企业会计准则第25号——原保险合同

第一章 总则 第一条 为了规范保险人签发的原保险合同的确认、计量和相关信息的列报,根据《企业会计准则-基本准则》,制定本准则. 第二条 保险合同,是指保险人与投保人约定保险权利义务关系并承担源于被保险人保险风险的协议.保险合同分为原保险合同和再保险合同.     

企业会计准则第25号 原保险合同

第一章总则第一条为了规范保险人签发的原保险合同的确认、计量和相关信息的列报,根据《企业会计准则——基本准则》,制定本准则。第二条保险合同,是指保险人与投保人约定保险权利义务关系,并承担源于被保险人保险风险的协议。保险合同分为原保险合同和再保险合同。原保险合同,     

保险经纪人与保险代理人的不同

做股票有经纪人,如今买保险也有了经纪人。保险经纪人与保险代理人是有区别的。 保险经纪人与保险代理人的不同之处,表现在两大方面。首先表现为代表利益的不同。保险经纪人是接受投保人的委托,在投保人授权范围内努力维护投保人的利益。包括设计最可取的保险方案,寻找承保能力最强、收费最合理的保险人,争取最有利于投保人的承保条件,并代办投保手续、代缴保险费、代向保险人提出索赔。在这个意义上,保险经纪人可以被视为投保人的代理人,代表投保人的利益。而保险代理人是接受保险人的委托,     

保险合同相关会计处理规定

一、保险混合合同分拆 （一）保险人与投保人签订的合同,使保险人既承担保险风险又承担其他风险的．应当分别下列情况进行处理：     

保险合同相关会计处理规定

财政部国家税务总局财会[2009]15号文件一、保险混合合同分拆(一)保险人与投保人签订的合同,使保险人既承担保险风险又承担其他风险的,应当分别下列情况进行处理:1.保险风险部分和其他风险部分能够区分,并且能够单     

企业会计准则第25号——原保险合同

第一章总则第一条为了规范保险人签发的原保险合同的确认、计量和相关信息的列报,根据《企业会计准则-基本准则》,制定本准则。第二条保险合同,是指保险人与投保人约定保险权利义务关系.并承担源于被保险人保险风险的协议.保险合同分为原保险合同和再保险合同。原保险合同,是指保险人向投保人收取保费,对约定的可能发生的事故因其发生所造成的财产损失承担赔偿保险金责任,或者当被保险人死亡.伤残、疾病或者达到约定的年龄、期限时承担给付保险金责任的保险合同。第三条下列各项适用其他相关会计准则:(一)保险人签发的原保险合同产生的损余…     

浅析出险时通知迟延的法律后果

从保险的一般原理而言，投保人在事故中如果是受害人，享有针对加害人的赔偿请求权，其可以选择直接向加害人索赔。也可以选择向保险人索赔。在选择后者时，不通知保险人也未尝不可，只要投保人在事故发生后及时报案，妥善处理赔偿事宜，并未对保险人造成任何不利和损害。文章认为出险时投保人的通知义务并非法律的强制性条款，但保险人往往利用自身优势制定通知迟延法律后果的格式条款加重投保人的责任。因此，我国《保险法》应该在借鉴其他国家和地区相关法律基础上，增加明确规定通知迟延的法律后果的条款，以减少纠纷，维护合同双方当事人的利益。     

我国巨灾风险证券化的制约因素及其发展建议

在巨灾风险逐渐增多、造成损失不断扩大的现实背景下,传统保险和再保险方式已无法应对不具传统可保条件的巨灾风险。有必要对巨灾风险证券化这一新的巨灾风险转移方式进行国际的、动态的、系统的理解和把握。巨灾风险证券化这一创新方式使巨灾风险的转移不再仅限于保险市场,而是扩展到资本市场。它对提高保险人的承保能力、改善投保人的福利、增加投资者的收益、淡化政府"最后再保险人"的角色、改善保险市场和资本市场的资本结构、实现保险资源的优化配置、促进资本的有效流动等各个方面都将发挥巨大的作用。促进巨灾风险证券化理论的系统和成熟对巨灾风险证券化在我国的发展和运用具有较强的现实意义和理论意义,对中国保险业在这方面的创新研究也将起到一定的参考和借鉴作用。本文旨在对巨灾风险证券化的相关理论和实务进行较系统的分析,并在此基础上,对在中国推行巨灾风险证券化进行思考和探讨。     

