Ownership,Access, and Sequential Investment

We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.     

产权约束、投资低效与通货紧缩

本文从产权逻辑来诠释 2 0 0 3年以来的投资膨胀。文章认为 ,在土地转让权含糊不清和银行产权约束不力的背景下 ,土地和信贷市场的价格机制无法给出市场定价 ,客观造成了巨大套利空间的存在。当经济景气时 ,一些地方政府、企业和银行三方共谋土地和贷款这两种最关键的生产要素 ,从而导致投资的非理性膨胀 ,并通过金融加速器效应带来宏观经济的大幅波动。从根源上讲 ,过度投资和投资低效的本质是产权约束和地方政府政绩观导向的问题。因而 ,本文提出的相应政策含义是 ,在短期内主要以经济杠杆来控制总量 ;在中长期应转变政府职能 ,推进产权改革。     

The composition of foreign capital stocks in South Africa: The role of institutions,domestic risk and neighbourhood effects

Foreign capital inflows are an important source of funds to finance investment in developing economies. International finance literature is therefore concerned with how institutional factors like property rights and corruption affect foreign capital inflows. We investigate the determinants of the absolute volumes and composition of foreign capital stocks in South Africa, focusing on the role played by institutional quality (property rights), domestic default risk and neighbourhood effects as potential determinants. The empirical results show that secure property rights and low default risk in the host country positively affect the absolute volumes of both long-term foreign capital and short-term foreign capital, but tilt the composition in favour of long-term foreign capital. Empirical results also demonstrate the existence of neighbourhood effects where the institutional environment in Zimbabwe significantly impacts on South Africa's foreign capital inflows. In this regard, weak property rights in Zimbabwe lead to an increase in South Africa's foreign direct investment (FDI), but a reduction in South Africa's portfolio investment. This suggests that Zimbabwe and South Africa compete for foreign direct investment in similar sectors, and present two alternative investment destinations to foreign investors. By contrast, weak property rights in Zimbabwe appear to raise the perceived risk for portfolio investment in South Africa.     

Private Property Rights,Investment Patterns,and Asset Structure

The right to private property was first written into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China in March 2004. This study takes advantage of the 2004 amendment and uses a difference‐in‐differences approach to empirically test the impact of private property rights security on investment patterns and thereby on asset structure. Employing the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database from 2000 to 2007 to implement the analysis, we find that private property rights security has not only led enterprises to boost investment in both fixed assets and intangible assets but also induced them to allocate available resources more towards intangible assets. We address two potential concerns about our empirical design.     

From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence

We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is that first movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, first movers’ (uninformed second movers’) demands are lower (higher) the lower the probability of information transmission. JEL Classification C72 · C78 · C92     

Why did he do that? Using counterfactuals to study the effect of intentions in extensive form games

We investigate the role of intentions in two-player two-stage games. For this purpose we systematically vary the set of opportunity sets the first mover can choose from and study how the second mover reacts not only to opportunities of gains but also of losses created by the choice of the first mover. We find that the possibility of gains for the second mover (generosity) and the risk of losses for the first mover (vulnerability) are important drivers for second mover behavior. On the other hand, efficiency concerns and an aversion against violating trust seem to be far less important motivations. We also find that second movers compare the actual choice of the first mover and the alternative choices that would have been available to him to allocations that involve equal material payoffs.     

Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance

We introduce a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. This measure, called contract-intensive money or CIM, is based on citizens decisions regarding the form in which they choose to hold their financial assets. Country case studies show that CIM varies over time in response to political events in ways predicted by our arguments. We also show that CIM is positively related to investment and growth rates, and to the relative size of contract-dependent sectors of the economy.     

中国自然资源产权混合市场建设的制度路径

从自然资源产权市场的3个层次。即初始产权界定、交易权规定和交易制度安排上综合研究我国自然资源产权市场混合化转轨建设的制度途径。提出三步连续而渐进的制度改革战略：①建立市场化的自然资源公共产权规制模式；②在现有的自然资源所有权安排条件下，实现自然资源使用权和经营权的市场化；③把部分自然资源的所有权私有化，形成公私产权对接的完善的自然资源产权混合市场。     

The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

In this paper, the strategy method's impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example, second movers punished significantly more often in the hot version of the low cost game. Furthermore, first mover behavior was significantly different in the hot and cold versions of both games. In the hot games, first mover behavior suggests an expectation of decreased rewards and/or punishments from second movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first movers that the decision procedure used by second movers has changed. Therefore, first mover behavior must be shaped by their perceived assessment concerning how second movers make decisions. We argue that first mover behavior can be explained by the interaction of two well-known psychological effects: the consensus and positive self-image effects.     

农地产权冲突、经济绩效与土地制度创新差异化原则——《农村土地承包法》的法与经济学分析

本文对《农村土地承包法》中农地产权安排的内在权利冲突及其在经济上的后果进行了分析,主要探讨农地承包制对农业投资水平和技术选择的影响。承包期限的延长对农业投入的影响是有限的、有条件的,承包制不利于规模经济技术的推广应用。农村土地制度的进一步改革需下放土地制度创新的权利并遵循地域差异化、产业差异化和所有权主体差异化原则。     

Hot vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games

In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.     

