Why do auditors fail? What might work? What won’t?†

Auditing failures and scandals have become commonplace. In response, reformers (including the Kingman Review in the U.K. and a recent report of the U.K.’s Competition and Market Authority) have proposed a variety of remedies, including prophylactic bans on auditors providing consulting services to their clients in the belief that this will minimize the conflicts of interest that produce auditing failures. Although useful, such reforms are already in place to a considerable degree and may have reached the point of diminishing returns. Moreover, this strategy does not address the deeper problem that clients (or their managements) may not want aggressive auditing, but rather prefer a deferential and perfunctory audit. If so, auditors will realize that they are marketing a ‘commodity’ service and cannot successfully compete based on their quality of services. Rationally, they would respond to such a market by seeking to adopt a cost-minimization strategy, competing by reducing the cost of their services and not investing in new technology or higher-priced personnel.

What could change this pattern? Gatekeepers, including auditors, serve investors, but are hired by corporate management. To induce gatekeepers to better serve investors, one needs to reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding this relationship by making gatekeepers more accountable to investors. This might be accomplished through litigation (as happens to some degree in the U.S.), but the U.K. and Europe have rules that discourage collective litigation. Thus, a more feasible approach would be to give investors greater ability to select and remove the auditor. This paper proposes a two part strategy to this end: (1) public ‘grading’ of the auditor by the audit regulator in an easily comparable fashion (and with a mandatory grading curve), and (2) enabling a minority of the shareholders (hypothetically, 10%) to propose a replacement auditor for a shareholder vote. It further argues that both activist shareholders and diversified shareholders might support such a strategy and undertake it under different circumstances. Absent such a focus on agency costs, however, reformers are likely only re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.     

Effect of audit report disclosure on auditor litigation risk

Internationally, the escalating number of cases levelled against auditors and the costs of defending such actions has led to the auditing profession calling for measures to reduce their liability burden. Relatively few measures have been taken by the auditing profession by way of adapting the disclosure contained in the audit report to mitigate their litigation risk. This study examines whether the issuance of an audit opinion with a going concern related ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraph or work practices disclosure has any effect on potential litigants' likelihood of pursuing litigation against the auditor. An analysis of 69 responses from advanced law students and 18 practitioners working in corporate liquidation demonstrate that a modified (but not qualified) audit report effectively acts as a ‘red flag’ and reduces potential litigants' propensity to initiate litigation. However, work practices disclosure did not significantly alter potential litigants' inclination to recommend litigation. Despite this finding, respondents (particularly liquidators) indicated that work practices disclosure was an important factor in their litigation decision. These results suggest that further investigation into how to effectively disclose the work done on audit and assurance engagements is needed. This has implications for standard setters and the auditing profession, especially considering recent changes in the disclosure contained in audit and assurance reports.     

Code of ethics quality and audit fees

Using a sample of U.S. firms from 2003 to 2018, we examine the effect of an audit client’s code of ethics quality on audit fees. We find that clients with a lower code of ethics quality pay significantly higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors perceive such clients as riskier and charge greater risk premiums. We also find that such clients have higher litigation risk and auditors spend greater effort when auditing such clients. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of a client’s code of ethics quality in audit pricing. Overall, our findings are consistent with codes of ethics being useful to auditors in assessing managers’ financial representations and providing value to firms.     

Class-action privileges and contingent legal fees: Investor and lawyer incentives to litigate and the effect on audit quality

The Cohen Commission recognized the importance of litigation incentives and recommended that research based upon an economic approach be conducted into the effects that litigation incentives can have on the auditing profession. By extending Simon (1981), an economic analysis of an auditing environment is presented wherein audit firms issue reports, representative investors make decisions based upon audit reports, and lawyers (as well as representative investors) play an active role in determining whether or not to initiate litigation against audit firms. The influence that alternative litigation privileges (i.e., class-action privileges with contingent legal fees and no class-action privileges with fixed legal fees) have on representative investor and lawyer incentives to litigate and on the equilibrium characteristics of this audit market are analyzed.     

