A set-valued Markov chain approach to credit default

We propose a novel credit default model that takes into account the impact of macroeconomic factors and intergroup contagion on the defaults of obligors. We use a set-valued Markov chain to model the default process, which includes all defaulted obligors in the group. We obtain analytic characterizations for the default process and derive pricing formulas in explicit forms for synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Furthermore, we use market data to calibrate the model and conduct numerical studies on the tranche spreads of CDOs. We find evidence to support that systematic default risk coupled with default contagion could have the leading component of the total default risk.     

Factor decomposition of the Eurozone sovereign CDS spreads

In the present study, we examine the factors driving Eurozone sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. For identifying factors we utilize independent component analysis (ICA), a technique similar to principal component analysis (PCA). We identify three factors that impact spreads and capture the features specific to the crisis such as the breakup risk of the Eurozone: peripheral factor, global factor, and Eurozone common factor. In contrast, when PCA is applied, only a single factor is identified. Moreover, using ICA with a GARCH model, we show that the source of volatility for CDS spreads shifted from the global factor in 2009 and the peripheral factor in 2010 to the Eurozone common factor in 2012, and that the dynamic correlation reflects the decoupling between low credit risk countries such as Germany and high credit risk countries such as Greece. We also show that the goodness-of-fit of the ICA-based model is better than other models used such as the Student's t copula model.     

Is bank default risk systematic?

We evaluate the impact of commonly used indicators of bank distress on broad (i.e. sector and country) risks. This issue deserves special attention in the banking industry where there is a strong degree of interconnectedness among institutions and the default of a single bank may cause a cascading failure, which could potentially bankrupt the entire system. Using several measures of individual bank risk our results show that these measures have a direct impact on European banking (i.e. systemic) stock market risk. We also provide strong evidence suggesting that, for listed banks, default risk tends to be systematic (i.e. non-diversifiable).     

Large EU banks’ capital and liquidity: Relationship and impact on credit default swap spreads

This paper explores the interrelations between bank capital and liquidity and their impact on the market probability of default. We employ an unbalanced panel of large European banks with listed credit default swap (CDS) contracts during the period 2005–2015, which allow us to consider the impact of the recent financial crisis. Our evidence suggests that bank capital and funding liquidity risk as defined in Basel III have an economically meaningful bidirectional relationship. However, the effect on CDS spread is ambiguous. While capital appears to have a relatively large impact on CDS spread changes, liquidity risk is priced only when it falls below the regulatory threshold.     

Mergers increase default risk

We examine the impact of mergers on default risk. Despite the potential for asset diversification, we find that, on average, a merger increases the default risk of the acquiring firm. This result cannot solely be explained by the tendency for generally safe acquirers to purchase riskier targets or by the tendency of acquiring firms to increase leverage post-merger. Our evidence suggests that managerial motivations may play an important role. In particular, we find larger merger-related increases in risk at firms where CEOs have large option-based compensation, where recent stock performance is poor, and where idiosyncratic equity volatility is high. These results suggest that the increased default risk may arise from aggressive managerial actions affecting risk enough to outweigh the strong risk-reducing asset diversification expected from a typical merger.     

Does the threat of takeover affect default risk?

We examine the impact of the threat of takeovers on default risk. Using a sample of 50,189 firm-year observations for US firms over the period 1990–2015, we find that the threat of takeovers has a negative relation with default risk. We use difference-in-difference analysis to address potential endogeneity concerns and propensity score matching to control for self-selection bias. The results are robust to alternative measures of default risk and exclusion of the dot com and financial crisis periods. Our results also hold after controlling for Governance Index and Entrenchment Index. We identify improvement in performance and earnings quality in response to the threat of takeovers as channels underlying our main result. The effect of the threat of takeovers on default risk is more pronounced for firms with opaque information environment and low institutional ownership. Our findings provide important insights for the market for corporate control as a disciplining mechanism in reducing default risk.     

National politics and bank default risk in the eurozone

We study the impact of national politics on default risk of eurozone banks as measured by the stock market-based Distance to Default. We find that national electoral cycles, the power of the government as well as the government’s party ideological alignment significantly affect the stability of banks in the eurozone member countries. Moreover, we show that the impact of national politics on bank default risk is more pronounced for large as well as weakly capitalized banks.     

