资金占用、股价暴跌风险对信息透明度的影响研究

以1999-2014年中国 A 股主板上市公司为研究样本,考量资金占用、股价暴跌风险对信息透明度影响。结果表明：大股东的资金占用程度越高,越容易给公司股价带来暴跌风险;股价发生暴跌后管理层采取相应策略改善形象,提高公司信息透明度。鉴此,投资者应利用大股东资金占用、股价暴跌与信息透明度之间的逻辑关系,构建投资套利组合;同时监管者需加强对大股东资金占用和信息透明度的监管,保护中小投资者利益。     

Social Concentration on Boards,Corporate Information Environment and Cost of Capital

Prior evidence on the relationship between demographic diversity in corporate boards and firm performance is mixed. Some studies have found that the relationship between board attributes and firm performance is driven by a firm's information environment. This study examines whether corporate transparency also impacts the relationship between gender and ethnic diversity of directors and firm performance. To test this hypothesis, I use a Herfindahl Index based on directors’ gender and ethnicity to measure board diversity, and an opacity index based on analyst following, analyst forecast error, bid‐ask spread, and share turnover to measure corporate transparency. I find that the cost of capital is positively associated with social concentration on corporate boards and that this premium is larger for highly opaque firms. In further analysis, I find that the interaction of corporate information environment and social concentration on boards is more important for operationally complex firms. Compared with simple firms, operationally complex firms pay a greater premium on their capital if they have a socially concentrated board and an opaque information environment.     

Corruption and Transparency in a Growth Model

We develop a Ramsey type model of economic growth in which the “Engine of Growth” is public capital accumulation. Public capital is a public good, and is financed by taxes on private output. The government may either use the taxes gathered to fund public capital accumulation or consume the resourses itself; that is engage in corruption. There is an irreducable level of endogenously determined corruption which constitutes rents for which potential governments compete. This competition takes the form of choosing a time path for public capital invesment, which implies time paths for output and household consumption. We study both the model’s steady state, and dynamical behavior along the saddle path. The predictions of our theory accord well with the existent empirical evidence on the relationships between the level and growth rate of output, corruption, public investment and fiscal transparency. Our analysis also provides a perspective on the transition experiences of several Eastern European economies. JEL Code: O41, H41     

Public–private partnerships in Social Impact Bonds: facilitating competition or hindering transparency?

ABSTRACT

The use of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs), which introduces the potential for investor profit in public service provision, has been widely discussed. Some argue that SIBs might promote government transparency because outcome data collection and evaluation are part of contractual terms. On the other hand, some argue that SIBs might hinder government transparency because more contractual parties might lead to more uncertain data ownership and because the profit motive transforms information into a competitive advantage. This paper looks at SIBs in five countries, examining how transparency differed between SIB and non-SIB financed programmes at the same social service provider. On the positive side, SIBs led to more and longer collection of outcome data and the publication of evaluations. On the negative side, it was found that SIBs tend to generate significant obstacles to the release of data to academic researchers and that sponsored evaluations do not measure impacts.     

Does corporate governance transparency affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts?

Using country‐level proxies for corporate governance transparency, this paper investigates how differences in transparency across 21 countries affect the average forecast accuracy of analysts for the country's firms. The association between financial transparency and analyst forecast accuracy has been well documented in previous published literature; however, the association between governance transparency and analyst forecast accuracy remains unexplored. Using the two distinct country‐level factors isolated by Bushman et al. (2004 ), governance transparency and financial transparency, we investigate whether corporate governance information impacts on the accuracy of earnings forecasts over and above financial information. We document that governance transparency is positively associated with analyst forecast accuracy after controlling for financial transparency and other variables. Furthermore, our results suggest that governance‐related disclosure plays a bigger role in improving the information environment when financial disclosures are less transparent. Our empirical evidence also suggests that the significance of governance transparency on analyst forecast accuracy is higher when legal enforcement is weak.     

交易透明度对证券场外交易信息效率的影响

黑池交易系统（Dark Pools）是美国近年发展较快的非公开交易平台, 其信息透明度较低,可提供匿名交易的服务,并由此实现信息的非公开传递。通过扩展后验信念收敛速率的模型来描述不同交易透明度下场外市场的信息显示速率, 发现私人信息与公共信息共存有利于信息更快地显示,因而私人信息渠道与公共信息渠道共存有利于提升信息效率,由此解释了非公开交易平台的价值,也为我国场外市场的分层发展提供可行建议.     

Tweaking public sector reporting with integrated reporting (IR) concepts

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the annual departmental reports prepared by Maltese government departments and highlights the gap between current practices and integrated reporting (IR). The authors suggest that principles and elements of IR could be gradually introduced in an effort to enhance transparency and accountability. The internalization of integrated thinking could also lead to enhanced value creation, and overcome the silo mentality that characterizes the Maltese public sector. Detailed guidelines for preparing ADRs urgently need to be developed in Malta—preparers should not expect to find them in the IIRC Framework, because they are not there.     