Public Equity and Audit Pricing in the United States

To what degree are audit fees for U.S. firms with publicly traded equity higher than fees for otherwise similar firms with private equity? The answer is potentially important for evaluating regulatory regime design efficiency and for understanding audit demand and production economics. For U.S. firms with publicly traded debt, we hold constant the regulatory regime, including mandated issuer reporting and auditor responsibilities. We vary equity ownership and thus public securities market contextual factors, including any related public firm audit fees from increased audit effort to reduce audit litigation risk and/or pure litigation risk premium (litigation channel effects). In cross‐section, we find that audit fees for public equity firms are 20–22% higher than fees for otherwise similar private equity firms. Time‐series comparisons for firms that change ownership status yield larger percentage fee increases (decreases) for those going public (private). Results are consistent with litigation channel effects giving rise to substantial incremental audit fees for U.S. firms with public equity ownership.     

From common sense to expertise: Reflections on the prehistory of audit sampling

This essay argues that sampling emerges as a claimed “technique” in auditing in both the U.K. and U.S.A. much later than is commonly imagined. While practical auditing texts provide evidence that auditors were selective in testing prior to 1900, this is not explicitly articulated as sampling at least until the 1930s. Accordingly, statistically based sampling develops to rationalise practices that had been in place for some years and to invest auditing with a new scientific authority. The essay further suggests that the history of development in auditing technique may be decoupled from changes in audit objectives. Overall, the argument represents a preliminary stage in a wider programme for understanding auditing in its social and organisational context.     

AUDITOR'S SKILL,AUDITING STANDARDS,LITIGATION, AND AUDIT QUALITY

This paper introduces a model of the market for audit services in which auditors differ in their levels of skill, which may or may not be observable and capture differences in ability. The model captures the interplay amongst auditing standards, litigation, and auditors’ levels of skill, which determines auditors’ responses to auditing standards. The paper shows that the quality of audit supplied by any auditor is increasing in the auditor's level of skill regardless of whether or not auditors’ levels of skill are observable. An increase in the quality of audit prescribed by auditing standards is shown to induce some auditors endowed with low levels of skill to decrease the quality of their audits so that the average quality of audit and economic welfare may actually decline as auditing standards are raised. Auditors’ choices of audit quality are furthermore shown to be increasing in trial awards. Incentives for trials and out-of-court settlements are shown to depend crucially on whether or not auditors’ levels of skill are observable. Only when auditors’ levels of skill are unobservable do trials obtain with some probability. When auditors’ levels of skill are unobservable, the introduction of either restrictions on costs awarded by the courts or an imperfection in the courts’ technology is shown to lead the most skilled auditors to supply audits of a quality strictly exceeding the quality prescribed by the prevailing auditing standards. When the courts err often enough, the most skilled auditors having exercised due care furthermore make offers to settle when sued.     

TORT REFORM AND MASS TORTS: TOBACCO AS AN EXAMPLE

Abstract: As data regarding the U.S. tort liability system become more refined and dependable, evidence of the importance of mass torts is emerging. Much of the impetus for and debate surrounding tort reform, however, has focused on individual tort claims. The purpose of this research is to consider the unique characteristics of mass torts, particularly those that generate from latent injuries, with regard to the likely effect of currently popular tort reforms. The various tobacco litigation efforts are employed as mechanisms within which to undertake this consideration. The results indicate that care in designing tort reforms is necessary if modifications are to be effective in reducing the litigation costs associated with mass torts. Furthermore, research into the social benefit of various system structures currently being debated is warranted. The risk management and insurance community is interested in the debate and related reforms, both for purposes of reducing costs and for the purpose of increasing certainty of liability outcomes.     

Audit litigation research: Do the merits matter? An assessment and directions for future research

This article reviews audit litigation research and discusses suggestions for future research. Recent reforms in federal and state laws related to accounting and auditing services increase the opportunities for research. An overarching issue in the public policy debate over legal reforms is the role of merits in bringing and resolving lawsuits against auditors; this issue frames the discussion of audit litigation research.     