专利侵权惩罚性赔偿问题研究

我国《专利法》规定了4种专利损害赔偿方式，司法解释对此也进行了细化。但总体而言，对专利损害赔偿的规定较为原则，实际操作中存在许多难以解决的问题，如赔偿数额低、诉讼时间长、举证困难等，难以遏制故意侵权和多次侵权，有必要引入惩罚性赔偿制度。最新的《专利法修订草案》第六十八条规定故意侵犯他人专利权处以一倍以上三倍以下赔偿数额。但是，对于什么情况下是“故意”、一倍以上三倍以下赔偿数额如何确定等还没有具体规定，缺乏可操作性。阐述专利侵权损害赔偿概念及计算方法，比较美国、日本、中国台湾地区专利惩罚性赔偿制度对我国的启示，分析我国专利侵权损害赔偿制度及存在的问题，并提出相关政策建议。     

专利执行保险与上市公司创新行为研究

专利制度的本质是对知识资源产权归属进行确权。基于我国第一批和第二批专利执行保险试点这一准自然试验,借助沪深上市公司2008-2017年数据,通过双重差分法（DID）实证检验了专利执行保险对上市公司创新行为的影响。研究发现：专利执行保险加强了知识产权保护,能显著提升上市公司创新积极性和创新投入力度;专利执行保险显著增加了上市公司专利申请数量及专利授权数量等创新产出。进一步研究发现,国有控股、市场化进程、法制化完备程度均能显著促进专利执行保险对上市公司的创新激励效应。利用敏感性检验和工具变量法对内生性进行控制后,上述结论仍然成立。因此,加强专利保护制度建设对促进上市公司创新具有重要意义。     

Perfect versus Imperfect Observability—An Experimental Test of Bagwell's Result

In a seminal paper Bagwell ((1995). Games Econom. Behav.8, 271–280) claims that the first mover advantage, i.e., the strategic benefit of committing oneself to an action before others can, vanishes completely if this action is only imperfectly observed by second movers. In our paper we report on an experimental test of this prediction. We implement four versions of a game similar to an example given by Bagwell, each time varying the quality of the signal which informs the second mover. For experienced players we do not find empirical support for Bagwell's result. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.     

中国企业人力资本产权变革三次浪潮评析

人力资本股权化是现代企业产权制度变革的基本逻辑和大趋势.如何在实际操作层面解决"两权分离"悖论,不仅是现代公司制度运作和发展的主题,也是中国企业人力资本产权制度变革的逻辑起点、核心问题和主要矛盾.1992年以来,中国企业人力资本产权变革经历了三次浪潮.目前,对于中国企业来说,实现人力资本股权化、稚行股权激励计划,已经不是什么"理论"问题而是如何实际"行动"的问题.基于人力资本产权制度变革积极推行股权激励计划,是未来中国企业必然而明智的战略选择.     

Property Enforcement as Organized Consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutionsthat make property rights viable, ensuring their enforcement,mobilizing the collateral value of assets, and promoting growth.In contrast to contractual rights, property rights are enforcedin rem, being affected only with the consent of the right holder.This ensures enforcement but is costly when multiple, potentiallycolliding rights are held in the same asset. Different institutionsreduce the cost of gathering consents to overcome this trade-offof enforcement benefits for consent costs: recording of deedswith title insurance, registration of rights, and even a regimenof purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies withthe number of transactions, the risk of political opportunism,and regulatory consistency. The analysis also shows the rationalityof allowing competition in the preparation and support of privatecontracts while requiring territorial monopoly in recordingand registration activities, this to ensure independence andprotect third parties.     

Electric grid investment under a contract network regime

This paper analyzes the incentives for electric grid investment that result from various proposed transmission network property regimes. In particular, we focus on transmission congestion contracts within a contract network regime such as proposed by William Hogan. We formalize a rule for awarding these new property rights to investors and show that, under certain conditions, this contract network approach can effectively deter detrimental investments, some of which are encouraged under other regimes. However, when these conditions are not met, market participants may still find it profitable to undertake network alterations which are detrimental to the network as a whole.The authors would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of William Hogan, Ed Kahn, Ross Baldick, Pravin Varaiya, and three anonymous referees. This research was partially funded by the California Energy Commision under contract #700-93-003, amendment 2.     

股权结构、内部现金流和企业投资行为——对自由现金流和信息不对称理论的检验

中国上市公司控制权和现金流权的高度分离为我们提供了一个很好的研究投资现金流敏感性的样本.本文从终极控制人的视角,以我国2003-2007年上市公司为研究对象,研究了终极控制股东现金流权及控制权与现金流权的偏离对企业过度投资的影响.研究表明:企业的投资现金流敏感度随着终极控股股东现金流权的增加而趋于下降;伴随控制权与现金流权分离水平的增加而上升.这种结果和自由现金流假说一致,即控股股东拥有过多的自由现金流可能导致过度投资,并且这种过度投资问题在资产收益率低的公司里更加严重.我们的结果不仅解决了以往关于现金流和投资之间的敏感是由于控股股东偏好过度投资还是投资不足的争论,而且为控股股东存在“激励效应”和“堑壕效应”提供了直接证据     

Banking as a basis for economic cooperation in less developed Europe

This article examines to what extent Russia's increasing reliance on foreign capital could potentially kick-start the economy and generate growth. The analysis highlights more fundamental issues of governance and institutional arrangements, for which the focus on foreign economic activities serves merely as an example to reflect on pathologies of the Russian economy as a whole. The article consists of a theoretical framework, discussing the change of institutional arrangements in the first section and analysing crucial issues of corporate governance and property rights in the last, while empirical information is compiled for Russia as a whole and its constituent regions in the second and third core sections. The article concludes that the Russian map of high foreign trade activities will be shaped only by patchy growth spots, located either where the domestic market is largest or opportunities for export exist, mainly in large urban agglomerations (economies of scale) and commercial hubs, resource-rich and gateway territories (gravitation to international trading blocs). Major investment disincentives will remain as long as the existing system of taxation has not been substantially changed, property rights are not protected, land and bankruptcy legislation is not properly enforced and local authorities are not prevented form rent-seeking activities.