试论寿险保险的二重性

一、基本概念和现状 人寿保险是以人的生存死亡为保险事故,事故发生时由保险人负给付一定金额责任的保险。寿险基金是指寿险保险人根据投保人意愿,在严密的风险概率测算基础上与投保人签订商业保险契约,通过收集投保人缴纳的保险或保险储金而筹集起来的专门用于补偿被保险人约定风险损失的一种货币基金。它是保险人承担经济补偿或给付义务的准备金。由于寿险投保标的特殊性,寿险基金具有长期性和稳定性的特点。寿险基金由自有资本和保费收入两部分构成,其中保费收入是构成寿险基金的主体。 随着金融、投资业的发展,投资方式和投资工具…     

协会货物保险条款下保险责任的认定

在国际海上货物运输中,经常会发生货损货差,保险索赔也就随之而至。而保险人保险责任的认定则是一项政策性强、程序复杂的重要工作,它直接影响到国家的信誉和企业的利益。本文结合伦敦保险协会海上货物运输保险条款,从责任期间、保险标的、可保利益以及索赔款项的合理性等四个方面详细论述了保险人保险责任认定的条件。     

Are generalized call-spreads efficient?

In order to explain coexistence of a deductible for low values of the loss and an upper limit for high values of the loss in insurance contracts, we consider the exchange of risk between two rank dependent expected utility maximizers. It is shown that if the insurer (insured) takes more into account the lowest outcomes – hence maximal losses – than the insured (insurer), then the optimal contract has an upper limit (includes a deductible for high values of the loss). If furthermore, the insured (insurer) neglects the highest outcomes while the insurer (insured) does not, the optimal contract includes a deductible (full insurance) for low values of the loss.     

Optimal investment and reinsurance policies for an insurer with ambiguity aversion

In this paper, we study the optimal investment and reinsurance problem for an insurer based on the variance premium principle, in which three cases are considered. First, we assume that the financial market does not exist. The insurer only holds an insurance business, and the optimal reinsurance problem is studied. Subsequently, we assume that there exists a financial market with an accurately modeled risky asset. The optimal investment and reinsurance problem is investigated under these conditions. Finally, we consider the general case in which the insurer is concerned about the model ambiguity of both the insurance market and the financial market. In all three cases, the value function is set to maximize the expected utility of terminal wealth. By employing the dynamic programming principle, we derive the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equations, which are satisfied by the value functions and obtain closed-form solutions for optimal reinsurance and investment policies and the value functions in all three cases. Most interestingly, we elucidate how investment improves the insurer’s utility and find that the existence of ambiguity can significantly affect the optimal policies and value functions. We also compare the ambiguities in the two markets and find that ambiguity in the insurance market has much more significant impact on the value function than the ambiguity in the financial market. It implies that it is more valuable for insurer to precisely evaluate the insurance risk. We also provide some numerical examples and economic explanations to illustrate our results.     

Optimal insurance contract under VaR and CVaR constraints

This study endogenously develops an optimal insurance contractual form for maximizing insured expected utility under VaR and CVaR constraints. We find that CVaR constraint does not affect the contractual form, but may increase minimum insurance premium requirement. Additionally, when the VaR constraint is binding, the optimal contract is a double deductible insurance. However, if the contract is restricted to a regular form (both indemnity schedule and retained loss schedule are continuously nondecreasing) for avoiding moral hazard problem, the optimal contract is a piecewise linear deductible insurance. Finally, we provide intuitive comparison between this study result and relevant studies.     

Optimal time-consistent reinsurance and investment strategies for a jump–diffusion financial market without cash

This paper considers an optimal reinsurance and investment strategies for an insurer under mean–variance criterion within a game theoretic framework. Specially, it is assumed that the surplus process is governed by a Cramér–Lundberg model, and apart from purchasing reinsurance, the insurer is allowed to invest in a financial market with multiple assets that all can be risky, whose price processes are modeled by the jump–diffusion process. Due to the market without cash, the method of separating the variables is not viable any more. We turn to an alternative approach to solve the extended Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation, and closed-form expressions of the optimal strategies and value function are not only derived but also proved to be uniqueness. Moreover, some special cases of our model are provided and several numerical analyses for our results are presented as well. Under this criterion, different from existing literature, we find that (i) the value function is not linear but quadratic with respect to the current wealth; (ii) the optimal reinsurance and investment strategies depend on the wealth process; (iii) the parameters of risky assets(insurance market) have impacts on the optimal reinsurance(investment) policy; (iv) the safety loading of the insurer affects the optimal strategies.     

保护性股权激励与现金股利政策——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

基于中国高管股权激励契约中股利保护性条款的特殊制度安排,本文采用Relogit模型与多元线性模型实证分析中国上市公司股权激励对其现金股利支付政策的影响.研究发现,在未控制公司规模下,实施股权激励的公司相比未实施激励的公司更具有现金支付倾向,且现金股利支付水平更高.通过建立联立方程组考虑内生性问题后,以上结论依然成立.     