审计委员会:本原性质与作用机理

本文研究审计委员会的本原性质和其在公司治理中的作用机理,并剖析以美国为代表的现行审计委员会制度安排。本文分析指出,审计委员会的本原性质在于,它是代表股东利益直接负责企业外部会计事务,并享有企业内部会计事务的消极权力,从而确保注册会计师对经理人的独立性,以降低企业治理成本。审计委员会的作用机理则需基础于其本原性质而设计。而以美国为代表的现行制度安排下的审计委员会不是符合本原性质的审计委员会,其性质是经理人为履行自身向股东等诚实报告之受托责任而专设的职能管理机构。     

制度变迁、集团客户重要性与非标准审计意见

客户重要性是否影响审计师独立性,是审计理论界和实务界都非常关注的话题。本文以企业集团作为一个整体来研究集团客户重要性对审计师独立性的影响,发现集团客户经济依赖性会损害审计师的独立性,这种现象对于小规模事务所而言尤为严重。此外,本文还进一步考察了2007年新会计准则、审计准则及事务所民事诉讼风险加强等制度环境变化对审计师行为的影响。研究发现,在制度环境改善之后,审计师执业总体上变得更加谨慎,大规模事务所尤其如此。     

Selection Bias and Auditing Policies for Insurance Claims

Selection bias results from a discrepancy between the range of estimation of a statistical model and its range of application. This is the case for fraud risk models, which are estimated on audited claims but applied on incoming claims in the design of auditing strategies. Now audited claims are a minority within the parent sample since they are chosen after a severe selection performed by claims adjusters. This article presents a statistical approach that counteracts selection bias without using a random auditing strategy. A two‐equation model on audit and fraud (a bivariate probit model with censoring) is estimated on a sample of claims where the experts are left free to take the audit decision. The expected overestimation of fraud risk derived from a single‐equation model is corrected. Results are close to those obtained with a random auditing strategy, at the expense of some instability with respect to the regression components set. Then we compare auditing policies derived from the different approaches.     

审计报告的不同解读

对审计职业来说,审计报告的标准化可减少审计成本和避免审计法律诉讼,还可约束恣意和为理性选择提供合理保障;而对社会公众来说,审计报告留下了太多职业保护的痕迹。审计报告如何权衡设计职业保护与社会公众利益间的关系,本文提出了三种建议。     

LITIGATION RISK FOR AUDITORS AND THE RISK SOCIETY

The auditing industry has mounted a global campaign to reduce its liability. In Canada, it is attempting to change from a doctrine of joint and several liability to proportionate liability, to have the Federal government legislate a statutory cap on liability, or to have the Provincial governments approve the establishment of Limited Liability Partnerships. These initiatives are consistent with the proposals of the CPA firms in the US and the CA firms in the UK. This cross-national trend suggests that a global theory of society is needed to analyze the consequences of audit risk. This paper uses the “risk society” model proposed by Beck to understand why the audit industry focuses on reducing exposure to liability, rather than on improving the quality of audits. Beck's theory of “reflexive modernization” provides an analysis of the so-called “liability crisis” that attempts to overcome the institutional construction offered by the auditing industry. The paper recognizes that it is very difficult for observers outside of the large auditing firms to judge the real risks of audits and to develop alternative public policy options. Ideally, we should be able to evaluate litigation in a modern audit environment. However, the audit firms are not required to disclose sufficient information about their costs to determine the real impact. Meanwhile, professional groups are lobbying hard for changes that will reduce auditors risk without addressing the root causes of audit failures.     

Whistle-blowing by external auditors: Seeking legitimacy for the South African Audit Profession?

Auditing is often cited as playing an important role in managing agency-related costs and, accordingly, being integral to the sound functioning of capital markets. There may, however, be more to the attest function than a technical rational practice. By virtue of relying heavily on claims to technical expertise, professionalism, prudential judgement and public confidence, auditing is both a source of legitimacy for organisations and, paradoxically, dependent on claims to legitimacy for its continued existence. From this perspective, recent regulatory developments, purportedly enacted to increase arms-length control over the profession, may not only be about improving perceived audit quality and practice but also about ensuring continued faith in the well-established ‘rituals’ of the assurance function. A reporting duty imposed on South African external auditors, akin to whistle-blowing, is used as a case study to explore this perspective. In doing so, this paper contributes to the scant body of interpretive research on auditing, simultaneously offering one of the first insights into auditing regulation from an African perspective.     