Accountability and Transparency in English Local Government: Moving from ‘Matching Parts’ to ‘Awkward Couple’?

Although excessive transparency and accountability demands can have a counterproductive effect on organisational performance (Bovens, 2005), longstanding hierarchical accountability structures to ensure financial conformance in English local government continue to endure. Interestingly however, the previously top‐down regime for performance accountability in English local government has been replaced by bottom‐up mechanisms such as greater transparency and a more open market for public services. Using the framework developed by Hood (2010), this paper will show how such reforms mean that transparency and accountability are moving from being ‘matching parts’ to an ‘awkward couple’, and how this has significant implications for public services.     

Carbon Disclosure,Financial Transparency,and Agency Cost: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies

Given the constraints on carbon emissions due to their impact on global warming, carbon disclosure has become an important way to deliver signals to the market. We examine the benefits associated with carbon disclosure from the standpoint of corporate social responsibility (CSR) for China’s manufacturing industries from 2010 to 2014. We divide corporations into heavily polluting and non-heavily polluting groups in order to control the industry factor. Based on the Principal-Agent Theory, we empirically test the relationship between carbon disclosure and financial transparency, and we evaluate the effect of carbon disclosure on agency costs and operations. Our results highlight that carbon disclosure is negatively associated with agency costs. However, we do not find enough evidence to prove what role financial transparency plays in the relationship between carbon disclosure and agency cost. Therefore, the influence of financial transparency as a mechanism is not yet clear. This study provides a way to look at the intentions of firms that disclose carbon information, and it also enhances the literature on carbon disclosure and agency costs in China based on Chinese data.     

信息透明度对资本配置效率的影响——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

以2001~2012年沪深两市A股制造业上市公司为研究样本,借鉴Wurgler的资源配置效率估算模型,从盈余管理角度探讨了中国现实制度背景下信息透明度对资本配置效率的影响。实证结果表明,无论是在行业层面还是公司层面,信息透明度与资本配置效率均呈显著的正相关关系,其中以修正的DD模型衡量的盈余管理解释力度最强。进一步采用深交所信息披露考评结果作为稳健性检验的替代指标,结论依然不变。可见,改善上市公司盈余质量,提高信息透明度,是正确引导证券市场资本有效配置的关键。     

Implementation of accrual accounting in Thailand’s central government

This paper evaluates the outcomes of accrual accounting implementation in Thailand’s central government. A new conceptual framework was used to study transition barriers and their effects. Financial transparency and accountability were shown to have improved. Significant barriers to the transition to accrual accounting include a lack of incentives, a management culture, a lack of accounting manuals, and a failure to understand accrual information.

IMPACT

This paper explains the transition barriers Thailand has faced in adopting accrual accounting in its central government and how these barriers are affecting financial reporting in the public sector. The results in this paper can be applied to other countries in terms of evaluating outcomes or planning transition processes.     

Testing the transparency benefits of inflation targeting: Evidence from private sector forecasts

Using inflation forecast data for 11 IT adoption countries, IT adoption is found to promote convergence in forecast errors, suggesting that it enhances transparency. This result, which is subjected to several robustness checks and found to be robust, supports Morris and Shin's (2002) contention that better public information is most beneficial for forecasters with bad private information. However, it does not support their hypothesis that better public information could make private forecasts less accurate.     

Fiscal Transparency,Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings

Fiscal transparency can provide policymakers with incentives to adopt better policies by enhancing the public debate on the design and sustainability of fiscal policy and establishing accountability for their implementation. Fiscal transparency can also reduce uncertainty about fiscal policy and fiscal outturns by providing more information on the underlying fiscal position and fiscal risks. Both effects suggest that countries should benefit from adopting transparency enhancing policies through better market assessments of their sovereign risk. In this paper, we investigate whether fiscal transparency has an effect on market perceptions of sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign credit ratings, and if so, through which channels. We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings – one standard deviation increase in fiscal transparency increases credit ratings by 0.7 and 1 notches (or steps in the credit rating scale) in advanced and developing economies, respectively – but its effect works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, fiscal transparency is associated with better fiscal outcomes, leading indirectly to higher credit ratings. In developing economies, the direct uncertainty‐reducing effect of fiscal transparency seems to be more important. Indeed, the effect of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance is found to increase with the level of institutional development.     

