过一系列定量和定性指标来调校全局性资本金追加标准;宏观审慎决策需要一定的相机抉择,但必须对其施加相应的约束以保障政策的透明度、责任性和前瞻性,建议制定完备的责任约束机制,从而形成"有约束的相机抉择"的宏观审慎机制;一国宏观审慎制度需要得到国际合作与配合才能充分地发挥效力。     

Managing price and financial stability objectives in inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific

Many central banks have adopted explicit objectives for financial stability, raising the possibility of trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. Based on structural vector autoregressions that incorporate both monetary and macroprudential policy shocks for four inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific, we analyse the role of each policy shock in explaining deviations from the other policy’s objective, by applying historical decompositions. The macroprudential measures used in the study affect credit extended to the private sector. We find that there are periods when macroprudential policy shocks have contributed to pushing inflation away from the central bank’s inflation target and when monetary policy shocks have contributed to buoyant credit, suggesting that there have been short-term trade-offs between price and financial stability objectives. However, we also find periods when macroprudential policy shocks helped stabilise inflation and monetary policy shocks contributed to financial stability.