An Investigation of Audit Committees' Oversight Responsibilities

Audit committee performance has come under close scrutiny in recent years from a variety of policy-makers, interest groups and researchers. In particular, the adequacy of audit committee oversight has been challenged. At the same time, audit committees are under pressure to increase the scope of their oversight work. This study examines audit committee oversight from the internal perspective of active U.S. audit committee members. A two-part survey used Wolnizer's (1995) list of seventeen prescribed audit committee objectives related to accounting and reporting, auditors and auditing, and corporate governance in general as a basis to assess audit committee members' abilities to recognize their assigned objectives and explore their perceptions of the key tasks and issues currently addressed by audit committees. The results indicate that audit committee members appreciate the importance of all audit committee members having sufficient expertise in oversight areas related to accounting, auditing and the law. However, some respondents agreed they lacked sufficient expertise in many or all of these areas. In addition, the findings indicate that audit committee members tend not to recognize their assigned responsibilities, but agree with the proposed expansion of committee responsibilities. Using a multimethod approach, internal control evaluation was consistently listed and ranked as the most important oversight responsibility. These findings provide insight into the priority perceived by audit committee members as to their oversight responsibilities, and the adequacy of U.S. reporting disclosures as signals of audit committee work.     

The costs and benefits of retirement policies at U.S. audit firms

The mandatory retirement age within U.S. Big 4 audit firms ranges from 55 to 62, which has attracted controversy and legal scrutiny. The potential costs of an earlier retirement age include the loss of established networks, experience, and expertise. However, studies in non-U.S. jurisdictions conclude that partners nearing retirement disengage from their work, which manifests in lower audit quality. Using intensive hand-collected data on the age of 3,148 U.S. audit partners, we provide the first evidence of the costs and benefits of mandatory retirement policies at U.S. audit firms. We find that audit quality does not vary, but that fees are significantly higher for U.S. partners approaching retirement. These findings suggest that U.S. mandatory retirement policies are forcing out experienced revenue earners that are producing audit quality equivalent to younger partners. Additional analysis reveal that partner retirements are mechanisms to promote and grow the client portfolios of younger and female audit partners, and therefore increase partner diversity. Our additional analysis of non-U.S. audit partners leading audits of U.S. listed companies shows that partners approaching retirement are associated with lower audit quality across certain measures. This suggests that the audit quality of older U.S. partners is superior to their non-U.S. counterparts.     

Extending corporate accountability: A survey and framework for analysis

This paper has three objectives: to review the state of the art with regard to the literature on corporate internal audit activities; to report on a research study of recent developments in the scope and organization of the internal audit function in major companies in U.S.A.; and to propose an analytical framework which may be used in future research to describe the scope, procedures and responsibilities of the corporate internal audit function. Although there appears to be some confusion in the extant literature regarding the definition and scope of certain internal audit efforts, this research provides new evidence that major U.S. companies are engaging in unprecedented experiments into the use of auditing as a tool for enforcing management and social accountability. This is a movement away from the traditional financial audit which is frequently assumed to fully circumscribe the internal audit function. The implications for implementing heightened standards of corporate accountability should be of interest to audit committees of boards of directors, corporate management, investors, consumers, and future researchers.     

Audit firm, corporate governance, and audit quality: Evidence from Bahrain

The aim of this research is to document the perceptions of credit and financial analysts with regard to the relationship between the effectiveness of audit committee, size of the auditing firm and audit quality in the context of Bahrain, which is characterized by a developed financial sector, low-liquidity stock market, low turnover in board of directors of listed firms, an inactive merger and acquisitions market and almost non-extent litigation. A survey of 300 credit and financial analysts shows that analysts considered auditors' opinion useful. Both credit and financial analysts see the credibility of financial statements to be a function of the size of the auditing firm. Both groups assume that the characteristics of Big-Four firms allow them to produce better-quality reports than non-Big firms. Non-audit services were found to affect auditor's independence and hence impair audit quality. Both the groups of analysts believe that effective audit committee enhances the quality of audit reports. Financial analysts perceive financial statements to be more credible than do credit analysts.