Transparency of environmental decision making: a case study of soil cleanup inside the Hanford 100 area

Environmental decisions in a democracy should be transparent. Transparency allows all those who are interested in a decision to understand what is being decided and why. Transparency is especially critical for decisions that are intended to protect public health and safety, and that have long‐term consequences. Decisions are recorded through publicly available documents (such as Records of Decision), collectively known as the public record. In this paper the transparency of the public record is examined for a specific decision at the US Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford site. To do this, the concept of transparency is unpacked into seven objectives: clarity, accessibility, integration, logic/rationale, truth/accuracy, openness, and accountability; and a framework for measuring decision transparency is developed. Then a Record of Decision is evaluated based on four of the seven objectives. Throughout, the importance of understanding decision processes and expected outcomes, and the broad values underpinning activities and choices are emphasized. It is found that, while many aspects of the process are transparent, it is difficult to discern and connect the values, objectives, subobjectives and criteria used as the basis of the decision. Several information structuring improvements (value trees, decision paths, and simple graphics and tables) that could make the public record more transparent are suggested. Such improvements are necessary for long‐term stewardship because future decision makers are likely to rely on the public record as the primary source of decision information. If information is not transparent, future decisions may be compromised.     

Corporate tax avoidance: is tax transparency the solution?

Corporate tax avoidance has been a matter of considerable public attention, particularly since the 2008 global financial crisis. The nature of calls for tax reform and increased regulation, advocated most prominently by tax activists and NGOs, has revolved around transparency as a possible corrective to unacceptable tax avoidance, although there is no consensus as to what the term tax avoidance encompasses and when it becomes unacceptable. We examine two responses to calls for increased transparency about the tax affairs of multinational entities: firstly, country by country reporting that provides information to tax authorities, and secondly the UK requirement for publication of tax strategies, whereby large companies put information into the public domain. We find considerable misunderstanding about the benefits of transparency in this setting. By failing to consider the limits of transparency initiatives there is a risk of dysfunctional consequences, for example additional costs in providing and processing additional information, the prospect of increased disputes as new information generates new misinterpretations and uncertainty in determining the final tax position. There is a risk that greater disclosure will not effectively address concerns about unacceptable corporate tax avoidance.     

Transparency in the Procurement of Public Works

The construction contract bonding system is used worldwide to protect the owner of a project against the risk of non-performance by the contractor. There is a close relationship between the construction contract bonding system and transparency in public works, which policy-makers and officials need to be more aware of. There are mainly three systems in use, which the authors have analysed in depth. Each of the three models has a different influence on transparency in public works: the ‘high penalty conditional model’ is considered the most functional model in improving transparency, the ‘low penalty unconditional model’ does not contribute very much to improving transparency, while the ‘substitute contractor model’ can lead to greater opportunities for corruption on the contractor's side.     

High-quality regulation: its popularity,its tools and its future

This article examines the impact of devolution, the New Public Management and public management culture on accounting for democratic accountability in the first term of the devolved national assemblies and parliament in the UK. Although there is more openness, transparency, consultation and scrutiny with regard to budgets, accounts and performance as a result of devolution, there is extensive information overload. Thus, many politicians are highly dependent on the parliamentary division of labour and are reliant on experts and advisors functioning as buffers and filters of accounting information.     

Securitization of Longevity Risk: Pricing Survivor Bonds With Wang Transform in the Lee-Carter Framework

Longevity risk is a major issue for insurers and pension funds, especially in the selling of annuity products. In that respect, securitization of this risk could offer great opportunities for hedging. This article proposes to design survivor bonds which could be issued directly by insurers. In order to guaranty some transparency in the product, the survivor bond is based on a public mortality index. The classical Lee‐Carter model for mortality forecasting is used to price a risky coupon survivor bond based on this index.     

Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets

We use an asset market model based on Diamond (1985) to demonstrate that increased central bank transparency may lead to crowding out of costly private information, which can result in a market that is less able to predict monetary policy. Consequently, for intermediate levels of public information precision, it is optimal for the central bank to actually disclose less than it knows. We show that such crowding out can occur, even in the likely scenario that public information is more precise than private information, under the plausible assumption that traders are nearly risk neutral. Central banks should be aware of possible adverse effects of transparency and take note if market participants reduce investment in information.     

Corporate Governance,Companies’ Disclosure Practices and Market Transparency: A Cross Country Study

We examine the link between corporate governance, companies’ disclosure practices and their equity market transparency in a study of more than 5,000 listed companies in 23 countries covering the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2008. Our results confirm the belief that better‐governed firms make more frequent disclosures to the market. We also find greater disclosure in common law relative to code law countries. However firms with better governance in both code and common law countries make more frequent disclosures. We measure market transparency by the timeliness of prices. In contrast to single country studies, results show, for the 23 countries collectively, better corporate governance is associated with less timely share prices. This would suggest that a firm substitutes better corporate governance for transparency. We are thus led to the conclusion that even if information is disclosed more frequently by better‐governed firms, it does not necessarily follow that information is reflected in share prices on a timelier basis.