News sentiment and sovereign credit risk

We explore the impact of media content on sovereign credit risk. Our measure of media tone is extracted from the Thomson Reuters News Analytics database. As a proxy for sovereign credit risk we consider credit default swap (CDS) spreads, which are decomposed into their risk premium and default risk components. We find that media tone explains and predicts CDS returns and is a mixture of noise and information. Its effect on risk premium induces a temporary change in investors’ appetite for credit risk exposure, whereas its impact on the default component leads to reassessments of the fundamentals of sovereign economies.     

Firm-level political risk and distance-to-default

This study provides the first empirical evidence of the relationship between firm-level political risk and distance-to-default. Based on our examination of a quarterly dataset of 2727 U.S. firms covering a period from January 2002 to April 2019, we conclude that firm-level political risk is negatively associated with distance-to-default. We document three economic mechanisms through which political risk increases default risk: information asymmetry, organizational capital, and investment growth. The evidence indicates that the association is more pronounced for firms with low analysts’ forecast accuracy, organizational capital, and investment growth. Employing hand-collected data, we also reveal that firms are able to exploit their corporate lobbying to immunize themselves against default risk. Our findings are robust to different endogeneity identifications, including a natural experiment, alternative distance-to-default proxies, and different sub-samples. Overall, we present novel evidence of an adverse impact of firm-level political risk on distance-to-default and how such a negative effect can be mitigated.     

In search of climate distress risk

Using the Merton distance to default model we investigate whether a firm's climate risk affects its default (distress) risk. S&P 500 non-financial firms during 2010–2019 are analysed and we employ both corporate carbon footprints and climate risk disclosures in annual filings to measure climate risk. Our results show that climate risk has a negative impact on firms' distance to default. This impact is limited to the disclosure of transition risk in annual filings. In contrast, disclosures of physical or non-specific risk do not affect firm-level default risk, while the impact of corporate carbon footprints is inconsistent but insignificant in most models. We also find that the negative effect of climate transition risk on firms' distance to default is stronger for firms headquartered in states with carbon pricing (California and states covered by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) and temporarily strengthens because of the Paris Agreement in 2015. However, this ‘Paris’ effect is short-lived and fades away in subsequent years.     

Effect of rollover risk on default risk: Evidence from bank financing

We study the effect of rollover risk on the risk of default using a comprehensive database of U.S. industrial firms during 1986–2013. Dependence on bank financing is the key driver of the impact of rollover risk on default risk. Default risk and rollover risk present a significant positive relation in firms dependent on bank financing. In contrast, rollover risk is uncorrelated with default probability in the case of firms that do not rely on bank financing. Our measure of rollover risk is the amount of long-term debt maturing in one year, weighted by total assets. In the case of a firm that depends on bank financing, an increase of one standard deviation in this measure leads to a significant increase of 3.2% in its default probability within one year. Other drivers affecting the interaction between rollover risk and default risk are whether a firm suffers from declining profitability and has poor credit. Additionally, rollover risk's impact on default probability is stronger during periods when credit market conditions are tighter.     

An analysis of currency crisis in South Korea

This paper provides empirical evidence on the causes and timing of the 1997 currency crisis in South Korea. A persistent weakness in the economic fundamentals through out much of the pre-crisis period created necessary conditions for the crisis. However, the timing of the currency crisis was determined by a unique combination of an unprecedented increase in default risk faced by the banking system and a decrease in foreign exchange reserves (FXRES) that restricted the ability of the government to bail out. A VAR model identifies two important variables that were crucial in triggering the currency crisis. One is the ratio of dishonored bills (DS) that measures default risk and serves as a proxy for the market value of banks. The other is FXRES that measures the strength of the government's bailout policies. Estimates from a vector autoregressive (VAR) model confirm a strong impact of the lagged changes in the ratio of DS and FXRES on the current changes in the won's value. Immediately before the November crisis, the ratio of DS reached an all-time high while reserves dropped to 1-month imports. These developments significantly contributed to the negative expectations resulting in a massive capital outflow followed by a drastic devaluation of the currency.     

劳动保护、社保压力与企业违约风险——基于《社会保险法》实施的研究

本文利用2011年《社会保险法》实施的政策冲击所造成的准自然实验情境构建双重差分模型,考察了劳动保护对上市公司债务违约风险的影响。研究发现,劳动保护加强后,劳动密集型企业的违约风险显著提升了约1.5%。在此基础上,进一步检验了劳动保护影响企业违约风险的渠道,发现劳动保护提高了企业的经营性负债水平,并最终提高了违约风险。此外,在国有企业、融资约束水平较高、信息披露水平较低和创新水平较低的企业,劳动保护对企业违约风险的影响更加显著。本文拓展了劳动保护经济后果的研究,也为评价《社会保险法》的政策后果提供了新的经验证据。本研究可为"新冠"疫情期间政府制定政策减免企业社保支出提供参考。     