A sharing mechanism of investment outcome for interest-sensitive life insurance products

As growing sales of insurance contracts with a saving feature, an issue of sharing investment outcome gets the attention of insurers and policyholders. This paper focuses on a systematic way of finding the sharing mechanism for an optimal contract design in such a way that a policyholder and an insurer maximize their expected utilities. We adopt the policyholder and the insurer as a principal and an agent, respectively, and regard a share of the investment performance as an incentive for the insurer to elicit efforts. As a result of this setting, the moral hazard issue generated from the insurer is unavoidable. For the purpose, the Holmström (1979)’s principal-agent model with limited observability of the insurer’s action plays a leading role in resolving a pie-cutting problem. Under our model assumption, the sharing mechanism states that a portion of the outcome belonging to the insurer is a nondecreasing function of the excess of the portfolio return over a benchmark return when the two parties are risk-averse. In particular, the sensitivity of the sharing portion has an S-shape curve which is consistent with the insurer’s risk propensity.An empirical study based on companies’ portfolio attributes and crediting rates verifies that our theoretical findings are consistent with statistically significant results. In particular, we confirm that the bargaining power of the insurer has a considerable impact on the sharing mechanism as it is theoretically important.     

Equilibrium mean–variance reinsurance and investment strategies for a general insurance company under smooth ambiguity

This work investigates the equilibrium investment and reinsurance strategies for a general insurance company under smooth ambiguity. The general insurance company holds shares of an insurance company and a reinsurance company. The claims of the insurer follow a compound Poisson process. The insurer can divide part of the insurance risk to the reinsurer. Besides, the insurer and reinsurer both participate in the financial market and invest in cash and stock. However, the general insurance company is ambiguous about the insurance and financial risks and is an ambiguity-averse manager (AAM). The uncertainties over the insurance and financial risks are described by second-order distributions. The AAM aims to maximize the average performance of the weighted sum surplus process of the insurer and reinsurer under the mean–variance criterion and smooth ambiguity. We present the extended Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) system for the optimization problem combining the mean–variance criterion and smooth ambiguity. In the case that the second-order distributions are Gaussian, we obtain the closed-forms of the equilibrium reinsurance and investment strategies. At the end of this work, sensitivity analyses are presented to show the economic behaviors of the AAM.     

Optimal multiple stopping models of reload options and shout options

The reload provision in an employee stock option entitles its holder to receive one new (reload) option from the employer for each share tendered as the payment of strike upon the exercise of the stock option. The number of reloads allowed can be finite or infinite. The shout feature in a call option allows its holder to reset the option's strike price to the prevailing stock price upon shouting. We explore a symmetry relationship between the price functions of the employee reload options and shout call options. When the dividend yield of the underlying stock is zero, the value of the employee reload option can be expressed in terms of the price functions of a shout call option and a forward contract. For an employee reload option with an infinite number of allowable reloads, the payoff of the employee reload option can be related to the lookback feature of the stock price process. We also examine the optimal exercise policies of the multi-reload employee stock options. The behavior of the critical stock price at which the holder should exercise optimally is shown to depend on the relative magnitude of the dividend yield, interest rate and volatility. Our analysis of the multi-reload and multi-shout options contributes to the literature on optimal stopping policies of contingent claims with multiple stopping rights.     

国外财务再保险会计对我国的启示

财务再保险作为一种非传统的风险转移方式,常被保险公司作为优化会计报表财务安排或金融工具。目前我国缺乏关于财务再保险的企业会计准则,会给一些滥用财务再保险的保险公司以可趁之机。因此,必须对我国财务再保险会计处理进行研究。本文在介绍国外财务再保险会计确认和会计处理的基础上,结合我国具体情况,对规范我国财务再保险的会计处理提出了政策建议。     

Alpha-robust mean-variance reinsurance-investment strategy

Inspired by the α-maxmin expected utility, we propose a new class of mean-variance criterion, called α-maxmin mean-variance criterion, and apply it to the reinsurance-investment problem. Our model allows the insurer to have different levels of ambiguity aversion (rather than only consider the extremely ambiguity-averse attitude as in the literature). The insurer can purchase proportional reinsurance and also invest the surplus in a financial market consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky asset, whose dynamics is correlated with the insurance surplus. Closed-form equilibrium reinsurance-investment strategy is derived by solving the extended Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. Our results show that the equilibrium reinsurance strategy is always more conservative if the insurer is more ambiguity-averse. When the dependence between insurance and financial risks are weak, the equilibrium investment strategy is also more conservative if the insurer is more ambiguity-averse. However, in order to diversify the portfolio, a more ambiguity-averse insurer may adopt a more aggressive investment strategy if the insurance market is very ambiguous. For an ambiguity-neutral insurer, the investment strategy is identical to the non-robust investment strategy.