The differential impact of leverage on the default risk of small and large firms

We analyse a sample of 6 million firm-year observations of large corporations and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) spanning 6 European countries from 2005 to 2015, to determine the impact of leverage and different sources of funding on default risk. We find that financial leverage has a greater impact on the probability of default of SMEs than of large corporations. The difference in default probability between the top and bottom leverage quartiles is 1.24% for large firms and 2.87% for SMEs. This difference may be explained by the greater exposure of SMEs to short-term debt and their consequently higher refinancing risk. Indeed, we find that SMEs that recover from the state of insolvency may have similar leverage to defaulted SMEs; however their liability structure is significantly altered towards long-term debt and away from short-term debt. Our findings have important implications not only for bank regulators and policy-makers but also for credit risk modelling.     

DURATION,DEFAULT RISK,AND THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES

We examine the interactive effect of default and interest rate risk on duration of defaultable bonds. We show that duration for defaultable bonds can be longer or shorter than default‐free bonds depending on the relation between default intensity and interest rates. Empirical evidence indicates that in most cases duration for defaultable bonds is much shorter than for their default‐free counterparts because of the negative relation between default risk and interest rates. Results suggest that the duration measure must be adjusted for the effects of default risk and stochastic interest rates to achieve an effective bond portfolio immunization.     

Optimal loan-to-value ratio and the efficiency gains of default

We study the optimal loan-to-value (LTV) ratio in a monetary general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents, collateral default, production and a banking sector. We find that the welfare of the debtor is not monotonically increasing in the LTV ratio, i.e. tighter financing constraints can be welfare-improving for the debtor. Moreover, the optimal LTV ratio for both the debtor and the creditor allows for the possibility of ex post default. Collateral default enhances efficiency by allowing for better consumption smoothing and risk hedging. Our result improves the argument in Dubey et al. (Econometrica 73(1):1–37, 2005) and Zame (Am Econ Rev 83(5):1142–1164, 1993), which use default penalties instead of collateral to induce repayment and show the efficiency gains of default.     

The effects of default and call risk on bond duration

This paper examines the effects of default risk, call risk, and their interactions on bond duration. We find that call risk decreases durations of default-free bonds, while default risk alone generally decreases durations for risky bonds with only a few exceptions. The joint effect of default and call risk always results in shorter durations for corporate bonds. Controlling for the effect of default risk, call risk has a negative effect on duration, which diminishes as bond ratings decline. Finally, the effect of call risk on duration depends on bond characteristics. Empirical evidence shows that the effect of call risk is smaller for discount bonds and for deep-discount fallen angels.     

U.S. Real Interest Rates and Default Risk in Emerging Economies

This paper empirically investigates the impact of changes in U.S. real interest rates on sovereign default risk in emerging economies using the method of identification through heteroskedasticity. Policy‐induced increases in U.S. interest rates starkly raise default risk in emerging market economies. However, the overall correlation between U.S. real interest rates and the risk of default is negative, demonstrating that the effects of other variables dominate the anterior relationship.     

The increasing default risk of US Treasury securities due to the financial crisis

This paper examines the impact of the current financial crisis on long-term US Treasury yields by testing the impact of a series of events from December 2007 to March 2009 on the spread between 10-year USD LIBOR swap and 10-year US Treasury (constant maturity) rates to measure risk associated with Treasuries. Controlling for the liquidity of the two markets, the default risk of the swap, and the net foreign purchases of Treasury securities, we find that 13 of the tested 20 events have significantly negative coefficients. We conclude that the lower spread is consistent with greater default risk for US Treasury securities.     

What drives investment bank performance? The role of risk,liquidity and fees prior to and during the crisis

This paper examines factors that affect the performance of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland. In particular, we focus on the role of risk, liquidity and investment banking fees. Panel analysis shows that those variables significantly impact upon performance as derived from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Given our sample also comprises the financial crisis, we further test for regime switches using dynamic panel threshold analysis. Results show different underlying regimes, in particular over the financial crisis. In addition, a strong positive effect of Z-Score on performance for banks in the regime of low default risk is reported, while fee-income ratio has also a positive impact for banks with low level of fees. On the other hand, liquidity exerts a negative impact. Notably, there is a clear trend of mobility of banks across the two identified threshold regimes with regard to risk a year before the financial crisis. Our results provide evidence that recent regulation reforms regarding capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are on the right track and could enhance performance.